140 | Consciousness, Animal been a boom in affective science—the scientific study of feelings and emotions—more generally In affective neuroscience and behavioral genetics, where the scientific agenda is to discover underlying mechanisms for pain and stress responses, mice and rats are the most common animal models, although rhesus monkeys are also widely used by neuroscientists Physiological, for example, hormonal, and behavioral approaches to affective science cover a wider range of species, from mink to trout This diversity is partly due to the agenda of applied animal science for managing animals in agricultural and wildlife settings; hence, even fish have been studied for their responses to painful stimuli As with animal cognition, most who work in the affective sciences have avoided addressing questions of consciousness directly This sometimes puts these scientists in the difficult position of arguing that the animal models they study are good models for human emotions and feelings, while arguing that the lack of equivalence between humans and animals justifies the pain and distress that is caused by their experiments However, by limiting themselves to objective behavioral and physiological measures, most scientists manage to sidestep the topic of consciousness in their professional publications There are, of course, many concerned scientists who share the common sense view about animals Nonetheless, they take a more skeptical stance in their scientific work, evincing a “show me” attitude that refuses simply to go along with common sense Scientific skepticism has very often trumped common sense (the earth does move!), and it must be taken seriously by those concerned with the ethical treatment of animals, because scientists’ opinions are very important in forming laws and rules about how animals should be treated in research and agriculture Sometimes special interests override consistent scientific treatment in the formulation of these rules For example, based on the recommendations of a scientific panel, the British Animal Scientific Protection Act draws a line between vertebrates and invertebrates, but makes an exception to give the common octopus the same protection from harmful treatment as any mammal, bird, fish, reptile, or amphibian Are octopi special among invertebrate animals in having conscious experiences? The United States Animal Welfare Act was amended in 2002 to exempt rats, mice, and birds Despite the apparent arbitrariness of these lines, it nevertheless seems reasonable to draw a line somewhere, and scientific consensus may draw the line less inclusively than common sense would The central question here is the distribution question: Which animals are conscious and which ones aren’t? Most people think that there’s no black-andwhite answer to this question Perhaps earthworms, or goldfish have some degree of consciousness, just not the same as ours But what would that mean? Could it mean that goldfish see, hear, smell, and taste things dimly (or in pale colors)? Or does it just mean that they are aware of fewer things than we are? We also know of many examples where animal senses are more acute than humans Honeybees, for example, have five different color vision cones compared to our three, so they can differentiate between flowers that look the same to us Do they have a higher visual consciousness than humans? Such questions are examples of the phenomenal question: What are the conscious