MIND AND SOUL main diYculty—ably presented in the eighteenth century by Bishop Joseph Butler—arises in connection with the role that Locke assigns to memory If a person, call her Titia, claims to remember doing something, or being somewhere, we can check whether her memory is accurate by investigating whether she actually did the deed or was present on the appropriate occasion We this by tracing the history of her body But if Locke is right, this will tell us nothing about the person Titia, but only about the human being Titia Nor can Titia herself, from within, distinguish between genuine memories and present images of past events which oVer themselves delusively as memories Locke’s account of self-consciousness makes it diYcult to draw the distinction between veracious and deceptive memories at all The distinction can only be made if we are willing to join together what Locke has put asunder and recognize that persons are human beings Whatever the merits of Locke’s distinction between persons and humans, it does not exhaust the complication of his account of personal identity, because he includes a third category, that of spirits According to Locke, I am at the same time a man (a human animal), a spirit (a soul or immaterial substance), and a person (a centre of self-consciousness) These three entities are all distinguishable, and Locke rings the changes on various combinations of them The soul of Heliogabalus translated into one of his hogs gives us a case of one spirit in two bodies One spirit might be united to two persons: Locke had a friend who thought he had inherited the soul of Socrates, though he had no memory of any of Socrates’ experiences On the other hand, if the present mayor of Queensborough had conscious recall of the life of Socrates, we would have two spirits in one person Locke explores more complicated combinations which we need not explore There are many diYculties, by no means peculiar to Locke’s system, in the whole notion of a soul considered as an immaterial, spiritual substance, and few of Locke’s modern admirers wish to preserve this part of his theory of personal identity The Soul as the Idea of the Body in Spinoza The relation between soul and body, which was problematic in Descartes and Locke, becomes more obscure than ever when we turn to Spinoza The way in which Spinoza states it, however, sounds beautifully simple: the 227