M ichelle M ontague And Stoljar concurs: In one formulation, the problem of intentionality is presented as concerning a particular class of properties, intentional properties Intentional properties are those properties expressed by predicates formed from verbs of propositional attitudes.41 Philosophers then took traditional propositional-attitude states to be prime examples of states that did not possess any phenomenology Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson and Nelkin provide standard statements of this position According to Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, perceptual experiences are prime examples of states for which there is something it is like to be in them They have phenomenal feel, a phenomenology. Cognitive states are prime examples of states for which there is not something it is like to be in them, of states that lack a phenomenology (1996, 129, 295) And Nelkin states: Neither the believing nor the consciousness that one oneself is believing feels like anything, if by ‘feels’ one means some sort of phenomenal or phenomenological state It is only because we take sensations and sensation-like states as our paradigms of consciousness that we think that any state about which we are conscious must have phenomenological properties (1989, 424; original emphasis) A second factor that contributed to the separatist treatment of intentionality and phenomenology was a focus on unconscious mental states A concern with propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires naturally leads to a concern with unconscious mentality, since beliefs and desires are paradigm cases of dispositional or ‘sub-personal’ states Furthermore, functionalism – perhaps the dominant theory in analytic philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century – was most successful in accounting for beliefs and desires; so functionalists naturally focused on these sorts of attitudes More generally, the postulation of unconscious mentality was entirely natural within a functionalist framework, given its analysis of mental states partly in terms of behaviour or behavioural dispositions.42 One central argument for the existence of unconscious mental states is that it is necessary to explain certain sorts of behaviour.43 If someone then asks why the relevant behaviour indicates an unconscious mental state, rather than simply indicating that the subject is in a particular neurological state which has certain causal properties, the functionalist has an immediate answer: for if there is a constitutive 218