Logic, methodology and philosophy of science VIII proceedings of the eighth international congress of logic, methodology and philosophy of science, and philosophy of science proceedings) ( PDFDrive ) 80
ETHICS AND SCIENCE 61 not simply express the obvious need of some “democratic” way of solving this urgent problem, but corresponds to a much deeper understanding of the relations between science and ethics, an understanding which has again to with the systems-theoretic view mentioned above In fact, in speaking of the relationships between science and ethics, it is insufficient to consider the influence that ethics has to exert upon the doing of science, as we have mainly done thus far An equally interesting investigation concerns the influence of science upon the elaboration of ethics and moral norms We shall confine ourselves to mentioning here only a couple of examples Ethics makes use of certain fundamental concepts such as freedom, normality and human nature, and it is clear that a concrete specification of these concepts, and of their applicability to actual human actions, requires taking into account the results of several sciences, especially of those concerning man, from biology, to genetics, neurobiology, psychology and sociology Without correct information being taken from these sciences, it is possible that the ethical discourse be incapable of speaking to the man of today, who has derived from science a new “image” of himself, and thus may be led to feeling that ethics is something obsolete and backwards As to the formulation of moral norms, the progress of science (particularly of applied science) has already created and will certainly continue to create quite new and unexpected situations, to which the existent moral norms can hardly apply; or, by suddenly opening unforeseen possibilities of action, and therefore of choice, this progress gives moral relevance to situations which in the past totally escaped the possibility of human decision All this indicates that the growth of science imposes a dynamistic aspect on morals, which does not mean moral relativism, but making morals capable of coping with the actual situation of contemporary man This, as we have said, is a consequence of the systems-theoretic approach mentioned above: if morals in general express the imperative of “doing what is right”, without the contribution of other fields they cannot answer the question ‘‘what it is right to do”, when it comes to concrete situations Science, without pretending to answer this question (which is not a scientific question), can nevertheless be of help in elaborating the answer