ETHICS are no moral facts, and he does his best to devalue two of the key concepts of most moral systems, namely justice and guilt The answer, I think, is that Nietzsche shares with traditional morality an ultimate concern with human flourishing, and the reason that he condemns many conventional virtues is precisely because he believes that they hinder rather than help the achievement of a worthwhile life But in his preference for the great over the good, and for the nobleman over the gentleman, he shows himself to have a fundamentally aesthetic, rather than ethical, criterion of the good life His ideal human being not only does not love his neighbour: he has no neighbour Analytic Ethics As an ethicist, G E Moore stands at the opposite pole from Nietzsche He placed goodness at the apex of the pyramid of moral concepts, and he was not at all interested in genealogical questions of the origin and development of the concept In his Principia Ethica (1903) he sees himself as giving an answer to the question ‘How is goodness to be defined?’ simply by inspection of the object or idea that the word ‘good’ stands for The question, he maintained, is fundamental and must be faced before we ask what kinds of actions we ought to perform For the actions we ought to perform are those that will cause more good to exist in the universe than any possible kind of alternative So before we ask what things are good, we must ask what kind of property goodness itself is The question, he maintained, could not be answered by giving any definition of goodness, because goodness was a simple, indefinable notion, like the notion of yellow But unlike yellowness, which was a natural property of things, goodness, Moore maintained, was a non-natural quality If we consider goodness, and any other property akin to it, such as pleasantness, we will see that ‘we have two different notions before our minds’ Even if everything good were in fact pleasant, it does not follow that ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ mean the same To identify goodness with any property such as pleasantness was to commit a fallacy: the naturalistic fallacy, of confusing a non-natural property with a natural one Though Moore maintained that goodness was not a natural property, he did not deny that it could be a property of natural things Indeed, it was a 242