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RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Michelle Parker, Kimberly Colloton Sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Reconstruction Under Fire Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 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Martens iii Preface It is widely agreed that effective civilian relief, reconstruction, and development work can help convince people to support their govern- ment against insurgency. Knowing this, insurgents will target such work, threatening both those who perform it and those who benefit from it. Too often, the result is a postponement of efforts to improve government and serve the population until contested territory has been cleared of insurgents. is can lead to excessive reliance on force to defeat insurgents—at best, delaying and, at worst, preventing success. Unsatisfied with this general state of affairs, a RAND team with combined security and development expertise set out to learn how “civilian counterinsurgency” (civil COIN) could be conducted more safely in the face of active insurgency, when it can do the most good. anks to a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation, matched by support from the U.S. Department of Defense, the team has completed this inquiry and set out the results in this monograph. Its findings and recommendations should be of as much interest to practitioners, policy leaders, and scholars of civil COIN as well as to those involved in security. is research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combat- ant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. iv Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at James_Dobbins@rand.org; by phone at 703-413- 1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 S. Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org. v Contents Preface iii Figures ix Tables xi Summary xiii Acknowledgments xxiii Abbreviations xxv CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1 Conceptual Bearings 1 e Nature and Importance of Civil COIN 7 Civil COIN, Violence, and Risk 12 Context 18 Method and Organization of the Monograph 21 CHAPTER TWO ree Cases 23 Objectives and Criteria 23 Nord-Kivu, DRC 26 Background 26 Context 29 reat 31 Focus Areas 32 Nangarhar, Afghanistan 33 Background 33 Context 36 vi Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency reat 38 Focus Areas 39 Al Anbar, Iraq 41 Background 41 Context 45 reat 46 Focus Areas 48 Summary Observations and Analysis 50 CHAPTER THREE Integrated Analysis, Integrated Approach 59 Civil-Military “Integration” 59 e Nature of Civil COIN 61 e Practicalities of Civil COIN 68 A Network Model for Securing Civil COIN 71 Co-location to Reduce and Manage Risk 75 Integrating Security and Civil COIN Operations 79 Current Efforts to Integrate and Secure Civil COIN 83 Conclusion 86 CHAPTER FOUR Security Requirements 89 Modes of Providing Security 93 Embedded Security 94 Mobile Security 97 Quick-Reaction Forces 98 Information Sensing and Sharing 100 Non-Lethal Capabilities 103 Investments 104 Summary 107 CHAPTER FIVE Conclusions 109 Summary of Key Findings 110 Recommendations 117 General Principles 117 Contents vii Further Analysis 118 Application and Experimentation 118 Concluding oughts 119 About the Authors 121 Bibliography 125 [...]... States is better at the latter than at the former xiii xiv Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency There are two main problems with U.S civil COIN: lack of resources and danger from insurgent violence While acknowledging the first problem, this study tackles the second It proposes four enhancements to civil COIN under fire: • a concept for setting priorities among civil COIN... Establishing priorities can help secure civil COIN by providing a basis for the allocation of security forces Priorities depend on the history and culture of the country or province under threat; the insur- xvi Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency gency’s aims, maturity, strength, and level of violence; the gravest deficiencies in the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach... Congo xxv xxvi Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area FM field manual HIG Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin ICONOPS integrated concepts of operations IDP internally displaced person IIP Iraqi Islamic Party IP Internet protocol ISF Iraqi Security Forces MSI Mutammar Sahwat al-Iraq NGO non-governmental organization PRT provincial reconstruction. .. local forces are governed by the rule of law At the local level, population security and civil COIN security are both needed and may be closely connected The former is critical if the xviii Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency government is to convince the people of its ability and will to protect them; the latter is critical to enable the same people to get essential... ICONOPS to manage and lower risks to the nodes, hubs, and movements of civil COIN networks • Civil COIN security should explicitly be made one of the principal missions of COIN security forces xx Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency • Civil authorities should recognize the contribution of civil COIN to reducing insurgent strength and violence and should pursue ways to... former commander of the 25th Light Infantry Division; Thomas Parker, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Kaitlin Shilling, doctoral candidate, Stanford University; Mohammad Masoom xxiii xxiv Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency Stanekzai, Jennings Randolph Afghanistan fellow with the U.S Institute of Peace and former minister of telecommunication/information and communication... COIN often choose not to place their people at risk Limited efforts are being made to address this problem The use of COIN provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), with mixed civilian and military personnel, is an important, if small, step toward securing civil COIN under fire But the PRT does not encompass the facilities, assets, government services, and indigenous personnel that must be involved and... proceeding, it may be helpful to clarify how the authors conceive of insurgency, COIN, and civil COIN Insurgency is, in essence, an armed challenge to a government, from within its jurisdic- 1 2 Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency tion, that seeks and capitalizes on the support of important segments of the population It can be thought of as an attempt to win the people’s... complete, we should note that insurgencies can also be defeated through brutal means available to authoritarian governments but not to democracies These methods will not be discussed here 4 Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency For the United States, the vantage point from which this study was done, the aim in engaging in COIN is normally two-fold: to produce an outcome... Afghanistan outside of Pashtun tribal lands because of fresh memories of their excessively strict and not especially efficient rule 9 See Gompert, Gordon, et al (2008, Chapter Five, pp 87–122) 6 Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency The first way, as the expression implies, is to manipulate the provision of services and resources of the government and its foreign backers . Priorities depend on the history and culture of the country or province under threat; the insur- xvi Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency gency’s aims, maturity,. the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. iv Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency For more information on RAND’s International. 29 reat 31 Focus Areas 32 Nangarhar, Afghanistan 33 Background 33 Context 36 vi Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency reat 38 Focus Areas 39 Al Anbar,