102 | Captive Breeding Ethics to try to prevent extinction and restore nature, at least to some degree, even if doing so in some way mentally or physically “harms” individual animals? The larger ethical consideration of whether or not to engage in captive breeding for reintroduction often relates to broader worldviews and core (or more strongly held, central) values In this situation, the main ethical consideration is how we balance the welfare and rights of individual animals against the value of captive breeding to reintroduction programs and our obligations to sustain populations, species, and ecological communities and processes (Norton, 1995) Michael Hutchins and colleagues (2003, p 964) describe this as “ issues of individual animal welfare versus overall species and ecosystem conservation.” This is an important consideration, because sometimes actions designed to benefit populations will conflict with the interests of individual animals held in captivity (Wuichet & Norton, 1995) Tom Regan (1995) suggests that there are three basic worldviews with respect to holding animals in captivity (in particular, he was discussing zoos, not breeding facilities for reintroduction per se) These are utilitarianism, animal rights, and environmental holism Briefly, the utilitarian doctrine, as championed by Peter Singer (1980), argues that we should afford rights to sentient species—those able to experience suffering and pleasure—or we risk engaging in what he calls speciesism (favoring some species, most notably human, over other species) Singer argues that we should engage in actions that result in the greatest good for all sentient organisms Thus, we must take into account all the costs and benefits of our actions Tom Regan (1983) argues from a strong animal rights stance which values the individual rights of all animals He suggests that we should minimize depriving individuals (of all sentient species) of their basic rights Is subjecting animals to our wants nothing more than environmental fascism (Regan, 1983)? Finally, environmental holism grew out of Aldo Leopold’s essay “Land Ethic,” which argues that, “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (1968L, pp 224 –225) Thus, followers of this worldview believe that the interests of the entire biotic community trump the rights of the individual Conservationists, for example, often argue from this perspective to justify holding animals in captivity for “the good of the species” (c.f Hutchins et al., 2003) What these different worldviews suggest with respect to captive propagation for reintroduction? Regan (1983) argues that any type of captivity or manipulation of a sentient animal represents a form of “environmental fascism.” Are other animals sufficiently different from humans to warrant different treatment? ask Joy Mench and Michael Kreger (1996) As we learn more about other animals, we find fewer distinctions, yet no one, not even Peter Singer or Tom Regan, suggests that we should treat all animals equally So should different species be afforded different rights? What about species that are not sentient or feel no pain (Bostock, 1993)? One of the great difficulties in evaluating different ethical stances is our ability to assess the impacts of captivity on individuals of other species Would an individual animal trade greater freedom for the greater security and amenities (such as adequate food, water, and shelter) of captivity? Many humans agree to these tradeoffs, albeit