eA 9
Why GAO Did This Study ‘he Department of Defense (DOD) embarking on a mer of Sorts to enhance warihting and the way the department comucts tring made to develo improved ‘weapon systems to combat various eat to Us secur White the
‘weapons that DOD attinately Aovelops havo no ni là ‘siperionsy, weapon systems ‘Sequlston ema fong standing Highsk area, GAO's eviews over tconsitent problems with weapon equlstons such cost crests, Selle delay, and performance Shortfall nation, DOD Taces Several budgetary challenges that tindorcore the need to deliver few maior eapon programs vin ested cots and Than Os maa rm Ue
Investinonts DOD ean help resolve ‘hee poblens by saga ore moeledacbasedapproach for Ateveloping new weapons
‘hia report provides congressional st DOD deision makers wth Independent, knowledge based ssemnent of select denne Drograms that Metis potential tis and needed actions when 2 progean'sprojeced altainent of nowiedge diverges from to best Dactle tea al highlight those Droge that employ practices ‘worthy of emulation by oxher
Programs GAO plans to update and Se this port annually
‘Farmureeanetion conuct Pas Pans
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Assessments of Selected Major Weapon
Programs
‘What GAO Found
(GAO assessed 5 programs, which represent an investment of over 4500 bilion, ranging from the Missile Defense Agency's Alehorne Laser to the Amy's Warfighter Information Network Tactical GAO' assessments are anchored ina knowledge-based approach to product development that reflects es practices of success programs This approach centers on taining high levels of knowledge in tree elements of new product oF
‘weapor-technolog, design, and production-al key consecutive junctures in ‘development Ifa program isnot attaining these levels of knowledge, i ‘ncurs increased ris of technical problems, with sliieant potent cos and schedule growth implications (ee Hue) I program ffi shoe ‘one element, ike technology maturity, its harder to attain Ue requisite
mount of knowledge to prudently proceed in succeeding elements —= Bi
"The majority of programs GAO assessed are costing more an taking longer to develop than planned Mose ofthe programs proceeded with less knowledge at eleal junctures than suggested hy best practices although some prograns came close to meeting best practice standart For example, technology and design forthe F:-22 matured lat inthe program
‘contributing to large ost growth and schedule delays The JASSM program, in contrast, has achieved a high evel of knosledge at ciiealjnetires while ‘experiencing minimal cost inereases or scedle delays,
Managing these levels of knowledge takes on ational signifeance as DOD's state ofthe aseretonary budget faces increasing pressure from the srowth in mandatory spending and the demas of ongoing rltary
‘operations For these reasons if DOD approves programs with lv levels of knowledge and aceeptsthe attendant kely adverse cost and schedule ‘consequences it will probably gel fever quantes forte sume investment ‘or face dificut choices on which investments i cannot ford to pursue
Trang 3Contents Foreword vi
Letter A Challenging Time for Weapon System Investments ' 1
Current Programs Are Costing More and Taking Longer to
Develop AKuowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition 5
Outcomes 6
Most Programs Have Proceeded with Lower Levels of
Knowledge at Critical Junetures 8
Assessments of Individual Programs u
Airborne Laser (ABL) 6
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) it Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHE) 19 Active Electronically Seanned Array Radar (AESA)
Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) ‘Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS)
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermessure/Common Misile
‘Warning System (ATIRCMICMWS) ”
'B2 Radar Modernization Program (8-2 RMP) at €-130 Avionies Modemization Program (C-150 AMP) 33 €5 Avionies Modernization Program (C6 AMP) 35 5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program
(CSRERP) a
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 8
(CHL-ATE Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-TF) 4t
Compact Kinetic Energy Missile (CKEM) 4
Future Aireraft Carrier CVN21 45
DD(X) Destroyer Hư
+10A Nuli.Sensor Comrmandamd Conlrol Airera (E-I0A) 40
Trang 4
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (PV) Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM)
‘Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile
F/A2 Raptor
Future Combat Systems (FCS)
{Global Hawke Unmanned Aerial Vehile
'Groundilased Mideourse Defense (GND) Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modered Spueei0cs
‘Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR)
Joint Airto Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) Joint Common Missile (JCM)
Joint Strike Fighter SE) Joint Standoff Weapon (ISOW)
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Closter 5 Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KED, Land Wamior
1ãdondl Combat Sip (LCS)
‘Meauun Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) AMullanlsloa Narhtine Airerf (MA)
Mobile User Objective System [AUOS) MQ Predator B
National Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Small Diameter Bomb (SDB)
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (SSS) ‘Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ‘Tactical Tomnahavel Missile
Trang 5
‘Wideband Gapiier Sates (WS) Warfighter Information Network:Tatesl(WIN-T) Ti tại
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation ta
Scope of Our Review Ba
Appendixes
Comments from the Department of Defense 120
Scope and Methodology tr
‘Technology Readiness Levels `
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments m6
Related GAO Products 138
Tables Table Coat and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems Table Examples of Programs with Reduced Buying Power 1 5
“Thị Cost and Cycle Time for the Same Programs 2001 “Assessment and 2005 Assessment 5
Figures Figure RDT&E and Procurement Funding—Malor Defense Acquistion Programs
Figure Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key Junetures 8 Figure Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stability at Key Sunetures 0 Figure & Depiction ofa Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared with Best Practices 13
Trang 6Abbreviations Acts BAN BTERM DARPA DeMa, pop
AEH Comsec/Transee System Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
Ballsie Trajectory Extended Range Musition Defense Advanced Restarch Projets Agency Defense Contract Nanagement Ageney Department of Detense
‘exoatmospherie killvehicle Fiscal year Government Accountability Office
eosynetironous earth orbit Global Positioning System highly etiptiea orbit, heavy lút vehicle
Integrated Maintenance information System Intelligence, surveillance and veeonnalssance Joint Direct Attack Manion
“oint Single Integrated Aie Pleture Systems Bngineering Organization isle Defense Agency
ot applicable National Aeronsties and Space Administration North Atlante Treaty Organiation
National Oceanic and Atzaosphere Administration ‘Operational Test and Hvaluabon Preliminary Design Review
Research, Development, Tes, and Bvaluation Solid Divert an Attitade Control System Standard Missle
tobe determined
‘Terain Following and Tertain Avoidance ‘Technology Readiness Level Unmanned Acta! Vehicle
tea high frequency United States Cade
Unkced States Maine Coms
Trang 7
nied States Itmey be repreduced and dstibued ns entiay mihout tune
Trang 8of the United State Tilted States Government Accountability Office Washington, Doc 20548 March 3, 205 Congressional Comittee
seal realities demand that the Department of Defense (DOD) get better ‘outcomes from is wezpon system investments Federal diseedionary spending, along with other federal policies and programs, wil face serous Duulget pressures inthe coming years While providing for th cotton Afense i inthe Constitatian, defense spending is considered
“iseretionary” from a budget sense Furthermore investzaents in new capabilities such as Weapon ssstem are more discretionary than other aspects af defense sending, sich as personnel cass ad the costs of ‘supporting and maintaining current force operations, As result itis "mnperaive that DOD's lnted resources be allocated tothe most propriate weapon system investinen’s based on current and reasonably expected threats and that the investments yield the results promised (34h fspesformiance, cost, and liming} within the constesats impased Dy those
We have assessed weapon acquisitions asa high-risk area since 1990 Attnough US weapons are the Bes inthe world, the programs to acquire them often take signifeantly longer and cost siieandly more money chan promised anv often deliver fewer quantities a ather capabilities than planned Kis not nusial for estimates of time nd money to be of by 20 to 50 percent When costs and schedules increase, quantities are ent, ad the ‘ahve forthe sarfighter—as well asthe value ofthe investment dllar—is feced, In these ines of asymmetsie threats and neteentscty india ‘weapon system investments are geting larger and more complex Just 4Lyears azo, the top five weapon systems cost about $28 billion: today, in the same base yea dollars, the top five weapon systems cost about 521 billion IFthese megasystems are jvanaged with tindiional margins of| ferro, the ftancial consequences can be dire, especially i ight ofa
‘constrained discretionary budget
‘Our work on the development of success commercial and defense prodyets has shown that its possible co get better outcomes fom Investments if decisions are based on high levels of knowledge: Defense acquisition policies sipportsueh an approach to manaying weapon system programs, However, actual practi isnot yet consistently following tentien policy As this annual assessment of major weapon acquisitions shows, most programs are proceeding with inadequate levels of
Trang 9
‘growth, along with schedule delays and perfonnance shortfalls On the fother hand, this assessment also iselides programs That are proceeding ‘with high leves of knowledge, showing thạc practice can follow poles
Trang 10Tilted States Government Accountability Office
AChallenging Time for Weapon System
Investments
Congtessional Comsalttees
The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on x numberof efforts to enhance warfighting capabilites Primary among these efforts are the Investments being made to develop improved weapon systems with technologie supevionty and enhanced lethality to combat threals co US security Investment in programs such asthe Amny's Future Combat Stents and Warfighter information Network-Tactiea, the Missile Tefense Ageney’s suite of land, sea, alan space systems, the Navy'sadvanced Ships such asthe DDC) Destroys, an the Alt Botee’s space systems seh 48 te Transformational Satelite Commanications System age kely to đđoninale he budget and daetinal debate well in the next decade Many ‘oftese embody the dual challenge of employing complex technology with ‘atapie pace af development Fiscal realities, coupled withthe larger scope fof key acanisitions, reduce the ability of budgets lo accommodate type! ‘margins for estor in terms of east increases sind selene delays
‘dentfying risks early and adlressing them before they become problems «an lessen cost increases and seltedule delays az thus enable budgets to bay what was planned
Ân Bi report, we assess 34 programs that represent an investment of approximately 880 billion.’ Our objective i to provide decision makers ‘with independent, knowledge-based assessments of individual systems Atlante knowledge and potential risks
DOD has entered apeviod of high investment A significant portion of this Investment is for the acquisition of weapon systems th offer
Trang 11[DOD's total planned investment In these progranis is approximately 365 billion, as shown in figure 1, ofthe seal year 2005 investment request 81 tlio, with sbout $512 blion of dat investment ye fo be made,
‘There ae several challenges to getting the most from tha investment Fist, because DOD'S hwvestnent in Weapon systems represents ane ofthe largest diseretionary cers nthe Federal budge’, DOD'S budget fees
Trang 12
‘Towing pressures from increnses in mandatory Tederal spending”
According tthe Congressional Budget Office, federal deficits toaverage $250 billion Dhroush feal year 2000 and new budgetary ave expected demands stemming from demographie wend ie beyond that tine frame In calendar year 200, discretionary spending 2ecounied for about ofthe federal budget, and cureent projections show that beeause of 38 percent
Inceeases in aandatory spending, diseretionsey spending sikely to sdeecease 1.35 percent ofthe federal budget by fiscal year 2000 Te wil be dlitculs for DOD to inerease its budget share (o cover cost increases in ‘veapon programs in that environment
Second, DOD faces competing densands within ts own budget, such a8 from operationsin Afganistan and rag, Since September 2001, DOD hss needed $158 bilion in supplemental appropriations to support the global ‘sar on terrorism "Te budget implications of these operations further Increase the demand mate of the defense dollar and therefore the Investment in new weapon programs For example, current military
‘operations are causing faster wear on existing weapons, which ill weed ‘refurbishment or replacement sooner than planned These needs will ‘compete with the investment in new Weapon programs
Trang 13Table 1 Examples of Programe wih Reduced Buying Power
inti Initial Latest atest Percent unit
Program investment MP quanhg _invesiment quantity cost increase
Sie Pie 51896 bilon «ase ale S98 iNon—aaSTavemh 282
Soma, ES 788bilen sSunte 108M36n tùng “ Systeme Frage ht 5 Pelee 784on `
IfDOD cannot deliver its major new programs within estimated costs, dlfcultehoices have tobe made regarding which investments to pursue and which to discontinue,
Trang 14
Current Programs Are Costing More and ‘Taking Longer to Develop
‘The majority of programs in our assessment are costing more and taking longer to develop than estimated As shown in able 2, otal ROTRE costs {or 26 common set weapon programs ivereased by nearly $127 billion, or 42 pereent, over the orginal business ease (he first ful estimate) The same programs have also experienced an increase in the tine needed to ‘develop capabilities wih a weighted-avetage schedule increase of nearly 20 pereent “Table Cost and Cyete Te Growth or 25 Weapon Systeme Frat haere ata Parest hangs
Trang 15
‘During the last year, cos and schedule estimates for dhe same 26 programs have ncressed noticeahly since our last assessment, as shown in table “Table: Cast and Cyete Te forthe Same Program 2004 Resentment and 2005 Assenement TH HH aags Y§77T77077n0eniqir7TTTrrrrrmrrmarrrmenrom
Approach Can Lead to {Caoustanes tom bexrpuen cevsnpaverfacice Vui Better Acquisition ‘successful programs take steps to gather knowledge that confirms that Onna tế nh St no fet del pasta ir renee processes are in control Separating echnatogy development from product
‘evelopment is important fo this effort Suecessful programs make a Science and technology organtzation, rather thi the program oF product development manager reguonsile Tor maturing technologies, Sch Steps can help to reduee costs ane deliver a product on tine and within budget, DOD'S current acquisition guidance embraces the use of evolutionary ‘knowledge baer aequlstion practices proven 1 be more effective and eflclentìn developing new products By filly implententing these
practices, DOD can bette leverage its investments by shortening the time it
Trang 16
‘aes o develop capabilities with more preditable eosin and schedules, thereby maintaining ts ving power
Successful product developers ensure a high level of awed was achieved at key juneturesin development We characterize these junctures 1s knowledge poin's These knowledge points and associated indiators fate defined a8 follows
+ Knoyledge point 1 Resources oyledgc occurs sre a sound business case ise fr the and needs match This evel of
roduct—that is, atnateh is mace betaeeen the customers requicements ‘nd the produit developer's available resources in terms lie, and money Aeeving a high level of eehology maturity atthe of knovedze, ‘tart of system development isan important indicator of whether this tnatch bas been made, This means hat the technologies needed o meet essential product requirements have been demonstrated to work their Intended environinent
+ Knowledge point 2: Product design is sable This level of knowledge ecurs khen a program determines that n product's design is stable— hạt le twill meet customer requirements and cost and schedule ages A best practice isto achieve design stability atthe system-level trical design review, usally held midway dhrough development, Completion oft least 99 percent of engineering drawings tthe system design review provides tangible evidence that the design is stable ‘+ Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature This level of knowledge is alieved when it has heen demonstraed that the prodhet
can be manufaetited within cost, schedole, and quality targets best [practice iso ensue that all key manufacturing processes ae in
‘Salisical control—that ls, they ae repeatable, sustainable 2nd eapable br eonsistenty producing parts within the produets quality tlerances Ani stanidarls—a the star of production
‘The attalnment of egch successive knowledge point bulls on the preceding one While the knowledge ise lds continously without ‘lear lies of denvaccation, die atainntent of knowledge ints is
sequential In otter words, production maturity cannot be attained ifthe ‘fesign isnot stable, andl design stability cannot be attained if he cites technologies are not mature
Trang 17
‘Seeking to improve acquisition outcomes, DOD revised its acquisition Dolley in May 2003 t9 Incorporate a knowledge-based, evolitionary
framework The policy adopts lessons teamed from suecessfil commer companies, For example, the polieyattempis co separate technology evelopment irom produet development ard requires the demonstration of technologies to high readiness levels The policy also allows managers to develop a product i increments rather than tying to corporate al of Ihe ‘sired eapabiliies in he fist version that comes off the production line
Most Programs Have Proceeded with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical Junctures
‘Most ofthe programs we reviewed proceeded with lower levels of knowledge at ertical junctures and attained key elements of product, -knovsledge later in development than specified in DOD pales, which sted in cost increases and schedule delays
Development Start ‘Our work shows cha the demonstration of technology maturity by the start of system development isthe key measure for achievement of knowledge point 1 A program that proceeds into product development without emonstrating mature technologies does so with inerezsed risk of cost fsrowth and seherhile delays throughout the life ofthe program,
Trang 18————— Figure 2: Percent ot Propramne That Achieved Technology Malu at Key dunctures
More often than not, programs sought to mature technologies well into system development when they should have focused on maturing system design and preparing for production The programm tha started
development with mature technologies experienced lower development and unit cost increases than those programs that started development with immature technologies For example, RDT&E costs for the programs that started development with mature technology increased by an average of 5 percent over the first ful estimate, whereas the development costs forthe progeams that started development with immature technologies increased Aan average of 11 percent over the frst fl estimate Likewise, program ‘acquisition unit costs forthe programs with mature technology inereased by less than 1 percent, whereas the programs that started development ‘with immature technologies experienced an average program acquisition
Trang 19
‘unit coat increase of nearly 21 percent over the first full estate." Finally the programs with mature tecinology experienced an average schedule delay of T months-—a9 percent increase—whereas the schedule forthe programs tat started development with immature technology increased an average of 13 monthis-a 13 percent increase Design Review review achieved! design stability a that Key juncture Asillustated In figure 3, 2 percent of the programs that held design Figure 3: Percent of Programs Achieving Design Stablity at Key Junetres TT for
Sites rt pons alpen sah
Trang 20
‘With the exception ofthe Navy's V22, which has experienced significant Jesign changes since development star 1980 these programs have experienced a 6 pereent inerease jn developmen costs and an average Schedule increase of 11 months since the rst ful estimate.” Those programs that did not achieve design stability have experienced combined development cost inerease of 6 percent and an average schedule increase of 29 manths since she frst fl estimate
Design stabibty cannot be attained if key technologies are not mature Ten programs held design review without demonstra mature ritieal rechnolozies Out ofthe 10 pragrans, 7 had experlenced a cos increase, schertle delay, ofboth The unit east of of these programs increased by atleast 10 pereent.” In eontrast, 3 programs entered product development ‘with mature technologies These three programs kept progrars unit east, Increases toa rồnhmunn, with casts either failing or increasing by single igus
Cass at st The Pas hl ee ng ee 18d wb me |
Trang 21
‘Nine programs are scheduled to hold thelr aystem design review inthe next sean.” Only two of those programs, the 8-2 Radar Modernization aud the Excalibur program, expect their cechnologies co be mature at dhe tine of their design reviews, The remaining seven programs project chat teit technologies will mot attain maturity untl aller User eitent design reviews,
Production Start
How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed
To determine ifa product’ design is reliable and producibe, successful programs nse stalisieal process control to bring manufacturing processes lunder eonteol so they are repeatable, sustainable, and consisterely
producing parts within quality standards, The colleton of process control ‘aa priorto a production decision can enable a smooth transition from product development to the production phase OF the 19 progeams in production or approaching a production decision inthe next year, only 2 collected or panto collect statistical process control data to measure the rmhurty of production processes While the absence ofthe data does not ‘mean that production processes assessment agalnst an objective standard were immanure, it does prevent a
‘We assess each program in 2 pages and depict the exten! of knowledge ina stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary a the bottom of the fst page- As illustrated in figure 4, the knowledge graph is tase om the three knowledge poins ad the ke indieaors forthe atainment af oovledge: tehology maturity (depicted in orange), design stability (epicted in green), and production maturity (depicted in Live) “best practice" ine is ran based on the ideal atainment ofthe three types of| ‘knowledge atthe three knowledge points in sone eases, ve obtained projections from the program office offuure knowledge ataimvent These projections ate depicted as dasted bars, The closer a programs aiained [knowledge is to the best practice line, the more hkelythe weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and schednle A knowledge deficit atthe Start of development—indieated by a zap between the technology ‘knowledge attained and the best practice ine—moeans the progrant proceeded with immature technologies and feces a greater likelihood of
Trang 22
‘ost and schedule increases as technology risks are discovered and resolved, Figure: Depletion ofa Notional Weapon System's Knowledge se Compared with Bert Practose ‘Attainment of Product Knowledge RUN, HA Trehneloy| mau |
Dewcomet san DOD in ‘decision An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing ‘knowledge point 1 Knowledge point 2 was not attained atthe design review as some technologies were still not mature and only a
‘small percentage of engineering drawings had been released, Projections for the production deesion show tha the program is expected to achieve treater levels of maturity but will til fall shor Its ely that this programm would have had signifieant eost and schedule increases
Trang 23
‘We conducted our review from July 2004 dưough Mareh 2005 Aceardance with generally accepted government auditing standards Appendix It eontains detailed formation on ow methodolow
follow
Trang 24
Common Name: ABL Airborne Laser (ABL)
MDA ABL element is being developed in incremental, capability based blocks to destroy ‘enemy missiles during the boost phase of their Might Carried aboard highly modified Boeing 7
aieraft, ABI employs beam contrite contro! subsystem to focus the beam on target, high-energy chemical laser co rupture the fuel
tanks of enemy missiles, and a battle management subsystem to plan and execute engagements ‘We assessed the Block 2004 design that is under
{evelopment and expected to lea to an inital
capability ina future block,
‘Technologylystem development Ina eapabity
Program Essentials Program Performance (fiseal year 2008 dollars in millions)
Pre contactor Boeing TA Percent
Progam fe: Kitand AFB, N Max, Tả Research and doolpmont cost GHẾ vases hange ssa $503 ah
tân Ea odlo Procurement cost 00 | 00 00
TU ‘otal program sort, ¬" aa
“oa uring $2.3869 ition TS SƠ tôn HỆ “ott quanttes| Program unt cost Ne NRO TRD TNA MA MÃ
eee eres eee NA
Although program officials expected ABL to Attainment of Product Knowledge provide an initial capability during Block 2006, prosaton
this event has been delayed and only one ofits seven critical technologies is fully mature During ratray | eign Block 2004, the program contimies work ona
prototype thats expected to provide the basi
Aesign fora future operational capability Program — Bean, officials expect to demonstrate the other six sy technologies during a prototype Might test that wil assess ABLS lethally Dial in integrating
otolype components could delay ths effort from
2105 02008 MDA has released about 94 DEFEeM sean fofthe engineering drawings forthe prototype’s design, which will be the basis for an intial tan
Trang 25‘Common Name: AB ABL Program Technology Maturity
Only one of ABLS seven critica! technologies — maisaging the high-power beamn—is full native ‘The program office assessed three technologies — the sic module laser, missile tracking, and
atmospheric compensation—as near manuee The reralning thee technologlestransinissive opties, ‘plies! coatings, snd jitter cantvol-ate che least mature Aecordng to program offal al of test technologies are needed to provide the system with an intial pperational capability
While the program office has zssessed the six-module laser as being elose to reaching fll ‘maturity, the power generated by grouping sx laser ‘modules together must be demonstrated before fll aatrityean be reasonably assessed The tecent ‘demonstration of te staltaneous firing ofall sax laser modules relaces risk in this area, Adaltional testing planned over the next 6 months, ‘nus sillbe completed to demonstrate the fll power and dratian of the laser segment prior to Fstallation on the aera
‘The transmissive opties,opitea coatings, and iter ‘control ate the least mae ential technologies and ‘consist of prototypes that have only been tested in {he aboratory or demonserated through alysis aad ‘simulation The program plans to demonstrate all {technologies in an operational environment duriga Miah tes of the system prototype, referred 1038, lethal demonstration in whiel ABI, wil ater to shoot downa short-range ballistic missle
Callenges with integrating the laser ard beans controVfize control subeomponents could delay this {es ta 2008, but the final schedule ito be
{devernined, Upon suecessful completion of this tes MDA expectsto develop asecond itera that will provide an initial operational capability
Design Stability We could not assess the design stability because ABLs intial capability will not be fall developed ‘until the second sirerafl—what is expected to Drovide sn nial eapabty—is well underway ‘Wile the progeans has released 10,280 ofthe 1081 engineering drawings for the prototype, its unclear whether te design ofthe prototype aireft can be relied upon asa good indicator of design Stability fr the second aireraft lore dravvings m
be needed if the design is enhanced or if problems neountered daring Miah testing foree design anges
Production Maturity
We did not assess the production maturity of ABI Ihecaase MDA has not eade a production decision “The program is producing a limited quantity oF hardware for the system's protoiype: Program officials explained that they continue to experience problems mainaining a stable manufacturing base for prototype subcomponents
Other Program Issues Technological challenges caused he prime contract to appnoaeh is cost celling during fiscal year 2004 Ineaely Apel 2001, MOA directed the ABL- progran to resiricture the contact, nezease ts cost cen, tind refocus the contract’ efforts on making technical progress, Asa resi, the cost ceiling ‘was inereased by 81.5 billion al the period of performance was extended to 2008 fom 2005 The eonteaet s eureently valved at approximately $36 lion,
The foeus of eurrent work is onto nears evenis The first event was the six mode laser test tn aground test facility that the program completed in November 2004, The second event was the inital Beam Controlire Control flight test, which ‘ceurred in December 2004
Agency Comments
Trang 26Aegis Ballist
MDA’ Aegis BMD element isa sea-based missile {defense system being developed in incremental, ‘apability-based blocks to protect deployed 1S forees and eriial assets from short-and medium-range ballistic missle attacks Key ‘omponens include the shipboard SPY-1 radar, hitto-kllintereeptors, and command and control systems I will also be used asa forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and tracking of
Intercontinental balistie missiles We assessed only Block 2004 of the elements intereeptor—the Standard Missile 8 (SMS),
(Common Name: Ais BMD Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) ‘Technologylystem development Ina eapabity Program Essentials, Program Performance (fiseal year 2005 dollars in millions)
Pra sonar: Raythaon (8-3) "TA Percent
Progam oe: Aegon, Ve HỮỔ ones RSE
Forsng FYOSEYOR RAD 840082 ion Procurement cost Feseachand devotpmentesst Sarita 878789 0 mg Tt so
mẽ ace Total peg eos stone srama HA
“oa uring $4008 Penney carta 3 itlon Toni guannes| Program unt cost NA” Na TBD 8 NA M
‘existe oc ie (rt) NÀ 180 Na
Trang 27‘Common Namo: Aegis BMD Aegis BMD Program Technology Maturity
Program officials estinsate that ll shee
{echnologies eitieal to the SMB are mature These echnologies tie third stage rocket motor the inrred seeker ofthe kinetie warhead, an the Sole Divert ad Attitude Control System (SDACS) ofthe kinetic warhead—were ll ested i ght While the
frst two technologies were fully demonstrated in flight tess, the SDACS, which generates divert, pallses o steer the kinetic warhead, was only Partially demonstrated As noted previous ull but paral failed during June 2009 fight vest iver” technology seceded in ground testing
According to program officals, the ts allure was likely caused by a defective subeoroponent within the SDACS, «problem that shouldbe corsected through specie desig modifications Prograre officals note that only partial fanctionaliy of dhe SDACS is required for Slack 24, whieh was sticcessflly demonstrated in Might tests Although the kinetic warhead ofthese interceptors will have reduced divert capability they provide a credible defense against a large population ofthe threat and fan be retroatied upon the completion of design Updates and testing
Design Stability
rogram officials reported thatthe desian forthe Sst eight interceptors being fielded during
‘Block 2004 is stable with 100 percent ofits denwings released to manufacturing The progtam plans 0 implement design eranges in subseaient
contigurations of Ue SM (delivered during
20062007 to resalve the SDACS fale witnessed in the June 2009 Mish test,
Production Maturity We did not assess the production maturity of the missiles being procured for Block 2008 Program officials sated that given the low quantity of ‘missles being proshiced, statistical process control ata on the produetion pracess would have no Significance The Aegis BMD program is using other means fo assess progress in production and
‘manufacturing—sich as integrated product teams, tisk reviews, and SM-2 metries—as art of ts overall evelopment of the SMS,
Other Program Issues
‘The Aegis HMD element builds upon the existing capabilites of Aegiseauipped Navy erusersand ttesrovers Planned hardvare and softvare
"paradesto these ships willenable them to cary out te ballistic missile defense mission In particular, the program is working to upgrade Aegis destroyers for surveillance and tacking of incexcontinental ballistic missiles, Beesuse this hnetion is new to the lement—allowed only ater the US withdeawal from the Ant Hallistic Missile Treaty—the program office face ight schedule o fully develop and est Thịs addel unelonaliv, whieh it completed i September 2004 with the deployment ofthe frst Hdestzoyer for this mission
‘Agency Comments
Trang 28_— CammonName: AEHE Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF)
The Air Force's AEHF satelite system wil replenish the existing Milstar system with higher eapacity survivable, jam resistant, worldwide, secure
‘communication capabilities for strategie and tactical ‘warfighters The program inhides stelites and a mission control segment Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are acquired separately by each service ABHF san international
partnership program that includes Canada, United Sngdom, ad the Netherlands We assessed the satellite and mission control segment ‘System development Production
Program Essentials ‘rogram Performance (iscal year 2008 dolar in millions)
fre mtn Lston arin VÒP ish zat
Tang 6i 0M TU Tin ` Pecunia ốc Hono ‘aie xa ES 8
be eto ‘onan 820 mon ‘oa pogam ot Program nt eoet "` fare omy ae
ng Aaa ch Hs (re) Tague : ow S88 “es
According to the program offi, the APHIE ee GRot
Progra technologie Issiable However the high risk strategy of are mature and (ie 41g progeny ee concurrenly developing two crideal path tema Saxe fasted to further schedule delays and cost, ‘nereases The program i lying onthe
concurrent development ofthe AEHE oro
‘Comsec/Transec System (ACTS) suite of cexyptological equipment, which limits access to authorized users, and terminals used for satelite motwry
‘command and control Both of these tems are
being developed outside the program offic, s Delivery delays ofthe ACTS and command and Sean ‘control terminals resulted in an addtional 12monHh Ìauch delay and an estimated
20 pereent cost inerease, incurring NunieMeCurdy breach (10 U.S.C 2493) at the 1Bpercent threshold
Trang 29
Common Name: AEHE AEHF Program, Technology Maturity
All ofthe Lt enteal technologies are manute, -ecordingto the program otis Te adion, ll 1 of {he appicationspecitie integrated crculsertieal to Thnetioning of the commisications payload have been Might qualified through demonstration nd testing
Design Stability ABHP's design i now stable since more than 97 percent of te design drawings have been released While the program completed its system Jevel ertieal design review In April 2004 with only bout two thirds ofthe drawings cleased the AEH ‘contractor has since resolved al oustanding issues from that review Production maturity could nat be assessed a the prouram office doesnot collect satistieal process ‘control lata, In June 2004, the formal decision as rade to acquite the third and final satelite
Other Program Issues The concurrent developanent of two eitical path 'Remns- the ACTS and the commnandl am contưot tenninals_ hasled to further schedule delays and
cost owt The ACTS sa suite of eryptologieal ‘equipment insalied in both the satellite ad the {erminals to linst access to authorized users and is being developed and produced by the National Security Agency The ACTS has aleeady experienced significant eos growth aid schedule delays due production problems and changing sexily
‘requirements, In September 2003, ACTS delivery {lays and development problems led the program office to delay the launch ofthe est two satellites by A months The second erieal path eem—the ‘command post cerminals—is developed and funded boy another Air Force program office These
terminals must be in place and tested prior to the Hrs auneh or cheve will bea day-frday sip inthe satelite laineh schedule
The concurrent development of the AEHE satellites, terminals, and the ACTS hus led to further delays and cost ineteases Delayed delivery of the ACTS ‘ha resulted in sv additional 12-mnonth dea Launches for the tree ABNF saelites are now scheduled for Apel 200, April 2009, sad Apri ‘The launch delays along with added pasos
‘component testing and replacement of etical elecronie parts are expeeted to increase the fverall program cost by about 20 percent
In December 2004, the Air Force notified Congress of NunnAfeCurdy breach atthe 15 percent threshold
Jn December 2002, satellites four al five were leleted from the AEH program because the new Transformational Satelite Communications System (ISAT), assessed elsewhere in this report, is to replace these satellites if they are suficienty Heveloped, The Air Force scheduled an interim review point in November 2001 to determine ‘whether to buy addtional AEHF satelites or eely on TSAT However, in light of the I23v0ath program sip, the decision was delayed until November 005 ‘Agency Comments
Trang 30Common Name: AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA)
‘The Naiy’s ABSA radar is one ofthe top upgrades, forthe PIA-ISEIF aircraft IListo be the airerafts primary searehftrack and weapon control radar and 1s designed to correct deficiencies in the current radar According tothe Navy, the AESA radar Is key {omalntaining the Navy's aleto ale ghỪng
advantage and will improve the effectiveness of the airto-ground weapons When completed, the radar ‘willbe inserted in new production airerat and retrofit into lot 26 and above alrerat
‘Concept System development Production
— wane TT cớ {ng sansen poset
Program Essentials rogram Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in millions)
Prins eontator MeOenna Dugas fsot Latest Percent
Corp Praja lfc: Far Aer Me Research and doolpmont cost cm .—- 1 change Funding reese complet "Hao Stes ion “oa program cost Procurement cost "ma ^^: Procurement 81.8147 millon “ound §t 8800 man Program unt cost “ott quanttes| ssoi 9653188 a as Đo
Procurement quan 265 ‘eqasion ole tie (ents) 3 Con
‘The AESA radar’ critical technologies were not ‘mature atthe start of system development or at the desin review, bu they now appear to be ‘mature The design also appears stable However, radar development is continuing during
production The program is tracking a number of risks withthe technieal performance of the radar Ifproblems are discovered, they could require design changes while the radar isin production For example, the software schedule leaves litle oom for error ot rework, and development of the zadar simulation model puts training at risk In Addition, there are some prodition risks that
‘could afect the quality ofthe initial radarsand the aireraft delivery schedule, Antitamper protection forthe radar is curently in design The ABSA, program also has interdependencies with other programs that eould make the radar vulnerable to elays in thelr progress
ae
Fessene angrier winding be FHF a 83
Trang 31‘Common Name: AESA ABSA Program Technology Maturity
‘The Tates technology readiness assessment forthe radar determined that the four eeitical eehnologies were mature To further ensure cetmology maturity, aminitechnoloay assessments planned prior 0 the fulkrate production decision Hy then, the ‘technologies should have heen demonstrated in he final form and under expected conditions Design Stability As of July 2004, ll engineering drawings forthe ‘radar and its subsystems had been vleased At the design review in 2001, 59 percent had been release Development ofthe radar hes eantinued daring production The program office has wend some ‘evelopment risks that could result in design changes According toa prograre alice risk assessinent the Lop curentehallenge involves the Software, The lack of tively software delivery puts the program a significant risk, and could aso eqnire radar hardware rework dae to delays in the Might rest program Another risk is thatthe radar Simalation mode integrated nto the F/A-18 training
Simulator may not accurately represent the ‘operation and performance of tie ear, which could result in some taining tat is unrealistic Fhrther, the numberof conducted may not be adequate ro mature radar fight tests that ean be
software Other enzrent risks inele whether the rrudar will be able to track siffcient targets Simultaneously, radiation emissions wil interfere ‘with FACIBE/® weapon systems; and will have the capability to detect tal aspect targets at low altitude Aitigation plans are in place to addeess a Aesign risks,
Production Maturity
During 4 low-rate produetion runs 84 radars are planned—20 perceat of the 415 radars to be procured, The program is currently inthe second Drodietion run Most radars are planed to be Installed is F/A-ABE/PS on the areratt ptolueflon line, However, 135 radars will have to be retrfitted into alealy produced F/8-ISE/F%—a more costly process upfront, that, according to the Navy, is expected to save money an support casts ater We could noc assess production maturity because atistcal process control data are not being collected, Officias said they are comfortable with _manufacturing processes based on audits and
Inspections conducted at some key manufacturers Nonetheless, radar production eursently faces umber of esks, The radar contractor may have Aifeulty transitioning from development t0 production due to production risks, which could tease sone Late aera deliveries Other risks include realty poblenis with one ofthe ada's eiteal telmologies may not allow intial radars to rect a specification and qualification tests may not bbe complete in tie, resting in delivering radar ‘hardware that isnot filly qualified Moreover full-rate production costs could increase
Sgnifieandy ithe projected payot from cost reduction initiatives is nt fully realized, Hexeever, program officials expect sizaifeant savings from the ost redietion inilatives
Other Program Issues
The program office is closely tacking
Interdependencies that could place the radar at risk Success! development of ether Navy programs s required forthe radar to meet key performance parameters Also, the midae program i being fleveloped, in part, with funding from contractors, (Changes in the flow of his funding woud afect the ABSA program, but progtam officials stated that ‘Almost al of the contractor funding is been
provided,
1m, 1990, DOD diveeted the seevices to implement bitamper protection to guard against explotation ofenteal US technologies This protection was not fone of the radar's orginal requienvents While oficial said there sa requirement for his
Droteetion co have no effect on radar performance, ‘nerational tess ofanitamper models are not planned until after perational tests of radars ‘without this protection, wich may identify problems that require design changes tothe protection package,
Trang 32
Common Name: AN/ASO 205 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)
‘The Naiy’s AMNS is designed to relocate, ident, and neuialize bottom of moored sea mines: AMNS consists of an operating console and a launch and ‘handing system containing up to four neutalizers ‘When deployed, the ME-608 helicopter hovers near the target mine and lowers AMNS via stow eable Ino the water A neutralizer, controlled through fiberoptic cable, exits the lunch and handling
system and uses sonar to find the mine and fires 2
lethal charge, destroying the mine and the neutralizer concept ‘Syne development roan dân, ko a) “on on
Program Essentials Program Performance (fiseal year 2008 dollars in millions)
Ps contactor: Raytheon IDS sot atest Percent
Progam fe: Wasgtan, 20 eee Research and doolpmont cost — ¬-.=- ‘oi S67 2S RE TS Procter $108.8 mon “oa program cost Pecrenentee guar $1031 sms 3083 Hà 272 22 reimliietdoel ete ee “ott quanttes| Program unt cost suet $3100 # 28 20,
‘gain ole ine ont) 2 00
‘erent eyo as gon em nt en
‘The AMNS program began system development Attainment of Product Knowledge with none oft four eriical technologies mature proucton
‘While progress as been made since then, See
women ica te he cm HH SS] Ko ong mets cn clonal in
ondute nid Ut, The ANS prow’
designs sable `- thedamings complete Hoeven since ANNS Sa tteinologies ae a expected to demonstrate
Trang 33Common Name: AWASO.235 AMNS Program Technology Maturity
‘The AMNS launch and handling system, the eplaymentsubsssembs, the warhead assembly, and the neutralizer are not fully ature, The poutralizes, which was demonstrated ina relevant environment, i approsching ull maturity The program office desenibes the newraizet asa rondevelapimental em because i already
‘operations However, needs to ndergosfes ad performance improvements before it wil be realy {or ANS The other three technologies have not been sntegtated or demonstrated outside of Jaboratory environment, bat program officals have
‘sated that no technology hurdles remain, merely ‘engineering challenges, Program officials expec all Tour technologies developmental testing tha ls chedtlef ta take fo demonstrate maturity during
place between May and October 2008
Among risks identified by program officiats are ‘eoncenis rat dhe neutralzer will no launch properly nn environment of strong water eurents ‘The program office isatempying by establishing plans and fondling fr testing the to mitigate this sk
neutralizer in strong water eurrents, including fame Lani testing Additionally, progran officials noted ceoucerns bout the survivability of he lawach and Pauling systenn in an underwater explosives environment The program office plans for this isk {abe mitigated through an alysis oF lamuch and handling sssten ternal yar ad an analysis £0 Drove tat the launch and handing ysten can {olerate environments of up Lo B06 levels,
Design Stability
Approximately 0 percent of the AMNS drawings ate currently releasable Moreover, the program bflce projects al drawings to be releasable 10 ‘mamfacturing atthe completion of the design feadiness review in March 2005 Accordingto program officials, (op level assembly drawings
will be considered atthe design readiness review Detaled designs of AMNS components were ‘aliated throagh 17 interim design reviews held by {he progeam oice,
Because the AMNS technologiesare not expected to demonstrate maturity unt developmental vesting is conducted in mid-2005, the program rus the risk thất any problems idenifed durin testing would require drawings tobe modified
Other Program Issues
The program office hss requested an approximately 813 milion inceesse mn research and development funds for the fiscal year 2008 budget According to program officials, this increase is required to Support altemate testing on the ME-SAE helieapter ani fo supporta iG-month delay in completion of {eating on the MELAS hefeopter The MH-608 helicopter will not be wala to suppor the courvent AMINS development snd tes sehedule Without alrerate testing on the MH-52E helicopter, Lye program will not be able to make a low-rate intial production decision in Peb rary 2008 of, more ‘importantly, naintsin an intial operational
capability of June 2007 For the MH-60S helicopter, development testing is wot seheduled to start until B monthsaftera low-rate inal production decision thas been made,
‘Agency Comments
In commenting on a deat of this assessment, che Navy stated that the program quantity increased fram 474001 as result ofa change in Navy strategy to deploy the system from Lion
rather than aircraft carters Regarding technology ruaturity it noted that currently the programs ecitical technologies, for example the warhead sembly, are slightly more mature than indicated inthe assessment In addition o performing a fnalysis to prove tat the Iauneh and handing system can tolerate high pressure underwater environments, the Navy intendsto conduct Underwater Bxplosive Testing as futher risk mitigation
Regarding other program issues, the Navy stated that whale alternate platform testing on Une SEH-S3E helicopter would enable the program to meet its lov-rate inital prodhetion decision sn inital operational eapabiity targets, alternate platform testing fs pending approval by the Assistant
Seeretary ofthe Navy (Research, Development, snd Aquisition) I also indicated tat constzalnts in the walsbllty 8ƒ ME 0S test assets have the potential 1o elay the progranrs schedule and inevease is cost beyond the projections presented inthe assessment
Trang 34Common Name: APKWS Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)
‘The Army's APKWS isa precision guided,
airto-surace missile designed to engage soft and lightly armored targets The system will ad a new laser based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 Rocket ‘System and is expected to provide lower cost, accurate alternative to the Helfie missile, Future block upgrades are planned to improve system effectiveness, We assessed the laser guidance technology used inthe new seeker ‘Concept System development Production
Preuremant $1531 mon Total pega cost Do:
Tehi lương 817100 lim .eeurenenisuarky: 8458 ‘Tout quanttes| Program unt cost som an ea ee 2A 4
‘gain ole tie (rent) vô Đo 186
‘The APKWS entered system development and held ts design review before demonstrating that is critical guidance technology was fully mature ‘While the system's design was otherwise stable at the time ofthe March 2004 design review; initial system-level testing identified problems with the design Program plans eal fora production ‘ecision in September 2005 and low-rate
production contract award in December 2005 We ‘were unable to assess the program's production maturity beeause program officials do not expect tobegin collecting statistical data on their key ‘manufacturing processes until the start of
production Remaining efforts include competing Aevelopmental and operational testing It
Trang 35Common Name: APKWS APKWS Program Technology Maturity
‘The APEWS program has not demonstrated full raatuity of is onl ete tehnologs—laser auidance, Although a procotype guidance system ‘was secessfilly demonstrated ruler the ow Cost Precision Kill Advanced Technology Demonstration, the current design forthe guidance system includes numerous hardware changes 19 Improve stem) ost, performance, and peoduetilty The new guidance system will not be fully intenrated and {ested from an aireralt unl winter 2005 Program officals noted that although he protorspe ssn {design exists reverting oie would inerease cost and {degrade the system's performance and producibibiy
Design Stability
rogran officials relessed 100 percent of the ravings after aysten level design review in March 2001, Recently completed testing, however, uncovered the need fr design changes The APKWS, ta date, has completed two test lights, The frst test ‘igh went as planned The second fghn test missile, however, experienced! a mechanical fallure ofthe ‘wing lack mechanism, causing the test msi to veer off target The program office identified & esizn solation, and fight resting resumed in September 20
Production Maturity
Program officials expect shat tere ill be nine key processes associated with manufacturing the [APKWS The program plans to collect statistical fata an these prcesses wen prodietion begins in fiscal year 2008
Other Program Issues
Trang 36Common Name: ASDS Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS)
‘The Special Operations Forces’ ASDS isa battery powered, dry interior minisubmarine eveloped for clandestine insertion and extraction fof Navy SEALS and their equipment It is carvied to ‘ts deployment area by a specially configured SSNS class submarine eis intended to provide
Increased range, payload, on-station loiter time, and endurance over current submersibles, The (5-fot long, §foot diameter ASDS is operated by a {two-person erew and equipped with alock outiock
in chamber tallow divers to exit and reenter the vehicle
concept Shite development Podieloi
a en "ear HAI (SB) (ĐEN Tà
Program Essentials rogram Performance (fiseal year 2005 dollars in millions)
Ps contractor: Nortvep Gtumman Latest Percent
Progam fe: Washington, 26 Punäng mndedteorile' esearch and devlpment oe HUẾ - Change Ea 2280 hunker aie, Procurement $1 2180 mien Procurement cost Total pega cost sists Siamese rat sts “oa uring 81.2594 miton Procurement quant =| Program unt cost ‘Tout quanttes| Su eo es
‘eqn ole tie (ent) reo NA
One of ASDS's thee erticalteehnoogies—the Attainment of Product Knowledge
oon aeee (mat
‘The production decision hasbeen delayed from sma”
test other vehicle design changes The Navy Sens | :
foleciede deter ark ou tery ond) „*
'atery replacemenL other vehieleimprovemehts — mưny”—$# are being developed and tested and design om
problems are being addressed Acoustic signature sate
sues are being addressed; however, this
requirement doesnot have tobe met until delivery ‘ofthe second ASDS boat =
Trang 37
Common Name: ASOS ASDS Program Technology Maturity
Ofte three critteal technologies identified by {he ASDS program office, one—the lithium fon battery—has not reached maturity However, tis expected tobe mature before the December 2005 ‘production decision or addtional boats
Acoustic, or noise level, problems are belng addressed; however, the frst boat isnot que, ‘enough to meet acoustie stealth requirements In carie tests, the ASDS propeller {he most significant noise, sida new composite was te source of
propeller was installed before operational test and ‘valuation in 2003 hough program officials believe it meets requirements, precise acoustic rmersurements have not been made and are not scheduled tobe done before the production ‘Sesion, ther acoustic issues wil be adressed ‘ona timesphased basis because the acoustic requirement has heen deferred unit delivery ofthe
second boat,
Design Stability Although el engineering drawings for ASDS have been relensedl to manfacturing, ASDS design changes have been required based on aditional §improsemenis, tes resuls, ad other tes since ASDS reached initial operational capability in Noveriber 209, An assessment of ASDS
survivability design feanres is also underway however, the Vulnerabilty Assessment Report will othe completed until Apel 2005
An uprated ASDS operations requirements document was approved in June 2001 The nuhnber ff key performance parameters Ghose elementsthat are so significant tat fiir to tt thêm could eal ino question a system's ability to perfor rissions) were redueed from 16 08, and they lnchide one new requirement (operational
avails) Other fequitements are categorized a8 ‘system erica requirements,
Until requirements are addressed, technical Droblensare solved, and testing is eompleted, we believe ASDSSs final design sail remain acerca and may ave eost and schedule implications
Other Program Issues
‘The Navy completed an independent cost estimate, Including ite-eyee cass, Maech 2004, Hoseever, Hala were not released, andthe estimates ice now ‘out-of date because they do not refieet the inet of the 2-year delay in production ofthe second bost Acco tothe June 2004 Selected Acqisiion
Report the U.S Special Operations Command was preparing a new proposed program plan to account for the delay inthe production decision and updated ost information was expected tobe reported i (he December 2014 report However, according to the Navy's January 2005 update, he revised program plan atl updated cost estimate willbe developed,
reviewed, and approved as pan of the production Aecision, which has been delaed unl December 2005, Sine the program’ frst cost estimate was ‘originally approved in 1994, research and
tievelopment costs have more then triple
The Navy plans to conduct follow-on testing (0 ‘erly that đeDciencies øndl vilnerablities Mentiied dug the Blay 2003 operational evaluation are ‘corrected: However, not all results will be known before the scheduled production deision
‘Agency Comments The Nevy provided technical comments, which were incomporated ss appropriate
Trang 38Common Name ATIRCMICHWS Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System ‘The Army's and the Special Operations Command's
ATIRCM/CMWS isa component of the integrated infrared countermeasures suite planned to defend US areraf from advanced infrared guided missiles ‘The system willbe employed on Army and Special Operations alrerat The system includes an ative infrared jammer, a missile warning system, and a countermeasure dispenser eapable of loading and ‘employing expendables, such 38 ares, chal, and smoke
Concent system development Prodution
Program Essentials Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in millions) ora convactor:BAE Sytem Noh Asol —Latst Percent freien Seaton, Ne fesnacrandanecometcnt Seo Saas efi suis Shge BS
ing reo compat Proaroman cot ` tt
nao tan nen Procurement $2097 ion Tot prea cet Program nit cos 1n soos S107 135 at ‘ral trang 82151? lon ‘rosa quan 2568 ‘hagas ‘egusten eye tie mont) Ciazaed_—Clsiied Chases ‘aoe “nese a
‘The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production
Attainment of Produet Knowied
InNovemter 209 with technologies matte poet nddesgnosable Cumenty, heprogan’s Spa `
ontoL The CMWS prlonofthe program entered limited production in February 2002 to meet ungent deployment requierents Howeve
{ullrate production for both components was motu delayed beenuse of reliably problems Over
the past several years, the program has had 10 ‘overcome cost and schedule problems brought on by shortfalls in knowledge: key technologies were demonstrated late in development and only 8 ‘mall number of design dravvings were completed by design review At the low-rate production decision point, the Army developed a new cost estimate reducing program procurement cost substantially
Trang 39
Common Name: ATIRCKLCNS ATIRCM/CMWS Program Technology Maturity
‘The ATIRCM/CMWSS five critieal technologies are arr However, they did not mature wit after the design review in February 1997, Most of the early technology development effor was focused on the application to rotary wingaireratt When system ‘evelopment began ln 1585, the requlrements were ‘expanded to include Naxy an Air Force fixed wing aireraf This change caused problems that large ‘contibited to cost ineresses of more han 150, percent to the development contract The Navy and {he Air Force subsequently dropped out ofthe program, rendering Nasy ail the Any are erent pursing Faure de extra effort needless, but the joint production planning
Design Stability
‘The basie design of the system is complete with 100 percent ofthe drawings released to manufacturing The design was not stable atthe tive ofthe design "oview, with only 22 percent ofthe drawings ‘complete This was primarily die othe expanded eqvement, Ie was not uni 2 vears ater the esign review that 9 pereent ofthe drawings were released and Une design was considered stable This ested in inefficient manufacturing, ewark, addtional esting, and a year schedale delay The ‘stem design was suecessfilly demonstrated rough engineering and manufacturing development and transitioned to production, Production Maturity
‘The production maturity could not be assessed ‘base! on the iormation provided by the program office Aecordng to program officials, the TIRCM/CMWS program has 16 key manufacturing processes i vations phases of contol They stated that ATIRCM statistical process controls are in ‘evelopment, contro plans are being enhanced and asthe programm continues in production and data are fathered, lessons lezned willbe included inthe Drocesses The Army entered tinted CNWS
production in February 2002 to meet an urgent need ff the US Special Operations Command,
Subsequently, fllrate produetion was delayed for ott earaponents die to relay resting fallres ‘The program implemented reliability fixes 1 Six podhction representative subsystems Lat wil be ‘used forintial operational test and evaluation,
Tuese systems were delivered in Blarch 2004 he {ollrate production deelsion forthe complete system is now seheded for 2008,
Other Program Issues The Army procured an initial 32 systems in fiscal sear 2002 fuse on the US Speelal Operations Commands CH47 helicopters The Army plans 10 procure a total of 98 systems to ont special fnerations stcraft betsreen fiscal year 2003 and 2009 Currently, program officals are working to (hfegrate CMIWS on 16 đdflomal platform types and modkls, eich will esi in an inerease quantity
sid funding The CMS low-rate intial production ‘quantity increased by 111 systems to a total of 200 The Army procured sll 200 of these systems, a deliveries are on sehedle
A the low-rate production decision poi, the Army developed a new cost estimate forthe program that atuted a variety of diferent program assumptions For exaniple, program officials deleted 17 years of Contractor Logisties Suppor, reducing potential duplication, and eleced 29 training systems As
result, program officals report that procurement, ‘os was reduced by 17 percent
‘Agency Comments ‘The Army concurred with this esseserent and provided echnical comments, which were
Trang 40Common Name: 8-2 IMP B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP)
‘The Air Force's B2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system to resolve potential conicts in frequency band usage To comply with federal requirements, the frequency must be changed to 8 band where the B2 will be designated asa primary user The modifed radar system is being designed to support the B2 stealth bomber and its combination ‘of stealth, range, payload, and near precision ‘weapons delivery capabilities
concept System development
Production
Pr contactor Norvep Grumman Anal gles tem Funan netcoit ees Prasent con asec and aoa cost wa THƠ a NA Ss0s NA Pmeuenent 98108 mMen Tatler cot Na sigs MA Trh tương $1204 Son Fe 01g 80g! Sa gas Progr nko NA ‘Seema eM MA = agus} te (mon) mo OMA
‘The B2 RMP entered system development in August 2004 with wo ential technologies mature and two approaching maturity ll eitical