Strategic-Defense-Disamament-and-Stability-Modelling-Arms-Race-Phenomena-with-Security-and-Costs-under-Political-and-Technical-Uncertainties

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317304663 Strategic Defense, Disamament and Stability: Modelling Arms Race Phenomena with Security and Costs under Political and Technical Uncertainties Book · October 1989 CITATIONS READS 23 127 author: Jürgen Scheffran University of Hamburg 711 PUBLICATIONS   7,487 CITATIONS    SEE PROFILE Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: Environmental security in the Anthropocene View project Societal impacts of climate engineering View project All content following this page was uploaded by Jürgen Scheffran on 10 November 2019 The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file Jürgen Scheffran Strategie Defense, Disarmament, and Stability Modellin g Arms Race Phenom ena with Security and Costs under Political and Technical Uncertainties Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Marburger Wissenscha ftler für Friedens-und Abrüstungsforschung und der Interdisziplinären Arbeitsgruppe Friedens- und Abrüstungsforschung an der Universität Marburg (IAFA) Nr r Jürgen Scheffran Strategie Defense, Disarmament, and Stability Modelling Arms Race Phenomena with Security and Costs under Political and Technical Uncertainties Doctoral Thesis Department of Physics University of Marburg, FR Germany October 1989 Granted by the Volkswagen-Stiftung STRATEGISCHE ABWEHR, ABRÜSTUNG UND STABILITÄT Eine Modellierung der Rüstungsdynamik mit Sicherheit und Kosten unter Berücksichtigung politischer und technischer Unsicherheiten (abgefaßt in englischer Sprache) INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde des Fachbereichs Physik der Philipps-Unversität Marburg/Lahn Vorgelegt von JÜRGEN SCHEFFRAN aus Weyerbusch/Westerwald Marburg/Lahn 1989 Vom Fachbereich Physik der Philipps-Univ ersität Marburg/ Lahn als Dissertation angenommen am 7.12.1989 Berichterstatt er: Prof Dr Melsheimer Mitberichters tatter: Prof Dr W Kerby (Hamburg) Mitberichters tatter: Prof Dr U Albrecht (Berlin) Die mündliche Prüfung zur Erlangung des Dr rer.nat wurde am 21.12.1989 bestanden IMPRESSUM Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Marburger Wissenschaftler für Friedens- und Abrüstungsforschung (AMW) und der Interdisziplinären Arbeitsgruppe Friedens- und Abrüstungsforschung an der Universität Marburg (IAFA) Nr Eigenverlag, IAFA, Dr Johannes M Becker, Wilhelm Röpke-Str G, Zi 21, 3550 Marburg Druck: Universitätsdruckerei Marburg Einband: Druckerei Mauersberger, Marburg Titelgraphik: Helga Kern Marburg 1989 ISBN 3-8185-0042-8 30,- DM Contents Introduction 1.1 English Summary • • • 1.2 Deutsche Zusammenfassung ( German Summary) 1.3 First Quotes • 1.4 Preface a.n.d Acknowledgements 1.5 Introductory Survey • 7 10 13 Qualitative Results and Conclusions 2.1 Abstract 2.2 Introduction • • 2.3 Requirements and Assumptions of the Arms Race Model 2.4 Qualitative Description of the Model Elements 2.5 Model Applications and Results • • • • • • 2.5.1 Conditions for Transition Stability 2.5.2 Analysis of the SCX Model • • 2.5.3 Simulation of the SCX Model • 2.5.4 Specifi.c Stability Aspects of the Strategie Forces 2.5.4.1 Offense 2.5.4.2 Defense 2.5.4.3 Offense-Defense Mix 2.6 Critical Rema.rks Short Summary Survey of the Quantitative Model Elements 3.1 Description of the SCX Model • 3.1.1 The Ba.sie Model Variables 3.1.2 The Basic Dynamic Equations 3.1.3 Verbal Description of the SCX model 3.2 Measures of Security a.nd Crisis Stability • • 3.2.1 Offense Capability an.d Damage - 3.2.2 First Strike and Second Strike Measures 3.2.3 The Strategie Cases • • • • • 3.2.4 Parameters of the First and Second Strike Ca.pabilities • • 3.2.5 Probability of Survival for Different Defense Operation Modes 3.2.6 Transition Stability in the Defense Domain • 3.2.7 Uncertainty and Perception • 3.2.8 Defensive Vuhterability and Survivability • 3.2.9 The Deterrence GaIIl.e • • • • • 3.2.10 Definition of the Strategie Security Function 3.2.11 Game Theoretic Measures of Crisis Stability • • • 16 16 16 17 18 19 19 21 22 23 23 23 24 24 25 26 26 26 27 28 28 28 29 29 • • • • • 30 30 31 32 33 33 34 34 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 35 35 35 36 36 37 37 Aspects of Arms Race Stability 3.3.1 Decision Rules 3.3.2 Time Delays 3.3.3 The Security-Cost Coefficients 3.3.4 Cost-Effectiveness 3.3.5 Measures of Arms Race Instability The Baseline Parameter Set Basic Figures 3.5.1 The Defense Domain 3.5.2 The Offense-Defense Vector Space Alphabetical Parameter Listing Abbreviations 38 38 39 40 44 Political and Strategie Aspects of Strategie Defense 4.1 From the ABM Debate to SDI 4.2 Strategie Aspects of Strategie Defense 4.2.1 US Government Positions and Strategie Stability 4.2.2 The Defense Analytic Community and the Transition Concept 4.2.3 US Congress and the Role of Arms Control 4.2.4 Soviet Positions and the START Negotiations 45 45 48 48 49 Stability in Seeurity Poliey and Arms Control 5.1 General Perspectives on Stability 5.2 Levels of Stability in Security Policy and Arms Control 5.3 Dimensions of Crisis Stability 5.3.1 Survivability a.nd Retaliation 5.3.2 Transition Stability and Vulnerability 5.3.3 Payoffs, Probabilities, and Incentives 5.3.4 Uncertainty, Perception, and Complexity 5.3.5 Other Dimensions of Crisis Stability 5.4 Dimensions of Arms Race Stability 5.5 Arms Control, Disarmament, and Stability 55 55 Models on Strategie Defense, Disarmament, and Stability 6.1 Introduction 6.2 A Survey on Strategie Stability Models 6.3 Some Critical Remarks on Modelling 69 69 Mathematical Description of Strategie Warfare 7.1 Characteristics of the Strategie Capabilities 7.2 The First Strike and Second Strike Capabilities 7.2.1 The Two-Strike Scenario 2.2 First strike 7.2.3 Second strike The Ma.thematics of Counterforce 7.4 Measures of Defense Performance 7.4.1 Basic Definitions 7.4.2 Interceptors and Defense Capa.bility 7.4.2.1 Simultaneous Multiple Defensive Shots 7.4.2.2 Successive shots The Probability of Survival for Different Defense Operation Modes 85 85 50 52 56 58 58 60 61 62 65 65 67 70 80 88 88 90 90 ~1 92 92 94 94 95 96 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 7.5.4 Uniform Defense (UD) Discriminating Semipreferential Defense (SPD) Complete Preferential Defense (CPD) Complete Preferential Attaclc (CPA) 96 98 99 100 M easures of Security and Crisis Stability 8.1 Measures of Strategie Security 8.1.1 Qualitative Aspects of Security 8.1.2 Quantitative Aspects of Security 8.1.3 Survivability and Deterrence 8.1.4 Game Theoretic Assessment of Strategie Security 8.1.4.l The Deterrence Game Matrix 8.1.4.2 The Ex.pected Relative Damages 8.1.4.3 The Expected Probabilities 8.1.4.4 The Expected Values 8.1.4.5 The Expected Security-Payoff 8.1.4.6 Special Cases 8.2 Measures of Crisis Stability 8.2.1 Stability of the Strategie Cases 8.2.2 Game Theoretic Stability Measures 8.2.3 Defensive Vulnerability and Survivability 8.2.4 Uncertainty and Perception Variance 8.2.4.1 Basic Considerations 8.2.4.2 First-Strike and Second-Strike Uncertainties 8.2.5 A General Eramework for Stability - First Considerations and Examples 8.2.5.1 The Basic Characteristics of Stability 8.2.5.2 Examples for the Stability Eramework 101 101 101 103 105 107 107 108 108 109 109 110 112 112 113 115 117 117 118 120 120 122 Transition Stability in the Defense Domain 9.1 Problem Description and Summary 9.1.1 The Stability Regions in the Defense Domain 9.1.2 Necessary Conditions for 'n:ansition Stability 9.1.3 Role of Uncertainties 9.1.4 Some Figures 9.2 Minimal Distan.ce between Exponential Functions 9.2.1 The Contact Problem 9.2.2 The Minimal Coordinate Distance and the Conditions of Contact 9.2.3 The Minimal Cross Distance 9.2.4 Symmetrie Parameters 9.3 Mathematical Analysis of the Transition Problem 9.3.l Parametrization 9.3.2 The Case = 9.3.3 The Case -:j: 9.3.4 The Symmetrie Case 9.3.5 Transition Stability Under Uncertainties 9.3.6 Transition Stability and Defense Survivability 124 124 124 126 128 129 133 133 135 141 143 144 144 145 146 148 151 153 z, z, 10 Models of Arms Race Phenomena 10.1 Qualitative Considerations on the Armament Dynamics 10.2 Selected Arms Race Models 10.2.1 The Richardson Model 10.2.2 Decision Rules and Seif-Stimulation 10.2.3 Nonlinearity, Predictability, and Chaos 10.2.3.1 Fundamentals of Chaos Theory 10.2.3.2 Saperstein (1984) 10.2.3.3 Grossma.nn and Mayer-Kress (1989) 10.2.3.4 Saperstein and Mayer-Kress (1988) 156 156 160 160 162 164 164 164 165 166 11 The 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 169 169 169 174 177 177 178 180 182 182 183 185 185 186 187 187 188 188 188 189 190 190 190 Elements of the SCX Model Basic Requirements Model Assu.mptions and Elements Survey on the SCX Model Elements The Elements of the Security Dynamics 11.4.1 The Security-Cost Coeffi.cient s 11.4.2 Security-Cost Exchange Ratios 11.4.3 The Self-induced Security Effect 11.5 The Elements of the Cost Dynamics 11.5.1 The Secw:ity Aspect Function K 11.5.2 The Cost Aspect Function Kc 11.6 Variable and Fixed Costs 11.6.1 The Microlevel 11.6.2 The Macrolevel 11.6.3 hnpact on Security 11.7 Decision Rules for the Strategie Capabilities 11.7.1 Definition of the Decision Rules 11.7.2 The Security Decision Function sf 11 7.3 The Growth Ftmction K 11 7.4 The Environment Term U{ 11.7.5 Limit Cases 11.7.5.1 Dedsion Rules With Security Effects 11.7.5.2 Decision Rules With Security Goals f 12 Dynamics and Stability of the SCX Model 12.1 The Security-Cost Dynamics 12.1.l Equilibria and Linear Sta.bility Analysis 12.1.2 The Decoupled Cost Dynamics 12.1.2.1 Basic Equations 12.1.2.2 Connection to Other Arms Race Models 12.1.2.3 Stability of the Cost Model 12.1.3 The Decoupled Security Dynamics 12.1.4 Control Aspects 12.1.4.l Maintain Constant Costs 12.1.4.2 Maintain a Const ant Security Aspect Ratio 12.1.4.3 Conditions for Chaotic Behavior 12.1.5 Simulation of the Security-Cost Model - Selected Examples 12.2 Measures of Cost-Effectiveness and Cast-Exchange 12.2.l Basic Definitions 192 192 192 195 195 196 197 197 199 199 199 200 201 208 208 12.2.2 Cost-Effectiveness of Wa.rheads a.nd lnterceptors 12.2.2.l The Lea.rning Curve 12.2.2.2 Cast-Exchange Ra.tio for Interceptors 12.2.2.3 Exponentia.l Dependence for D(I) 12.2.2.4 Linear Dependence for D(I) 12.2.2.5 Loga.rithmic Dependence D(I) 12.2.3 Security-Cost Effectiveness of the Strategie Capabilities 12.2.3.1 General Conditions 12.2.3.2 Denia.l of a Security Gain 12.2.3.2.1 Interna.! Cost-Effectiveness of Countermea.sures 12.2.3.2.2 Externa.1 Cost-Effectiveness of Defensive Actions 12.2.3.3 Compensation of a Security Loss 12.2.3.3.1 Interna.! Cost-Effediveness of Countermeasuxes 12.2.3.3.2 Externa.l Cost-Effectiveness of Defensive Actions 12.2.4 The Arms-Ra.ce Instability Index (ARlS) 209 209 209 210 212 213 213 213 215 215 216 218 218 218 219 13 Parameter Choice and Simulation 13.1 Definition a.nd Discussion of the Ba.seline Case 13.1.1 The Ba.seline Case 13.1.2 Chancteristics of the Strategie Forces 13.1.3 Parameters of First Strike a.nd Second Strike 13.1.4 Security Payoffs a.nd Probabilities 13.1.5 Cost Estimates 13.1.6 The Reaction Coefficients 13.2 Progra.m Description a.nd Simulation 13.2.l Progra.m Structure 13.2.2 Simulation Specification 13.2.3 Simulation Figures 13.3 Interpretation and Qualitative Discussion 13.3.l Interpretation of the Simulation Results 13.3.1.1 The Synunetric Baseline Case 13.3.1.2 The Synunetric Stabilized Case 13.3.1.3 The Asyrrunetric Fluctua.ting Ca.se 13.3.2 A Qualitative Model Application 13.3.3 Fina.l Rema.rks and 011tlook 223 223 224 224 225 227 227 228 229 229 230 232 247 247 247 248 248 249 250 A Technical and Stability Aspects of Strategie Warfare A.1 Offensive Forces A.1.1 Counterforce Uncertainties and Fra.tricide A.1.2 Estimation of the Costs of Offensive Weapons A.2 F\mdamenta.ls of Space Wa.rfare A.2.1 Orbital Satellite Configurations A.2.2 Orbital Distance between Satellites A.2.3 Interception Time for Space-Based Interceptors A.3 Space-Ba.sed Laser Wea.pons (SBL) A.3.1 Basic Variables and Equations A.3.2 Sensitivity of the Reference Laser Configura.tion A.3.3 Cost-Effectiveness of the Laser Defense A.3.4 Duels between Space-Ba.sed Laser Weapons A.3.4.1 The Mass-Exchange Ratio 253 253 253 256 260 260 261 263 265 265 266 268 270 270 A.3.-1.2 A Simple Landtester Model of Laser Warfare A.3.5 The Sec.urity-Cost Effects and Strategie Stability •.\ t X-R.ay Laser Weapons \ .t.l Characteristics and Basic Equations A.4 ~ Defense Capability for the Reference Con.figuration A.4.3 Stability A!!pects A.5 Space-Ba.sed Interceptors (SBI) A.5.1 Basic Equations A 5.2 Defense Capability and Cost-Effectiveness for the Reference Configuration A.5.3 Other Stuclies • A.6 Terminal Defense Interceptors A.6.1 The Interception Probability A.6.2 Defense Capability of a Two-Layer Terminal Defense A.6.3 Some Models on Stability Aspects , 270 273 275 275 277 277 280 280 281 285 287 287 288 290 B Models of Arms U se B Terminology B The Landtester Theory of Warfare B.2.1 The General Equations B.2.2 Distributed Fire and the Linear Law B.2.3 Concentrated Fire and the Square Law B.3 Models lncluding La.wich Reductions B 3.1 Distributed Fire · B.3.2 Concentrated Fire • B.3.3 A Missile Exdtange Model with Casualties B.4 Applicability and Limitations 292 C Selected Tables and Figures C.1 Strategie Offensive Fore.es C.2 Strategie D efensive Forces 303 303 311 D Lit erat ni-e 315 292 293 293 294 295 296 296 297 299 301 Chapter Introdu ction 1.1 English Summary This study, submitted to the Department of Physics in Marburg as a Doctoral Thesis, develops a comprehensive framework model for the ut:Scription and analysis of a complex annament dynarnics with respect to security, costs, and stability As an a.pplica.tion, the stability of the interplay between the buildup and the reduction of ~trat~gic nuclear weapons and defense systems is examined, including a variety of sc:ientific, technical, economic, and political factors The interdisciplinary attempt combines several contexts and model approa.ches on different l~vds of complexity The framew•>rk model, which to some degree is extracted from an extensive study of the literature on missile defänse, stability, and modelling in security policy but predominantly is derived from own con.siderations by means of physical and mathematical methods, has the following elements: l The dynamics of the basic variables, security S, costs C, and armament (military capabilities) X (offmse deft.nse, anti-defense) the so-called SCX mo del, is represented by time-discrete difference equations and is studied by analytic means of stability theory, in particular The security criteria, which ac:t as driving forces ofthe dynarnics, a.re derived from elementary game theoretic ronsidera.tions on the expected outcomes and probabilities of a strategic nuclear war, where the number of nuclear warheads and their potential damage are used as security measures For different quantitative criteria of crisis instability, arms race instability survivability and costeffectiveness, lirnit condition.s 1)f stability are derived With regard to the problem of stability during the introduction of strategic defense and the realization of eomprehensive nuclear disarmament, calculations are carried out on transition stability between unstable first-strike regions; a dynarnic model for the exchange between space weapons is applied; cost-effectiveness of measures and countermeasures is estimated; and the a.rmament dynarnics is simulated by a computer program ll gener11l treatment of the limits of modelling, a strong emphasis is placed on the role of uncertainties and the impact of threat perception Establishing a baseline parameter choice, the effect of parameter variations is tested In the Appendix some model parameters for different technologies are derived from physical considerations Within The following general conclusions can be drawn from the study Under current or near future technical, economic strategii: and political conditions , the massive attempt to build strategic defense systems would be, with high probability destabilizing with respect to crisis stability, arms race stability, and the risk of technical accidents Faced with the insufficient t.echnical basis and the high costs to be expected for Strategie missile defense such an attempt might stimulate offensive countermeasures and prevent or delay comprehensiv(' nuclear disannament Even for cost-effective and considerably survivable strategic defense systems thP model behavior can become chaotic and unpredictable by the interplay between actions and reactions, being reinforced by a variety of technical and political factors of uncertainty, leaving room for different perceptions A stabilization of this process would require decisive measures of mutual arms control, veriftcation, conftdence building, and coopeI1ltion A way with less risks 1md costs for threat elimination would be based on drastic reductions in t,he nuclear arsenals without defense systems, whose stability would be preserved by different mearures, in particular, by a strict inspection and verification regime, the normal depreciation of armament due to ageing and non-rnodemization, and the conversion of cost savings for civilian purposes 1.2 Deutsche Zusammenfassung ( German Summary) Bei der am fa :hbereich Physik in Marburg vorgelegten englischsprachigen Dokt orarbeit geht es wn die Entwicklung eines umfassenden Rahmenmodells zur Beschreibung und Analyse komplexer rüst ungsdynamischt'r Prozesse hinsichtlich der Begriffe Sicherheit, Kosten und St abilität In einer Anwendung wird die Stabilität des Wt>chselspids von Aufrüstung Wld Abrüstung strategischer Kernwaffen und Abwehrsysteme untersur.ht, untllr Einbeziehung einer Vielzahl naturwissenschaftlich-t echnischer, ökonomischer und politi5cher Faktorfü Dabei wird der interdisziplinäre Versuch unternommen unterschiedliche Zusammenhänge und Modellansät,ze auf verschiedenen Stufen der Komplexität miteinander zu verbinden Das Rahmenmoddl, das zum Teil aus einem umfangreichen Studium der Literatur zu Raketenabwehr St abiliti'it und Modellierung in der Sicherheitspolitik zum überwiegenden Teil aber aus eigenen Überlegungen mit Hilfe physikalisch-mathematischer Methoden abgeleitet wurde, hat folgende Element e: l Die Dynamik der Basisvariabll!Il Sicherheit (security) S, Kosten (costs ) C und Rüstunp;spotentiale (armament, military capabilities) X (Offensivfähigkeiten , Abwehrsysteme und Gegenmaßnahmen) das sogenannte SCX-Modell, wird durch zeitdiskrete Differenzengleichungen beschrieben und mit analytischen Methoden, insbesondere aus der Stabilitätstheorie, untersucht Die als treibende Kräfte der Dynamik wirkenden Sicherheitskriterien werden aus elementaren spieltheoretischen Überlegungen hinsichtlich der erwarteten Ergebnisse und Wahrscheinlichkeiten eines strategischen Nuklearkriegs abgeleitet, wobei als Maßstab die Zahl der Kernwaffen und die damit verbundfüe Schadenswirkung gewählt wird Für versr.hiedene puantitJt.tive Kriterien der Kriseninstabilität Rüstune:swettlaufinstabilit.ät Überlebensfähigkeit und Kosteneffektivität werden Grenzbedingungen der Stabilität abgeleitet Hinsichtlich der Fragestellung nach der Stabilität bei der Einführung von strategischen Abwehrsyste- men und der Realisierung umfassender nuklearer Abrüstung werden Be~.:hnungen zur Übergangsstabilität zwischen instabilen Erstschlagsbereichen angestellt, ein dynamisches Modell für den Schlagabtausch von Weltraumwaffen untersucht die Kosteneffektivität von Maßnahmen und Gegenmaßnahmen abgeschätzt und die Rüstungsdynamik mit Hilfe eines Comput erprogranuns simuliert Besonderes Gewicht wird im Rahmen einer allgemeinen Behandlung der Grenzen solcher Modelle, auf die Rolle von Unsicherheiten und die Bedeutung der Bedrohungswahrnehmung gelegt Ausgehend von einer begründeten Basis-Parameterwahl wird die Auswirkung von Parameter-Variationen dargestellt Im Anhang werden einige Modellparameter für verschiedene Technologien aus physikalischen Üherlet?Ul\ien abgeleitet Folgende allgemeinen Schluòfolgerungãm kửnnen aus der Arbeit gezogen werden Unter den gegebenen bzw in Zukunft zu erwartenden technischen, wirtschaftlichen, strat egischen und politischen Bedingungen wäre der massive Versuch der Einführung von strategischen Abwehrsystemen mit hoher Wahrscheinlickeit destabilisierend hinsichtlich Krisenstabilität, Wettrüsten-Stabilität tmd des Risikos t echnischer Unfälle An~esichts der unzureichenden technischen Basis und zu erwartender hoher Kost en fur strategische Re.ketenabwe hr dürfte ein solcher Versuch offensive Gegenmaßnahmen stimulieren und eine umfassende nukleare Abrüstung verhindern oder verzögern Auch bei kosteneffektiven und weit gehend überlebensfähigen strategischen Abwehrsystemen kann durch das Wechselspiel von Aktionen und Reaktionen das Modellverhalten chaotisch und unvorhersagbar werden, was durch eine Vielzahl technischer und politischer Unsicherheitsfaktorm die Raum für unterschiedliche Wahrnehmungen lassen, verstärkt würde Eine Stabilisierung dieses Prozesses würde einschneidende Maßnahmen hinsichtlich beiderseitiger Rtistungskontrolle Verifikation, Vertrauensbildung und Zusammenarbeit erfordern Ein risikoännerer und kostengünstigerer Weg zur Bedrohungsreduzierung wäre einschneidende nukleare Abrüsttmg ohne Abwehrsysteme dessen Stabilität durch verschiedene Maßnahmen abgesichert würde, insbesondel'E' durch ein striktes Verifikations- und Inspektionregime, Ausnutzung des natürlichen Alterungsprozesses von Rüstung durch v„rzicht auf Modernisierung und Konversion eingesparter Mitt el fur zivile Zwecke 1.3 First Quotes “A physicist getting involved in broad interdisciplinary collaboration soon finds that the systems studied in other fields of knowledge, such as biology or economics, are in many respects more complicated and more fuzzy than the systems studied in physics Concepts and ideas developed there, which at first may appear strange to him, can after some time turn out to be quite adequate for the systems studied Still, he may experience that very fundamental physical concepts are relevant to a wide variety of systems and processes - not in principle, but also in practice.” (Eriksson (1987), p v) “To have to translate one’s own verbal statements into mathematical formulae compels one carefully to scrutinize the ideas therein expressed Next the possession of formulae makes it much easier to deduce the consequences In this way absurd implications, which might have passed unnoticed in a verbal statement, are brought clearly into view and stimulate one to amend the formula An additional advantage of a mathematical model is its brevity, which greatly diminishes the labor of memorizing the idea expressed If the statements of an individual become the subject of a controversy, this definiteness and brevity lead to a speeding up of discussions over disputable points, so that obscurities can be cleared away, errors refuted, and truth found and expressed more quickly Mathematical expressions have, however, their special tendencies to pervert thought: the definiteness may be spurious, existing in the equations but not in the phenomena to be described; and the brevity may be due to the omission of the more important things, simply because they cannot be mathematized.” (Richardson (1960), p xvii) “Every translation of a situation into a problem involves simplifications, sometimes extremely drastic ones The history of physics, the most rigorous of the natural sciences, is a history of fortunate simplifications which have enabled the physicists to fit a wide sector of phenomena into a grandiose theoretical scheme However, the physicist is usually aware of the limitations which his simplified models impose on the range of validity of his conclusions while it is perfectly true that in natural science simplification has been a powerful tool for gaining real knowledge, it was continual comparison of a model with reality which insured the selection of the most essential phenomena studied and allowed the scientist to ignore the relatively inessential ones Aside from certain simulation techniques , the strategist has no experiments to guide him in his theoretical development.” “The strategist, like the engineer and like the operations analyst, assumes that decision problems have rationally defensible solutions The strategist’s commitment, however, is to the solution of “strategic problems.” Unlike the mathematician, who before undertaking to solve a problem usually inquires whether a solution to a given problem exists at all, the strategists tends to assume that his problems have solutions.” (Rapoport (1969), pp 84-85) “In the absence of any reality that was congenial to their abstract theorizing, the strategists in power treated the theory as if it were reality For those mired in thinking about it all day, every day, in the corridors of officialdom, nuclear strategy had become the stuff of a living dreamworld This mixture of habit, inertia, analytical convenience and fantasy was fueled by a peculiar logic as well It was, after all, only rational to try to keep a nuclear war limited if one ever broke out, to devise plans and options ahead of time that might end the war quickly and favorably, to keep the scope of its damage not too far out of tune with the importance of the political objectives over which the war was declared to begin with Yet over the years, despite endless studies, nobody could find any options that seemed practical or made sense The method of mathematical calculation, derived mainly from the theory of economics that they had all studied, gave the strategists of the new age a handle on the colossally destructive power of the weapon they found in their midst But over the years, the method became a catechism, the first principles carved into the mystical stone of dogma The precise calculations and the cool, comfortable vocabulary were coming all too commonly to be grasped not merely as tools of desperation but as genuine reflections of the nature of nuclear war The nuclear strategists had come to impose order - but in the end, chaos still prevailed.” (Kaplan (1983), pp 390-391) 1.4 Preface and Acknowledgements This study is the result of a research project which was carried out between January 1986 and June 1989 at the Department of Physics, University of Marburg, to provide a basis for a doctoral thesis in physics Since it is an application of scientific-mathematical methods to political problems some personal remarks on the history and character of this study should be justified After having finished my physics diploma thesis on “Complexity and Stability of Macro Systems”1 on March 23, 1983, I became interested in problems of arms control and peace research This interest was inspired by two events: the growing public debate on the deployment of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Western Europe and the so-called “Star Wars” speech of the former US President Ronald Reagan on the same day I was impressed and worried by the potential impact of this speech on many aspects of world development, in particular by the consequences for strategic stability and arms control, and by the role scientists were expected to play During the following years, I devoted much of my energy and time to analyse the role of strategic defense systems and space weapons Between October 1984 and October 1985, a study on ASAT arms control, granted by the Volkswagen Foundation, was conducted by me.2 In 1985, when the SDI debate reached its climax in Western Europe, I was confronted with a choice between two options: should I continue with peace research and arms control studies, at the cost of finally leaving the “classical path” of physical qualification; or should I instead begin a thesis in physics, at the cost of giving up the interest and understanding in arms control problems? Faced with this conflict I decided to combine both aspects Although such an attempt was quite new in the Federal Republic of Germany, I was motivated by good examples in the United States, where physicists and physical knowledge have played a major role in the arms control debate for many years (it is encouraging to see that at several universities in the FRG similar activities are on the way now) Additionally, it became clearer that the character of the global problems (like the arms race) would require interdisciplinary research beyond the classical limits of the disciplines While many physicists are involved in the development of new weapons technologies, it should be justified that other physicists devote their energy to the consequences, risks, and control of armament as an accepted and integral part of natural science I found support at the Physics Department in Marburg, in particular, by Professor Olaf Melsheimer who had been interested in peace research problems since several years and agreed to assist the dissertation project As an appropriate issue, the stability aspect was selected because stability played a dominant role both in my diploma thesis and in the SDI debate After having defined an issue, the Volkswagen Foundation decided to give financial support During the project, I had the opportunity to discuss the qualitative and quantitative aspects with several colleagues at the Physics Department Besides contacts in the FRG, two journeys to the United States provided valuable discussions with US scientists These contacts are one reason that this study is written in English, to allow more people to get access to the methods and results During the four years between the first considerations on this study in spring 1985 and its implementation in spring 1989, the political climate has dramatically changed, with grave consequences for the SDI program (see the survey in Chapter 4) Two events are of major importance The Reykjavik Summit, in October 1986, made clear the interaction between strategic defense and disarmament In December 1987, the Treaty on the Abolition of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) was signed which is the first disarmament treaty banning a whole category of nuclear weapons Both events and the START negotiations on a fifty percent reduction of strategic nuclear forces justified the inclusion of disarmament as a central matter of this study The relation between strategic defense and disarmament can be seen from figures 1.1 and 1.2 : for a growing budget on strategic defense and steady reductions in the nuclear arsenals, at which point would defense be strong enough to outweigh the remaining offense? How stable would this situation be? It soon became clear that the discussion of the stability problem would require the development of Scheffran (1983) Scheffran (1985) 10 a dynamical model of armament and disarmament, including not only physical and technical factors but also economic and political patterns Although conceptual simplicity was intended, a growing complexity was unavoidable as more and more details were included Instead of giving a simple answer to the stability problem, this study shows its variety and complexity by analyzing different perspectives with different mathematical methods which each provide an understanding of one aspect (this is one reason for the size of this study) In some chapters the reader will get the impression that more problems are raised than answered Because of the interdisciplinary character of the study, it was difficult to find the appropriate terminology and to formalize the problem so that mathematical methods could be applied Thus, the relevance of the study goes beyond the SDI program whose future is uncertain, since scientists have shown the large amount of unsolved technical problems and the vast costs for a comprehensive defense against massive nuclear attack However, if the SDI research program goes on, one cannot exclude that realistic technical solutions, modest strategic goals, and a low level of nuclear weapons could give SDI a new impetus Then stability will be, once again, an important question The author is grateful to all colleagues giving valuable and constructive criticism in many discussions In particular, I would like to thank the colleagues at the Physics Department in Marburg, above all Prof Olaf Melsheimer, Prof Holger Neumann, Prof Siegfried Maass, Udo Schelb, and Prof Siegfried Grossmann whose model on chaos in armament dynamics provided valuable ideas In the initial phase, a strong impetus towards the quantitative and technical aspects came from Jă urgen Altmann (now Bochum), who read through the whole study and gave many critical comments With respect to computer modelling I received much support by Andreas Piper During the last phase, at the Technical University of Darmstadt I had the opportunity for interdisciplinary discussion of my ideas in the Interdisziplină are Arbeitsgruppe Naturwissenschaft, Technik und Sicherheitspolitik” (IANUS), where stimulations came to question the own assumptions, at first from my colleagues at the Department of Physics Annette Schaper, Martin Kalinowski, Uwe Reichert, and Prof Egbert Kankeleit (whose simple arms race model laid a basis for extensive discussion), and the mathematician Wilfried Engelmann A strong emphasis on the political aspects came from Prof Ulrich Albrecht during his half-year temporary professorship in Darmstadt With regard to the aspects of stability and chaos I had to withstand critical comments by Gă otz Neuneck and Wolfgang Liebert In the United States I had the opportunity to visit the following institutions: Massachussetts Institute of Technology (MIT Cambridge), Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Federation of American Scientists, Wayne State University (Detroit), Harvard University, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Brookings Institution, Rand Corporation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, IBM Watson Research Center, Union of Concerned Scientists, Princeton University, University of California (Los Angeles, Santa Cruz), New York University The following persons helped me with information and critical advice (in alphabetical order): Jerome Bracken, Steven Brams, Matthew Bunn, Michael B Callaham, Gregory H Canavan, Ashton B Carter, Paul L Chrzanowski, Sidney D Drell, Wiliam J Durch, Freeman J Dyson, Stanley M Flatte’, Richard Garwin, Charles L Glaser, Michael D Intriligator, Glenn Kent, Herbert Lin, Gottfried Mayer-Kress, Barry O’Neill, Robert Pendley, John Pike, George Rathjens, Alvin M Saperstein, Thomas C Schelling, George C Smith, Paul B Stares, Kosta Tsipis, Dean Wilkening, Peter Zimmermann At several occasions, e.g during a conference visit in Moscow, the author had the opportunity to talk with Soviet scientists Despite the visits to the United States, my English writing remained imperfect and full of mistakes I thank Marianne Kolter and Chris Cohen for smoothing my English and cancelling some of the worst mistakes Last but not least, thanks go to Alfred Schmidt from the Volkswagen Foundation whose generous support and patience was a precondition for this study I am indepted to everyone in my environment who had to bear my “time-less” behavior during the final phase of the study 11 Figure 1.1: The Reagan proposal for a growing SDI budget (Pike (1985),p.7) Figure 1.2: The Gorbachev Proposal for complete Nuclear Disarmament (SPIEGEL (1986), p.98) The German text means in English: “Liberating the World From Nuclear Weapons - What Gorbachev Offers if Reagan Gives Up SDI.” 12 1.5 Introductory Survey The “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI) of the United States has been subject of public controversy since its spectacular start in 1983 by U.S President Ronald Reagan who asked the scientists to make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete”.3 The scientific discussion focussed mainly on the question of the technical feasibility of the whole system and whether it could reach this ambitious goal, but only little attention was directed to the question whether the stated or any other goal of SDI makes strategic sense and which consequences could arise for stability if some of the technologies would be realized Although this probably would take many years, even if less ambitious technologies and strategic goals were intended, the discussion of these questions should not be postponed until the first strategic defense systems are to be deployed (whatever their effectiveness is) The impact of SDI on stability has been estimated quite differently by proponents and opponents of SDI For the proponents a strategic defense provides more security without endangering stability In their view a builddown of offense and buildup of defense (whether cooperative or not) could lead to a more stable world without the dangers of first strike, unintentional nuclear war and nuclear attack by small nuclear powers.4 Contrary to them, the opponents of SDI fear an accelerating and dangerous arms race during the transition phase, in which a combination of offensive and defensive weapons would create many unpredictable risks The second strike capability would be endangered and the introduction of space weapons could provoke new technological instabilities.5 Any detailed analysis of the stability question is complicated by the fact that neither the technologies nor the strategic goal of SDI are clearly defined In his first speech in March 1983 President Reagan called for an effective defense of the whole country designed to overcome the threat of nuclear war Later on this goal was called a long term vision, while, in the short term, the strengthening of deterrence by protecting military targets with known ABM technology was seen as more important The understanding of deterrence has changed from “deterrence by punishment”, the “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) doctrine, to “deterrence by denial”, that is, to frustrate a “rational attack” While in the first vision a transition from MAD to MAS (Mutually Assured Survival), from vulnerability to invulnerability (survivability), was subject of discussion, a less ambitious approach calls for a mix of offense and defense In both cases, SDI aims at some kind of transition from an offense dominated world to a defense dominated world, with different meanings of “defense domination” In the years following Reagan’s speech, several studies and articles analysed the stability question in qualitative and quantitative terms Some models discussed conditions for a crisis stable transition from MAD to MAS (the transition problem), others focussed on cost-effectiveness, survivability, and accidental risks of strategic defense systems.6 Only a few papers discussed arms race stability of SDI in quantitative terms The following questions are discussed in this study: Which concept of stability is adequate in the SDI debate? To what extent is quantification useful and possible, which mathematical methods can be applied and what are the limits of mathematical modelling? Which instabilities may occur and can they be avoided during a hypothetical transition period? How sensitive is stability to uncertainties, changing perceptions, and qualitative changes in the force structure? Which impact on crisis stability can be expected from the different defense technologies? Which role space weapons play? Reagan (1983) For a description of some of the proponent’s position see for example Graham (1983), Jastrow (1983), Bova (1984), SPES (1984), Pournelle (1984) On the opponent’s perspective see for example Tirman (1984)(1986), Drell (1985) A survey of these models is given in the Chapter and Appendix A 13 How important are the Nitze-criteria of defensive cost-effectiveness and survivability for stability? By what means can the dynamic offense-defense interaction including disarmament under economic constraints be modelled, and under which conditions arms race instabilities occur? What stability effect security requirements and strategic goals have on the arms race? Which requirements for arms control and verification can be derived? The discussion of these questions is motivated by the following goals (which are not necessarily compatible): • Provide a scientific basis for an informed political decision on strategic defense • Test the value of quantitative methods in security policy and arms control • Improve the insufficient quantitative theoretical basis of arms race processes.7 • Show the complexity, uncertainty, and variety of the problem • Determine the limitations of modelling arms race and warfare To study these questions in quantitative terms, a comprehensive model is introduced, with a special emphasis on stability and the connection to strategic defense and nuclear disarmament Starting at the evaluation and representation of the literature on nuclear strategy and strategic defense, stability in security policy and arms control, modelling of strategic nuclear war and the armament dynamics, with reference to its limitations, a uniform approach for the mathematical description of these phenomena is chosen The following elements play a dominant role: The essential system variables (armament X, strategy and security goals S, costs C) of two military opponents (USA, USSR) The relevant unit is the potential damage provided by military means in case of war The connection of the system variables within a framework model (the SCX model) by the definition of a parameter set and system equations, in particular, of time-discrete difference equations for annual variable changes A game-theoretic assessment of security and crisis stability The mathematical treatment of transition stability Cost-effectiveness and stability analysis of the reduced security-cost model A computer simulation of the comprehensive SCX model The SCX model describes the coupled interaction between security, costs, and strategic military capabilities (armament) for an external competition of two military opponents and an internal competition of two economic interest groups, limited by upper and lower cost thresholds for the budget A general strategic security function is used as a driving force which is based on a simple two-strike model of a nuclear war, including first and second strike capabilities and the risks of accidental war as security criteria The model aims at discussing different strategic futures Despite its conceptual simplicity the model has some degree of flexibility, given by the choice of the strategic security criteria (decision rules) guiding the change of armament and costs Instead of a mechanistic scheme with fixed coefficients, like the Richardson equations, the impact of strategic goals and arms control on the armament dynamics can be tested Thus, even if its value for the prediction of a real arms race may be doubted since several factors are difficult to quantify, the model can be used as an instrument to discuss the impact of parameter variations on potential arms races As far as possible, the literature survey and qualitative aspects are separated from the quantitative model elements to improve readability and clarity The study has the following block structure: Arms race is used in this study as a general item for armament dynamics, including disarmament 14 • In the first block (Chapters to 3) an introduction to the study and a survey on the relevant qualitative and quantitative results and methods is given • In the second block (Chapter to 6) a survey on the political, strategic, and stability aspects of strategic defense and disarmament is drawn from the literature • The third block (Chapters to 9) defines and discusses quantitative measures of strategic war, security, and crisis stability • The fourth block (Chapters 10 to 13) derives the dynamic SCX framework model, analyses stability and cost-effectiveness, and simulates the dynamics for a baseline parameters set • The Appendix A to D gives physical, technical, and mathematical characteristics of strategic warfare, in particular, of space weapons and defense systems, and includes the literature listing for the whole study The single chapters have the following contents: • Chapters contains the summary of qualitative results • Chapter includes a survey on the basic quantitative methods and model variables • Chapter gives a survey on political and strategic aspects of the SDI debate • Chapter discusses qualitative perspectives on stability in security policy • Chapter gives a qualitative survey on models on strategic defense and disarmament and their general limitations • Chapter treats fundamental aspects of strategic warfare, in particular, the definition of first and second strike capabilities and damages as a function of the relevant variables and parameters • Chapter defines and examines quantitative measures of security and crisis stability, including the role of uncertainty • Chapter analyses the transition problem in mathematical terms • Chapter 10 gives a survey on arms race problems and models • Chapter 11 develops the SCX model of the armament dynamics • Chapter 12 analyses the dynamics and some of the stability aspects of the SCX model • Chapter 13 defines the standard parameter set and gives some results and conclusions of the computer simulation of the SCX model • Appendix A provides some technical characteristics relevant for space warfare and discusses specific stability aspects of offensive and defensive strategic weapons • Appendix B gives a survey on dynamical models in warfare, in particular, on Lanchester models • Appendix C contains some external figures, tables, and diagrams used in the study • Appendix D is an alphabetical listing of the literature The physical and mathematical substance is included in the following four points: Definition and calculation of analytical conditions for transition stability with respect to uncertainties and survivability of the defense (Chapter 9) Stability analysis of the SCX model (Chapter 12) Computer simulation of the armament dynamics for certain parameter choices (Chapter 13) Specific stability aspects for different offensive and defensive force structures (Appendix A) 15 Bisher in dieser Reihe erschienen: Bd Scheffran, Jürgen: Rüstungskontrolle im Weltraum Risiken und Verifikationsmöglichkeiten bei Anti-Satellitenwaffen überarb Aufl., 140 S., brosch., DIN 4, m zahlr Skizzen u Abb., Marburg 1986 UKB 10,00 DM (zuz Porto u Verp.: 2,50 DM) a Bd Altmann, Jürgen: Laserwaffen Gefahren für die strategische Stabilität und Möglichkeiten der vorbeugenden Rüstungsbegrenzung 300 S., brosch., DIN a 4, m zahlr Skizzen u Abb., Marburg 1986 UKB 15,00 DM (zuz 2,50 DM, s.o.) Bd Sommer, Gart/Becker, Johannes M./Rehbein, Klaus/Zimmermann, Rüdiger (Hrsg.): Feindbilder im Dienste der Aufrüstung Beiträge aus Psychologie und anderen Humanwissenschaften 312 S„ brosch., DIN a 5, m zahlr Abb., Marburg (2 korrig Auflage) 1988 UKB 15,00 DM (zuz 2,50 DM, s.o.) Bd Bibliographie zur Friedens-, Abrüstungs- und Konfliktforschung in Marburger Universitätsbibliotheken Mit Sach- und Autorenregister 240 S., brosch., DIN a5, Marburg 1987 UKB 15,00 DM (zuz 2,50 DM s.o.) Bd Cohen, Christopher: Zur Ökonomie der "Strategischen Verteidigungsinitiative" (SDI) Analyse der ökonomischen und fiskalischen Entwicklung der SDI von 1984 bis 1987 und der Verteilung der SOi-Kontrakte auf die Hauptauftragnehmer 156 S., brosch., DIN a 5, Marburg 1988 UKB 10,00 DM (zuz 2,50 DM, s.o.) Bd Scheib, Udo: Raketenzielgenauigkeit und Raketenteststop Ist die Entwicklung zur Punktziel-Watte rüstungskontrollpolitisch verhinderbar? 335 S., brosch., DIN a 5, Marburg 1988 UKB 20,00 DM (zuz 2,50 DM, s.o.) Bd Becker, Johannes M.: Der Nationale Militärkonsens Frankreichs Militär- und Sicherheitspolitik unter Francois Mitterrand im Spannungsfeld von nationaler Souveränität, NATO- und Westeuropaorientierung 350 S., brosch., DIN a 5, zahlr Abb., Marburg 1989 UKB 20,00 DM (zuz 2,50, s.o.) Bd Becker, Johannes M./Wagner, Beate/Weiner, Klaus-Peter (Hrsg.): EUREKA - Westeuropäische Technologiepolitik im Spannungsfeld wirtschafts- und sicherheitspolitischer Interessen Protokoll des Marburger Symposiums am 4./5.12.1987 134 S., Marburg 1988 UKB 20,00 DM (zuz 2,50 DM, s.o.) Bd Scheffran, Jürgen: Strategie Defense, Disarmament, and Stability Modelling Arms Race Phenomena with Security and Costs under Political and Technical Uncertainties 335 S., brosch., DIN a4, Marburg 1989, UKB DM 30,00 Bd 14 Weinar, Klaus-Peter (Hrsg.): Weltpolitik im Umbruch Strukturveränderungen in den internationalen Beziehungen Neue Instabilität oder Chance zur Lösung globaler Probleme? Mit Beiträgen von H.-J Axt, D Berg-Schlosser, V Böge, D Boris, E.-0 Czempiel, P Fedossow, B Greiner und L Jung 120 S., brosch„ DIN a5, Marburg 1989, UKB DM 12,00 Bestellungen an: IAFA, Wilhelm Röpke-Str G, Z 21, 3550 Marburg/Lahn Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Marburger Wissenschaftler für Friedens-und Abrüstungsforsc und der Interdisziplinären Arbeitsgruppe Friedens- und Abrüstungsforsc an der Universität Marburg (IAFA) Nr View publication stats