824 Groundless Paths following path o f liberation), they are also established as the causes for the path o f liberation (the direct result o f that uninterrupted path) Under the unfavorable conditions, (1) represents the general one and (2 )-(4 ), the particular conditions that, respectively, first obstruct entering the path; in the middle, prevent the path from b ecom ing pure; and, in the end, obstruct reaching the end o f the path 909 PGBG (p 342) says that, once the fruition o f the approach o f virtuous effort has becom e pure o f the stains o f its specific cause, the corresponding uninterrupted path, the seeing o f the true nature o f its objects (such as form) is also pure o f these very stains For these two purities are not different substances in terms o f specifically characterized phenom ena and they cannot be divided into different isolates in terms o f generally characterized phenomena Therefore, said purities are proclaimed to be o f the same type According to MCG (fols 71a.6-72a.4), at the point o f the path o f liberation that is the fruition o f the approach o f virtuous effort, the pure w isd om (the realizing subject) o f having relinquished the factors to be relinquished (such as clinging to real existence) is noth in g but the purity o f form and such (the objects) For w h en being em p ty o f real existence is realized with regard to a vase or a pillar, the clinging to their real existence has b ecom e pure The (seeming) real existence o f said vase or pillar is o f one taste with the purity that is primordial purity Other than realizing their being pure in this way, thereafter there is no other impurity within that vase itself or that pillar itself, just as one sees forms clearly by virtue o f an eye problem having been cleared away H owever, it is not the case that all impurities are terminated if one awakens to the single purity o f one specific factor to be relinquished The fruitions o f the types o f realization o f the three yánas are presented by virtue o f the manner in which the obscurations o f clinging to real existence and clinging to the characteristics o f dualistic appearances are purified W hen the perceiving subject has becom e pure in said manner, just like seeing clearly upon an eye problem having been cleared away, the nature o f the object is seen exactly as it is Therefore, the object also appears to be pure That these two purities o f subject and object are not different is by virtue o f a pure m ind seeing the actual nature o f the object However, the purity o f the object naturally abides like that—it is not m anufactured as pure by the mind Therefore, ultimately, all p henom ena always abide as having the nature o f great primordial purity free from obscurations Still, the pure actual m ode o f being o f all entities is seen progressively only through the correct path purifying what is observed in a mistaken way through becom ing affected by the mistaken m ind (just as a conch is white, but appears as yellow for som eon e with jaundice) This is the essential point here MPZL (pp -8 ) refers to 11.28 as the general topic o f identifying the nature o f purity and says that this nature is represented by the statement “M ind is naturally luminous, the stains are adventitious.” Accordingly, the w isd om o f the path o f liberation, which is pure o f adventitious stains and is the fruition o f the uninterrupted path (its cause) having relinquished the adventitious stains that are to be relinquished in the naturally pure basic nature o f form and such, com es about by virtue o f the essence o f the naturally pure basic nature o f all phenomena For these tw o purities are only different in terms o f isolates, but not in terms o f the nature o f objects, and they are indivisible even by the mind Therefore, the sütras proclaim that the nature o f the fruitional path o f libera tion is the nature o f purity 910 MPZL refers to 11.29 as the elaboration that teaches purity through dividing it into the purities o f the four noble ones Both MCG (fol 72b l) and MPZL (p 87) gloss “the utter purity o f buddhas” as “having relinquished both afflictive and cognitive obscurations, including their latent tendencies.” 911 MPZL (p 86) refers to 11.30-31 as the pertinent topic o f this section—the actual pure path o f familiarization 912 PGBG (p 343) adds that, by contrast, the ninefold paths o f familiarization o f the inferior yánas only purify limited factors to be relinquished MPZL (p 88) says that the above-m entioned Notes 825 nine levels o f samsara include all innate factors to be relinquished, which are relinquished through the w isdom s o f the paths o f liberation o f the pure path o f familiarization from the second through the tenth bhümis As for the manner in which these factors to be relinquished are relinquished, on the second bhümi the greater o f the great degrees o f all the factors o f said nine levels to be relinquished are relinquished together The same goes for the following bhümis and the corresponding degrees o f factors to be relinquished until, finally, on the tenth b hüm i the lesser o f the lesser degrees o f all the factors o f the nine levels are relinquished In this way, the entirety o f both afflictive and cognitive obscurations is purified 913 In other words, the objector holds that great factors to be relinquished m ust be relin quished by correspondingly great remedies and small ones by small remedies 914 MCG (fol 73a.2-73b.2) adds “that it is not reasonable for the remedies in one realm to be able to eliminate the obscurations o f all three realms” to the above qualm The reply on the ultimate level is that neither factors to be relinquished and remedies nor greater and lesser are established, while the conventional exam ple is as above The nonreferential w isdom o f the meditative equipoise o f the path o f familiarization does not conceive o f any real verifying cog nition and what is verified by it as being different as subject and object It is by virtue o f realizing their equality that this w isd om is asserted as the special type o f realization o f the mahàyàna that serves as the remedy for the factors o f the three realms to be relinquished MPZL (p 89) further glosses “great equality” as “lack o f arising.” Through explicitly teaching the division o f the pure path o f familiarization and the rebuttal o f disputes about it, the manner in which the purities o f ¿ràvakas and pratyekabuddhas are limited and the purity o f buddhas is utterly so will also be realized It is for this reason that master Haribhadra emphasizes the explanation o f this implicit m eaning However, it appears that those who not understand this and present explanations that confuse what is explicit and implicit lose the explicit meaning, which consists o f the pure path o f familiarization 915 The Tibetan has “extrem e” (mtha ) 916 PGBG (p 344) says that the realization o f noble bodhisattvas who wish for path prajnàpàramità abides neither in samsara, nor nirvana, nor in between because it is the kn ow l edge o f noble bodhisattvas o f directly realizing all p h en om en a in the three times as equality, that is, lacking real existence For M CG’s com m ents in addition to PBG, see endnote 480 According to MPZL (p 90), em ptiness with a heart o f com p assion —the w isdom o f seeing samsara and nirvana as equality (not abiding in samsara through prajnà, not abiding in nirvána through com passion, and therefore not abiding anywhere in between either)—realizes the fundamental nature o f entities, that is, the inseparability o f the seem ing phenom ena o f the three times (skan dhas and so on) and their true nature, great ultimate equality Therefore, it is asserted as having the nature o f prajnàpàramità 917 PGBG (pp 344-45) says that the reason for being distant from the fruitional m other is to not k now how to accomplish this mother because o f observing characteristics o f enti ties (due to not realizing the equality o f the three times) and lacking skill in means (due to lacking m ahàyàna mentors) N oble bodhisattvas are close to the fruitional m other because they possess the skill in m eans o f the two realities being in union According to MCG (fol 75a.375b.2), the hlnayàna system is to be distant from the perfect m other (the knowledge o f entities or the fruitional mother) for the following reasons D u e to clinging to the characteristics o f the phenom ena o f ground, path, and fruition, one does not realize equality, just as it is If one engages in that w ay through observing the characteristics o f entities and nonentities, one lacks the m eans to accom plish enlightenm ent (such as prajnà and m eans in union) The knowledge o f entities o f bodhisattvas does not conceive o f the characteristics o f entities and nonentities, but realizes them as equality Thus, though suchness is neither close nor distant from phenom ena, through possessing the skill in the m eans to properly realize this, the knowledge o f entities o f 826 Groundless Paths bodhisattvas is close to the ffuitional mother MPZL (p 92) adds that the knowledge o f entities o f šrávakas and pratyekabuddhas is like illusionists clinging to their own illusions, thus being distant from the fruitional mother 918 PGBG (p 345) says that the knowledges o f entities o f šrávakas and pratyekabuddhas are the antagonistic factors o f the bodhisattva path because they are factors to be relinquished by this path, that is because these knowledges entail the above three sets o f discrim inating notions MPZL (p 93) classifies the first tw o discriminating notions as clinging to the phenom ena co n tained in the t w o realities and the third one as clinging to the person w h o engages in the path That is, one clings to the skandhas as being the ultimate p h en o m en o n that is emptiness and to the bearers o f the nature o f emptiness as being the seeming p henom ena included in the three times One also clings to the six páramitás (the u n co m m o n path) and the factors concordant with enlightenment (the com m on path) as “I,” the one w h o engages in the path Implicitly, the discriminating notions o f clinging to the remedies o f these notions are also taught to be antagonistic factors to be relinquished There appear different systems such as saying that these notions exist only in the m ind streams o f šrávakas and pratyekabuddhas However, it appears to be the intention o f the AA here that said notions exist in šrávakas and pratyekabuddhas in a gen eral way, but that bodhisattvas also possess them in the form o f factors to be relinquished Up through the seventh bhumi, they som etimes even have m anifest clinging to characteristics Their relinquishment o f the clinging to a person is complete from the seventh bhum i onward, while their relinquishment o f the clinging to phenom ena is com plete at the end o f the continuum o f the ten bhumis 919 PGBG (p 345) says that the uninterrupted path o f the path o f seeing o f noble bodhisat tvas, which does not cling to “m e” (in the form o f the three spheres) with regard to generosity and such and enjoins others to this, is the remedy for the imputational obscurations o f clinging to the characteristics o f generosity and such because it is the maháyána uninterrupted path o f stopping all extremes o f attachment through engaging in the basic nature o f phenomena MCG (fol 75b.4-6) glosses “extrem e o f attachment” as “clinging to real existence in terms o f the fruition (the victors and so on)” and says that III.4ac describes the remedial k n ow led ge o f entities o f bodhisattvas MPZL (p 94) takes III.4ab as representing the knowledge o f entities that is com m on to bodhisattvas and šrávakas—the realization o f the remedy that is personal identitylessness 920 MPZL (p 94) takes III.4cd-6 as representing the u n com m on maháyána knowledge o f entities o f realizing phenom enal identitylessness III.4cd explains the reason for having to real ize entities as being free from extremes Bodhisattvas must stop all coarse and subtle extremes o f attachment in terms o f observing and clinging For otherwise there would be the flaw o f the subtle extrem e o f attachment to the perfect buddhas and so on 921 PGBG (p 346) says that focusing on special objects as being really existent is also a factor to be relinquished on the path o f bodhisattvas because the path that is the basic nature o f all phenom ena is free from being established by any nature o f its own Therefore, natural emptiness is the profound actuality MCG (fol 76a.3) glosses “free by nature” as “free from all reference points such as samsára, nirvána, entity, and nonentity.” 922 PGBG (p 346) says that the wisdom o f directly knowing that the phenomena o f noble bodhisattvas are o f a single nature in that they are empty o f real existence is the remedy for clinging to characteristics of the fruition because it is the w isdom that relinquishes the attach ment o f clinging to characteristics According to MCG (fol 76a.4-6), through realizing that all phenom ena o f samsára and nirvána have the single nature o f great profound equality without anything to be divided or eliminated, all clinging attachment will be relinquished Through this, the extremes o f both existence and peace are naturally put to an end MPZL (pp 94-95) takes III.5 as describing the feature o f the wisdom o f realizing entities as equality Since the path o f Notes 827 realizing the identitylessness o f dharmas (th e entities) is th e basic nature o f objects (all p h e nom ena being free from any reference points o f a nature), suchness is profound Throu gh the cognizing subject o f this—the clear realization o f the profound knowledge o f entities—know ing that phenom ena (the entities) are one in being the equality o f identitylessness, all coarse and subtle extrem es o f attachment to be relinquished are relinquished 923 According to PGBG (p 346), natural emptiness is said to be difficult to realize and thus, implicitly, to be profound because it has the nature o f being rejected through valid perceptions such as the direct seeing o f m inds that entail clinging to extremes 924 PGBG (p 346) says that natural emptiness is asserted to be inconceivable by the mind that realizes it because said m ind does not cognize it as any entity such as form MCG (fol 76a.676b.6) com m ents on III.6 as a unit— the reason w h y the nature o f phenom ena is profound The nature o f phenom ena is not to be k n ow n as anything such as entities (form and so on) or nonentities Therefore, it rejects the conventions o f seeing and hearing and so on through the cognizing subjects o f conventional valid cognition (such as an eye consciousness) By virtue o f that, this nature is said to be profound and difficult to realize Since it is beyond the scope o f the m inds o f ordinary beings, it is the object o f personally experienced w isdom It is not seen by conventional valid cogn ition because the character o f all p h en om en a from form up through the unique buddha qualities is the basic nature o f the mother The unity o f appearance and em ptiness—great equality—is never separated or new ly conjoined with appearances, but they are em ptiness from the very time o f their appearing Therefore, prajñápáramitá is held to be inconceivable Since árávakas and pratyekabuddhas not realize this equality, they fall into the extreme o f nirvana On the other hand, this represents the ultimate essential point o f it being impossible for bodhisattvas who see it to deviate from the maháyána path Therefore, it is the crucial point o f prajñápáramitá and one should know h ow to explain all its topics in the begin ning, middle, and end in accordance with this principle, thus grasping the heart o f the matter Similarly, MPZL (p 95) takes III.6 as describing the distinctive feature o f the great profundity o f prajñápáramitá As for its feature o f being difficult to realize through the cognizing subjects that consist o f the valid cognitions o f seeing just this life, the basic nature o f prajñápáramitá is profound by virtue o f not being the sphere o f any mental states that are consciousnesses because it rejects what is seen by them Thus, in the sütras it is said to be profound because it is difficult to be realized by any other yánas As for the nature o f the object being inconceivable, since the sütras teach that the p rofound nature o f entities is not k now n as any o f the aspects o f the four extremes in terms o f existence and nonexistence (such as form), it is asserted to be inconceivable 925 See P SD s m ore detailed explanation o f this 926 PGBG (p 347) explains under (3) that imaginary and the perfect forms are, respectively, incomplete and com plete as the support o f qualities (4) refers to not clinging to the lack o f attachment to form and so on being really existent According to MCG (fols 77a.3-78b.4), ( )(4) are classified in terms o f their objects; (5)—(7), in terms o f their natures; (8)—(9), in terms o f their functions; and (10), in terms o f the examples that cause understanding U nder (3), MCG com m ents that imaginary form m eans that form and so on are incom plete as the foundation o f qualities, which refers to the perception o f form by ordinary beings That is, no matter how much they focus on forms as being forms by way o f clinging to these forms while they are appearing in a dualistic manner, the qualities o f the path are not produced The form o f the nature o f p h en om en a is the perfect nature em p ty o f a real other-dependent nature, w h ich refers to the subsequent attainments o f noble ones If they focus on this form that is specified by lacking a nature o f its own, they see it as illusionlike and therefore the qualities o f the path are produced in a com plete manner (4) refers to not clinging to the lack o f attachment to these three kinds o f form (imaginary, other-dependent, and perfect) as being really existent ultimately A m on g 828 Groundless Paths these four trainings, the first three focus on the seeming and the last one, on the ultimate Thus, they counteract various ways o f clinging to the bearers o f the nature o f phenomena The next five trainings deal with clinging to the nature o f phenomena, prajnaparamita Thus, (5) refers to not clinging to the realization o f prajnaparamita being without change because, in its nature, there is no increase or decrease through it being taught or not taught (6) means that one does not cling to prajnaparamita ultimately not existing as an agent that pacifies praise, blame, attach ment, hatred, and so on That is, one does not cling to the nature o f phenom ena because, by virtue o f its being unconditioned, it is neither produced by anybody nor does it ultimately pro duce anything (7) It is difficult to aim at the knowledge o f all aspects, train in the knowledge o f the path, and make the knowledge o f entities workable because, ultimately, there is nothing to be attained, to be generated, and to be taught, respectively On the level o f seem ing reality, one must rely on these three knowledges because they are what is to be attained, what is to be known, what is to be relinquished, respectively H owever since it is not appropriate to cling to them as such, they are difficult to engage in Under (8), “wishing for fruitfulness” is glossed as “one’s training in prajnaparamita not going to waste.” (9) One does not cling to the f o l lo w in g all the qualities o f the path and the fruition are complete, when the mother is present because they not depend on anything other than this very mother Under (10), “dream s” are glossed as “appearing as transformations o f the latent tendencies o f clinging” and optical illusions are explained as reflections, circling firebrands, and shadows According to MPZL (pp 96 -9 ), this tenfold division o f the training represents its objects and the fourfold lack o f conceit in IILlOcd, the cognitive aspects o f the training that are the subjects The ten trainings are divided into (a) those that have the nature o f meditative equipoise and (b) the one that has the nature o f subsequent attainment The first are twofold—the trainings that stop engaging in clinging to (aa) appearances (the bearers o f the nature o f phenom ena) and (ab) em ptiness (the nature o f phenomena), (aa) consists o f stopping such clinging with regard to (aal) objects and (aa2) the subject, (aal) One stops clinging to (1) form and such as the bases o f the attributes o f appear ances, (2) impermanence and so on as their general attributes, and (3) their being incomplete and complete, respectively, as their com m on and uncom m on particular attributes (aa2) consists o f (4)—stopping clinging to the nature o f detachment, which is the subject o f stopping clinging to ( l ) - ( ) (ab) The trainings in stopping clinging to emptiness refer to clinging to emptiness as (abl) an object and (ab2) the subject, (abl) One stops clinging to (5) the nature o f emptiness (the nature o f phenomena) not changing into anything else throughout all situations and (6) its feature o f there b ein g no agent that is not produced by causes and conditions (ab2) consists o f not clinging to (7) the threefold feature o f the nature o f realization as the subject— the three knowledges as explained by MCG, (8) the feature o f the function o f the subject—wishing for attaining the fruitions o f the four kinds o f noble ones, according to on es destiny, through the three knowledges, and (9) the distinctive feature o f the subject—said fruitions not being d epen dent on any other causes and conditions because they arise from the three knowledges, (b) The training during subsequent attainment consists o f (10) not clinging to the seven exam ples that make one understand that all conventional appearances during subsequent attainment have the nature o f illusory phenom ena—being nonexistent and yet appearing 927 MCG (fols 78b.4-79a.2) says that the realization o f the equality o f subject and object, which is free from the four kinds o f conceit, represents the general m ode o f apprehension of these ten trainings It adds that the fourfold lack o f conceit can also be explained as respectively referring to the four doors to liberation—em ptiness, signlessness, wishlesness, and nonform a tion MPZL (pp -9 ) also explains this in terms o f said four doors and identifies the four lacks o f conceit as the cognitive aspects o f the training (the cognizing subjects), also referred to as “the four equalities.” It says that the third lack o f conceit (about form as being “m in e”) refers to the aspects o f form (such as its being impermanent), while the fourth one refers to unarisen phenom ena (such as the cognizing subject o f form) ... m other (the knowledge o f entities or the fruitional mother) for the following reasons D u e to clinging to the characteristics o f the phenom ena o f ground, path, and fruition, one does not... from phenom ena, through possessing the skill in the m eans to properly realize this, the knowledge o f entities o f 826 Groundless Paths bodhisattvas is close to the ffuitional mother MPZL (p 92)... to waste.” (9 ) One does not cling to the f o l lo w in g all the qualities o f the path and the fruition are complete, when the mother is present because they not depend on anything other than