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Four hundred stanzas on the middle way with commentary (47)

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Answer: It follows that the pot would not be a truly single unit, because it is, by way of its own entity, one with and not separate from its eight substantial particles which have diverse characteristics Assertion: The pot is a plurality Answer: In that case there should be a pot for each of the eight substantial particles Since there is no pot for each, the pot is not feasible as a plurality Assertion: The pot is a single unit through the coming together of the eight substantial particles Answer: The pot's composite can in no way be a truly existent single unit due to the coalescence of the eight substantial particles such as visible form and so forth, because the four elements which are tangible, and visible form, smell and so forth which are intangible cannot touch and coalesce Assertion: Even though there is no mutual contact, their combination is the "truly existent" pot Answer: The pot's visible form is a component or part of the pot and thus, for a start, is not the pot, just as smell and so forth are not Assertion: Since a compound reliant upon its components exists, that is the pot Answer: Since visible form, smell and so forth not each have a pot, the compound pot does not exist by way of its own entity The components, too, therefore not exist by way of their own entity, because they have parts Why are some things that have form pots and other things that have form not pots? It follows that all should equally be pots, for if the definition that form is simply that which is appropriate as form applies without any incongruity to all forms such as smell, taste and so forth as well as pots and woollen cloth, truly existent things with form should be the same in all respects It follows that form, smell and so forth would also be one, because of being one with the pot Objection: Form, smell and so forth are different Answer: You assert that smell, taste, and so forth are distinct from visible form because they are objects apprehended by different senses, but that visible form is not distinct from the pot Yet how can the pot that cannot be posited without taste and so forth, which are distinct from form, not be distinct from form? It follows that it should be, because the pot is different from form, smell and so forth by way of its own entity Since form and so forth are not the pot's causes by way of their own entity, the pot is not an effect existent by way of its own entity Thus there is nowhere a pot that exists by way of its own entity apart from its components like visible form and so forth Since a pot cannot be found isolated from its components, a pot which is a different entity from them does not exist Assertion: The pot is the effect of its components, such as clay, and they are its causes Answer: If the pot exists by virtue of its causes, and those causes exist by virtue of other causes, how can that which does not exist by virtue of its own entity produce a disparate effect? Anything, therefore, that needs to rely on causes does not exist by way of its own entity If it existed by way of its own entity, it follows that it would be causeless This reasoning which refutes the existence of a pot by way of its own entity should be applied to all effects Assertion: Though it has many components, the pot is a truly existent single unit Answer: Though visible form, smell and so forth meet and combine, form cannot be smell, for the things that create the composite not give up their different characteristics Though form, smell and so forth combine they not have one nature Thus just as the pot as a truly existent single unit was refuted by the words [in stanza 332], the composite too cannot be a truly existent single unit Just as the previously explained reasoning shows that there is no truly existent pot apart from form, smell and so forth, there is no truly existent component visible form apart from the great elements such as air, for it is imputed in dependence upon these Just as visible form, smell and the like cannot exist without air and so forth, the great elements too not exist by way of their own entity without relying on each other Thus fire is that which bums and the other three elements that which is burnt Fire burns only fuel whose nature is the other three elements, yet hot fuel is fire and no longer fuel to be burnt If it is not hot, since it is unrelated to fire how will it burn? Thus fuel independent of fire does not exist by way of its own entity and because of this, fire independent of fuel does not exist by way of its own entity either Assertion: Fuel is hard and so forth but not hot by nature When it is overpowered by fire, it grows hot and is that which is burnt Answer: Even if fuel grows hot only when overpowered by fire, why is it not fire? It follows that it should be fire because it is hot and burns.' Yet if fuel is not hot at that time, it is implausible to claim that something else which is not hot is present in fire In that case just heat divorced from the other three elements would be fire, but if one of the great elements does not exist the others cannot exist either Moreover it contradicts the statement, "Things that arise simultaneously are reciprocal effects like the elements."4 Assertion: Since the other three elements are not present in the smallest substantial fire particle, there is fire even without fuel Answer: Fire without fuel exists if the smallest fire particle does not have fuel Since it therefore would follow that uncaused fire exists, one should not assert a smallest substantial particle as the Vaisesikas If one admits that even the fire particle has fuel, for fear of the conclusion that it would otherwise be causeless, it follows that there is no singlenatured particle since the other elements are certainly present in each particle When functional things like pots and woollen cloth are examined as to whether they are or are not truly existent, these various things, because they have parts, not have truly existent singleness Nor they have truly existent plurality for the very reason by which they are not truly single, since plurality comes about through an accumulation of single units External and internal phenomena are not truly existent because they are neither one nor many They are like reflections One may think this refutation applies to our own sectarians who assert that the elements and elemental derivatives occur simultaneously, but not to outsiders who assert that a small permanent earth particle which is a single unit exists where there are no functional things apart from the smallest particles such as ... dependence upon these Just as visible form, smell and the like cannot exist without air and so forth, the great elements too not exist by way of their own entity without relying on each other Thus... just heat divorced from the other three elements would be fire, but if one of the great elements does not exist the others cannot exist either Moreover it contradicts the statement, "Things that... like the elements."4 Assertion: Since the other three elements are not present in the smallest substantial fire particle, there is fire even without fuel Answer: Fire without fuel exists if the

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