SOUL AND MIND equality we have encountered earlier But this encounter did not take place in our present life, nor by means of the senses: it must have taken place in a previous life and by the operation of pure intellect What goes for the Idea of absolute equality must work also for other similar Ideas, like absolute goodness and absolute beauty (73a–77d) Thirdly, Socrates argues from the concepts of dissolubility and indissolubility Whatever can disintegrate, as the body does at death, must be composite and changeable But the Ideas with which the soul is concerned are unchangeable, unlike the visible and fading beauties we see with our eyes Within the visible world of Xux, the soul staggers like a drunkard; it is only when it returns within itself that it passes into the world of purity, eternity, and immortality in which it is at home If even bodies, when mummiWed in Egypt, can survive for many years, it is hardly credible that the soul dissolves at the moment of death Instead, provided it is a soul puriWed by philosophy, it will depart to an invisible world of bliss (78b–81a) In response to these arguments, Simmias oVers a diVerent conception of the soul Consider, he says, a lyre made out of wood and strings, which is tuned by the tension of the strings A living human body may be compared to a lyre in tune, and a dead body to a lyre out of tune It would be absurd to argue that because attunement is not a material thing like wood and strings, it could survive the smashing of the lyre When the strings of the body lose their tone through injury or disease, the soul must perish like the tunefulness of a broken lyre (84c–86e) Cebes, too, has an objection to make He agrees that the soul is tougher than the body and need not come to an end when the body does; in the normal course of life, the body suVers frequent wear and tear and needs constant repair by the soul But a soul might be immortal, in the sense that it can survive death, without being imperishable, in the sense that it will live for ever Even if it transmigrates from body to body, perhaps one day it will pass away, just as a weaver, who has made and worn out many coats in his lifetime, one day meets his death and leaves a coat behind (86e–88b) Socrates produces several reasons for rejecting Simmias’ analogy Being in tune admits of degrees; but no soul can be more or less a soul than another It is the tension of the strings that causes the lyre to be in tune, but in the human case the relationship goes in the other direction: it is the soul that keeps the body in order (92a–95e) 236