and the desire of politicians to win elections In the real world, it is not individual voters who count but well-organized groups that can deliver the support of voters to a candidate Public choice theorists argue that the inevitable importance of specialinterest groups explains many choices the public sector makes Consider, for example, the fact noted earlier in this chapter that a great many U.S transfer payments go to groups, many of whose members are richer than the population as a whole In the public choice perspective, the creation of a federal transfer program, even one that is intended to help poor people, will lead to competition among interest groups to be at the receiving end of the transfers To win at this competition, a group needs money and organization—things poor people are not likely to have In the competition for federal transfers, then, it is the nonpoor who often win The perception of growing power of special-interest groups in the United States has led to proposals for reform One is the imposition of term limits, which restrict the number of terms a legislator can serve Term limits were first established in Colorado in 1990; California and Oklahoma established term limits the same year Subsequently, 18 other states adopted them They have been found unconstitutional in four State Supreme Courts (Massachusetts, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming) They have been repealed by the state legislatures of Idaho and Utah Thus, term limits now apply in 15 states [1] One argument for term limits from the public choice perspective is that over time, incumbent legislators establish such close relationships with interest groups that they are virtually assured reelection; limiting terms may weaken these relationships and weaken special interests The Attributed to Libby Rittenberg and Timothy Tregarthen Saylor URL: http://www.saylor.org/books/ Saylor.org 830