Four hundred stanzas on the middle way with commentary (70)

by inference through the power of the fact, and those about extremely hidden matters are not invalidated by inference through conviction All the great trailblazers use the validity of the Buddha's statements regarding obvious and slightly hidden things to establish the validity of those about extremely hidden matters, arguing that they are all equally the Buddha's words, spoken by the same person Moreover since his statements regarding the means to attain liberation and omniscience, the main focus of his teaching, are not deceptive, what he has taught about less important matters such as the means through which high rebirth is attained will not be deceptive either 9Ren 146.12 if lists the following four types of valid cognition: direct (mngon sum), inferential (rjes dpag), through appraisal (nye bar jal ba) and through scripture (lung gi tsad ma) While all valid cognition is either direct or inferential, the latter two-which are inferential cognition-are singled out for special attention In general there are three main types of inferential valid cognition: inference through the power of the fact (dngos stobs rjes dpag); through conviction (yid ches rjes dpag), which is equivalent to valid cognition through scripture; and inference through appraisal of an example (dpe nyer 'jal gyi rjes dpag), sometimes replaced by inference through renown (grags pa'i rjes dpag) Objects of apprehension can only be obvious or hidden, and thus valid cognitions apprehending them are only either direct or inferential For further discussion of inference see Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, pp 76-84 10Can 256.1.7 if succinctly formulates what is meant by self and selflessness in words that are cited in many other works "Here 'self' is an inherent nature of phenomena, that is, a non-dependence on another The non-existence of this is selflessness" (de la bdag ces bya ba ni gang zhig dngos po rnams kyi gzhan la rag ma las pa'i ngo bo rang bzhin to med pa ni bdag med pa'o) 11Nagarjuna's Praise to the Perfection of Wisdom (prajnaparamitastotra, shes rab kyi pha rol to ph yin ma'i bstod pa, P2018, Vol 46), 37.3.2 12True existence is called a natural stain (rang bzhin gyi dri ma) because all things are naturally free from it without the need for meditation on paths This so-called natural stain is not a stain at all because it does not exist Natural nirvana, since it is the fundamental mode of existence of all phenomena, is not actually nirvana, which is a cessation of adventitious stains attained through meditation on paths 13Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, P5225, Vol.95, 11.3.3 14Nirvana is not generally said to be attained when one reaches the path of seeing, since it is said to occur when all disturbing attitudes and emotions are eliminated Here the meaning appears to be that one can attain nirvana in the very life in which one reaches the path of seeing Gyel-tsap's Commentary on the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (rigs pa drug cu pa'i tikka, fromgyal tshab rje'i gsung 'bum [Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, 1981], Vol ca, p.411.4 ff.) says, "It is not evident in this system that the attainment of the path of seeing is posited as the attainment of nirvana Sutra says, 'My rebirths are finished, the task is done.' The statement is made in the context of Foe Destroyers." Notes to Chapter Thirteen 1gzugs Since sounds, smells, tastes and tangible objects are also forms, the term visible form is used as a variant for form to denote the object of visual consciousness 2rang mtshan pa is taken to be synonymous with ranggi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa in this chapter Elsewhere it is also translated as "real." Blue is introduced here to emphasize that not only visible form but color, which along with shape constitutes visible form, does not exist by way of its own character either 3rdzas brgyas In the Desire Realm the five objects of the senses, when not connected with consciousness, are composed of eight substances (or nine if sound particles are present) These eight are: earth, water, fire, wind, visible form, smell, taste, and that which is tangible The latter four derive from the elements When the object is connected with consciousness, particles of the body sense organ are present and there are thus nine components If particles of the other sense organs are present, there are ten components and eleven if sound particles are also present 4"Dialecticians" (rtogge ba) here refers to proponents of true existence (dngos smra ba) who assert that a direct perceiver has the three features of being a consciousness free from conceptuality, unmistaken with respect to its appearing object, a functional thing existent by way of its own entity and of both arising and engaging in its object in dependence upon a sense organ Candrakirti refutes the first of these in Clear Words, Commentary on INagarjuna'sJ 'Treatise on the Middle Way" (mulamadhyamakamttiprasannapada, dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba, P5260, Vol.98, 13.2.1 ff.) and refutes the second and third at this point in his commentary on the Four Hundred (259.1.5 ff.) Conceptuality usually involves perception for which a sound image (sgra spyi) and generic image (don spyi) are merged However, someone unversed in terminology may perceive the generic image of an object without its being merged with an associated sound image This is one explanation found in many texts for the term sgra don 'dres rung Jang-gya however asserts that the sound and generic image should not be differentiated in this way 5A single moment of consciousness cannot be produced and then engage with its object in dependence upon a sense organ as they assert occurs in direct perception, since moment by moment both the sense organ and consciousness cease upon production 6The opponent asserts that sense consciousnesses are direct perceivers in relation to their objects of engagement, the five sense objects existent by way of their own character However since objects merely appear to but not actually exist in this way, these consciousnesses are mistaken and deceptive in this respect To then refer to them as valid cognition which should be nondeceptive is inadmissible The Prasafigika definition of direct valid cognition is knowing that is not deceptive with respect to an object of comprehension which is its main object of engagement Thus for instance, both blue and blue existent by way of its own character appear to a visual consciousness perceiving blue However the visual consciousness is valid cognition with respect to blue, its main object of engagement, but not with respect to blue existent by way of its own character In Gyel Ch XIII 3.2 if read sties for zhes in accordance with Can 259.4.1 and rtog for rtogs in accordance with Can 259.4.2 7Can 259.4.1 if 8gzugs kyi Skye mched The six types of objects of consciousness (forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects and phenomena) and the six organs (eye organ, ear organ, nose organ, tongue organ, body organ and mental organ) are sources in that they act as stimuli to the production and development of awareness 9Stanza 308 has five lines in all versions inspected 10spyi don gzhan, one of the six categories of existents asserted by Vaisesikassubstance, quality, activity, generality, particularity and inherence Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, p.52.10 ff., says, "A generality acts as a common cause for applying terms and the mind to phenomena which it accompanies." 11The entailment is that visible forms, etc exist because the eye and the other organs that perceive them exist Implicit in the opponent's assertion is that both the subject and object exist by way of their own entity Stanza 316 refutes the eye as a perceiver by way of its own entity on the grounds that it does not perceive itself Its function as a perceiver can thus not be adduced by the opponent as proof of directly perceptible objects existent by way of their own entity 12Gah 448.1 13Smell-eaters (dri za, Skt gandharva) are celestial beings famed as musicians They enjoy and gain nourishment from smells of all kinds Although they are classed as gods in some texts and as demi-gods in others, Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge says they are intermediate state beings (bar srid) and that their phantom cities are dwellings in the intermediate state 14King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (P795, Vol.31, 283.4.5 ff.) contains the stanzas in the following order: (283.4.5 ff.); (283.4.4 ff.); (283.4.1 ff.); (283.4.3: although the meaning is similar the words are not as cited by Gyeltsap); (283.4.7 ff.); (283.4.8); (283.3.2 ff.); (283.4.1 ff.) Notes to Chapter Fourteen 1By qualifying existence with adjectives such as true, inherent, independent, etc and by the use of phrases such as "by way of their own entity," "by way of their own character" and so forth, it is evident that existence in general is not being refuted, but only a particular kind of existence Aryadeva's text often does not clearly indicate this difference The Madhyamika view should therefore not be misunderstood as a nihilist view 2Minds (sems) and their accompanying mental factors (sems byung) possess five similarities (mtshungs Iden Inga) Their base (rten) is the same in that, for instance, both a visual consciousness and its accompanying mental factors such as feeling depend on the same uncommon empowering condition, the eye organ They share the same focal object (dmigs pa) in that their object of engagement (jug yul) is the same; the same aspect (rnam pa) in that their mode of apprehension is the same; the same time (dus) in that they occur simultaneously; and the same substantial entity (rdzas) in that a moment of visual consciousness, for example, can only be accompanied by a single substantial entity of feeling 3Hot and burning (tsha zhing bsreg pa) is the definition of fire 4Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge (P5590, Vol.115, 118.4.4) Reference to simultaneously occurring causes and effects does not indicate the normal sequential cause and effect relationship, but a mutually supportive relationship as in the case of the four elements which occur simultaneously and cannot be isolated from one another This relationship also pertains in the case of the four characteristics of products-production, duration, aging and disintegration-and exists between mind and the omnipresent mental factors of feeling, discrimination, intention, contact and mental engagement which accompany it 51n this context refutation of the four alternatives focuses on the effect, negating the inherent production of an effect which exists or which does not exist at the time of its cause, which both does and does not exist at that time, and which neither exists nor does not exist at that time The reasons used to refute the above, presented in somewhat more detail by Ren-da-wa in his commentary on stanza 265 (p.135.9 ff.) are then applied to refute production in terms of a cause and effect which are inherently one, inherently different, both and neither This process of refutation focuses on the cause Thus the "diamond fragments" reason is used to analyze whether an effect is produced from a cause which is the same entity, an inherently different entity, both of the former or neither of the former Causeless production of an effect is often substituted for the last category in this analysis Gah 481.4 explains the Nirgrantha contention regarding the production of an effect which is both permanent and impermanent or both of one nature with yet different from its cause An example would be a gold bracelet that does not differ in nature from the lump of gold from which it was made but is different in that the gold has temporarily taken on a new aspect This is refuted by applying the reasons which refute cause and effect as a single entity and cause and effect as inherently different entities The contention that cause and effect are neither one entity nor different entities can be refuted by adducing the very same reasons If they are not one entity, they must be different entities, while if they are not different entities they must be one entity Implicit in all these contentions is an affirmation that things have objective and inherent existence All the reasons employed aim at refuting this underlying belief 6tshad ma sde bdun, Dharmakirti See bibliography These texts present the Cittamatra view Notes to Chapter Fifteen 1Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning (p.155.4 ff.) says, "Because of having characteristics such as production, forms and so forth are said to be products Sautrantikas and above [i.e Cittamatrins and Madhyamikas] assert that the characteristics, production and so forth are the activity of production, the activity of persisting and the activity of disintegrating of these phenomena Vaibhasikas, as explained below, assert that they are agents which cause forms and so forth to be produced, disintegrate and persist According to the latter, when something such as the form aggregate is defined as a product, it is not so defined because of being produced but because of having a separate agent of production and so forth According to the former, it is not defined in this way When Sautrantikas refute that the production and so forth of forms, etc are different substantial entities from the latter, Vaibhasikas object, asking how they could be characteristics of those phenomena that act as bases for characteristics In reply [Sautrantikas say that Vasubandhu] has explained in [his auto-] commentary on the Treasury [Explanation of the "Treasury of Knowledge" (P5591, Vol.115, 153.2.3)] that the combination of a hump and so forth is a characteristic of cattle and hardness a characteristic of the earth element, even though they are not different substantial entities Production and so forth are also like this." 2Our normal conception of production, duration, and disintegration is in terms of a thing's complete life span from the time it is newly produced or formed until it disintegrates, is old, wears out or falls to pieces Such a linear conception of these characteristics takes no account of the subtle changes which take place moment by moment Production, duration and disintegration are present at each moment, characterizing different features of an ongoing process Thus production is the new arising of what did not exist before; duration the ... tangible The latter four derive from the elements When the object is connected with consciousness, particles of the body sense organ are present and there are thus nine components If particles of the. .. discrimination, intention, contact and mental engagement which accompany it 51n this context refutation of the four alternatives focuses on the effect, negating the inherent production of an effect... dependence upon a sense organ as they assert occurs in direct perception, since moment by moment both the sense organ and consciousness cease upon production 6The opponent asserts that sense consciousnesses