2 th - century theories of consciousness attitudes (“beliefs and desires”) plus the phenomenal residue of qualia: intrinsic, ineffable and inefficacious sensory states It is striking how little in the important questions about consciousness depends on this conception, or on this particular division of mental states So accepting this division and its associated conceptions of intentionality and consciousness is not an obligatory starting point for the philosophy of mind A historical investigation of how these ideas came to be seen as inevitable can also help us see how we might reasonably reject them.1 Note I have been helped in writing this chapter by: very helpful comments on earlier drafts from Amy Kind, Hanoch Ben-Yami, Nico Orlandi and Galen Strawson; conversations with Katalin Farkas, David Pitt and Howard Robinson; and the writings of Charles Siewert Bibliography Anscombe, G.E.M (1965) “The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature” in Butler, R.J (ed.), Analytical Philosophy: Second Series Oxford: Blackwell: 156–180 Armstrong, D M (1968) A Materialist Theory of the Mind London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Baldwin, Tom (2010) “George Edward Moore,” in Zalta, Edward N (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Summer 2010 Edition http //plato stanford edu/archives/ sum2010/entries/moore/ Bayne, Tim and Montague, Michelle (eds.) (2013) Cognitive Phenomenology Oxford: Oxford University Press Block, Ned (1980) “Troubles with Functionalism,” in Block, Ned (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol I London: Methuen: 268–301 Block, Ned (1990) “Inverted Earth,” in Tomberlin, James (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind Atascadero: Ridgeview: 53–79 Reprinted in Block, N., Flanagan, O and Güzeldere, G (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997: 677–694 Block, Ned (1995) “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–247 Reprinted in Block, N., Flanagan, O., and Güzeldere, G (eds.) (1997) The Nature of Consciousness Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 375–416 Block, Ned (2003) “Mental Paint,” in Hahn, M and Ramberg, B (eds.) Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 165–200 Block, Ned (2007) “Consciousness, Accessibility and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30: 481–548 Block, Ned and Fodor, Jerry A (1972) “What Psychological States are Not,” Philosophical Review, 81: 159–181 Boring, E G (1946) “Mind and Mechanism,” The American Journal of Psychology, April Brentano, Franz (1874) Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Edited by L.L McAlister Trans A Rancurello, D B Terrell, and L L McAlister London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (1973) reprinted with an introduction by Peter Simons London: Routledge 1995 Originally published as Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot (1874) 99