KNOWLEDGE that make up the propositions, not in order to secure our assent to them once formed ‘Men never fail, after they have once understood the Words, to acknowledge them for undoubted Truths’ (E, 56) Descartes, on the other hand, does not maintain that all innate ideas are principles assented to as soon as understood: some of them become clear and distinct, and command assent, only after laborious meditation Locke devotes much of his treatment of innate ideas to the question whether there are any principles, whether theoretical or practical, which command universal assent He denies that there are any theoretical principles which are held by all human beings, including children and savages Turning to practical principles, he enjoys himself piling up examples of violations, in various cultures, of moral maxims which seem fundamental to all civilized Christians—including the most basic: ‘Parents preserve and cherish your children’ (E, 65–84) Even if there were truths universally acknowledged, this would not be suYcient to prove innateness, since the explanation might be a common process of learning Descartes, however, can agree that universal consent does not entail innateness, and he can also retort that innateness does not entail universal consent either It is a fundamental presupposition of his method that some people, indeed most people, may be prevented by prejudice and laziness from assenting to innate principles that are latent in their minds On the topic of innate ideas, the arguments of Locke and Descartes largely pass each other by Descartes argues that experience without an innate element is an insuYcient basis for scientiWc knowledge; Locke insists that innate concepts without experience cannot account for the knowledge we have of the world Both contentions may well be correct Locke claimed that the arguments of the rationalists would lead one ‘to suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, taste, Wgure etc innate, than which there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience’ (E, 58) Descartes did not believe that our knowledge of the colour or taste of a particular apple was something innate; but he found nothing absurd in the general idea of redness or sweetness being innate—and that for a reason that Locke himself accepted, namely, that our ideas of such qualities are entirely subjective Once again the surface dispute between rationalism and empiricism masks a fundamental agreement Locke’s argument for the subjectivity of qualities like colours and tastes begins with a division between those ideas ‘which come into our minds by 133