M ichelle M ontague Powerful thought experiments such as inverted spectrum and inverted earth thought experiments provide a further motivation for the metaphysical separation of intentionality and phenomenology I don’t have the space to discuss these arguments in this chapter See e.g Block 1990, Shoemaker 1982 and Tye 2009 I will use ‘representationalism’ as a name for this position in what follows although it used to have a very different meaning It referred to positions like Locke’s theory of perception Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, 2009 and Lycan 1996, 2001 are central proponents of representationalism, and in this chapter I will focus on them See Armstrong 1968 for an early endorsement of representationalism It would be a mistake to charge Brentano with ‘psychologism’, understood as the doctrine that logic (for example) is the study of contingent psychological truths, which was criticized by e.g Frege 1884 and Husserl 1900–01 I should also note that Brentano doesn’t use the term ‘evident’ to describe the kinds of emotions that can give us evaluative knowledge I have extended the use of ‘evident’ for ease of exposition Brentano summarizes some of these disagreements in Book One, Chapter of the Psychology In his later work, Brentano distinguished between what he called ‘descriptive psychology’ and ‘genetic psychology’ Descriptive psychology is concerned with necessary truths about our psychology based on evidence provided by first-person experience Genetic psychology is concerned with causal laws, laws governing how mental phenomena arise and the connections between the mental and the physiological According to Brentano, descriptive psychology is the more fundamental in the sense that we have to adequately describe phenomena before we can go on to give explanations of them 10 Descartes 1641 11 I won’t discuss Brentano’s argument for this claim 12 Remember that this is a distinction within the class of mental phenomena in our ordinary larger sense of the expression of ‘mental phenomena’ 13 He follows Descartes in this tripartite classification, which he expounds and defends in Chapters 5–8 of Book Two of the Psychology The love/hate category covers all emotions 14 Brentano classified desires, and willing in general, as emotions 15 Brentano cites Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Bain as holding this view Sometimes Brentano drops the word ‘appear’ and simply speaks of physical phenomena as having extension and spatial location To avoid confusion here, it is important to always keep in mind that Brentano is concerned only with appearances, whether they are physical appearances or mental appearances 16 There is still a lively debate about whether sound is inherently spatial See e.g P F Strawson’s 1959 famous discussion of the ‘sound world’ and O’Callaghan and Nudds’s 2009 collection on sound 17 By ‘thing’ I take Brentano to mean a particular individual thing, as opposed to something general such as a universal 18 It is clear through out the Psychology that Brentano is using ‘content’ and ‘object’ interchangeably 19 See e.g Crane 2006, Jacquette 2004, Moran 1996, Mulligan 2004, and Smith 1994 20 See e.g Byrne 2006, Crane 2001, Dickie 2010, and Jeshion 2010 21 For discussion of Brentano’s objectual theory see e.g Chisholm 1982 and Kriegel 2018 22 Notably absent from these reductions are singular propositions of the form and complex judgements involving e.g conditionals These are the hardest cases for Brentano’s theory, but I do not have the space to discuss them here See Kriegel 2018 for a spirited defense of Brentano’s theory 23 1894/1977: 226