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Limited Electronic Distribution Rights Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details For More Information This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation. 6 Jump down to document THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution Support RAND This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE EVALUATING NOVEL THREATS TO THE HOMELAND UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND CRUISE MISSILES Brian A. Jackson, David R. Frelinger Michael J. Lostumbo, Robert W. Button The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN 978-0-8330-4169-2 Cover Design by Stephen Bloodsworth The research described in this report was prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. iii Preface Deciding how to invest homeland security resources wisely in the United States can often appear to be an intractable problem because the large, open American society seems to be so vulnerable to so many threats in every corner of the country. is monograph is intended to help bound the problem in order to aid policy and resource decisions about one type of potential threat to the homeland: cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Importantly, the methodology used can be applied to other modes of attack, and the insights gained from this methodology extend to other threats as well. e focus of the research is on a specific class of weapons, but those weapons are not assessed in isolation; rather, it considers class of weapons as one of many options open to a potential attacker and seeks to identify invest- ment strategies that are effective against multiple threats. is monograph should be of interest to homeland security poli- cymakers, military and defense planners, analysts examining the ter- rorist threat, technology and defense system designers, and individuals charged with protecting potential targets in the U.S. homeland from terrorist attack. is research was sponsored by the Defense reat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Insti- tute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Uni- fied Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at Dobbins@rand.org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at RAND, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arling- ton, Virginia 22202. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org. iv Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland v Contents Preface iii Summary xiii Acknowledgments xix Abbreviations xxi CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Cruise Missiles: Technological Change Producing a Potential reat 2 e RAND Approach 7 Task 1: Conduct a Red Analysis of Alternatives 8 Task 2: Assess the Implications for the Defense 8 About is Report 9 CHAPTER TWO UAVs and Cruise Missiles as Asymmetric reats: How Do ese Systems Compare with Alternative Attack Modes? 11 Characteristics of UAVs and Cruise Missiles 14 Comparing the Capabilities of UAVs and Cruise Missiles in Attack Scenarios to ose of Alternative Attack Modes 16 Direct Attack 18 Indirect Attack 23 Aerial Dispersal 25 Conclusions 25 CHAPTER THREE What Adversary Operational Problems Can UAVs and Cruise Missiles Best Solve and How Do UAVs and Cruise Missiles Compare with Alternative Solutions? 27 1. Enable Attack over Perimeter Defenses 29 Alternative Means for Defeating Perimeter Defenses 31 Assessment of Options for Defeating Perimeter Defenses 35 2. Enable Attack over National Borders 37 Alternative Means for Attacking Across National Borders 39 Assessment of Options for Attacking Across National Borders 41 3. Enable Multiple Simultaneous Attacks 42 Alternative Means for Staging Multiple Simultaneous Attacks 43 Assessment of Options for Staging Multiple Simultaneous Attacks 45 4. Enable an Attack Campaign 47 Alternative Means for Sustaining an Attack Campaign 49 Assessment of Options for Sustaining an Attack Campaign 51 5. Enable Aerial Attack of Area Targets with Unconventional Weapons 52 Alternative Means for Dispersing Weapons over Area Targets 53 Assessment of Options for Dispersing Weapons over Area Targets 55 Conclusions 57 CHAPTER FOUR What Are the Terrorist Group Characteristics and Preferences Relevant to the Acquisition and Use of Technology? 61 Access to and Costs Associated with UAV and Cruise-Missile Technologies 62 Access to and Costs Associated with Alternative Technologies 64 Ability and Willingness to Develop the Expertise Necessary to Operate the Systems 65 Technological Preferences 66 Conclusions: Two Decisionmaking Pathways 66 Path I 68 Path II 69 vi Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland CHAPTER FIVE Considering Defensive Strategies and Options 71 Options Available to the Defender 73 Identifying and Catching the Perpetrators: Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Forensics 73 Controlling the Spread of UAVs and Cruise Missiles: Counterproliferation 76 Enabling Targeted Sites to React Before Impact: Detection and Warning 77 Acting Against the Incoming Weapon or the Launcher: Active Defenses and Prelaunch Engagement 79 Strengthening Targets to Survive Attack: Passive Defenses 80 Bouncing Back from Attack: Response, Recovery, and Reconstitution 81 Comparing the Options: Bases for a Blue Analysis of Alternatives 82 How Do the Options Differ in eir Effect on the reat from UAVs and Cruise Missiles? 83 Do the Options Provide Defensive Benefits with Respect to Other Forms of Attack Beyond UAVs and Cruise Missiles? 85 How Do the Costs Compare? 86 Are the Solutions Appropriate for the Homeland? 88 Are ere Technical or Organizational Challenges at Might reaten the Benefits of an Option’s Being Realized? 89 Defense Conclusions: Choosing Among Available Options 89 Deterring Asymmetrtic Use of UAVs and Cruise Missiles? 94 Deterrence by Punishment 94 Deterrence by Denial 95 CHAPTER SIX Conclusions 97 Anticipating the Attractiveness of a Novel reat to Adversaries 98 Implications for the Defense 98 Bibliography 101 vii Contents vii [...]... expected to sell into the international marketplace (Zaloga, no date) The total number of countries believed to be developing some type of UAV is 18, 13 of which are currently exporting the systems (Bolkcom, 4 Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland 2002, p 15) In addition, 22 other countries are reported to be capable of transitioning to producing cruise missiles As with the UAVs themselves, the costs... and the nature of the threat they posed, have similarly challenged established security concepts In the wake of the shifts brought about by both these now-historic cases, major efforts were focused on understanding both what had happened and how the world had changed, and the reaction to the shifts led to redoubled efforts at foresight to better understand whether more such shifts were on the horizon, to. .. of new responses to every threat that arises has the potential to spread a defensive effort thin or to dissipate resources that would be better used in pursuit of other national goals Consequently, security planners must examine new threats to determine what about them is not novel By explor- 1 2 Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland ing a new threat’s similarities with dangers the United States... How to invest homeland security resources wisely in the United States can appear to be an intractable problem because the large, open American society seems to be vulnerable to so many threats in every corner of the country This monograph is intended to present a defense-planning approach to bound the problem and thereby aid policy and resource decisions about one type of potential threat to the homeland: ... the attacker’s perspective, we conclude that they do xvi Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland not appear to have major advantages over other ways of carrying out operations against similar targets, although they cannot be dismissed outright as a potential threat Where they did appear preferable, the choice for these systems was driven by the actions of the defense or inplace security measures—i.e.,... systems—and of the systems themselves—have raised questions about whether the relative threat posed to the United States by adversary use of such systems is changing enough to warrant greater attention The availability of UAVs and cruise missiles to potential attackers will be determined to a large degree by their availability to legitimate military and civilian users around the world The most attractive... cruise missiles in the context of where their advantages are likely to be most important Through such an analysis, it is possible to identify the key characteristics of the systems that distinguish them from other means of attack and highlight the specific factors that might lead adversaries to acquire and use them After analyzing cruise missiles and UAVs in their most favorable light from the attacker’s... using other satellite systems, such as the European Galileo, Russian GLONASS, or Chinese Beidou satellite navigation systems 6 Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland C-802 anti-ship missile from Iran to Hezbollah), and have been employed in combat (see Myre, 2006) Western cruise missiles are available for on the order of $0.5 million at the low end to more than $2 million on the high end for the most-capable... (2001, pp 183–213) 8 Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland (2) defensive options to address the threat must be considered broadly These principles are reflected in two study tasks Task 1: Conduct a Red Analysis of Alternatives In pursuing their goals, terrorist organizations and other potential adversaries frequently consider a range of options Therefore, the attractiveness of these technologies will... cruise-missile or other air-defense assets for the nation, the problem needs to be bounded so that scarce resources can be focused productively Examining the Threat from UAVs and Cruise Missiles via a “Red Analysis of Alternatives” In essence, to assess the threat of cruise missiles and UAVs to the homeland, we cannot consider them in isolation; instead, we must consider the problem from the attacker’s . sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense. 68 Path II 69 vi Evaluating Novel Threats to the Homeland CHAPTER FIVE Considering Defensive Strategies and Options 71 Options Available to the Defender