Social status, social norms and bribe giving behaviors of citizens in Vietnam Social status, social norms and bribe giving behaviors of citizens in Vietnam Social status, social norms and bribe giving behaviors of citizens in Vietnam Social status, social norms and bribe giving behaviors of citizens in Vietnam Social status, social norms and bribe giving behaviors of citizens in Vietnam Social status, social norms and bribe giving behaviors of citizens in Vietnam Social status, social norms and bribe giving behaviors of citizens in Vietnam Social status, social norms and bribe giving behaviors of citizens in Vietnam
INTRODUCTION
Research rationales
In the context of globalization, although the issue of corruption has been a political and societal issue for centuries, corruption and bribery still have received increased attention and have been renewed as a subject of widespread concern Corruption refers to the dishonest or partial exercise of official functions by the public official (Independent Commission Against Corruption, 1998) Transparency International
(2010) defines corruption as the misuse of public power for private benefit, involving applying illegal and unethical standards Corruption appears in response to benevolent rules when individuals pay bribes to avoid penalties for harmful conduct or when monitoring of rules is incomplete As a key facet of corruption, bribery is defined as the offering, promising or giving something in order to influence a public official in the execution of his/her official duties (The Fight Against Bribery, 2000) Bribes can take the form of money or other pecuniary advantages In the conduct of global business, bribery is a worldwide issue that cuts across countries, businesses and individuals.
It is now widely accepted that the impact of corruption on economic development at national level is negative as corruption deters foreign investment, inhibits innovation and constrains growth The more recent studies have shown that from economic perspectives, corruption undermines innovation, damages firm integrity, erodes trust and thus crucially restricts firms’ long-term sustainability (Nguyen et al., 2017). Besides, corruption may reduce firms’ competitiveness and resources accessibility, which results in unfairly allocating between incomes groups and increasing inequality in the economy (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012).
The World Bank estimates that more than USD 1 trillion in bribes are paid each year out of a world economy of USD 30 trillion- 3% of the world’s economy The WorldBank estimates the corruption serves, essentially, as a 20% tax (Holder, 2010) In countries with corrupt public employees, citizens may need to pay petty bribes to get public services such as health, education and police Annually, around 1.6 billion
1 people have to pay bribes to get these services (Rose, 2015) Having to pay bribes for these
2 services violates the rule of law and directly affects civil rights to access public services, which reduces the confidence in government authorities and the quality of local governance (Le, 2017).
According to WB (2012), despite other problems identified as serious, a large proportion of citizens is concerned corruption as the most serious problems facing Vietnam It is reported that larger proportions of respondents experienced corruption first-hand in the form of bribery payment Accordingly, a majority, which was approximately 82 percent, of the respondents believed that corruption is prevalent or extremely prevalent among all levels from nation to commune Again, in 2016, World Bank conducted a study to examine the issues of conflict of interests from citizens’ perspectives in Vietnam According to the study (WB, 2016), gift-giving (cash or non- cash gifts), considered as one of the forms of “conflict of interests”, is also a typical form of bribery payment It is reported that gift-giving to public servants is a popular form and the most important determinants influencing public servants’ decisions.
In Vietnam, the proportion of people having to give bribes when using public services is considerable Survey data indicates that 47% of the respondents paid bribes for traffic police, 32% of them paid unofficially for education service and 25% of them paid for healthcare services (World Bank, 2012) According to Transparency International (2018), corruption in the public sector in Vietnam is considered highly serious, statistically, 61% citizens bribe when using public service or having administrative transactions To fight against this situation, three questions should be clear: (i) who often bribe? (ii) why citizens bribe? (iii) which factors make citizens bribe to get public services and administrative services?
At the individual level, the literature is not in consensus on what motivates citizens to give bribes Previous research on individual level bribery focuses on cost/benefit calculation (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012) or external factors, such as cultural factors (Barr &Lindelửw, 2004) or institutional factors (Le, Nguyen & Do, 2021).The reasons for giving bribes from individuals are possible that they feel anxiety, lack of confidence,and fear of being challenged while access to public services such as welfare, public utilities, or even public healthcare (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012), that they avoid sanctions for law violation with tax officers, customs officers, or traffic police (Sundstrửm, 2019), or that they want to receive better quality services While mainstream research explains why people pay bribes based on cost/benefit analysis, another vein of research on the individuals’ motives for engaging in bribery argues that bribery is a cultural phenomenon This underlines that people might feel encouraged to give bribes as others do in a reciprocity society, or they might expect others to choose corrupt acts in the same situation In this sense, corruption is considered a social phenomenon. Additionally, the interaction factors, which is relative power between the citizens and public officials have largely been ignored Thus, the socioeconomic status of individuals and norms affecting citizens' bribe-giving behaviors naturally leaves a question for researchers to examine.
From individual perspectives of corruption, the research gap of corruption is: (i) to explain why people in different social status might differ in accepting and giving bribes A citizen’s bargaining power vis-à-vis public officials would influence their decision to pay or refusal to pay bribes Thus, the cost-benefit and bargaining power framework explains why people bribe and which groups are more likely to give bribes when using public services; (ii) to investigate whether shared social norms could moderate the impacts of social status on the bribe-giving behaviours of citizens.
Research objectives and questions
The research aims at investigating how social status and culture norms affect bribes- giving of citizens Based on the empirical results, it proposes recommendations for the effective anti-corruption in Vietnam This study is among the pioneer on the bribe- giving behaviours from citizens’ perspectives; thus, its empirical results shed light on the anti-corruption agenda for Vietnam and other transitional economies.
To reach to the research objectives, this dissertation focuses on following research questions:
- How do social status and social norms affect the bribe-giving behaviours of citizens?
- How do social norms moderate the relationship among social status, norms and bribe-giving behaviours of citizens in Vietnam?
- What should be recommended to a more effective anti-corruption measures inVietnam and other emerging countries?
Subject and scope of the research
Research subject of this dissertation is the impacts of social status and norms on bribe- giving of the citizens” More specifically, the research subject of this dissertation focuses both main effects and moderating effects of social status and norms on bribe- giving of the citizens.
This research has been conducted in the context of Vietnam, focusing on the area of public service and public administration The sample is collected as secondary data, which belongs to two main primary data sources of Global Corruption Barometer (CGB) and Vietnam Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) The GCB survey asked respondents about their personal experience of bribery in their daily lives when using public services and their perception and experiences of corruption as well as their thoughts of government actions in fighting against corruption The data of Vietnam Public Administration Performance Index gave the evaluation of three complementary processes: policy formulation, policy implementation and monitoring of public service delivery In PAPI survey, citizens are seen as “end users of public administrative services” who can assess the quality of governance and public administration in their local communities.
Besides, this study further examines whether the impacts of social status and norms on bribe-giving of the citizens are consistent at the regional level These empirical results are complementary for estimated results in Vietnam For this research scope, other data sources are used from a variety of organizations’ surveys and statistics, including theCorruption Perception Index developed by Transparency International, WorldwideGovernance Indicators by the World Bank, and Democracy Index conducted by TheEconomist Intelligence Unit.
Research methods
This dissertation follows basic steps of quantitative research Initially, based on the literature review on factors affecting bribe-giving behaviors from individual perspective, this dissertation explores the research gap regarding the relationship between social status, social norms and bribe behaviors In order to fill the gap, based on the theoretical framework and data collected from various sources, relevant hypotheses are formulated and tested through Probit regression models Lastly, statistical results are reported for further discussion and implication Detailed research methods used are presented in the Chapter 3.
This dissertation used data from a variety of international sources The first data source was the Global Corruption Barometer conducted by Transparency International in
2017 at national level and regional level This survey asks citizens about their personal experience of bribery in their daily lives when using public services and their perception of corruption as well as their thoughts of government actions in fighting against corruption Global Corruption Barometer was first released in 2003 and has surveyed the experiences of everyday people in combating corruption in various countries and territories around the world.
The second data source was the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index, the country’s most massive annual nationwide policy monitoring tool It consists of six dimensions, including participation at the local level, transparency, accountability, control of corruption, public administrative procedures, and public service delivery PAPI measures and benchmarks citizens’ experiences and perceptions on the performance and quality of policy implementation and services delivery of provincial governments in Vietnam to advocate for effective and responsive governance These indices were normalized and had values ranging from 1 to 10 Accordingly, the higher index indicates the better level of administrative reform, corruption control, public service delivery and vice versa.
The other data sources come from a variety of organizations’ surveys and statistics, including the Corruption Perception Index developed by Transparency International, Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank, and Democracy Index conducted by The Economist Intelligence Unit The sources scored specific categories at country- level, and all collected data are for the year 2017 The CorruptionPerception Index indicates the level of citizens’ perceptions on public sector corruption and their evaluations on government campaign against corruption Worldwide Governance Indicators reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories, based on six dimensions of governance, including Voice and accountability, Political stability and absence of violence, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and Control of corruption The scores for each country are based on enterprise and individual data sources in various industrial and developing countries The last source is Democracy Index, developed by The Economist Intelligence Unit, which scores democracy worldwide for 165 independent countries and two territories This index includes five elements of the Electoral process and pluralism, Civil Liberties, the Functioning of Government, Political Participation, and Political Culture.
In this dissertation, quantitative research methods are employed to investigate the impacts of social status and norms on bribe-giving behaviors of citizens The research methods used in this dissertation include Desk study, Descriptive statistics Analysis, and Regression analysis Detailed research methods are presented in the Chapter 3.
Secondary information from previous research, including reports, studies and other relevant documents are collected, analyzed and summarized In order to reveal the knowledge gap of corruption and clarify research objectives, a review of literature regarding corruption and bribery has been conducted to explore the definitions of corruption and bribery, antecedents and consequences of corruption in different contexts The findings are compared in different approaches and methods.
A descriptive statistics analysis is used to describe and summarize the features of data from Global Corruption Barometer dataset Descriptive analysis forms the basis of virtually every quantitative analysis of data, together with simple graphics analysis In this dissertation, this method focuses on describing the corruption and anti-corruption situations in Vietnam, based on three main aspects: corruption and anti-corruption situations, bribe-giving of Vietnamese citizens and social norms of corruption in Vietnam.
The dissertation uses Probit models to estimate the impacts of social status and norms on bribe-giving behaviors of citizens Estimated results are also used to test the proposed hypotheses Afterwards, research results scientific basis to draw some implications for policy makers and individuals in fighting corruption in Vietnam as well as other emerging countries.
Contributions of the research
The contribution of the research to the academic literature is threefold Firstly, it applies the bargaining power framework and institutional theory to understand how social factors, including socioeconomic status and norms, affect bribe-giving of citizens under the Vietnam-specific culture Accordingly, this study not only views bribes as informal costs that citizens must pay for accessing public services; it also views bribe-giving as a norm in the society In the view of corruption as rational actions, an individual might accept bribes when the potential benefits of corruption outweigh the potential risks In corrupt transactions, the higher a citizen’s bargaining power has, the fewer bribes he/she pays This dissertation extends the bargaining power framework to explain the bribe- giving of the poor and unemployed in comparison to the low educated people It also extends the moderating effect of the bargaining power to explain the effect of social status on individuals’ bribe-giving behaviours in anti-corruption communities.
Secondly, from perspective of institutional theory, social-cultural norms on corruption strongly engage with the bribe-giving activities of citizens For example, people in communities in which citizens actively engage in anti-corruption practices as social norms, significantly associated with the low probability of giving bribes On the other hand, corrupt practice can be accepted in society, and the decision to accept corruption depends on the frequency of corruption and the way other people do things within a society It is found that social norms reduce the individual costs of corrupt behaviors,thereby promoting the growth of corruption (Truex, 2011) Hence, the institutional approach has been much more alive and inspiring to explain the bribe-giving behaviours, and it should be adopted to explain the individuals’ bribery to access public services.
Thirdly, this study is among the pioneer on the bribe-giving from individual perspectives; thus, its empirical results shed light on the anti-corruption agenda for Vietnam and other transitional economies.
In the given context, Vietnam and other Asian emerging countries, which is characterized by high level of corruption, this study provides empirical evidence and insightful explanations that why people bribe and how social factors affect bribe- giving behaviours Although there has been several research examining the antecedents as well as the motivations of corrupt behaviours among citizens, those studies still fail to take a comprehensive rational and institutional perspective to explore motives that foster individuals to offer bribes This dissertation contributes significantly to the literature, suggests a suitable framework to explain bribe-giving behaviours among citizens in different social groups and societal norms, and thus provides effective implications for anti-corruption issue in Vietnam.
Structure of the dissertation
This dissertation has been divided into five chapters.
Chapter 1 is Introduction It includes the rationales of the research, the purposes and objectives of the research, general research questions and a brief overview of the research methods.
Chapter 2 is Literature Review This chapter provides a review of current literature to the topic of corruption and bribery Accordingly, it provides various definitions and forms of corruption relating to the research study Also, the chapter includes a review of literature from previous studies identifying consequences and antecedents of corruption and bribery It provides the drivers of bribery, including passive and proactive motivations From the literature review, this chapter provides research gaps at the end.
Chapter 3 is Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology The chapter provides a detailed description of the related theories which are selected for this research It provides theoretical framework for the formulation of specific research questions and for the hypothesis to be tested The chapter also presents a description of the research design and models, including data collection, data sources, estimated models and coding procedures for the dependent and independent variables.
Chapter 4 is Empirical Results and Discussions The chapter discusses the results of the analysis and hypothesis findings.
Chapter 5 is Conclusions and Recommendations The final chapter presents main findings and conclusions Some recommendations for policy makers, governmental officials and citizens withdrawing from conclusions are provided This chapter concludes with some limitations and suggested avenues for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The concepts: Bribery, Social Status and Social Norms
It is important to clarify the definitions of bribery as well as corruption from different perspectives To start with, the term of corruption is somewhat inclusive and encompassing numerous types of frauds, such as bribery, nepotism, extortion or vote buying, etc and generally, it is true that there is no widely accepted definition of corruption (Ike, 2008) The lack of a universal definition of corruption was stated in the UN Anti-Corruption tool kit (UN, 2004) (p.111): “Conventional wisdom is that there is no single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition of corruption Attempts to develop a definition of corruption invariably encounter legal, criminological and, in many countries, political problems It was reported that when the negotiations of the United Nations Convention against corruption began early in
2002, one option under consideration was not to define corruption at all but to test specific types of acts of corruption”.
However, it is outlined some elements of corrupt practices that are generally accepted (UN, 2004), as following:
“i) the promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions. ii) the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her function”.
Corruption, summarized by the UN (2004), can be simply defined as “the misuse of
(public) power for private gain”.
The variety of forms of Corruption includes:
- “Bribery- involves the promise, offer or giving of any benefit that improperly affects the actions or decisions of a public official;
- Embezzlement – theft of resources by persons entrusted with authority and control over anything of value;
- Fraud –any behavior designed to trick or fool another person or entity for one’ s own or third party’ s benefit;
- Extortion – forcing a person to pay money or other valuables in exchange for acting or failing to act This coercion can be under the threat of physical harm, violence or restraint;
- Abuse of Power – using one’s vested authority to give undue preferential treatment to any group or individual or to discriminate against any group or individual;
- Exploiting a Conflict of Interest/Insider trading – engaging on transactions or acquiring a position or commercial interest that is incompatible with one’s official role and duties for the purpose of illegal enrichment;
- Receiving an unlawful gratuity, favor or illegal commission – a public official receives anything of value from others wishing to do business with the government;
- Favoritism – the assignment of services or resources according to family ties, party affiliation, tribe, religion, sect and other preferential groupings;
- Nepotism – a form of favoritism whereby an office holder with the right to make appointments, prefers to nominate his/her relatives for positions within the public administration;
- Illegal contributions –occurs when political parties or governments in power receives money in exchange for non-interference with the entity or group making the contribution It is closely related to bribery.”
Corruption can be defined differently based on various contexts, considered as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon (Luo, 2005) Previous studies have provided many lessons which are learnt in many cultures It is admitted that corruption is a universal disease in virtually all countries of the world (Ike, 2008).
Individual perspectives might refer to citizens’ perception Corruption is defined as an illegitimate exchange of resources such as the use or abuse of public or collective power for individual purposes (i.e., gains, benefits, profits or privileges) This definition also involves either corruption between organizations and governmental officials or intra organizations and inter-organizations (Luo, 2005) In that concept, corruption not only involves bureaucratic behaviors that violates rules or norms for private gains from abusing power in government sector Corruption might happen in both political agencies, profit organizations, and non-profit organizations, both domestically and internationally (Luo, 2005).
According to Transparency International (Transparency International, 2017), corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain” TI classified corruption into three categories: political, grand and petty corruption.
Political corruption refers to the act of manipulating the policies, regulations and procedures in the allocation of resources by political decision makers Political corruption affects the allocation of public spending and resources as the officials manipulate government’s budget on activities or projects that yield highest bribes. Hence, political corruption influences the decision-making process of politicians, leading to bend the rules of procedure and political institutions The leaders abused, ignored, or even tailored the laws and regulations to best fit their interests.
Grand corruption includes acts that are committed at high level of the government that somewhat distort the regulations, policies, or even the central functioning of the system to enable elites to gain additional wealth or other privileges at the expense of the public.
Petty corruption, or administration corruption, is everyday corruption at an entry level between public officials and ordinary citizens It is often in the form of bribery linked to the implementation of existing regulations, i.e citizens would need to pay an amount of money that is higher than the official price of some services, or even for something that is officially free Additionally, petty corruption can also be seen in the abuse of power in daily situations from public officials.
Another classification of corruption is three particular behaviors that threaten the integrity of government officials, including vote-buying, illegal-lobbying (or favor- asking), and the giving of the so-called ‘red envelopes’ either to facilitate an official transaction or as the presentation of a gift (Yu, Chen, & Lin, 2013) Accordingly, illegal lobbying is a kind of grand corruption, whereas the giving of ‘red envelopes’ is petty corruption.
It should be noted that illegal acts and corrupt acts are not necessarily the same all the time In certain societies, particular actions may already be considered a form of corrupt practices, while these acts may be classified as part of their “formal duties” and “just politics” in other societies Although definitions of corruption vary, the nature of corruption remains seven points: context- based, norm-deviated, power- related, virtually covert, intentional, ex post opportunistic and perceptional (Luo, 2005).
Firstly, depending on the different perspectives, culture or contexts, the meaning of
‘corruption’ can be viewed differently from different people Thus, changing political environment may change the way of explaining corruption terms and identifying corrupt behaviors.
Secondly, corruption is norm-deviated since it is detrimental to social welfare, violates legal codes or institutional rules stipulated in a given political context Certain behaviors can be identified as corruption in some situation, but generally, there is no legal definition which is officially established and widely accepted, except for some moral definitions In many cases, law-based norms are the most widely used This is because the legal definition of corruption is, in general, more operational, clear-cut, consistent and precise than the moral definition Furthermore, when a person gives bribes for someone else, he/she expects the receivers will prioritize his/her own benefits over the objectives of organizations This, therefore, leads to a security for private gains at the expenses of the whole society.
Thirdly, corruption always depends on power In a corrupt transaction, a party, who is a corruptor, must be in a position of power necessarily The power is created either by market imperfections or an institutional position that grants him discretionary authority.
Policy discretionary allows authority to make decisions and act corruptly for his benefits.
Fourthly, corruption is informal, as it transfers benefits from one’s public roles and power to personal gain The corrupt transaction happens even when there is no formal written contract and no guarantee for parties’ obligations Besides, corruption is partly provoked by the incompleteness of the formal system Whenever the formal system is incomplete, it will bring the corrupt actors and scheme into underground in the shadow of the formal system.
Consequences of corruption and bribery at individual levels
2.2.1 Inequality in accessing public service
Different from country level and corporate-level, studies on bribery from individual perspective is still quite vague These studies are conducted mostly at exploratory level through structural surveys by organizations such as World Bank and Transparency International The consequences of bribery and corruption on citizens are a surcharge on public service, a reduction on living standard and public service quality such as education, public healthcare, administration.
Firstly, if bribe payments became socially accepted, they would become additional fees forcing citizens to pay when accessing governmental service (Pacini et al., 2002).Besides, bribery leads to a relative increase in the prices of goods and services When a company pay bribes, it will pass the bribe expense to production expenditure as an administration cost (Nwabuzor, 2005) Hence, bribery raises the costs of product and services Secondly, wealth is gained by abusing power rather than by providing appropriate quality Accordingly, the overall quality of goods and services will decrease, at the same time, the higher quality of goods and services will become relatively expensive (Nwabuzor, 2005) Because of the rare and the price of high- quality goods, not many people can afford them, leading to decease the quality of living Moreover, bribery enhances resource allocation from social sector to intensive projects with higher bribes (McKinney & Moore, 2008) In this way, public spending suffers a massive lose, especially for non-profit areas such as healthcare, education, environment, etc As a result, bribery poses serious risks to citizens’ longevity and favor environmental deterioration As a result, citizens’ health are affected negatively in the long run (Baughn et al., 2010; McKinney & Moore, 2008).
2.2.2 Reduction in service quality and citizens’ satisfaction with public services
Existing studies explored the relationship between governmental corruption and citizen satisfaction with public services (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2011), between citizens’ trust, voting behavior and political corruption (Caillier, 2010) Accordingly, citizens were found to trust their civil servants less in countries with higher levels of corruption because corruption occurs to serve special interests of politicians and elites, then citizens assume to be less likely to view government as a problem solver Thus, corruption, real or perceived, reduces citizens’ perception of government performance in public services, negatively influencing citizens’ trust (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2011;Van de Walle & Migchelbrink, 2020) The relationship between corruption and citizens’ satisfaction is also negative as perceived corruption erodes public respect for the government as a service provider and disappoints citizens, thus fostering cynicism about government Houston et al., (2016) conducted an analysis of 21-country on citizens’ trust, government performance and corruption perceptions, taken from theWorld Bank Governance Indicators and Transparency International They found that the quality of the institutions affects citizen trust in public administration Additionally,Van de Walle & Migchelbrink (2020) performed a study of 137- European regions highlighted the absence of corruption and the improvement in quality of public service are positively correlation to citizens’ trust in public administration.
2.2.3 Inefficiency in governmental services provision and income distribution
Corruption poses additional transaction costs, hence, it reduces efforts by the bureaucracy and the quality of public investments (Bardhan, 1997; Kelman, 2000). Lack of trust in institutions may affect the innovative activities (Riaz & Cantner,
2020) As innovative projects are normally risky, corruption may raise uncertainty that deters individuals from investing in innovative activities and diverts them to more rewarding, rent seeking and easy to plan activities.
Additionally, Gupta et al., (2000) proved that countries with high level corruption are associated with inefficient government services and a low quality of public healthcare provision.
Specifically, corruption hampers national economic growth in connection to the negative effect of corruption on income distribution or inequality It may arise from the direction of money Bribes are not paid to the poor people, but to the people who have power and resources to give the payer Besides, illegal payments occur very often in sectors where the state offers a public good for free or lower than its market value A public official may refuse or delay help to the poor not able to pay the illegal commission, then public goods are diverted from their original purpose and provided for the people who can afford it A society where the public accepts authority and has low levels of accessibility may result in high levels of both inequality and corruption(Husted, 1999) Gupta et al., (2002) investigated the impact of corruption on income inequality, and they find a significant correlation between corruption and income inequality in a cross-section of 37 countries You & Khagram (2005) provided evidence that inequality increases corruption, because the poor have neither the political power nor the economic possibilities to monitor the rich, which enables the rich extort bribes.
Antecedents of corrupt behaviors among individuals
The impact of macro-environmental factors has been studied by numerous researchers. From individuals’ perspectives of corruption, corrupt acts are formed through their daily experiences of corruption Those behaviors are determined by the social, institutional and economic conditions of the countries where they live (Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, & Gangadharan, 2009) It is expected that in a community where the level of corruption is high, the tolerance of corruption might be promoted, which is reflected in social norms of behaviors Corruption becomes more acceptable because it gains widespread and easier to justify corrupt behaviors (Dey, 1989) Corruption might been emerged from substantially skewed or opaque governmental actions and decisions, weak system of counter-corruption, cultures that intertwine gift-giving with bribery, unclear business- government ties, subtle networking activities, lack of independent and well-functioned market structures, low public service efficiency, low public wages, influence of an black market, strong connections between officials and family businesses, a lack of democratic formulas for sharing power, poor media functions and inefficient openness to trade and market access’(e.g.(Bebchuk et al., 2009; Goldsmith, 1999; Husted, 1999; Johnson et al., 1998; Lambsdorff, 1999; Mauro, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Tanzi,
In a comparative study of bureaucratic corruption (Quah, 2003), corruption depends on the balance between opportunities, salaries and political effectiveness In the context of few opportunities, good salaries and effective policing, corruption will be reduced at minimal level On the contrary, the availability of opportunities, poor salaries and weak policing, corruption will be considerable Opportunities for administrative discretion and corruption derives from the modern transition in public administration agencies, especially agencies, such as customs, immigrations, police, etc have more chances to deal with foreign enterprises, banks, development projects Substantial budgets and access to large population create more opportunities for corrupt actions(Quah, 2003) Cumbersome administrative procedures cause delay and motivate their clients to pay “speed money” and simplify the processing of applications Low salaries, also, are an important cause of corruption When a civil servant is paid too low, they may be obliged to use their positions to collect bribes as a way of making ends meet, particularly when the expected cost of being caught is low Besides, the low risk of detection and low probability of punishment might flourish corruption When public officials perceive corruption as a low risk, high reward activity, they are more like to accept bribes and expect their clients to give bribes in accessing public service In this context, reducing corruption is based on increasing governmental benefits (officials’ paid), increasing the possibility of a corrupt official being caught and prosecution (policy effectiveness), and reducing returns to corruption by restricting government interference in the economy (opportunities) (Rock, 2009).
Despite the clear relationship of environmental determinants on corruption, the link between democracy and corruption is still on debate In recent studies, there are two ways of explaining the role of democratization on national corruption level (Jetter et al., 2015) First, democracy increases corruption, as more people have access to public funds and positions in the public sector (Case, 2002; Hicken, 2006; Rock, 2009). Second, it decreases corruption as the competition over the use of public funds and the filling of government positions are introduced (Chowdhury, 2004; Iwasaki & Suzuki, 2012; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; Treisman, 2000) However, it is argued that an inverted U relationship between democracy and corruption although so far no one has tested for this relationship (Jetter et al., 2015) Mohtadi & Roe (2003) provide theoretical support for why corruption might follow an inverted U relationship with democracy The explanation is that corrupt activities may first increase after democratization but could decrease naturally over time, owing to more competition among rent seekers Yet, the finding just supported empirical results in Indonesia and Thailand, which is broadly consistent with their theoretical argument There still leaves a topic of debate for researchers to explore.
In a nutshell, the external environment exerts considerable role in both ways of facilitating corruption and fight against corruption On one hand, in a weak institution,where has inefficient regulations, loss of trust, imbalanced power, officials are likely to abuse the system and engage in corrupt behavior that is detrimental to the society.Individuals are likely to bribe for personal interests On the other hand, corruption continue to decline in a strong institution that has trade openness, equal chance of competition, transparency and accountability (Dimant et al., 2016).
Social interaction, which consists of components such as social values, norms rules, have strong influences on an individual’s decision whether to corrupt or not in a given society (Dimant et al., 2016).
When it comes to sociological factors, culture is defined as a ‘difficult-to-define’ concept (Nguyen et al., 2009) According to Hofstede & Bond (1988), culture is a collective program of the mind that differentiates the members of one group of people from those of others Culture can be simply seen as a set of meanings, beliefs, value and symbols prevalent of a society (Schwartz, 2004) Cultural values evolve from generation to generation and shape the beliefs, actions and goals of individuals in a society Thus, culture orients and guides people to choose and justify their actions as well as evaluate others’ behaviors (Schwartz, 1992) Shadabi (2013) stated that corruption stems from social and cultural conditions Husted (1999) referred a corrupt country to characteristics of high power distance, high masculinity and high uncertainty avoidance Accordingly, in a culture with high power distance, superiors offer favors to subordinates in exchange for their loyalty As a results, corruption may arise due to nepotism and favoritism Other studies confirmed the positive relationship between the level of power distance and the level of corruption in a country (Achim, 2016; Davis & Ruhe, 2003; McLaughlin, 2013; Murdoch, 2009) Masculinity culture refers to a society characterized achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards (Hofstede, 1984) Davis and Ruhe (2003) investigated the relationship between masculinity and corruption level by conducting research on 42 countries. They noted that in the countries with high score of masculinity, people are more likely to receive money, or other material rewards, creating environment for extending corrupt practices The third trait of a corrupt country is greater level of uncertainty avoidance In such society, people might feel uncomfortable with uncertainty, then they tend to reduce uncertainty by obtaining more certain results Corrupt behaviors can be seen as effective mechanism for adapting unstable situations (Tong, 2014).Besides, the choice between long term orientation versus short term orientation also correlates to the level of corruption Long term orientation cultures are described as “persistence, ordering relationships by status, thrift and having a sense of shame”, while short term orientations are referred to “personal steadiness, protecting face, respect for tradition, reciprocation of greetings, favors and gifts” (Hofstede,
2011) Therefore, long term orientation is associated with a dynamic and future oriented mentality, whereas short term orientation might enhance the needs for gift or favors giving to get immediate benefits (Achim, 2016; Fang, 2003) Other studies found the positive relationship between individualistic society and high level of corruption A collectivistic community is expected to force members acts for their own groups without questioning In such groups, members are supposed to violate the law, increasing corruption Davis and Ruhe (2003) explored countries with individualism where valued competition and democracy, such as United States, Great Britain or Australia, the level of corruption is much lower than countries with collectivism culture The more collectivism a society is, the higher level of corruption (Davis & Ruhe, 2003; Murdoch, 2009; Tong, 2014).
In sociology, attention is mainly focused on the relationship between social structures and corruption From a sociological point of view, an interesting question is how social structure affects the possibility and nature of corruption and how that affects the society Many existing studies have highlighted how actors determine to act through social norms and rules Corruption is considered a departure from socially accepted norms Empirical research uses various forms of qualitative and quantitative analysis.Opinions on corruption and how it should be investigated are also very different It has been arguing whether corruption could be functional for the society in which it originated (Olson, 1989) It is not necessary to believe that corruption is negative or harmful, because it is a means of cohesion in conflict societies, enable social mobility and allow stability through wealth distribution These scholars discovered many positive effects of corruption, such as integration of industrial elites into the aristocratic political system by purchasing aristocratic titles In other words, from a fairly optimistic point of view, corruption will “grease the wheels” and make people urgently needed to change It is pointed out that corruption may be a way to overcome traditional laws and bureaucratic regulations that hinder economic growth On the other side, many scholars have begun to argue that the effects of corruption are generally negative and emphasize the immoral nature of this activity Corruption is a shame in every country Bribe recipients do not talk about it or feel honored to received too much Social structure is important for explaining the emergence and persistence of corrupt behaviors More importantly, the social structure explains why corruption rarely occurs in certain countries Accordingly, the prevention of corruption also requires collective action to enforce norms against corruption.
National culture can impact significantly on individual’s engagement of corruption. The that a country which is described as high uncertainty avoidance, high masculinity, and high power distance shows a high level of corruption and experiences a deterioration in institutional quality (Dimant et al., 2016) It is proved that citizens living in strong anti- corruption communities are less likely to give bribes than those living in corrupt societies, where people accept bribes as a norm to “get things done” (Le & Nguyen ,2020) In addition to studies conducted by aggregating at country level such as Treisman (2000) and Paldam (2002), experimental research are also considered as an unique methodology to explore individuals’ attitudes and behaviors towards corruption in different cultural countries (Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2002; Barr & Lindelửw, 2004; Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, & Mullainathan, 2007; Cameron et al., 2009; Frank & Schulze, 2000; Olken, 2007) Bühren (2019) conducted a bribery experimental comparison between China and Germany, indicating that social norms, such as reciprocity and trust, impact significantly on frequencies of decision on bribes taken by public officials and citizens Barr and Lindelửw (2004) conducted an experimental study using nursing students in Ethiopia as subjects, concluded that corruption in public sector is less likely to happen in the place that service providers have higher income and the risk of being caught is higher Using field experiments, Bertrand et al (2007) found that corruption not only reflect transfer from citizens to bureaucrats, but it also distorts allocation Besides, by using data from
600 road projects in Indonesia, Olken (2007) found that corruption level is reduced more effectively by governmental audits rather than monitoring by local authorities.Conducting research in four countries with low level of corruption (Australia, India,Indonesia and Singapore), Cameron et al (2009) found that the propensities to punish corrupt behavior is much variable than propensities to engage in corruption across culture In less corrupt countries, the propensity to engage in corruption is lower, whereas the propensity to punish corruption is higher.
Beside cultural aspects, researchers also found the effect of individual’s features, including education, gender, occupation, income, age, etc on corrupt behavior are considerable (Dimant et al., 2016) Higher education is strongly correlated with the likeliness to condemn corrupt behavior and the reluctance to accept even small bribes (Dimant et al., 2016; Le & Nguyen, 2020; Truex, 2011) Typically, women tend to obey society rules and are less likely to take serious risks and therefore less often commit to corruption Females are perceived to be more ethical than males due to their disparities on biological traits and social roles Women are usually associated with passivity, sensitivity, risk fear, whereas men are considered strength, aggression and risk taken (Swamy et al., 2001) This suggest differences towards level of compromise on unethical issues or illegal actions between males and females Frank et al., (2011) finds that men are willing to bribe more often with larger amount than women, and female officials are offered less than their male colleagues Similarly, People of lower class who are unemployed, low-educated or unskilled, typically feel anxiety, lack of confidence and fear of being difficult while using public service such as welfare or even public healthcare (Le, 2018) Thus, they tend to pay higher bribe and bribe more frequently.
Research strands of corruption and bribe behaviors
Corruption as a rational action draws attention to corruption carried out by rational actors who behave corruptly due to the benefit obtained from corruption Accordingly,corruption is seen as a result of a rational cost/benefit analysis by individual, as when the potential benefits of corruption outweigh the potential risks, then they will be corrupted The cost/benefit calculation performed by the actors includes the potential benefits of the corrupt behaviors, the possibility of being caught and the possibility of sanctions When an individual decides whether to adopt corrupt practices, it is important to consider the severity of the sanctions because it will directly affect the expected returns of the actor (Jeong & Weiner, 2012) The size of the returns also directly affects people’s perception of the attractiveness of corruption For instance, a high bribe will result in great temptation and increase the possibility of corruption (Rabl, 2011).
Scholars from this perspective tend to focus on the legal system It is believed that the compliance to law and legal system depends on the sanctions and incentives which exists in the country (Biswas, 2017; Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1999) If there are incentives for corruption, then the same severe sanctions must be imposed. Sanctions must be widely public and be used to stop corruption Knowing that the law is repeatedly violated in public within a period of time can eliminate the motivation of ordinary people to comply with the law This creates a vicious circle of large-scale violations and imitations that affects all areas of society.
Studies of corruption as a rational action have analyzed various situations that affect the possibility of corruption, such as the risk of punishment and the involved transaction costs (Lambsdorff, 2002), the complexity of corrupt behaviors (Ajzen,
1991), the risk of information disclosure (Carrillo, 2000), and the expected sanctions (Goel & Rich, 1989) The legal and regulatory environment directly affects the possibility of corrupt behaviors, which are significant to curbing corruption (Rose- Ackerman, 1999) The legal system also is a dimension of international legal system.
As studied, many nations have joint to anti-corruption treaties, such as OECD Anti- Bribery Convention 1997 This tends to deter cross-border corruption For example, companies doing business internationally have faced the risks of cross-border bribery and the degree of application of anti-corruption laws in the countries (Jeong & Weiner,
2012) As a result, uncertainty in law enforcement, perception of corruption or other’s compliance with the law, and lack of law effectiveness can all lead to corruption in international business.
From this perspectives, rational corruption is regarded as the business cost of doing business in enter a new market (Jensen, Li, & Rahman, 2010; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).When managers choose to conduct business overseas, they consider corruption as a part of the rules of the game, which should be included in a “pay to play” or “tax” in the evaluation of future business operations (Jeong & Weiner, 2012) Corruption is of vital importance of decision about entering new markets Nonetheless, on the contrary to taxation, corruption has additional complexity due to its confidentiality and illegality (Castro, Phillips, & Ansari, 2020) Corruption can reduce the amount of investment or the amount of payment for foreign mergers and acquisitions that the companies intend to pay (Weitzel & Berns, 2006) Therefore, national legal and institutional system have great influence on the company’s decision to invest overseas In addition, firms that operate or have headquarters in the country with strong anti-corruption regulations are less willing to activities in corrupt countries and more likely to face serious consequences of corruption at the international level (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006) In order to reduce the risk of international corruption, the multinational companies have formulated various strategies, ranging from outsourcing corruption risks with the help of intermediaries (Biswas, 2017) to cooperating with local companies in various ways to make use of corrupt markets (Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006). Sometimes, companies are unable to solve the corrupt problems by avoiding entering the new market, but they can solve the problems by entering the market without their own capital The none of equity to enter the markets gives the companies the opportunity to participate in a highly corrupt economy and avoids certain costs associated with corruption.
Corruption as a rational behavior has studied the relationship between company ownership structure and corrupt acceptance (Clarke & Xu, 2004; Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah, 2007; Wu, 2009) The relationship is of significance; however, it is sophisticated and hard to unravel Particularly, the influence of ownership structure on managers’ motivation to participate in corrupt actions is considerable and partially discovered For instance, if the managers of a listed companies pay bribes for the benefit of the company, it will be his/her unimaginable consequences if discovered.Under the limited liability contract and the assumption that shareholders are not responsible for the manager’s corrupt actions, the manager will be punished while the owner will not be punished It is reasonable to assume that when managers own a large number of company shares, they have more incentives to engage in corruption(Ramdani & Van Witteloostuijn, 2012) When management combines its incentives with the company’s motivations and aligns the incentives, the benefits of corruption might increase and thus raise the likelihood of corruption From this point of view,managers of large, listed companies and managers of state-owned companies are less prone to corruption than managers who own a large number of shares When employees’ salaries are considered low, even when the company performed well, the possibilities of corrupt behaviors increase Hence, corruption and compensation level are vital for shaping leadership behaviors (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) It is also proof that family ownership relates to the possibility of corruption and the efficiency of ani- corruption activities (Richards & Schembera, 2019).
Furthermore, transparency can reduce corruption by increasing the risk of exposure to the public Increasing transparency can combat corruption (Halter, De Arruda, & Halter, 2009) Transparency and corruption surveys have been conducted in a number of studies that examine the roles of external and internal factors on corruption. Recently, most extensive research on corruption derives data survey from Transparency International and the World Bank.
The biggest advantage of this perspective is that it is easy and simple to understand and apply in knowledge of corruption It provides powerful insight into the dynamics of corruption Nevertheless, the greatest weakness is that all companies will be involved in corruption if the benefit is high and the probability of being detected and punished of doing corruptly is low If there is no potential rent to be extracted from corruption, it is likely not to be corrupt, which converse anecdotal results.
In fact, different individuals react very differently to the same situation This means that although rational thinking can be considered theoretically as a useful way to decide whether to corrupt or not, there are many things to do in engage such behaviors.The analysis often focuses on financial incentives, but the incentives and penalties are actually much more complicated than simple financial gains and losses In reality, not all individuals choose corruption, even the financial benefits are high, and the cost of corruption is low Therefore, other aspects of the complex dynamics of corruption should be more considered by different perspectives.
2.4.2 Perceived as an institutionalized practice
Corruption as an institutionalized practice highlights the role of institutional practices on making conditions for corrupt behaviors Regarding institutional theory from sociology perspectives, individuals might respond to the cognitive, normative and regulatory pressures of the environment There is a large amount of literature on neo- institutional theories that corruption is a result of institutional practices (Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & Meyer, 2017) This view emphasizes that corruption not only stems from calculating cost/benefits, but also is affected by institutionalized practices in a community In that community, a common value system is shared, and community members interacts more frequently with each other rather than actors outside the community In this kind of community, certain practices become a legal way of doing things done, and individuals are under tremendous pressure to deviate from these practices.
From this perspective, institutions are agreement on the correct course of action (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996) Institutionalized practices are “relatively widely diffused practices, techniques or rules” (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002) Accordingly, Institutionalized practices become entrenched and taken for granted The behavior of actor is largely influenced by the institutionalized practices Individuals respond to their social environment, involving the institutional pressures from institutional context (Scott, 2013) From this perspective, even “bad” social behaviors, for example, corrupt behaviors, can be institutionalized A social fact can be perceived a conceivable, obvious, and natural way to become “the way we do things around here”. Although well- functioned social structure and institutions, such as laws, courts, police, can successfully inhibit social corruption in society, there is still a lack of accountable institutions that can allow corrupt practices to be taken for granted This process of institutionalization is a vital part of explaining the difficulty of ending corruption in areas where corruption is common and widely recognized.
From previous studies, it is obvious organizations do not take action independently of the people who lead them Besides, leaders are affected by the social environment in which they work, including institutional practices that exist in their field of work.
Institutional factors might have impacts on the interpretation of corrupt behaviors and on the boundary between ethical and unethical behaviors of an organization (Scott,
2013) Even if they are considered corrupt acts, they can be taken for granted In an environment where corruption is widespread, institutionalized corrupt behaviors are particularly difficult to stop When a practice is widely viewed as the ways of doing things, even severe punishment cannot change these behaviors The executives’ perception of corruption may lead them to believe that these actions are unlikely to be detected or sanctioned (Collins, Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009) Accordingly,institutional pressure might lead to increased corruption in the company or industry.For instance, a high-status company whose status is threatened might want to maintain its status and be more prone to corruption because the company has huge resources and a strong motivation for corruption The company have a strong network and mechanism to successfully implementing corruption (Jeong & Siegel, 2018) If a reputable company commits preliminary and limited acts of corruption, it can be easily accepted and legitimated By that way, the company is successfully maintaining its position, so the company is also interested in this kind of behavior The initial cost- benefit analysis of the first company has been superseded by the widespread belief that this is an acceptable way of doing business The following companies will be encouraged to engage in corruption, then corrupt companies and behaviors are legalized locally Corruption can also be institutionalized by exposing companies to fierce competition As mentioned earlier, managers might view corruption as a way to increase competitive advantage, especially they think other rivals are doing the same thing When multiple companies are involved in this situation, corrupt behavior can easily be regarded as normal or standard behavior and institutionalized in the field of industry Several determinants that affect the possibilities of corrupt practices includes organizational structure, institutional pressure, industry standard and structure, and financial results (Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib, & Perlitz, 2010; Wu, 2009) Therefore,either external or internal factors affect the perceived competitive advantage from corrupt behaviors Another area where institutional practices affect corporate corruption is the institutionalization of dysfunctional practices to cover up corrupt behavior For example, professional accountants who are responsible for auditing companies and discovering misconduct may lead to corruption if they institutionalize audit practice and impair their normal functions (Gabbioneta, Prakash, & Greenwood, 2014).
From the institutional perspective, people do not have options rather than accepting corruption because it is an accepted norm The firms chooses to follow the local social norm to avoid “being kicked out of the game” (Zhou et al., 2013) because they feel that the government officials might offer preferential treatment to their rivals if they are not willing to give bribes In this vein, the firms may suffer heavy losses if they refuse to engage in bribes, then they prefer to follow the corrupt practices Secondly, when a firm accepts bribes, it is for standard treatments it should have been entitled (Nguyen et al., 2016) In those cases, corruption can speed up the wheels of commerce that helps firms overcoming bureaucratic barriers and burdensome processes Corrupt acts might help avoid the delays or unnecessary procedure that might be caused by governmental officials (Malesky et al., 2020; Nguyen et al., 2016).
Research gaps
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of concepts, antecedents, rationales, contexts, and outcomes of corruption from either firm-level perspectives or individual- level perspectives Although corruption and bribery are popular and attractive topics of debate to researchers, managers and practitioners, there are many research questions unexplored First and foremost, most of the research on corruption has been conducted at national and corporate levels Hence, research at individual level is still limited This dissertation focuses on individual perspectives of corrupt behaviors, especially bribe- giving behaviors This gives an insight on the side of bribe-offerers in corrupt transactions Bribe-giving behaviors can be explained as a result of a rational cost/benefit analysis by individual In most cases, when benefits of giving bribes outweighs the cost of bribes, individuals are more likely to give bribes However, the interaction factors between the parties, in comparing relative power between citizens and officials are vague.
Second, new research on bribery highlighted the explanations based on cost and benefits analysis, without mentioning other psychological and sociological aspects of individuals An individual choosing whether to pay a bribe or not to avoid sanctions must evaluate if bribes bring economic gains Moreover, the profit-maximizing approach also shares interests in economic gains as a vital explanation of why people paying bribes.
Third, the individual’s behaviors of giving bribes are influenced by factors such as social norms, culture of a community Some studies argue that bribery is a social and cultural phenomenon and the profit motives are not rational for individuals to give bribes, which also differs from firms’ incentives In this sense, bribe-giving is not only individual calculation and knowledge but also the social pressure to comply with informal norms of corruption Thus, the socioeconomic status of individuals and norms affecting citizens' bribe-giving behaviors naturally leaves a question for researchers to examine Overall, it is essential to understand how socioeconomic factors and social norms affect bribe-giving from an individual perspective.
Fourth, the impacts of individual’s social status on bribe-giving behaviors of different individuals might differ in the context of various social and cultural norms The moderating effects of cultural norms might influence on the relationship between social status of an individual and his/her bribe decisions The influence of institutional factors on the interactions among social status, social norms and bribe behaviors should be focused on to examine these interactions in different contexts This thesis focuses on explaining why people bribe and examining the impact of determinants on bribe-giving behaviors from individual perspectives of corruption.
Finally, comparative research on the impact of social status, norms on bribe behaviors of Vietnamese citizens and those in other countries has not been explored Thus, this thesis also aims to carry out a testing and robustness check test of those relationships between Vietnam and other countries in the region.
The research gap of corruption includes: (i) to explain why people in different social status might differ in accepting and giving bribes A citizen’s bargaining power vis-à- vis public officials would influence their decision to pay or refusal to pay bribes Thus,the bargaining power framework help explain why people bribe, and which groups are more likely to give bribes when using public service (ii) to investigate whether shared social norms could predict the bribe-giving behaviors of citizens (iii) to explore the impacts of individual’s social status on bribe behaviors in different social and cultural contexts (iv) to propose some practical implications for anti-corruption measures inVietnam.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Bribery drivers: passive motivation versus proactive motivation
Studies on rationales for engaging in bribery have followed in two different directions, either passive motivation or proactive motivation to bribe (Frei & Muethel, 2017).
On the one hand, the motive for engaging in bribery is to follow “the rule of game” and for isomorphic reason (Nguyen et al., 2016) This type of bribes is called “survival bribes”, “greasing bribes” or “non-collusive bribes” (Malesky et al., 2020) From the institutional perspective, they do not have options rather than paying bribes because it is an accepted norm They feel that the government officials might offer preferential treatment to their rivals if they are not willing to give bribes In this vein, people typically feel anxiety, lack of confidence and fear of being difficult while using public service such as welfare or even public healthcare (Le, 2018) The proportion of people paying bribes is higher and the number of bribes is larger when they are disappointed of low speed and quality of public service The fear of receiving low speed or worse service often arise from the lack of confidence of the bribe-offers or the lack of trust in public administrations Another reason is discretion authority of officials and citizens in public transaction (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, 2013) On one side, the policy discretion allows official to decide making it difficult or easy, fast or slow service procedure to his/her clients, which leads to bribe giving and accepting behaviors On the other side, citizens who have wide range of freedom to make decision often accept bribes for work to get things done For example, the rich clients are more willing to pay due to a higher discretion authority, valuation of time and demand (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012).
On the other hand, individuals pay bribes for unfair favorable treatments, which is benefit-seeking bribes or rent-seeking bribes In contrast to passive motivation, proactive motivation aims to outperform competitors to gain resources and competitive advantage (Frei & Muethel, 2017) Thus, where citizens pay to avoid sanctions for law violation such as in customs or traffic police, they might get short-term benefits form an illegal act From collusive actions, citizens may have incentives to investigate bribery and receive benefits from violations Citizens in those situations act first and offer bribes following a legal breach (Sundstrửm, 2019) From cost-benefit analysis, the public officials may evaluate the risks and gains of bribe accepting behaviors In details, the income of bribery, seen as an income opportunity, is compared to the chance of state detecting, such as loss of employment, penalty rates and the relative size of salary. Thus, the rational views on why people pay bribes are based on the assumptions that a citizen expect how public officials will react If the enforcement officer responds to the bribe offers, citizens might feel encouraged to give bribes They might choose to refuse to bribe if they do not see the net benefits, even when they perceive the price of non- compliance of bribe agreement with public officials In this vein, more powerful individuals may be able to avoid or negotiate down the amounts of bribes For those situations, the ability to refuse to pay bribes or to negotiate for better net benefits from bribes depend on its bargaining power (Rose-Ackerman, 1975) The bargaining power is reliance on its capacity and the availability of alternatives to bribes ( Rose- Ackerman, 1975).
From this perspective, individuals are rational actors and rational actors make their decisions or choices within a benefit-cost framework In the situation of deciding whether or not to involve in corruption, an individual will choose to bribe government officials when it perceives the potential benefit of doing that exceeds the cost it incurred (Gao, 2011) Hence, there is a positive relationship exists between an individual's perceived benefit and its behavior of bribery (Gao, 2010).
Research hypothesis development
Hollingshead (1975) indexed four factors of the social status of an individual, including her gender, marital status, education, and occupation, while economic status commonly refers to income Socioeconomic status is defined as a measure of one’s combined economic and social standings The socioeconomic status of an individual is an economic and sociological combined measure of income, education, and employment (Baker, 2004) People are usually separated into groups based on these metrics, from least advantaged to most advantaged, or low, medium, or high socioeconomic status Individuals from different groups or socioeconomic structures have different attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors toward corruption (Maeda &Ziegfeld, 2015).
In this research, I proposed a process that explains the citizens’ engagement in bribery payment when using public services Accordingly, citizens might engage in bribery payment through two stages as follows At the first stage, cost/benefit perspective is helpful to explain who would be more likely to face situations to pay bribes In other words, by calculating cost and benefits of giving bribes, those who would be more beneficial from engaging bribes are more likely to give bribes At the second stage, if they face pressure, they will consider whether to actually engage in bribe or they have other alternatives In such cases, bargaining power helps explain why some people would be less likely to pay bribes while others would not In both stages, it is expected that social norms moderate these relationships between social status and bribe behaviors of citizens.
Net benefits of bribe-giving behaviors
The net benefits of bribe-giving depend significantly on the motivation of bribe exchange The benefits of paying bribes speed the services and increase the quality of services that citizens might receive from public officials (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012). People are more likely to pay bribes when they expect to receive high speed and better quality than the standard services that the citizens are conventionally given This type of bribe- giving is popular in emerging countries where market-supporting institutions are under- developed, and professions, salaries, and integrity of the public officials are relatively low (Nguyen, Sullivan Mort, & D’souza, 2015; Nguyen et al., 2020) The trade-off between speed of service, quality of service, and “bribe” fees of service influence citizens’ decisions whether to bribe or not (Nguyen, Sullivan Mort, & D’souza, 2015) From a cost-benefit analysis, the rich will be more likely to bribe since they have the ability to pay bribes, and their cost of refusing to pay bribes is higher than the “bribe” price for service, for example, long waiting time and poor quality services (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012).
In contrast, the poor are less able to pay bribes that are required to access public services for two reasons Firstly, they are unable to afford bribes as they do not have enough resources, or they do not have other alternatives In this sense, the marginal costs of giving bribes of the poor are incredibly high, and they are less likely to pay bribes.
Secondly, instead of bribing for saving time or receiving a high quality of services, the poor prefer saving that amount of money for other purposes and willing to accept the standard services as commonly provided Like the poor, the unemployed might have a lower probability of giving bribes than the employed because they have time to wait for the standard services, and the unemployed do not have enough resources to offer bribes either.
However, the bargaining theory predicts that the unemployed and the poor are those who have lower social status (Hollingshead, 1975) They lack confidence and are afraid of participating and getting public services Therefore, the poor and unemployed might face two separate effects on their decision on bribe-giving First, they have low socioeconomic status or low bargaining power; thus, they are more likely to pay bribes since they lack confidence and are anxious or afraid of being made difficult It is called anxiety effect (Kankeu & Ventelou, 2016; Peiffer & Rose, 2018) Second, the poor and unemployed do not have enough resources or the ability to pay a bribe, and the marginal costs of paying bribes are much higher than the marginal benefits received from the bribes-ability to pay effect (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012) Thus, they are less likely to give bribes.
In the context of Vietnam, the poor and near poor have received much support from the government, especially in using public services For example, the poor have tuition waive when enrolled in a public school; they are offered free health insurance; they are also waived any administrative fees when using public administrative services Those supportive policies make the poor and unemployed less participating in bribe-giving behaviors Therefore, combining effects lead to hypothesis 2 as following.
H1: The poor and unemployed are less likely to give bribes once using public services Bargaining power – relative power between citizens and public officials
Previous studies have focused on the influences of economic motives on bribe-giving behaviors From the economic perspective, bribe-giving is considered as an instrumental, rational decision based on economic utility and profit maximization (Lan
& Hong, 2017) For example, bribe-giving is a “get things done” way for individuals and organizations to achieve optimal economic gains It is commonly accepted that corruption depends on power, and the bargaining power framework would be appropriate for studying bribes (Fisman & Miguel, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 2013; Svensson, 2003) Bargaining power is defined as the relative power of parties to exert influence over each other in a negotiation In this sense, a citizen’s bargaining power is the relative power over public officials in making decisions in bribes Bargaining power can influence the citizen’s ability to refuse to pay bribes or even negotiate for better benefits from bribes (Maeda & Ziegfeld, 2015; Nguyen, Dinh, & Pham, 2020).
The bargaining power of a citizen depends on her capabilities and the availability of alternatives to bribes The bargaining power framework views citizens as not only as victims but also as facilitators of bribes If a citizen is a victim of bribes, higher bargaining power reduces the possibility of giving bribes to access public service. Maeda and Ziegfeld (2015) find that strong bargaining power is together with higher education background, experiences, and perception of corrupt issues Accordingly, citizens with high education levels might have strong bargaining power and be able to refuse bribes since they have better knowledge to be more critical and less engage in corrupt activities They might have a better legal understanding, more substantial social knowledge and have alternatives to influence (Dimant & Schulte, 2016). Besides, well- educated people might know other influences rather than bribes; for example, they can use social relationships, follow formal regulations and procedures. They are even willing to report officials’ harassment and extortion to the higher authorities if they become victims of corrupt actions or being difficult while accessing public services In contrast, the citizens with little education are less knowledgeable about how the bureaucracy works, and they find themselves as potential recourse for the corrupt officials Therefore, we hypothesize:
H2: Highly educated citizens associate with lower probability of engaging in bribe- giving behaviors
The influences of institutional factors on both stages: Social norms
Another strand of previous studies explains corruption based on social norms(Lindgren, 1992; Nguyen, Ho, Le, & Nguyen, 2016; Zhou, Han, & Wang, 2013).According to the socialized actor theory, individual action is intended as a choice among alternatives
(Parsons & Shils, 1951) When people are pushed to weigh up the options, they might choose what they prefer or choose what they believe in conforming to social expectations Social norms can drive bribery in two ways Abbink, Freidin, Gangadharan, & Moro, 2018) First, in a society where bribes are common, people may accept bribery as “others do the same” and give bribes for isomorphic reasons. People in corrupt contexts justify bribe-giving behavior based on assessments of other peers’ behavior It suggests that people decide on whether to pay bribes or not based on the actions of others’ behavior (Sundstrửm, 2019) In other words, citizens living in the communities in which people are willing to fight against corruption tend to have a lower probability of bribery engagement, and vice versa Second, in a corrupt society, citizens may feel the fear and anxiety that the refusion of paying a bribe would upset officials and receive worse service or unnecessary delays Then, in provinces whose level of corruption in the public sector or corrupt public officials are perceived as serious, citizens must accept bribes as the rule because they do not have other alternatives (Sundstrửm, 2019; Truex, 2011) As a result, citizens’ bargaining power in bribery negotiation might be reduced, and the probability of giving bribes increases. However, in a strong anti-corrupt community, in which people refused bribery or are willing to report corruption, the likelihood of people offering bribes decreases.
In Vietnam, there is a typical culture that influences individual perception, lifestyle, and behaviors over generations It is called “village culture”, which is formed and preserved in rural areas In each village, the relationships of relatives, neighbours, and local authority become intertwined, and the behaviors and responsibilities of members are controls by village customs Hence, in rural areas, citizens tend to have a lower probability of giving bribes rather than those in urban culture Social norms are not only important for individual decision making but also significant to moderate impacts of individual socioeconomic status on bribe-giving In this sense, the impacts of individual socioeconomic status on bribe-giving would be lessened when the social norms of corruption are weak Therefore, hypotheses were proposed.
H3a: Living in a “culture of anti-corruption” community, citizens reduce their probability of bribe-giving.
H3b: Social norms as a “culture of anti-corruption” make the impacts of education, unemployment, and income on bribe-giving lessened.
Based on theoretical framework and hypothesis development, the theoretical analysis of this dissertation is as follows.
Data sources
This study used data from a variety of international sources The first data source was the Global Corruption Barometer conducted by Transparency International in 2017 at national level and regional level.
At national level, the survey was conducted at the individual level in the 18 randomly selected provinces with 122 districts/communes in all six economic regions of Vietnam, representing population size, urbanization, and development levels. Interviewed citizens were drawn by a cluster sampling method in which interviewers randomly selected a cluster and the starting address/household The sample consisted of 999 respondents who were over 18-years old The survey asked respondents about their personal experience of bribery in their daily lives when using public services and their perception and experiences of corruption, as well as their thoughts of government actions in fighting against corruption The description of sample is shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Sample description of Vietnam data
Level of highest education: Up to high school 83 96.69 Level of highest education: Higher school and above 916 8.31
At regional level, the survey is conducted in 16 countries and territories, including Australia, Korea, Japan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Mongolia The survey asked citizens about their experiences with corruption and how they perceived the effectiveness of government efforts against corruption in these countries However, reaching the research questions, five countries and territories were excluded: Australia, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Mongolia since they are neither being emerging countries nor having sufficiently homogeneous data as the rest The study sample includes 15,015 respondents surveyed in 11 countries and territories Each respondent corresponds to a household of which a member over 18 years old is surveyed.
The second data source was the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index, the country’s most massive annual nationwide policy monitoring tool It consists of six dimensions, including participation at the local level, transparency, accountability, control of corruption, public administrative procedures, and public service delivery 1 PAPI measures and benchmarks citizens’ experiences and perceptions on the performance and quality of policy implementation and services delivery of provincial governments in Vietnam to advocate for effective and responsive governance Among the six dimensions of the PAPI index, the two selected dimensions for this study were Public Administrative Procedures and Transparency in local decision-making since they strongly associate with corruption at the local level (Thang V; Nguyen, Bach, Le, & Le, 2017) Public Administrative Procedures reflected citizens’ perception of the government’s efforts on administrative reform, including certification of procedures, construction permits, land procedures, and personal procedures Transparency measured how citizens perceived the government’s efforts on the transparency of poverty lists, commune budget, and local land-use planning and pricing These two indexes were normalized and had values ranging from 1 to 10 The higher indexes indicated a better level of public administration reform and more transparent, and vice versa.
1 Since 2019, PAPI was added two sub-indexes, including environmental governance and E-governance.
In addition, the other data sources come from a variety of organizations’ surveys and statistics, including the Corruption Perception Index developed by Transparency International, Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank, and Democracy Index conducted by The Economist Intelligence Unit The sources scored specific categories at country-level, and all collected data are for the year 2017 The composition of the research sample and data descriptions are presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Description of national data of Asian countries s (-2.5 to +2.5) people)
Source: Consolidated from Transparency International, World Bank, and The Economist Intelligence Unit
Ranked worldwide 180 countries and territories, the Corruption Perception Index indicates the level of citizens’ perceptions on public sector corruption and their evaluations on government campaign against corruption It uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt, and 100 is very clean In 2017, it highlighted that most countries are making little or no progress in fighting corruption Also, people in corrupt countries, such as journalists and activists, are in danger to raise their voices against corruption in their daily lives (Transparency International, 2018).
Worldwide Governance Indicators reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories, based on six dimensions of governance, including Voice and accountability, Political stability and absence of violence, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, and Control of corruption The scores for each country are based on enterprise and individual data sources in various industrial and developing countries In the study’s scope, the dimensions of Political stability and absence of violence, Government effectiveness and Control of corruption are used as proxies for the governance quality of surveyed countries and territories.
The last source is Democracy Index, developed by The Economist Intelligence Unit,which scores democracy worldwide for 165 independent countries and two territories.This index includes five elements of the Electoral process and pluralism, CivilLiberties, the Functioning of Government, Political Participation, and PoliticalCulture In this study, the national democracy and civil liberties scores are used as a proxy for the democracy index.
Estimated models and variables
Bribe-giving behaviors of citizens are affected by many factors, including social status, norms, and characteristics of citizens Each factor is represented by different variables in equation (1).
- Y is the dependent variable of bribe-giving behaviors Y = 1 if an individual gave bribes when using public services, including public administration and public utility services (for example, public schools; public healthcare; getting documents like birth certificate, driver’s license, passport or permit from the government; getting water, sanitation, or electric services; and contacting police or courts), and Y = 0 otherwise.
- X is the vector representing social status proxied by education, employment, and economic situation.
- Z is the vector representing social norms proxied by norms on anti-corruption and corruption practices, such as bribe-reporting willingness, bribe-reporting acceptance, and level of corruption in the public sector in the locality.
- C is the vector of control variables for individuals, such as age, gender, ethnicity, religion, and household size of the respondents and control for the community of respondents such as location and provincial governance.
- � are random errors, which are independent identically distributed.
- Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
- � , � , � , and � are vectors of parameters that need to be estimated.
In this study, the variable of “bribe-giving” is measured by asking citizens about their personal experiences when they accessed essential services of government in the past
12 months, including public schools, public healthcare, getting an identity document like birth certificate, driver’s licence, passport or permit from the government, getting water, sanitation or electric services, contacting police or courts The variable of
“social norms” in this dissertation is measured by two proxies of Level of corruption in the public sector and Bribe-reporting willingness rate of district.
The definitions and measures of variables are described in Table 3.3.
High education = 1 if citizen gets high school education and higher; 0 otherwise It is a dummy variable GCB
Poor and near- poor = 1 if a citizen is poor or near-poor who has less than the average income; 0 otherwise It is a dummy variable.GCB
Unemployment = 1 if citizen is unemployed; 0 otherwise It is a dummy variable GCB
Table 3.3 Variable definitions and measures
Bribe-giving = 1 if a citizen paid bribes in order to get the public services, including public schools; public healthcare; getting documents like birth certificate, driver’s license, passport or permit from government; getting water, sanitation or electric services; and contacting police or courts that he needed (once or twice/ a few times/ often), and equals to 0 otherwise.
Rural = 1 if the citizen lives in rural areas, and 0 otherwise It is a dummy variable.
Level of corruption in the public sector measuring how citizens perceive corruption in the public sector, including public administration and public service, ranging from 1 (least corrupt) to 5 (most corrupt).
Bribe-reporting willingness rate of district measuring the citizen’s willingness to report bribe- giving at district level It is the rate of willingness to report bribery behaviors It is calculated as scale from 0 to 1 (or from 0 to 100%).
Female = 1 if an individual is female and 0 otherwise GCB
Age measuring the age of the respondents GCB
Kinh group = 1 if the citizen is Kinh (Viet people), and 0 otherwise.
Religions = 1 if the citizen follows any religions, and 0 otherwise.
Household size the number of people living in the same house GCB
Provincial public administration measuring the perception of citizens on public administrative procedures, ranging from 0 to 10.
Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index
Provincial transparency measuring the transparency of the province in providing public administrative services, ranging from 0 to 10.
Population It is the total population of a country.
It is proxied by national GDP per capita (constant
It measures the democracy index, ranging from 1 to 10.
Confucian It is a dummy variable; it equals 1 if a citizen is
The estimated coefficients in the equation (1) show the changes of z-score corresponding to the changes of independent variables It is necessary to calculate the marginal effect of independent variables on the dependent variable The marginal effect measures the impacts of independent variables on the probability of citizens changing from non-bribe (Y = 0) to bribe (Y = 1) The marginal effect is calculated as follows:
The estimated results of equation (2a), (2b), and (2c) imply the change in the probability that a citizen shifts from not paying a bribe to paying a bribe when independent variables change from their mean.
This dissertation estimates the impacts of social status and norms on bribe-giving of citizens in Vietnam In additional, the dissertation also checks whether the impacts are consistent in a broader context of emerging Asian countries to add evidence that would be advised for developing anti-corruption agenda in Vietnam and other emerging countries in the Asian region.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Bribe-giving and Anti-corruption in Vietnam
4.1.1 Research context: Corruption and anti-corruption situation in Vietnam
As the culmination of a long anti-colonial and anti-imperialist fight for independence, through a war of national liberation, Vietnam has gained power under the communist party’s victory Since 1986, the communist party has decided to transit from a socialist- command economy to a market economy Thanks to Doi Moi economic renovation, the transitional economy of Vietnam enjoyed remarkable achievements. Nevertheless, Vietnam still confronted with challenges of high levels of corruption and weak control of anti-corruption systems Corruption posed major threats to socio- economic development because corruption affects various public sectors such as health, education, land management, natural resources and other industries Also, in the private sector, the cumbersome legislation facilitates both incentives and opportunities for corruption.
Statistics and studies have highlighted Vietnam remains a high level of corruption. According to Corruption Perception Index in 2020 by Transparency International (TI,
2020), Vietnam performed below the average with score of 36 on a 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly clean) scale The country ranked 104 out of 180 assessed countries over the world Although climbing 5 points since 2012, Vietnam still experienced slow in anti-corruption efforts Compared to data in 2017 with CPI score of 35 (Transparency International, 2017), the CPI score of 36 in 2020 means that the progress in Vietnam is still too little over years.
Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2020) confirmed the index of control of corruption at a low level The indicators are assessed based on areas of governance, including voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Among them, the control of corruption showed little improvement, from 31.25 in 2017 to 34.13 in 2019 (on a 0 to 100 scale, with higher score corresponding to better outcomes) Control of corruption has changed, but not significantly.
From a report of Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) (CECODES, UNDP, & RTA, 2017), the indicator of control of corruption scored 6.09 (on a 0 to 10 scale, with higher score corresponding to better control of corruption) According to the report, in public service provides such as hospitals or schools, it is reported that almost 50 percent of the respondents had to pay a bribe for better service Similarly, more than 45 percent of them reported paying bribes to get certificates of land use right or construction right However, only 2.8 percent cases are reported for being extorted.
Regarding anti-corruption, it is generally accepted that the legal framework for anti- corruption has improved significantly in recent years The Anti-Corruption Law in
2005 was introduced to constitute major steps forward In terms of thematic scope in Asia, Vietnam became the most wide-ranging (TI, 2010) However, due to the lack of public information about the results of the government’s anti-corruption efforts, there is no evidence that these efforts have achieved the expected results The problem is how to ensure the effectiveness of the law, implementation and enforcement in order to convince people’s trust and confidence Vietnamese government has recognized these problems and assessed the main problems hindering the country's development. The negative impact of corruption on future prosperity are milestones in the fight against corruption Besides, there have no independent organization of anti-corruption available taking in charge of implementing of corruption measures, many institutions have anti- corruption tasks The four big institutions are the Central Steering Committee against corruption, the Government Inspectorate, the People’s Procuracy, and the State Audit of Vietnam.
The Central Steering Committee against corruption was established in accordance with the Anti-Corruption Law 2005 and is directly chaired by the Prime Minister The committee is authorized to guide, coordinate and supervise the implementation ofGovernment’s anti-corruption The office of committee was established in 2007 to support the work of the committee In 2008, Steering Committees were created at the provincial level It was established under the responsibility of the provincial executive power (Provincial People Committee).
The Government Inspectorate is a government agency that deal with corruption inspections, controls, complaints and agreements It was established in 1956, but it was not until 2005 that it obtained clear anti-corruption powers It functions is responsible for investigating corruption reports Each Ministry has its own investigation which reports to both the Government Inspectorate and their own Ministry’s hierarchy This means that in practice these investigators have only powers to make recommendations rather than powers to implement their findings and conclusions Inspection reports are not always publicly available, and in many cases the content of these reports is not complete.
The People’s Procuracy is responsible for prosecuting corruption cases and is composed of the Supreme People’s Procuracy Department of Prosecution and Corruption Investigation which was set up in 2006 The People’s Procuracy has the power to initiate criminal proceedings after investigation and execution of the law by governments and citizens at all levels The Prosecutor-General is elected and removed by the National Assembly at the proposal of the President.
The State Audit of Vietnam is the supreme audit institution in Vietnam, responsible for verifying the accuracy and legality of the national budget State Audit of Vietnam reports directly to the National Assembly and has expanded its mandate in recent years Nevertheless, those institutions are considered very weal due to the lack of independence, funding and qualified officials.
Corruption and anti-corruption in Vietnam
According to PAPI statistics (CECODES, VUSTA & UNDP), the index of Control of corruption in the public sector in Vietnam over the period from 2011 to 2020 (Figure 4.1) increased significantly by 12 scores, indicating a positive indicator for the efforts of Vietnamese government in controlling and fighting corruption in public sector This shows that Vietnamese citizens have witnessed and recognized the efforts and improvements of government in anti-corruption Similarly, in comparison to other countries in the world, based on corruption perception survey of TransparencyInternational, the index of Vietnam increased from 29 in 2011 to 36 in 2020 (Figure4.2) The CPI index has risen by 7 scores over 10 years, which is the highest score that
Control of corruption in public sector
Transparency International has assessed for Vietnam, presented an affirmation of positive results in anti-corruption in Vietnam In the view of firms operating in Vietnam, they also rated very high provincial competitiveness index in terms of sub- indice Transparency and Access to Information (Figure 4.3) The median provinces have scored roughly 60 points out of 100 The results confirmed that provincial authorities have successfully enhanced a transparent business environment and equitable business information Over 10 years, 2020 marked a success of administrative reforms of national Vietnamese government, especially presiding impressive changes in anti-corruption campaign However, there is still room for improvement in public service sector, such as improvement in quality of provincial website or responses to requests from provincial authorities.
Figure 4 1 Control of corruption in the public sector
Source: PAPI (CECODES, VUSTA & UNDP)
Figure 4 2 Corruption Perception Index of Vietnam
Figure 4 3 Transparency and Access to Information
The fight against corruption is being strongly directed by the Party and State of Vietnam, which is strongly supported by Vietnamese people The fight has achieved positive results, accelerating the determination to prevent and fight corruption of the Party, State and people in Vietnam Accordingly, international communities and countries all positively evaluate this effort of Vietnam The above results demonstrated the political determination along with drastic actions and implementation of effective solutions of the Party and State, from the central government to local authorities in anti-corruption Specifically, the Central Steering Committee for Anti-corruption was established with the desire to step-up the anti-corruption campaign one step further.
Anti-corruption campaigns have made strong progress with many breakthroughs and in- depth policies and solutions Accordingly, corruption is curbed, which is gradually prevented and tended to decrease This makes a vital contribution to maintain political stability, socio-economic development, enhancing the prestige and position of Vietnam in the world It is highlighted that institutions have been built and improved. Particularly, the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party, the Politburo and the Secretariat have issued 45 resolutions, directives, regulations and conclusions on building and perfecting the Communist Party, preventing and combating corruption. The Government issued 511 decrees, 413 resolutions and 160 decisions to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of State governance in preventing corruption in all social areas Some characteristics of anti-corruption directions in Vietnam can be highlighted as follows: (1) no restricted areas, no privileges, no exceptions, no improper influence of any individuals or organizations; (2) take step by step, clear where to handle to there;
(3) involvement of all people and the whole political system; (4) humanities and serve socio-economic development; (5) prevention as priority, detection and handle as important and urgent.
Although the anti-corruption efforts in Vietnam have created positive effects and spread widely in the whole society, it takes years to address the negative consequences of corruption on citizens’ perception.
Corruption perception of Vietnamese citizens
Citizens also share the perception that corruption is a serious problem in the country. From Figure 4.4, it can be seen that Vietnam is facing challenges of rampant corruption, especially in public administration service In Transparency International’s Corruption Barometer, 65 percent of Vietnamese respondents paid actual bribes when accessing public services or having administration transactions.
Figure 4 4 Bribery rates across the Asia Pacific region in 2017
Descriptive statistics
The description of the survey sample and data adapted from a survey sample of 999 observations from 18 provinces in Vietnam were presented in Table 4.1 It can be seen from the table 4.1 that the average age of surveyed respondents is 41, female accounts for 43.5 percent, and people living in the rural area accounts for 64.7 percent The percentage of unemployed respondents is 2.8 percent Respondents with high school education and higher levels of education account for 91.7 percent of the total survey sample The survey results show that 100% of respondents used public service or have public administration transactions, in which 61.6% of them paid actual bribes when using those services.
Table 4 1 Description of Vietnam sample data
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Level of corruption in the public sector 3.9640 0.9862 1 5
Bribe-reporting rate of district level 0.5686 0.2979 0 1
Table 4.2 presents the defined variables and their measurement adapted from a survey sample of 15015 respondents from 11 Asian countries and territories.
Table 4 2 Description of Asian sample
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Level of corruption in the public sector 3.005 1.088 1 5
Among the respondents accessing the public services, 30.3 per cent of them paid bribes to access the services The survey results also showed that female respondents account for 50.4 per cent, and the average age of the respondent is about 42 Also, the number of respondents who are employed are 10,549, accounting for 70.2 per cent.Respondents obtaining a bachelor’s degree and higher account for 19.7 per cent, while the poor and near-poor account for 24.4 per cent.
Estimated results and hypothesis testing
The dissertation conducted multicollinearity tests using the Pearson correlation matrix and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which are presented in Table 4.3 All correlation coefficients among independent variables were lower than 0.3, and the highest VIF was 1.22, much lower than the cut-off of 10 Those results indicate no evidence of multicollinearity among the independent variables used in the estimated models.
Table 4 3 Pearson Correlation matrix (Data survey in Vietnam)
Level of corruption in the public sector (5) -0.052 -0.050 0.006 0.007 1.000 1.20
Bribe-reporting rate of district level (6) 0.233 -0.027 0.016 -0.029 -0.168 1.000 1.05
The dissertation aims at investigating the impacts of social status and norms on bribe- giving of citizens and testing the hypothesis It deploys a Probit model with robust standard errors for different specifications Estimated results of the Probit regression models with robust standard errors are presented in Table 4.4 Model 1 shows the marginal effects of socioeconomic status, social norms, and control variables on the bribe-giving of citizens Models 2, 3, and 4 provide the marginal effects of all the above independent variables specified in Model 1 and the interactions of education, poor, and unemployed with social norms of corruption proxied by “bribe-reporting willingness”, respectively.
Table 4 4 Marginal effects of social status and norms on bribe-giving behaviors of citizens in Vietnam
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 High education (X1) -0.457** -0.669* -0.515*** -0.458**
Level of corruption in the public sector
Bribe-reporting rate of district level
Note: *, **, and *** indicates significant level of 10%,
Standard errors are in parentheses.
From the tables above, the estimated results show that the estimated models are appropriate and accepted at a high significance level (LR-chi2 from 161.44 to 162.60 and p