When States Go Broke The Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal Crisis ppt

    When States Go Broke collects insights and analyses from leading academics and practitioners who discuss the ongoing scal crisis among the American states. No one disagrees with the idea that the states face enormous political and scal chal- lenges. There is, however, little consensus on how to x the perennial problems associated with these challenges. This volume lls an important gap in the dialogue by offering an academic analysis of the many issues broached by these debates. Leading scholars in bankruptcy, constitutional law, labor law, history, political science, and economics have individually contributed their assessments of the origins, context, and potential solutions for the states in crisis. It presents readers – academics, policymakers, and concerned citizens alike – with the resources to begin and continue that important, solution-oriented conversation. Peter Conti-Brown is an Academic Fellow at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford Law School and the Stanford Graduate School of Business. His research focuses on banking regulation and nancial and s- cal crises, and includes articles published in the Stanford Law Review, UCLA Law Review, and the Washington University Law Review, among other law journals. David A. Skeel, Jr., is the S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. He is the author of The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences (), Icarus in the Boardroom (), and Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (), as well as coeditor with Michael Klarman and Carol Steiker of The Political Heart of Criminal Procedure (), a collection of tribute essays to William J. Stuntz. When States Go Broke  , ,          Peter Conti-Brown Rock Center for Corporate Governance Stanford University David A. Skeel, Jr. University of Pennsylvania School of Law Edited by    Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City Cambridge University Press  Avenue of the Americas, New York,  -,  www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/ © Cambridge University Press  This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published  Printed in the United States of America A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data When states go broke : the origins, context, and solutions for the American states in scal crisis / [edited by] Peter Conti-Brown, David Skeel. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.  ---- (hardback) . State government bankruptcy – United States. . Finance, Public – United States – States. I. Conti-Brown, Peter, – II. Skeel, David A., – .  ′.–dc   ---- Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. v Contents List of gures page vii List of tables ix List of contributors xi Acknowledgments xiii Introduction: The Perennial Crisis for the American States  -  PART I. THE ORIGINS OF THE STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS  Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Crises  -       Obligations Without the Power to Fund Them  .    Public Pension Pressures in the United States  .    Structural Challenges in State Budgeting    PART II. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF PUBLIC DEBT  What States Can Learn From Municipal Insolvency  .   Contentsvi  Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism     American States and Sovereign Debt Restructuring    PART III. EVALUATING SOLUTIONS  State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up  . , .   Fiscal Federalism and the Limits of Bankruptcy  .    Extending Bankruptcy Law to States  .    Bankruptcy For the States and By the States     Labor and the States’ Fiscal Problems       Epilogue – David A. Skeel, Jr.  Index  vii Figures . Adoption of rst constitutional debt restrictions, by decade page  . Number of states that have a constitutional debt restriction, by decade  . Adoption of rst constitutional BBR, by decade  . Number of states that have a constitutional BBR, by decade  . Number of adoptions of RDFs, by decade  . Number of state rainy day funds, by decade and type  . Limits on traditional TELs and property tax limitations, by decade of rst adoption  . Number of states that have traditional TELs and property tax limits, by decade  . Adoption of constitutional scal institutions  . Number of states that had adopted each type of constitutional scal institution, by decade  . Anticipated year of exhaustion for state pension fund assets  . Pie chart of state and local tax sources in   . Graph of pupil-teacher ratios and education spending as a share of GDP over time  . The growth of federal grants relative to state and local current expenditures  . Credit default swaps for selected U.S. states  . Credit default swaps for selected U.S. states and member states of the European Monetary Union  List of guresviii . Debt-to-GDP ratios for European countries and U.S. states  . Unadjusted Hourly Compensation – Public and Private Sector Compared:   . Adjusted Hourly Compensation – Public and Private Sector Compared:   . Public Pension Plan Funding Ratios by Extent of Collective Bargaining Rights: Fiscal Year   . Median Budget Gap by Extent of Collective Bargaining Rights: Fiscal Year   . Median Budget Gaps by Extent of Collective Bargaining Rights, Fiscal Years –  . Median State Workforce as a Percentage of Total Workforce by Extent of Collective Bargaining Rights:   . Median State Labor Expense as a Percentage of State Budget by Extent of Collective Bargaining Rights: Fiscal Year   .  When States Go Broke collects insights and analyses from leading academics and practitioners who discuss the ongoing scal crisis among the American states. No one disagrees with the idea. spending, infrastructure, education, and nearly every other government service; investors, in the form of general and specic debt; and indeed, any other individual or insti- tution who interacts. central to the American system as federalism itself continues to y under the radar: The American states, in their individual governmental capacities, are in extraordinary debt. Although the states