A Deeply Flawed Fuel Bank docx

103WINTER 2010 / 2011 ESSAY PROVIDING NATIONS WITH ENRICHED URANIUM WILL NOT PREVENT PROLIFERATION. IT WILL PROMOTE IT. AmitAi Etzioni A Deeply Flawed Fuel Bank T here’s a new and troubling idea aoat in the world of nuclear proliferation. To ensure that nations will not enrich uranium—a key element in nuclear bomb production—they will be provided with already-enriched ura- nium. Nations that already have signi- cant enrichment capabilities, including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Rus- sia, the United Kingdom and the United © 2010 WORLD POLICY INSTITUTE States, will provide the enriched uranium. To ensure the recipient nations are not dependent on the good will of any one nation, coun- tries will contribute to an inter- national nuclear fuel bank, regulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency [] or some other, yet-to-be identied international entity, from which recipi- ent nations could obtain enriched ura- nium. Call it a fallback bank. 104 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL ESSAY The uranium provided will be low- enriched, or , usually dened as enriched to 20 percent or less of the ssile isotope uranium-235, which is used for energy-related purposes, rather than highly enriched uranium, , usually dened as 90 percent enriched or more of uranium-235, which is used to make nuclear bombs. The fuel bank idea attempts to prevent recipient nations from further enriching the  to make bombs, forcing them to give up their enrichment capabilities and submit to inspections, preventing them from turning their  into . In short, nations will be able to build nuclear reactors and use them for peaceful purposes without enriching uranium, and the world will rest assured that no nuclear proliferation is in the ofng. The plan sounds good, but as is often the case, a great distance separates the lip and the cup. Two signicant aws exist— one in its design and another in its imple- mentation. Both pitfalls make it likely that outsourcing uranium enrichment will actu- ally propel proliferation, rather than slow it. CORRECTING A FLAW Outsourcing enrichment corrects a gaping hole in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea- ty []—a aw that is acknowledged by long-time experts in nuclear security (my rst books on the subject were published in 1962 and 1964). The treaty allows a nation to build nuclear facilities, including those needed to produce enriched uranium, as long as these facilities are used for non-mil- itary purposes. But the treaty also permits a recipient nation to give three months’ notice to the other parties and the UN Se- curity Council that it is opting out of the treaty—allowing it to take advantage of its fully developed nuclear facilities to manu- facture bombs. This is exactly what North Korea did in 2003. Given that there are 189 parties in the , including countries such as Iran, Venezuela and Myanmar, reaching consensus on modifying the treaty is about as likely as getting all of the oil that has spilled into the Gulf of Mexico to ow back into Deepwater Horizon’s well. When the signatories do meet—once every ve years—they have difculty agreeing on something as simple as the agenda. Typically, their efforts produce very little. Instead of vainly seeking to correct this detrimental aw in the , nuclear experts who lose sleep over these matters came up with the idea that if nations could be cajoled, enticed and pressured not to build uranium enrichment facilities themselves (and instead purchase enriched uranium from other nations) the  could work without correcting its core loophole. In this way, if a nation genuinely committed to not enriching uranium and to use its reactors merely for non-military purposes, it would have all the ready-made fuel it needed. If it strayed, the supply could be cut off. Moreover, if a nation quit the , it would not have enrichment facilities. So far, so good. THE SUBSTITUTION EFFECT The fuel bank idea, which for years was the main subject of position papers and theoretical discussions among experts, was implemented in the United Arab Emirates in 2009. It is now being of- fered to other nations. In the process, Amitai Etzioni is a Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University and the author of Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy (Yale 2007). 105WINTER 2010 / 2011 A FLAWED FUEL BANK          , ,          the fuel bank faces two major challenges that are almost never mentioned. The rst concerns the used rods leftover in reactors after the uranium is consumed. These rods can be reprocessed to make plutonium-239, which can be used to make bombs. Plutonium warheads are smaller than those that use . By some estimates, it takes 15 kilos of uranium but only 4 kilos of plutonium, or even less, to make a bomb. So the plu- tonium that can be derived from used rods in the nuclear reactors in Bushehr, Iran—now fueled by Russia—could be used to make 30 bombs a year, according to Paul Leventhal, former president of the Nuclear Control Institute. This is not just a theoretical no- tion, but also an unlikely development. Making plu- tonium is difcult, turning it into bombs is far from a cakewalk, and miniaturizing the bombs adds further chal- lenges. But this is precisely how North Korea developed part of its stockpile of nuclear weapons. It is dangerously smug to assume that just because Iran has had difculties in proceeding with its nuclear program that it will be unable to proceed in a similar fashion. The same holds for other nations with a sizable industrial and technological core. Selling such nations processed uranium just makes their journey to proliferation easi- er, if this is the nation’s desired route. Fuel bank supporters are likely to argue that the basic deal requires recipi- ent nations to return spent fuel rods to the suppliers. Many reports simply take this for granted, as if picking up radio- active rods is akin to picking up a pack- age at the post ofce. Gerald Seib writes in the Wall Street Journal, “By providing the fuel, and taking away spent fuel, the Russians have undercut Iran’s argument that it has to do its own enrichment.” Likewise, a State Department spokes- man tried to reassure critics by saying that Bushehr was “under  safeguards and Russia is providing the needed fuel and taking back the spent nuclear fuel, which would be the principal source of proliferation concerns.” One can also imagine that the ura- nium suppliers would cut off future supplies of enriched uranium if the re- cipient nation did not cough up the used rods. However, such a nation still could use the rods to make a hefty batch of plutonium-based bombs before its ready- made uranium supplies run out. It is not known how many years worth of uranium Russia is provid- ing for Iran’s reactors, but a single rod, used for one year in a fully loaded reac- tor could make 30 bombs. True, such a nation would need a reprocessing plant, which would emit krypton-85, giving away the plant’s location. However, the international community can do little to prevent Iran from making plutoni- um. Furthermore, additional uranium supplies may be purchased from some other source (say, South Africa) during the construction of the recipient nation’s own enrichment facilities. The second major catch arises in the implementation methods for the fuel bank. When enriched uranium is pro- vided to nations that already have enrich- ment facilities, but are in short supply of uranium ore or have only limited facilities 106 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL ESSAY Brazil, when Colin Powell excused friction between the Brazilian government and the  by declaring that he was “sure” the Brazilian government was not pursuing nuclear weapons. This approach has two defects. First, governments change. One can readily imagine that the authoritarian and op- pressive Saudi regime will come to a sud- den end. Moreover, the idea that there are “good” governments that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and “bad” govern- ments that cannot is a dangerous concept. Pakistan could fall to the Taliban before you nish reading this text—and even before that, Jordan, which has abundant sources of uranium and is seeking nuclear power plants, could fall to the Palestin- ians. Even Brazil, which General Powell considered a reliable partner, has taken a rather sharp left turn in recent years. Second, to some extent non-prolifera- tion efforts are based on what Brown Uni- versity professor Nina Tannenwald calls the “nuclear taboo”—the notion that good citizens of the international community develop neither nuclear arms nor the facil- ities that can be used to make them. Once exceptions are allowed, it becomes more difcult to encourage other nations not to follow suit. And once one major power holds that it can make exceptions for its allies, other major powers can hardly be expected to be far behind. Indeed, China responded to America’s deal with India with its own deal with Pakistan, a very troubling development given the failing state of this country. VIETNAM Another exception for a trusted ally is the communist government of Vietnam, which is also favored because it is considered a counterweight to China. The United States and skills, the bank’s uranium frees them to use what they already have for military purposes. This substitution effect, as I will show shortly, is a realistic risk. “TRUSTED” GOVERNMENTS The United Arab Emirates signed a deal with the United States in January 2009 based on the outsourcing fuel bank mod- el. The pact, called a “123 Agreement,” (named for the section of the Atomic En- ergy Act that governs trade on sensitive nuclear technologies) obligates the United States to supply the UAE with uranium for power plants, and the government of the UAE agreed, in exchange, to forgo any enrichment or reprocessing activities. This agreement also freed the UAE to sign a $20 billion agreement with South Korea in De- cember 2009 to build four nuclear reactors. The rst will be operational by 2017. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are reported to be next in line. Together with the UAE, these three nations have no uranium enrich- ment facilities of their own, so the substitu- tion effect is of no concern. But, while the UAE and Bahrain likely do not have the wherewithal to make bombs out of the used rods, the same cannot be said for Saudi Ara- bia. Several observers expect Saudi Arabia will seek to develop nuclear arms if any are discovered in Iran. The United States and its allies, though, consider the UAE, Bah- rain and Saudi Arabia to be trustworthy governments, and are not concerned that they will abuse their enriched uranium sup- plies. Gary Samore, special assistant to the president and White House coordinator for arms control, said recently that the “Gold Standard” was applied to the agreement made with the UAE, but from now on it will be applied “selectively,” meaning that other nations will be given more leeway. This notion came up before, in reference to 107WINTER 2010 / 2011 A FLAWED FUEL BANK tor in Bushehr, on Iran’s southern coast. Russia says it will retrieve the used rods from Iran, but it is unclear how this will be enforced. Iran is short on yellowcake and enrichment facilities, so providing it with enriched uranium allows it to use the supplies it already has for military pro- grams. (Western powers offered Iran en- riched uranium—but only if Iran agreed to shut down its own facilities.) Providing Iran with enriched uranium is like pouring gasoline on a re. After years of protracted negotiations, the United Nations has concluded that Iran is not living up to the international obligations it assumed by signing the . Iran did not allow the kind of inspections needed to vet its claim that it plans to use the nuclear facilities it is constructing exclusively for peaceful purposes. Indeed, the , whose board comprises 35 nations— including non-western nations such as Russia, Malaysia, and Cameroon—has implied that Iran is seeking to build nuclear arms. Other observers hold that some of the facilities, for instance the one at Qom that Iran tried to conceal, are suited only for making bombs. And after much give and take, even Russia and China agreed to impose some additional sanctions on Iran, albeit not the crippling ones the United States sought. In this context, Russia’s move has strong consequences. Iran has difculty enriching uranium and was reported, in April 2010, to is negotiating an agreement with Vietnam to provide it with nuclear fuel and tech- nology—without the usual constraints on uranium enrichment. The deal has been under discussion for several months follow- ing Hanoi’s announcement that it plans to build nuclear power stations over the next 20 years. Vietnam signed an initial memo- randum of understanding on nuclear power with the Bush administration in 2001 and the Obama administration has accelerated these talks. The United States and Vietnam signed a new memorandum of understand- ing in April 2010 over broad cooperation on nuclear power, including access to “re- liable sources of nuclear fuel,” such as enriched uranium. In addition, Hanoi signed nuclear cooperation agreements with several other countries—in- cluding China, France and Rus- sia—as sources for fuel. Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Wash- ington, says that the United States, by allowing Hanoi to produce its own nuclear fuel, undermines its deproliferation efforts, along with the efforts of those who seek to reverse whatever proliferation has al- ready taken place: “After the U.S. set such a good example with the UAE, the Vietnam deal not only sticks out, it could drive a stake through the heart of the general effort to rein in the spread of nuclear fuel-making.” At least it fully violates the basic fuel bank precept. IRAN On August 13, 2010, Russia announced it would supply low-enriched uranium fuel rods to the 1,000 megawatt nuclear reac-       ,                  108 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL ESSAY Ofce took the same position, saying that the “announcement underlines the fact that Iran does not need to pursue these oth- er activities to enjoy the benets of nuclear power.” However, one wonders if the world needed such evidence, and whether it is worthwhile to enable Iran to divert its lim- ited uranium assets to a military program to gain public relations points. INDIA India is one of two nations that, though it admits to having nuclear bombs and fa- cilities, has refused to join the . The other is Pakistan. (Israel probably has nuclear bombs, but has not ofcially ac- knowledged it.) This reason alone should be enough to pressure both India and Pak- istan equally into giving up their nuclear arms. Instead of pressuring India to dis- arm, the Bush administration moved in the opposite direction, providing Ameri- can aid to India’s civilian nuclear energy program and expanding U.S India coop- eration in nuclear technology, as India ne- gotiated its own 123 deal with the United States for peaceful use of nuclear energy. Ostensibly, this assistance was to be used only for non-military purposes. But by al- lowing the sale of uranium to India for its civilian reactors, the United States enabled India to move the limited supply of urani- um it already had to military use. (Before that, to make more nuclear bombs, Indian power plants were operating at reduced capacity.) The Bush administration ratio- nalized these steps by claiming it would improve relations with India, considered the West’s best hope to “balance” China. However, rather than creating a closer re- lationship between India and the United States, the deal remains controversial in India. It took years of wrangling before it was nally approved in August 2010. be nearly out of yellowcake. Because Russia is providing it with uranium for some facilities, Iran can enrich whatever remaining yellowcake it possesses or is able to acquire for its weapons program. Equally important is that the rods Russia provides to Bushehr can be processed to yield enough plutonium-239 to make about 30 nuclear weapons a year (assuming the reactor is fully fuel-loaded). Plutonium-239 can make much smaller bombs than , so it is ideally suited for Iran’s evolving offensive missile program. Russia announced that the deal entails Iran returning the used rods. However there is no realistic way to enforce this agreement. If Iran refuses to release these rods, the most Russia can do is cut off Iran’s future supply. This, of course, will not prevent Iran from using what it has to make bombs or from getting uranium elsewhere, such as from Jordan. On March 18, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, during a press conference in Moscow following a meet- ing with the Russian foreign minister, that Russia’s deal with Iran was prema- ture, given the suspect nature of Tehran’s nuclear intentions. By August, though, the Obama administration had given a green light to Russia’s move in exchange for Russia supporting additional sanc- tions against Iran—although, again, they were not as stringent as the Americans had hoped. It was like allowing someone to deliver an ocean liner full of heroin— but only after paying customs. White House spokesman Robert Gibbs, trying to put a positive spin on the deal, stated that the reactor “proves to the world that if the Iranians are sincere about de- veloping a peaceful program, their needs can be met without undertaking its own enrichment program.”The British Foreign 109WINTER 2010 / 2011 A FLAWED FUEL BANK be excluded. Hence supplying uranium to India and Pakistan not only adds to the risks posed by these two nations (and to the materials that terrorists may ob- tain, one way or another), but also grave- ly undermines the already-weakening . Moreover, the basic conditions of the fuel tanks are ignored—India is not even required to turn over the used rods nor to submit to inspection. The next chapter of this outsourced uranium saga will be set in Jordan. Unlike India and Iran, which are short on urani- um, Jordan recently discovered that it has sizable deposits. It has sought to sign a 123 Agreement with the Unit- ed States as a way to gain nuclear reactors and know how. But so far, Jordan has refused to submit to the same demands that the UAE agreed to in its 123 Agree- ment—no domestic enrich- ment and no reprocessing of the used rods. With its newly-discovered uranium, Jordan insists it has a right under the  to enrich on its own as much uranium as it wants. Moreover, the King believes that only pressure from Israel prevents Wash- ington, so far, from acceding to its nuclear ambitions. For Jordan to live by the pre- cept of the fuel bank, it will have to ship its own uranium to be processed by others, which is not required by the  treaty. THE DIVERSION RISK Enriching uranium is a tricky business. However, the rst stage—enriching up to 20 percent—is much more difcult than the next stages, leading to 90 percent en- richment. Hence providing a nation with  (20 percent enriched), gives it a ma- Far from winning the United States some political support in India, Indian opposition to the deal was loud, swift and widespread. Opposition politicians maintained that American assurances of steady fuel supply were not legally binding. Leftist members of Parliament held that the accord violated Indian sov- ereignty, and that the government was hiding details of Indian obligations in the agreement. Others claimed that the deal surrendered Indian foreign policy to an American veto. The Indian opposi- tion grew as Indian politicians came to believe they were misled by their govern- ment about the details of the accord—specically, an added provision stat- ing that the United States would cut off the uranium supply if India conducted a nuclear test. Most disconcerting, in direct response to the Bush administration’s deal with India, Pakistan increased its nuclear program on its own by rapidly expanding its plutonium production, and China granted Pakistan two more re- actors as part of an agreement parallel to the U.S India one. The result is a case study in how the expansion of nuclear fa- cilities in one country leads to the expan- sion of nuclear facilities in others. The American agreement with India and the tit-for-tat deal between China and Pakistan are particularly troubling. The Nuclear Suppliers Group [], an informal cartel of enriched uranium suppliers—the “shareholders” of the fuel bank—will not serve nations that are not signatories of the . So India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel were to B           ,  ..          110 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL ESSAY after western intelligence sources discov- ered the planned Qom nuclear facility did Iran inform the  of its existence. And though Iran is an  signatory, it has not done all it can to ensure  access even to its declared facilities. Iran signed an “Additional Protocol” with the  in 2003, an agreement allowing more intru- sive inspections with shorter notice time, but withdrew its assent in 2005. Providing nations with enriched ura- nium works if the nation has neither en- richment facilities of its own nor ore to extract. This may be true in the UAE. But even in this case, the question of control- ling the spent fuel rods is a very serious consideration. There is a considerable risk that the recipient nation will reprocess the spent fuel rods to produce plutonium to make nuclear weapons, or that the re- cipient country will divert uranium from peaceful programs to military ones. There might well be a germ of a good idea in the fuel bank, but for now its major aws must be addressed. To avoid prob- lems with the used rods, nations should be given only limited supplies of enriched uranium—say, to last them six months— and the material thrown off while these rods are used should be collected every six months and repatriated. In this way, we can rest assured that the nation beneting from the ready-made fuel will be unable to draw on them to make plutonium bombs. Finally, to avoid diversion, ready-made fuel should not be given to nations that are not members of the  and are not in full compliance with its various protocols. In this way, one might well be able to gain reasonable assurance that no diversion of fuel takes place and that the fuel is used only for non-military purposes. jor leg up. Iran had to start from scratch, slowing its nuclear progression. More- over, it has been subjected to a multi-fac- eted and intensive dissuasion campaign, extending as far as outright sabotage. However, a nation receiving ready-made  from the fuel bank without being subjected to attacks, would have a much easier journey if it chose to make bombs. To make this central point with numbers: it takes 24 cascades of 164 centrifuges to enrich natural uranium to 3.5 percent; eight cascades of 164 to bring it to 20 percent; but only four cascades of 114 centrifuges to bring it to 60 percent, and a mere two more cascades of 64 centri- fuges to bring it to weapons grade. Supporters of the fuel bank argue that those nations receiving  will have to submit to inspection in order to ensure that the fuel is not further enriched and weaponized. We have already seen that this requirement has been set aside. One should also take into account that inspec- tions have a sorry record. Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea all managed to make considerable progress toward clandestine nuclear stockpile while being subject to inspections. Benn Tannenbaum, program director of the Center for Science, Tech- nology and Security Policy at the Ameri- can Association for the Advancement of Science, put it well when he noted that inspections only work “when you know for what you’re looking, you know where you’re looking and you’re allowed to do the inspections you want to do when you want to do them, where you want.” These conditions, of course, almost never exist. There’s an imbalance of information— inspectors can only visit sites that host na- tions choose to declare to the . Only l . the Obama administration had given a green light to Russia’s move in exchange for Russia supporting additional sanc- tions against Iran—although, again,. leads to the expan- sion of nuclear facilities in others. The American agreement with India and the tit-for-tat deal between China and Pakistan are particularly