PHILOSOPHY OF MIND about whose precise nature Wittgenstein refused to commit himself, since that was a matter for empirical psychology (TLP 3.1, 3.11–12) A propositional sign can only be a proposition if projected by a thought on to the world, and conversely a relationship between mental elements can only be a thought if it is a projection on to the world of a propositional sign (TLP 3.5) ‘In a proposition’, Wittgenstein says at 3.2, ‘a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought.’ The ‘objects of the thought’ are the psychic elements whose relation to each other constitutes the thought A proposition is fully analysed when the elements of the propositional sign correspond to the elements of the thought An unanalysed proposition of ordinary language does not bear this relation to the thought; on the contrary, it disguises the thought We can understand ordinary language and grasp the thought beneath its folds only because of enormously complicated tacit conventions Wittgenstein in the Tractatus resembles Freud in attaching great weight to unconscious operations of the mind; the structure of the thoughts that lie behind our utterances are something of which we have not the faintest awareness Among our thoughts there appear to be some that are thoughts about thoughts: propositions reporting beliefs and judgements, for example These are apparent counter-examples to the general thesis of the Tractatus that one proposition could occur within another only truth-functionally, because a sentence like ‘A believes that p’ is not a truth-function of p Wittgenstein deals with the problem in drastic fashion: such sentences are not genuine propositions at all ‘It is clear,’ we are told at 5.542, ‘that ‘‘A believes that p’’, ‘‘A has the thought that p’’, and ‘‘A says p’’ are of the form ‘‘ ‘p’ says p’’, and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.’ ‘ ‘‘p’’ says p’ is a pseudoproposition: it is an attempt to say what can only be shown; a proposition can only show its sense and cannot state it We may think that, according to the Tractatus, the fact that, say, in ‘London is bigger than Paris’ ‘London’ is to the left of ‘is bigger than’ and ‘Paris’ is to the right of ‘is bigger than’ that says that London is bigger than Paris But it is only this fact plus the conventions of the English language that says any such thing What does the saying in the sentence is what the propositional sign has in common with all other 208