Authors libby rittenberg 869

maximize their own satisfaction, not the public interest This insight suggests that regulatory agencies seek to expand their bureaucratic structure in order to serve the interests of the bureaucrats As the people in control of providing government protection from the rigors of the market, bureaucrats respond favorably to lobbyists and special interests Public choice theory views the regulatory process as one in which various groups jockey to pursue their respective interests Firms might exploit regulation to limit competition Consumers might seek lower prices or changes in products Regulators themselves might pursue their own interests in expanding their prestige or incomes The abstract goal of economic efficiency is unlikely to serve the interest of any one group; public choice theory does not predict that efficiency will be a goal of the regulatory process Regulation might improve on inefficient outcomes, but it might not Consumer Protection Every day we come into contact with regulations designed to protect consumers from unsafe products, unscrupulous sellers, or our own carelessness Seat belts are mandated in cars and airplanes; drivers must provide proof of liability insurance; deceptive advertising is illegal; firms cannot run “going out of business” sales forever; electrical and plumbing systems in new construction must be inspected and approved; packaged and prepared foods must carry certain information on their labels; cigarette packages must warn users of the dangers involved in smoking; gasoline stations must prevent gas spillage; used-car odometers must be certified as accurate The list of regulations is seemingly endless Attributed to Libby Rittenberg and Timothy Tregarthen Saylor URL: http://www.saylor.org/books/ Saylor.org 869