PHILOSOPHY OF MIND quiescence is achieved is called the ‘purpose’ of the cycle, and the initial mental occurrence involving discomfort is called a ‘desire’ for the state of affairs that brings quiescence A desire is called ‘conscious’ when it is accompanied by a true belief as to the state of affairs that will bring quiescence; otherwise it is called ‘unconscious’ (AM 75) Behaviour cycles, according to Russell, are causally initiated by mental events possessing the characteristic of discomfort The nature of these events is left unclear in his system But other philosophers and psychologists, in their accounts of desire and emotion, dispensed altogether with mental events For the behaviourist school, particularly after Pavlov had in 1927 presented his theory of conditioned reflexes, the relation between mental and bodily events was no longer a causal one Behaviour cycles were not the effect of mental events, they were the actual constituents of such things as desire and satisfaction Behaviourists regarded reports of mental acts and states as disguised reports of pieces of bodily behaviour, or at best of tendencies to behave bodily in certain ways Intentionality thus vanished from psychology Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy of Mind It was in reaction to Russell’s account of desire and expectation that Wittgenstein began to develop his later philosophy of mind What was wrong with Russell’s account, he said, was precisely that it ignored intentionality; and he agreed with Husserl that intentionality was all-important if we were to understand language and thought To give a correct account of it was one of the major problems of philosophy That’s him (this picture represents him)—that contains the whole problem of representation What is the criterion, how is it to be verified, that this picture is the portrait of that object, i.e that it is meant to represent it? It is not similarity that makes the picture a portrait (it might be a striking resemblance of one person, and yet be a portrait of someone else it resembles less) When I remember my friend and see him ‘in my mind’s eye’ what is the connection between the memory image and its subject? The likeness between them? (PG 102) Wittgenstein’s achievement in philosophy of mind was to give an account that preserved the intentionality that the behaviourists had denied with212