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CHAPTER 13 • Game Theory and Competitive Strategy 507 TABLE 13.12(a) PRODUCTION CHOICE PROBLEM Race Car Motors Far Out Engines Small cars Big cars Small engines 3, 3, Big engines 1, 8, Suppose Far Out threatens to produce big engines no matter what Race Car does; suppose, too, that no other engine producer can easily satisfy the needs of Race Car If Race Car believed Far Out’s threat, it would produce big cars: Otherwise, it would have trouble finding engines for its small cars and would earn only $1 million instead of $3 million But the threat is not credible: Once Race Car responded by announcing its intentions to produce small cars, Far Out would have no incentive to carry out its threat Far Out can make its threat credible by visibly and irreversibly reducing some of its own payoffs in the matrix, thereby constraining its own choices In particular, Far Out must reduce its profits from small engines (the payoffs in the top row of the matrix) It might this by shutting down or destroying some of its small engine production capacity This would result in the payoff matrix shown in Table 13.12(b) Now Race Car knows that whatever kind of car it produces, Far Out will produce big engines If Race Car produces the small cars, Far Out will sell the big engines as best it can to other car producers and settle for making only $1 million But this is better than making no profits by producing small engines Because Race Car will have to look elsewhere for engines, its profit will also be lower ($1 million) Now it is clearly in Race Car’s interest to produce large cars By taking an action that seemingly puts itself at a disadvantage, Far Out has improved its outcome in the game Although strategic commitments of this kind can be effective, they are risky and depend heavily on having accurate knowledge of the payoff matrix and the industry Suppose, for example, that Far Out commits itself to producing big engines but is surprised to find that another firm can produce small engines at a low cost The commitment may then lead Far Out to bankruptcy rather than continued high profits THE ROLE OF REPUTATION Developing the right kind of reputation can also give one a strategic advantage Again, consider Far Out Engines’ desire to produce big engines for Race Car Motors’ big cars Suppose that the managers of Far Out Engines develop a reputation for being irrational—perhaps downright crazy They threaten to produce big engines no matter what Race Car Motors TABLE 13.12(b) MODIFIED PRODUCTION CHOICE PROBLEM Race Car Motors Far Out Engines Small cars Big cars Small engines 0, 0, Big engines 1, 8,
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