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International Trade in Animals and Animal Parts 233 Rational Choice Theory As the IWT is regarded to be the third largest black market in the world, explanations often focus on rational choice and opportunity theories Rational choice theory (Cornish and Clarke 1986) has been used repeatedly to explain how and why offenders chose certain species and processes to engage in IWT (Pettrossian and Clarke 2014; Pires and Clarke 2011, 2012) This research persuasively argues that acceleration in the collection and killing of wildife is mainly explained by market forces Put simply, substantial economic gain is increasingly likely as more wildlife is labelled ‘endangered’ and ‘scarce’, leading to intensified demand, higher prices and thereby a stronger motivation to offend The resale value of rhino horn, for example, is estimated at around €40,000/kilo (comparatively gold is approximately €31,000/kilo), while tiger bones sell for up to €900/kilo and raw ivory prices can reach €620/kilo (European Commission [EC] 2014, p 2) Where individual wildlife does not command such large financial sums—Regueira and Bernard (2012), for example, have recorded the sale of song birds for as little as $1 in South American markets—animals are traded in their millions to ensure profit Although most of these live animals may die enroute, this is deemed acceptable collateral damage Self-interested rational offenders are only concerned with the instrumental value of wildlife—any harms or abuses inflicted on animals happen as an indirect consequence of trade activities—a simple cost benefit analysis The ‘rational’ choice to engage in legal or illegal trade can be influenced by a combination of push and pull factors which help inform decision making IWT is frequently linked to the socio-economic and political characteristics of countries and regions, typically facilitated in countries characterised by poverty, economic development, new trade borders, governance challenges, organised crime, violent conflicts and corruption (De Greef and Raemaekers 2014; Lemieux and Clarke 2009; Nellemann et al 2014) In countries, such as Brazil, with high biodiversity and social inequality, poachers and smugglers without legitimate means to achieve their financial goals, use the IWT to subsidise their earnings Frequently, there are few obstacles in the path of would-be offenders as these countries are also often characterised by their remoteness and poorly managed and monitored trade systems, challenges that are exacerbated by bureaucracy, corruption (Sollund and Maher 2015; Wyatt 2014), conflict (Lemieux and Clarke 2009) and, more recently, organised crime groups Rapid economic and population growth can also provide the perfect conditions in which IWT can flourish