Logic, methodology and philosophy of science VIII proceedings of the eighth international congress of logic, methodology and philosophy of science, and philosophy of science proceedings) ( PDFDrive ) 70

ETHICS AND SCIENCE 51 serious ‘conflict with other domains Thus, the imperative of peace and the respect of fundamental human rights are now advocated as limitations to political action; the needs of protecting the environment, of avoiding technological catastrophes and regulating genetic manipulations are producing a demand for the regulation of science and technology; the promotion of social justice is imposing limitations on the unbridled search for economic profit Therefore, the delicate problem we now confront is that of effecting a critical revision of the said points, without becoming involved in obscurantism, regressive involution, or negation of the positive aspects which are certainly contained in the claims of autonomy and freedom It is with this problem that we shall be concerned here We shall first try to understand in which sense those domains for which autonomy is vindicated are to be considered “value-free” This cannot mean that they are “devoid of any value”, or that those who operate within these domains have nothing in view Indeed no human action (if it is really “human”) is performed without a purpose, i.e without a goal which is considered worthy of being pursued by the agent In this sense this goal or aim represents a “value” which inspires the action Moreover, it follows from the examples considered above that the autonomy of certain domains was actually claimed by explicitly assigning to each of them a well-determined specific aim, and by indicating the criteria for evaluating how particular facts, assertions, actions and products ought to be in order for this aim to be pursued in the most satisfactory manner This stage corresponds to what we have called above the “independence in the criteria of judgement”, and expresses a need for analytic clarification against which it would be hardly possible to raise objections This stage does not involve moral problems, since it is only related to action in an indirect and hypothetical way, i.e by suggesting which course of action should be taken ifthe specific goal envisaged were the only goal It by no means implies either that this be the unique or the supreme goal of human action in general, or that one should disregard the impact that the fulfilment of this goal might have upon the realization of other human aims or values Those who accept this “implication” make a transition from the first to the second of the above-mentioned meanings of “autonomy”, i.e to the meaning of “independence in action”, and become immediately involved in a specific and highly debatable ethical claim To the extent that the third meaning is related to the second, ethical questions also exist in connection with the third sense