42 A Arluke and L Irvine think of his actions (Favre 2009) Some methods of dog training include physical ‘corrections’, such as jerking, shocking and hanging or swinging the dog by a leash Critics of these methods consider them cruel (Owens and Eckroate 2007) Concerned citizens who report the use of such methods have found that cruelty laws provide exemptions for training, and courts have ruled that ‘a beating inflicted for corrective or disciplinary purposes without an evil motive is not a crime, even if painful and excessive’ (State v Fowler, 205 S.E.2d 749, N.C Ct App 1974) Laws also provide exceptions for hunting and farming Practices considered acceptable and necessary in agriculture, such as branding, castration and beak trimming, all done without anaesthetics or analgesics, would be considered inhumane and illegal if performed on a companion animal The infliction of pain, even to the point of suffering, does not necessarily constitute cruelty Thus, the nature of cruelty is situational, and the same treatment ‘in one context can be regarded as cruel, while in another it can be considered culturally acceptable’ (Arluke 2006, p 184) Some attempts to assess the nature of cruelty emphasise motive, specifying it as ‘the wilful infliction of harm, injury, and intended pain’ (Kellert and Felthous 1985, p 1114), ‘behavior that intentionally causes unnecessary pain, suffering, or distress’ (Ascione 1993, p 28), or the ‘desire to gain satisfaction from the infliction of suffering, pain, or some other harm’ (Rowan 1999, p 330) Yet, sadism does not characterise all perpetrators of cruel acts As Regan argues, ‘some cruel people not feel pleasure in making others suffer Indeed, they seem not to feel anything’ (1980, p 534) Insensitivity to suffering, rather than sadistic enjoyment of it, can also count as cruelty Consequently, many statutes include not only intention but also ‘reckless indifference’ to an animal’s pain (Garner 2014, p 303) Cruelty might result from ignorance, carelessness or neglect; indeed, these constitute the primary sources of suffering among companion animals (Patronek 1997; Solot 1997) Although some argue that the lack of ‘deliberate maliciousness’ makes the resulting abuse less serious (Rowan 1993, p 218), statutes often use the term ‘cruelty’ ‘generically to encompass both deliberate infliction of harm and harm that arises from neglect’ (Patronek 1997, p 277; see also Donley et al 1999) In sum, numerous challenges arise when attempting to characterise the nature of cruelty Limiting the discussion to companion animals overlooks the suffering endured by the majority of animals, such as those involved in food production, through practices considered acceptable and legal Determinations of cruelty depend not just on statutory language but also on context, situation, purported ‘necessity’, intention and motive