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CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Who RegulatesWhom?AnOverviewofU.S.
Financial Supervision
Mark Jickling
Specialist in Financial Economics
Edward V. Murphy
Specialist in Financial Economics
December 8, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40249
Who RegulatesWhom?AnOverviewofU.S.FinancialSupervision
Congressional Research Service
Summary
This report provides anoverviewof current U.S.financial regulation: which agencies are
responsible for which institutions, activities, and markets, and what kinds of authority they have.
Some agencies regulate particular types of institutions for risky behavior or conflicts of interest,
some agencies promulgate rules for certain financial transactions no matter what kind of
institution engages in it, and other agencies enforce existing rules for some institutions, but not
for others. These regulatory activities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
There are three traditional components to U.S. banking regulation: safety and soundness, deposit
insurance, and adequate capital. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (P.L. 111-203) added a fourth: systemic risk. Safety and soundness regulation dates back to
the 1860s when bank credit formed the money supply. Examinations of a bank’s safety and
soundness is believed to contribute to a more stable broader economy. Deposit insurance was
established in the 1930s to reduce the incentive of depositors to withdraw funds from banks
during a panic. Banks pay premiums to support the deposit insurance fund, but the Treasury
provides full faith and credit for covered deposits if the fund were to run short. Deposit insurance
is a second reason that federal agencies regulate bank operations, including the amount of risk
they may incur. Capital adequacy has been regulated since the 1860s when “wildcat banks”
sought to make extra profits by reducing their capital reserves, which increases their risk of
default and failure. Dodd-Frank created the interagency Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) to monitor systemic risk and consolidated bank regulation from five agencies to four. For
banks and non-banks designated by the FSOC as creating systemic risk, the Federal Reserve has
oversight authority, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has resolution
authority.
Federal securities regulation has traditionally been based on the principle of disclosure, rather
than direct regulation. Firms that sell securities to the public must register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), but the agency generally has no authority to prevent excessive risk
taking. SEC registration in no way implies that an investment is safe, only that the risks have
been fully disclosed. The SEC also registers several classes of securities market participants and
firms. It has enforcement powers for certain types of industry misstatements or omissions and for
certain types of conflicts of interest. Derivatives trading is supervised by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), which oversees trading on the futures exchanges, which have self-
regulatory responsibilities as well. Dodd-Frank has required more disclosures in the previously
unregulated over-the-counter (off-exchange) derivatives market and has granted the CFTC and
SEC authority over large derivatives traders.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) oversees a group of government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs)—public/private hybrid firms that seek both to earn profits and to further the
policy objectives set out in their statutory charters. Two GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
were placed in conservatorship by the FHFA in September 2008 after losses in mortgage asset
portfolios made them effectively insolvent.
Dodd-Frank consolidated consumer protection rulemaking, which had been dispersed among
several federal agencies in a new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. The bureau is
intended to bring consistent regulation to all consumer financial transactions, although the
legislation exempted several types of firms and transactions from its jurisdiction.
Who RegulatesWhom?AnOverviewofU.S.FinancialSupervision
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Introduction 1
What Financial Regulators Do 1
Banking Regulation 6
Safety and Soundness Regulation 6
Deposit Insurance 7
Capital Regulation 7
Systemic Risk 8
Capital Requirements 8
Basel III 9
Capital Provisions in Dodd-Frank 10
Non-Bank Capital Requirements 12
The SEC’s Net Capital Rule 12
CFTC Capital Requirements 12
Federal Housing Finance Agency 13
The Federal Financial Regulators 14
Banking Regulators 14
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 15
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 15
The Federal Reserve 16
Office of Thrift Supervision (Abolished by Dodd-Frank) 17
National Credit Union Administration 18
Non-Bank Financial Regulators 18
Securities and Exchange Commission 18
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 21
Federal Housing Finance Agency 21
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 22
Regulatory Umbrella Groups 23
Financial Stability Oversight Council 23
Federal Financial Institution Examinations Council 24
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 24
Unregulated Markets and Institutions 25
Foreign Exchange Markets 25
U.S. Treasury Securities 25
Private Securities Markets 26
Comprehensive Reform Legislation in the 111
th
Congress 26
Figures
Figure A-1. National Bank 28
Figure A-2. National Bank and Subsidiaries 28
Figure A-3. Bank Holding Company 29
Figure A-4. Financial Holding Company 29
Who RegulatesWhom?AnOverviewofU.S.FinancialSupervision
Congressional Research Service
Tables
Table 1.Federal Financial Regulators and Who They Supervise 4
Table 2.The Basel Accords: Risk Weightings for Selected Financial Assets Under the
Standardized Approach 9
Table 3.Capital Standards for Federally Regulated Depository Institutions 11
Appendixes
Appendix A. Forms of Banking Organizations 28
Appendix B. Bank Ratings: UFIRS and CAMELS 30
Appendix C. Acronyms 32
Appendix D. Regulatory Structure Before the Dodd-Frank Act 33
Appendix E. Glossary of Terms 34
Contacts
Author Contact Information 41
Acknowledgments 41
Who RegulatesWhom?AnOverviewofU.S.FinancialSupervision
Congressional Research Service 1
Introduction
Historically, major changes in financial regulation in the United States have often come in
response to crisis. Thus, it is no surprise that the turmoil beginning in 2007 led to calls for reform.
Few would argue that regulatory failure was solely to blame for the crisis, but it is widely
considered to have played a part. In February 2009, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner
summed up two key problem areas:
Our financial system operated with large gaps in meaningful oversight, and without
sufficient constraints to limit risk. Even institutions that were overseen by our complicated,
overlapping system of multiple regulators put themselves in a position of extreme
vulnerability. These failures helped lay the foundation for the worst economic crisis in
generations.
1
In this analysis, regulation failed to maintain financial stability at the systemic level because there
were gaps in regulatory jurisdiction and because even overlapping jurisdictions—where
institutions were subject to more than one regulator—could not ensure the soundness of regulated
financial firms. In particular, limits on risk-taking were insufficient, even where regulators had
explicit authority to reduce risk.
This report attempts to set out the basic principles underlying U.S.financial regulation and to
give some historical context for the development of that system. The first section briefly
discusses the various modes offinancial regulation and includes a table identifying the major
federal regulators and the types of institutions they supervise. The table also indicates certain
emergency authorities available to the regulators, including those that relate to systemic financial
disturbances. The second section focuses on capital requirements—the principal means of
constraining risky financial activity—and how risk standards are set by bank, securities, and
futures regulators.
The next sections provide brief overviews of each federal financial regulatory agency and
discussions of several major financial markets that are not subject to any federal regulation.
What Financial Regulators Do
The regulatory missions of individual agencies vary, partly as a result of historical accident. Here
is a rough division of what agencies are called upon to do:
• Regulate Certain Types ofFinancial Institutions. Some firms become subject
to federal regulation when they obtain a particular business charter, and several
federal agencies regulate only a single class of institution. Depository institutions
are a good example: a new banking firm chooses its regulator when it decides
which charter to obtain—national bank, state bank, credit union, etc.—and the
choice of charter may not greatly affect the institution’s business mix. The
Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA) regulates only three government-
sponsored enterprises: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan
1
Remarks by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner Introducing the Financial Stability Plan, February 10, 2009,
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg18.htm.
Who RegulatesWhom?AnOverviewofU.S.FinancialSupervision
Congressional Research Service 2
Bank system. Regulation keyed to particular institutions has at least two
perceived disadvantages: regulator shopping, or regulatory arbitrage, may occur
if regulated entities can choose their regulator, and unchartered firms engaging in
the identical business activity as regulated firms may escape regulation
altogether.
• Regulate a Particular Market. The New York Stock Exchange dates from 1793,
federal securities regulation from 1934. Thus, when the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was created by Congress, stock and bond market institutions
and mechanisms were already well-established, and federal regulation was
grafted onto the existing structure. As the market evolved, however, Congress
and the SEC faced numerous jurisdictional issues. For example, de minimis
exemptions to regulation of mutual funds and investment advisers created space
for the development of a trillion-dollar hedge fund industry, which was
unregulated until the Dodd-Frank Act.
Market innovation also creates financial instruments and markets that fall
between industry divisions. Congress and the courts have often been asked to
decide whether a particular financial activity belongs in one agency’s jurisdiction
or another’s.
• Regulate a Particular Financial Activity. When regulator shopping or
perceived loopholes appear to weaken regulation, one response is to create a
regulator tasked with overseeing a particular type or set of transactions,
regardless of where the business occurs or which entities are engaged in it. In
1974, Congress created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) at
the time when derivatives were poised to expand from their traditional base in
agricultural commodities into contracts based on financial instruments and
variables. The CFTC was given “exclusive jurisdiction” over all contracts that
were “in the character of” options or futures contracts, and such instruments were
to be traded only on CFTC-regulated exchanges. In practice, exclusive
jurisdiction was impossible to enforce, as off-exchange derivatives contracts such
as swaps proliferated. In 2000, Congress exempted swaps from CFTC regulation,
but this exemption was repealed by Dodd-Frank.
On the view that consumer financial protections should apply uniformly to all
transactions, the Dodd-Frank Act created a Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, with authority (subject to certain exemptions) over an array of firms
that deal with consumers.
• Regulate for Systemic Risk. One definition of systemic risk is that it occurs
when each firm manages risk rationally from its own perspective, but the sum
total of those decisions produces systemic instability under certain conditions.
Similarly, regulators charged with overseeing individual parts of the financial
system may satisfy themselves that no threats to stability exist in their respective
sectors, but fail to detect systemic risk generated by unsuspected correlations and
interactions among the parts of the global system. The Federal Reserve was for
many years a kind of default systemic regulator, expected to clean up after a
crisis, but with limited authority to take ex ante preventive measures. Dodd-
Frank creates the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to assume a
coordinating role, with the single mission of detecting systemic stress before a
Who RegulatesWhom?AnOverviewofU.S.FinancialSupervision
Congressional Research Service 3
crisis can take hold (and identifying firms whose individual failure might trigger
cascading losses with system-wide consequences).
From time to time, the perceived drawbacks to the multiplicity of federal regulators brings forth
calls for regulatory consolidation.
2
The legislative debate over Dodd-Frank illustrates the different
views on the topic: early versions of the Senate bill would have replaced all the existing bank
regulators with a single Financial Institution Regulatory Authority. By the end, however, Dodd-
Frank created two new agencies (and numerous regulatory offices), and eliminated only the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).
There have always been arguments against regulatory consolidation. Some believe that a
fragmentary structure encourages innovation and competition and fear that the “dead hand” of a
single financial supervisor would be costly and inefficient. Also, there is little evidence that
countries with single regulators fare better during crises or are more successful at preventing
them. One of the first proposals by the Conservative government elected in the UK in May 2010
was to break up the Financial Services Authority, which has jurisdiction over securities, banking,
derivatives, and insurance.
Table 1 below sets out the federal financial regulatory structure as it will exist once all the
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act become effective. (In many cases, transition periods end a year
or 18 months after July 21, 2010, the date of enactment. Thus, OTS does not appear in Table 1,
even though the agency will continue to operate into 2011.) Appendix D of this report contains a
pre-Dodd-Frank version of the same table. Supplemental material—charts that illustrate the
differences between banks, bank holding companies, and financial holding companies—appears
in Appendix A.
2
See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modern Financial Regulatory Structure, March 2008,
which called for a three-agency structure: a systemic risk regulator, a markets supervisor, and a consumer regulator.
Who RegulatesWhom?AnOverviewofU.S.FinancialSupervision
Congressional Research Service 4
Table 1.Federal Financial Regulators and Who They Supervise
Regulatory Agency Institutions Regulated
Emergency/Systemic
Risk Powers
Other Notable
Authority
Federal Reserve Bank holding companies
a
and certain subsidiaries,
financial holding
companies, securities
holding companies, savings
and loan holding
companies, and any firm
designated as systemically
significant by the FSOC
State banks that are
members of the Federal
Reserve System, U.S.
branches of foreign banks,
and foreign branches of
U.S. banks
Payment, clearing, and
settlement systems
designated as systemically
significant by the FSOC,
unless regulated by SEC or
CFTC
Lender of last resort to
member banks (through
discount window lending)
In “unusual and exigent
circumstances” the Fed
may extend credit beyond
member banks, for the
purpose of providing
liquidity to the financial
system, but not to aid
failing financial firms
May initiate resolution
process to shut down
firms that pose a grave
threat to financial stability
(requires concurrence of
2/3 of the FSOC)
Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC)
National banks, U.S.
federal branches of foreign
banks, federally chartered
thrift institutions
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)
Federally-insured
depository institutions,
including state banks that
are not members of the
Federal Reserve System
and state-chartered thrift
institutions
After making a
determination of systemic
risk, the FDIC may invoke
broad authority to use the
deposit insurance funds to
provide an array of
assistance to depository
institutions, including debt
guarantees
National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA)
Federally-chartered or
insured credit unions
Serves as a liquidity lender
to credit unions
experiencing liquidity
shortfalls through the
Central Liquidity Facility
Operates a deposit
insurance fund for credit
unions, the National
Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund (NCUSIF)
Who RegulatesWhom?AnOverviewofU.S.FinancialSupervision
Congressional Research Service 5
Regulatory Agency Institutions Regulated
Emergency/Systemic
Risk Powers
Other Notable
Authority
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)
Securities exchanges,
brokers, and dealers;
clearing agencies; mutual
funds; investment advisers
(including hedge funds with
assets over $150 million)
Nationally-recognized
statistical rating
organizations
Security-based swap (SBS)
dealers, major SBS
participants, SBS execution
facilities
Corporations selling
securities to the public
must register and make
financial disclosures
May unilaterally close
markets or suspend
trading strategies for
limited periods
Authorized to set financial
accounting standards
which all publicly traded
firms must use
Commodity Futures
Trading Commission
(CFTC)
Futures exchanges,
brokers, commodity pool
operators, commodity
trading advisors
Swap dealers, major swap
participants, swap
execution facilities
May suspend trading,
order liquidation of
positions during market
emergencies.
Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA)
Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and the Federal Home
Loan Banks
Nonbank mortgage-related
firms, private student
lenders, payday lenders,
and larger “consumer
financial entities” to be
determined by the Bureau
Consumer businesses of
banks with over $10 billion
in assets
Does not supervise
insurers, SEC and CFTC
registrants, auto dealers,
sellers of nonfinancial
goods, real estate brokers
and agents, and banks with
assets less than $10 billion
Acting as conservator
(since Sept. 2008) for
Fannie and Freddie
Writes rules to carry out
the federal consumer
financial protection laws
Source: CRS.
a. See Appendix A.
Who RegulatesWhom?AnOverviewofU.S.FinancialSupervision
Congressional Research Service 6
Banking Regulation
Absent regulation, the banking system tends to multiply the supply of credit in good times and
worsen the contraction of credit in bad times. Bank profits in good times and losses in bad times
amplify the cycle of credit in the aggregate economy even in the presence of a lender-of-last
resort. One policy goal of bank regulation is to lessen the tendency of banks to feed credit bubbles
and magnify credit contractions. The regulation of the funding and activities of individual banks,
including capital requirements, is one policy tool that has been used to try to stabilize the
aggregate credit cycle in the United States.
There are three traditional components to U.S. banking regulation: safety and soundness, deposit
insurance, and adequate capital. Dodd-Frank added a fourth: systemic risk. Safety and soundness
regulation dates back to the 1860s when bank credit formed the money supply, and recent events
have demonstrated that bank safety and soundness remains an important component of the
aggregate credit cycle. Deposit insurance was established in the 1930s to reduce the incentive of
depositors to withdraw funds from banks during a panic. Banks pay premiums to support the
deposit insurance fund, but the Treasury provides full faith and credit for covered deposits if the
fund were to run short. Deposit insurance is a second reason that federal agencies regulate bank
operations, including the amount of risk they may incur. Capital adequacy has been regulated
since the 1860s when “wildcat banks” sought to make extra profits by reducing their capital
reserves, which increased their risk of default and failure. Dodd-Frank created a council to
monitor systemic risk, and consolidated bank regulation from five agencies to four. For banks and
non-banks designated as creating systemic risk, the Federal Reserve has oversight authority, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has resolution authority.
Safety and Soundness Regulation
As a general concept, safety and soundness authority refers to examining and regulating the
probability of a firm’s default, and the magnitude of the losses that its owners and creditors would
suffer if the firm defaulted. One public policy justification for monitoring the safety and
soundness decisions of banks is that bank risk decisions suffer from the fallacy of composition—
the consequences to a single bank acting in its own interests diverge from the aggregate
consequences that occur if many banks choose similar risk strategies simultaneously. The fallacy
of composition is sometimes illustrated by the stadium example—a single person standing up at a
ballgame is able to see the field better, but if everyone stands up at the same time, few people will
be able to see the field better, yet most people are less comfortable. In the case of banks and bank
regulation, a single bank may be able to increase profits by making more risky loans or failing to
insure against counterparty default, without significantly increasing the probability of losing its
own access to liquidity should events turn out badly. However, if many banks simultaneously
make more risky loans, or fail to insure against counterparty default, then no single bank may
gain market share or be more profitable. Yet in the aggregate, interbank liquidity is more likely to
collapse, and the broader economy can suffer a precipitous contraction of credit. Since the 1860s,
federal bank regulators have had some authority to examine and regulate the riskiness of
individual banks’ activities because the decisions of individual banks can affect the availability of
aggregate credit and the size of aggregate financial losses.
If there is more than one agency with examination powers, then there may be a race to the bottom
in banking supervision. Some observers have claimed that the multiplicity of banking regulators
allowed some banks to shop for their regulator prior to the financial crisis of 2008. To the extent
[...]... Congressional Research Service 28 WhoRegulatesWhom? An Overviewof U.S FinancialSupervision Figure A-3 Bank Holding Company Figure A-4 Financial Holding Company Congressional Research Service 29 WhoRegulatesWhom?AnOverviewof U.S FinancialSupervision Appendix B Bank Ratings: UFIRS and CAMELS Federal bank regulators conduct confidential assessments of covered banks The Federal Financial Institutions Examination... by Mark Jickling and Kathleen Ann Ruane 36 Dodd-Frank Section 1024 See CRS Report R41338, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title X, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, by David H Carpenter Congressional Research Service 27 WhoRegulatesWhom?AnOverviewof U.S FinancialSupervision Appendix A Forms of Banking Organizations The structure of banks can be complex Currently,... expenses can reduce the rating for earnings Difficulties in forecasting and managing risks can also reduce the earnings rating 37 The Comptrollers handbooks are occasionally updated The most recent handbook for the Bank Supervision Process is dated September 2007 and can be found at http://www.occ.gov/handbook/banksup .pdf Congressional Research Service 30 WhoRegulatesWhom?AnOverviewof U.S Financial Supervision. .. account management’s ability to identify and manage the risks that can arise from the bank’s trading activities in financial markets It also takes into account interest rate risk from nontrading positions, such as any duration mismatch in loans held to maturity Congressional Research Service 31 WhoRegulatesWhom? An Overviewof U.S FinancialSupervision Appendix C Acronyms AICPA American Institute of Certified... of deposit insurance; and banks have been assessed an insurance premium by the FDIC based on the amount of their insured deposits The financial crisis of 2008 revealed a number of lessons related to bank runs and deposit insurance Several non-banks suffered the equivalent of depositor runs, including money market mutual funds and the interbank repo market Because the equivalent of depositor runs can... History and the Dodd-Frank Act, by Kathleen Ann Ruane and Michael V Seitzinger Congressional Research Service 26 WhoRegulatesWhom? An Overviewof U.S FinancialSupervision • Over-the-Counter Derivatives 35 OTC derivatives, a $600 trillion market, were generally not subject to the Commodity Exchange Act before Dodd-Frank Title VII of Dodd-Frank establishes a comprehensive regime for the regulation of swap... OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency OFHEO Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight OFR Office ofFinancial Research OTS Office of Thrift Supervision PCS Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems PWG President’s Working Group on Capital Markets SEC Securities and Exchange Commission SIPC Securities Investor Protection Corporation SRO Self Regulatory Organization UFIRS Uniform Financial. .. 22 WhoRegulatesWhom? An Overviewof U.S FinancialSupervision Regulatory Umbrella Groups The need for coordination and data sharing among regulators has led to the formation of innumerable interagency task forces to study particular market episodes and make recommendations to Congress Three interagency organizations have permanent status Financial Stability Oversight Council Title I of the Dodd-Frank... technically on the bank’s balance sheet Asset quality can include changes in loan default rates, investment performance, exposure to counterparty risk, and all other risks that may affect the value or marketability ofan institution’s assets Management Capability The governance of the bank, including management and board of directors, is assessed in relation to the nature and scope of the bank’s activities... Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Systemic Risk and the Federal Reserve, by Marc Labonte Congressional Research Service 23 WhoRegulatesWhom? An Overviewof U.S FinancialSupervision Although the FSOC does not have direct supervisory authority over any financial institution, it plays an important role in regulation, because firms that it designates as systemically important come . three-agency structure: a systemic risk regulator, a markets supervisor, and a consumer regulator.
Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of U. S. Financial Supervision. Bureau
Consumer businesses of
banks with over $10 billion
in assets
Does not supervise
insurers, SEC and CFTC
registrants, auto dealers,
sellers of