Ancient philosophy a new history of western philosophy volume 1 (new history of western philosophy) ( PDFDrive ) 244

METAPHYSICS between Socrates and his wisdom because they have two diVerent histories: as Socrates gets older, Socrates’ wisdom may increase or perhaps evaporate But Socrates and his humanity not have two diVerent histories: to be Socrates is to be human, and if Socrates ceases to be a human being he ceases to exist But is there not still the diVerence between concrete and abstract to be taken account of ? Aristotle helps us with this in his discussion of cominginto-being in chapters and 8, where he makes the point that when a thing comes into being, neither its form nor its quiddity begins to exist Using his long-overworked analogy, he says that if I manufacture a bronze sphere, I not thereby make either the bronze or the spherical shape He goes on to generalize: What comes into existence must always be divisible, and there must be two identiWable components, one matter and the other form it is clear from what has been said that the part which is called form or substance does not come into existence; what comes into existence is the composite entity which bears its name (F 1033b16–19) He goes on to draw an anti-Platonic conclusion: if everyday enmattered forms not come into existence at all, there is no need to invoke separate, Ideal, Forms to explain how forms come into existence (F 1033b26) We not even need to invoke Forms to explain how an individual substance gets its form Human beings derive their form not from an Ideal Human, but from their parents (F 1033b32) The father (plus the mother, though Aristotle was ignorant of this) is responsible for introducing form into the appropriate matter ‘The Wnal product, a form of such-and-such a kind in this Xesh and these bones, is Callias or Socrates What makes them distinct is their matter, which is distinct; but they are the same in form (for that is not subdivided)’ (F 1034a8) In this passage Aristotle enunciates a thesis that was to have a long history, namely the thesis that matter is the principle of individuation According to this thesis, however diVerent two things may be from each other, it is not the diVerences between their properties or characteristics that make them distinct from each other For it is possible for things to resemble each other totally without being identical with each other Two peas, for instance, however alike they are, are two peas and not one pea because they are two diVerent parcels of matter 221