LOGIC expressed in the proverbs that what’s done cannot be undone, and that it is no use crying over spilt milk (cf NE 1139b7–11) The central part of de Interpretatione is an inquiry into whether this kind of necessity that applies to present and past propositions applies also to all future propositions There are, no doubt, universally necessary truths that apply to the future as well as to the present and to the past: but Aristotle’s attention focuses on singular propositions such as ‘This coat will be cut up before it wears out’, ‘There will be a sea-battle tomorrow’ The truth or falsity of such propositions is not, on the face of it, entailed by any universal generalization However, it is possible to construct a powerful argument to the eVect that such a proposition about the future, if it is true, is necessarily true If A says that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, and B says that there will not be, then one or other will be speaking the truth Now there are relations between propositions in diVerent tenses: for instance, if ‘Socrates will be white’ is now true, then ‘Socrates will be white’ has been true in the past, and indeed was always true in the past So—the argument goes— If it was always true to say it is or will be, then it is impossible for that not to be or to be going to be But if it is impossible for something not to come about, then it cannot not come about But if it cannot not come about, then it is necessary for it to come about Therefore everything that is going to come about is, of necessity, to come about (9 18b11–25) The argument that Aristotle is considering began by supposing that someone says, for example, ‘There will be a sea-battle tomorrow’ and someone else ‘There will not be a sea-battle tomorrow’ and pointing out that one or the other is speaking truly But, he goes on, a similar prediction might have been made long ago, ‘There will be a sea-battle ten thousand years hence’, and this too, or its contradictory, will be true Indeed, it makes no diVerence whether any prediction has ever been made If in the whole of time either the proposition or its contradictory has been the truth, it was necessary for the thing to come about Since of whatever happens ‘It will happen’ was always previously true, everything must happen of necessity (9 18b26–19a5) It will follow, Aristotle says, that nothing is a matter of chance or happenstance Worse, there will be no point in deliberating and choosing between alternatives But in fact, he says, there are many obvious examples 133