I ntentionality sophisticated theory of objects was in part motivated by a Brentanian claim about intentionality, namely, that all mental phenomena are object-directed Once this claim is divorced from Brentano’s assertion that the objects of mental phenomena are ‘immanent objects’, and intentionality is seen as a relational phenomenon, if we accept at face value that we think about non-existent objects, it seems it is no leap at all to postulate non-existent objects! Although it is not clear what Brentano thought of Twardowski’s content/ object distinction, he completely rejected a Meinongian development of his main insights Although he doesn’t explicitly mention Meinong, he does say the following in the 1911 Appendix (213–14/274): I not wish to bring this discussion of mental reference to a close without having given a word of consideration to the view that there is a distinction between “being” and “existing.” According to this view both are to be taken in a very peculiar sense Namely, a person might be led to say that if someone is mentally referring to an object, the object really always has being just as much as he does, even if it does not always exist as he does . . I confess that I am unable to make any sense of this distinction between being and existence Twardowski’s content/object distinction is very much in line with current conceptions of intentionality, for discussions about intentionality typically focus on the notions of ‘intentional content’ or ‘representational content’, and the objects of our intentional states are typically taken to be mind-independent entities.28 Brentano’s resistance to a Meinongian theory of objects is also clearly in sync with present day attitudes towards Meinong and Meinongian-inspired views But although Brentano may have rejected Meinong’s postulation of non-existent objects, theorists have continued to focus on the possibility of thinking about the non-existent in twentieth-century analytic philosophy 4. From Chisholm’s Brentano to contemporary theories of intentionality More than any other analytic philosopher, Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999) brought Brentano’s philosophy to the attention of the analytic tradition.29 First, he introduced Brentano’s theory of intentionality as centrally concerned with our apparent ability to think about non-existent objects Second, and now putting aside Brentanian exegesis, Chisholm’s focus on thinking about the non-existent set the stage for much of the discussion about intentionality in the second half of the twentieth century I’ll consider both of these issues in turn After citing Brentano’s famous passage, Chisholm summarizes it as follows: When Brentano said that these attitudes “intentionally contain an object in themselves,” he was referring to the fact that they can truly be said to 213