J ens J ohansson every one sees he would be the same person with the prince” ([1690] 1975, 340) Locke’s reference to the soul is confusing, however, since souls not seem to persist by virtue of psychological continuity (see sect 10) (The title of Quinton’s essay is similarly confusing.) Some philosophers would say that, in addition to the causal conditions necessary for psychological continuity, some further ones are necessary for personal identity (e.g that the psychological continuity has not come about in an abnormal way) I shall ignore this complication in this chapter In the book from which the case is taken, Shoemaker himself does not assert that Brownson is Brown; however, he does so in his (1970) This is so whether or not there is a single thing – a larger, scattered object with twenty toes – that Lefty and Righty together compose after fission They would still be two parts of that object, not one “Only if,” but not “if and only if,” for one fission product may exist at a future time at which the other one no longer does so; the former is not thereby identical to the original person However, adherents of the “bodily” view not agree that Henry is Only; nor “animalists” (sect 9) This does not mean that considerations about prudence provide no reason to prefer the non-branching view to non-psychological theories The separation between personal identity and what prudentially matters is probably much more radical given a “bodily” or “animalist” view (Unger 2000) 10 More exactly, this is the “worm” view – by far the most popular version of fourdimensionalism (e.g., Heller 1990; Lewis 1976; 1986) For another version, see section 7 Some writers use “four-dimensionalism” to denote a view of the metaphysics of time: the view that past, present, and future objects all exist (“eternalism” is a more common name) Like many others, I use “four-dimensionalism” only to denote a theory of persistence – the one that appeals to temporal parts 11 Although reductionism and non-reductionism concern personal identity over time, they are not answers to question (a) in section 1 (or to question (b) or (c)) Instead, they are, of course, answers to the question, “Does the fact of a person’s identity over time just consist in the holding of certain more particular facts, such as facts about psychological or physical continuity?” 12 Merricks (1998) defends a non-reductionist view that does not involve immaterial souls 13 Historically, considerations of this sort have sometimes been regarded as evidence against reductionism and related views For example, Butler urged that Locke’s theory implausibly makes “the inquiry concerning a future life of no consequence at all to us, the persons who are making it” ([1736] 1975, 99) Parfit turns this kind of argument on its head 14 Similarly, according to some writers (Feldman 2000; Mackie 1999b), a human animal will eventually become a corpse (unless its death is unusually violent); and outside of horror stories, corpses have no psychological features This argument is more controversial, however (Olson 2004) 15 Similar considerations show that the psychological-continuity view is incompatible with the doctrine that we are our bodies However, this doctrine does not seem to be the same as animalism For one thing, some hold that human animals are “constituted” by but numerically distinct from human bodies For another, some animalists claim that it makes no sense to say that a person is identical to his body (van Inwagen 1980, 283) 16 Brueckner and Buford (2009) interpret the argument in this third way (and argue against it) 144