N ico O rlandi Paul Crowther (2006) rightly points out that this is only one conception of non-conceptual content in the literature Indeed, Crowther and Richard Heck disagree on whether this dispute is consistently about a single notion (Heck 2007) For more on this dispute see Evans (1982), Peacocke (1983), Heck (2000), Roskies (2008), McDowell (1994) 10 See Burge 1979 for the idea of mental states having content See Siegal (2010) for the idea that perception has content 11 To be fair, representationalists also think of perception as directed at objects Representations are, by definition, states that stand for something else But, as I mentioned, representationalists face the challenge of explaining how perception can be a relation to intentional contents while also being a direct acquaintance with objects 12 A central Gestaltist thesis was also ‘psychophysical isomorphism’ according to which perceptual experiences are structurally isomorphic to physiological, brain events (Wertheimer 1912; Köhler 1920/1950 and 1947) 13 For a comparison between some of the principles of organization of Gestalt psychology and those of constructivism, see Pomerantz and Kubovy (1986) 14 This is also true of the major competitor of constructivism, the ecological approach that I discuss in section 2.3 15 The list of references includes Dretske 1981; Fodor 1975; 1983; Haugeland 1991; Millikan 1984; Piccinini 2008 Bibliography Anscombe, G.E.M (1965) “The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature,” in Butler, R J (ed.) Analytical Philosophy: First Series Oxford: Blackwell: 143–158 [Reprinted in her Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Papers, Vol II Oxford: Blackwell; also in Noë and Thompson (eds.) 2002.] Armstrong, D (1961) Perception and the Physical World London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Austin, J L (1946) “Other Minds,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 20: 148–187 Austin, J.L (1962) Sense and Sensibilia, reconstructed from the manuscript notes by Warnock, G J., Oxford: Oxford University Press Ayer, A J (1956) The Problem of Knowledge London: Macmillan Ayer, A J (1963) The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge London, MacMillan SML edition: 183–199 Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) “Naturalized Sense Data,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 353–374 Bermudez, J., and Cahen, A (2012) “Nonconceptual Mental Content,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2012 edition), Zalta, Edward N (ed.) http://plato.stan ford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/content-nonconceptual/ Block, N (2000) “Mental Paint,” in Hahn, M and Ramberg, B (eds.), Essays in Honor of Tyler Burge Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Bradley, F H (1899). Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay London: Palgrave Macmillan Brainard, D H (2009) “Bayesian Approaches to Color Vision,” The Visual Neurosciences, http://color.psych.upenn.edu/brainard/papers/BayesColorReview.pdf Brentano, F (1874) Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Abingdon, UK: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2009 Brewer, B (1999) Perception and Reason Oxford: Oxford University Press 120