and every voter would already know how every program will affect him or her A world of costless information would have no lobbyists, no pressure groups seeking a particular legislative agenda No voter would be more important than any other Now let us drop the assumption that information is costless but retain the assumption that each legislator’s goal is to be reelected Legislators no longer know how people in the district feel about each issue Furthermore, voters may not be sure how particular programs will affect them People can obtain this information, but it is costly In this more realistic world of costly information, special-interest groups suddenly play an important role A legislator who does not know how elderly voters in his or her district feel about a certain issue may find a conversation with a representative of the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) to be a useful source of information A chat with a lobbyist for the Teamster’s Union may reveal something about the views of union members in the district These groups also may be able to influence voter preferences through speeches and through public information and political action efforts A legislator in a world of costly information thus relies on special-interest groups for information and for support To ensure his or her reelection, the legislator might try to fashion a program that appeals not to a majority of individuals but to a coalition of special-interest groups capable of delivering the support of a majority of voters These groups are likely to demand something in exchange for their support of a particular candidate; they are likely to seek special programs to benefit their members The role of special-interest groups is thus inevitable, given the cost of information Attributed to Libby Rittenberg and Timothy Tregarthen Saylor URL: http://www.saylor.org/books/ Saylor.org 829