The Identification of Problems in Agricultural Economics Research

The Identification of Problems in Agricultural Economics Research Author(s): A N Halter Source: Journal of Farm Economics , Dec., 1960, Vol 42, No 5, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Farm Economic Association (Dec., 1960), pp 1459-1471 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1235709 REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1235709?seq=1&cid=pdfreference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms and Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Farm Economics This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms PROBLEMS OF METHOD IN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH CHAIRMAN: JOHN M BREWSTEm, AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVIC THE IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH* A N HALTER University of Kentucky THE MOST important mental requirements for doing successful re search are curiosity and love of research One of the main incentives for research is the desire to win the esteem of one's associates The chie reward from research is the thrill of discovery Thus at the start, the ta of identifying a workable problem appears to be a rather drab prerequi- site to research However, in agricultural economics we have been blessed with scholars who are willing to identify the problems to whic they feel the members of the profession should orientate their research efforts The latest attempts at identifying problems are those made by the members of a subcommittee of the Social Science Research Council Committee on Agricultural Economics which appeared in the Augus 1959, issue of the Journal.1 Thus in regard to formulating problems my paper comes after the "final curtain." Hence, I will venture to go behind the "scenes" and try to report to the audience what I interpret has gone on "backstage." In reporting on the "backstage" activities you understand that I didn't see any of the "dress rehearsals" nor have I talked to members of the production personally Any "backstage" has immovable fixtures which serve for many plays and different actors Likewise in the identification of problems there ar some immovable points of view which give rise to particular kinds of problems Hence in this paper I will first present a heuristic device for examining most points of view This device will serve the useful purpose of (1) classifying problems and (2) making explicit where "short circuits of facts and "frayed ropes" of theory can give rise to pseudo-problems Second, I will attempt to show how the problems that the subcommittee * The author would like to acknowledge the advice of P R Johnson, H H Jack and J W Hubbard in preparing this paper However, I am fully responsible for the inadequacies that remain 'George K Brinegar, Kenneth L Bachman, and Herman M Southworth, "Reorien- tations in Research in Agricultural Economics," J Farm Econ., 41:600-19 (Aug 1959) One can rarely pick up a research paper or peer into the Journal without seein a mass of problems in the process of being identified This paper is not intended to be a review of that literature 1459 This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1460 A N HALTER has identified can be examined with this device Finally, I will present a point of view which I believe clarifies certain issues and provides a new way of approaching research problems in agricultural economics Device for Depicting Points of View First consider the realm of the facts, that collection of actual happenings which everyone can experience Let us divide this collection into at least two parts, social and physical (natural) and represent them diagrammatically by two intersecting elipses Call the left one SF denoting social facts and the right one PF for physical (natural) facts Now if your point SF X X PXF of view tells you there are part such by putting a cross (X) in t lieve there are both kinds of f lune A cross (X) in the intersec some SF which are also PF How there are no SF which are PF.2 the proponents of the point of existence or nonexistence of these Second, consider the interpret called the domain of theory Le (1) Social or societal theory, (2) mative theory These can be re Call the left one ST for societa sT N! only th middle also in t Crossh This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 1461 facts Finally, the remaining ellipse, denoted as NT for normative theory, consists of propositions in the indicative and the imperative moods which state either what the ends of individuals and society are or what they should be.3 Now the intersection between ST and NT can: (1) contain a cross (X) implying that the particular societal theory considers existing ends necessary for describing and explaining social facts (These propositions are in the indicative mood.) (2) be cross-hatched implying that existing ends are not necessary for describing and explaining SF (3) be blank Either case (2) or (3) combined with a cross (X) in the lune of NT implies that the normative theory states propositions in only the imperative mood The intersection of PT and NT can be given a similar interpretation The intersection of PT and ST are those propositions in the indicative mood which describe and explain SF and/or PF The intersection of ST, PT, and NT are those propositions in the indicative mood which use existing ends in describing and explaining SF and/or PF Understand that only the intersection with NT contains propositions in the indicative mood, the lune of NT contains only propositions in the imperative mood Thirdly, let us consider the region of metaphysics which can be represented by one ellipse containing those propositions taken for granted before the physical and/or societal theories can explain SF and PF or before normative theory can prescribe ends.4 To show the relation between this ellipse and the other two sets, let us construct as in Diagram I a hierarchy of order between them Thus metaphysics is of the highest order, followed by theory with facts at the bottom The relation of each level to the other two can be indicated by sets of directed lines (arrows indicate direction of relation) Between the metaphysical and theoretical levels lines labeled P for the presupposing relations can be indicated to connect the presuppositions with the theory Between the theoretical and the factual levels, lines can be drawn (labeled E in Diagram I) which denote the methodological relation of explaining.5 Finally a fourth level can be indicated between the levels of theory and fact by an ellipse which denotes those propositions of technology, i.e., those of medicine, engineering, and, depending upon your point of view, agricultural economics The lines labeled C between any theory and technology imply a contributory relation, i.e., technology may use propo8 Indicative pertains to that mood of the verb which represents a concern with an objective fact Imperative pertains to that mood which is expressive of a command 'Cf A N Halter, "A Metaphysical Hypothesis," J Farm Econ., 40:1871-74 (Dec 1958) The arrow on the line labeled E on the diagram denotes direction(s) of the re- lation(s), here induction and deduction This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms A N HALTE 1462 Metaphysical Level Level Theore Technological Level tSF ( PF Factual Level DIAGRAM DEVICE FOR DEPICTING POINTS OF VIEW sitions of ST and/or PT in the indicative mood with propositions of in the imperative mood to derive propositions which can influence t social facts-SF Hence a line labeled I between technology and SF plies an influence relation, i.e., technology changes SF Now in constructing this hierarchy a means for classifying proble for research can be evolved Thus the four levels provide four kinds problems: (1) metaphysical, (2) theoretical, (3) practical or technologi and (4) factual Transition between the levels involves a chain of meth ological problems Thus each line between the levels implies a particu set of methodological problems, e.g., the E relations imply the metho logical problems of science, the I relations imply the problems of met in teaching, preaching and "politicking."6 The P relations between social or physical and metaphysics imply the probl that philosophy of science study and the C relations imply the technical problem crafts, e.g linear programming in current usage This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 1463 Now that the structure for picturing a point of view has been developed let us apply it to a particular one and see what it shows The subcommittee referred to earlier stated their belief that F S C Northrop's (The) Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities provides a "frame of reference" for analyzing the intellectual efforts of agricultural economists.7 Therefore, before examining the subcommittee's view, let us gain some facility in applying the device by examining the view set forth in Northrop Northrop separates theory into three kinds: (1) theory of natural science, (2) theory of social science and (3) normative theory of the humanities and social science The first he says is basic to such discoveries as the atomic bomb, the second designates the de facto state of affairs in society and the third designates "the humanistic and social end, the correct or good form of social organization, not yet perfectly actualized in fact, at which we should aim."8 His claim that there are social and physical facts is clear from the following quotation: The only difference between the theory of natural science and the factual theories of social science is that the former applies the traditional method of the natural sciences to the facts of nature, whereas the latter applies it to the facts of culture and society To build up the relation between theory and what we have called metaphysics we need to consider several passages from Northrop's book First he argues that normative theory can be verified He says that the scientific method for verifying normative social theory cannot be that for verifying the theory of natural science or factual social theory For otherwise normative social theory and factual social theory would be identical, and the distinction would evaporate.9 Second he says that there is an empirical connection between the postulates of nature or natural man and normative theory It is this connection which provides the method by which the correct or most adequate, normative social theory can be picked out from among the possible normative social theories Let us picture what we have up to now in a diagram showing the theoretical and factual levels of Northrop's view (Diagram 2).10 The cross in the lunes at the fact level indicates he believes both exist; however, the blank lens means he made no commitment concerning the intersection The cross in the lens between PT and NT indicates the existence of nor7Brinegar, et al., op cit., p 618 'F S C Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), p 329 ' Ibid., p 329 This point is well taken The equating of normative and predictive theory is a common confusion in agricultural economics literature '? Both this and the way in which Northrop presents his view are abstract However, Northrop (perhaps intentionally) presents no examples specific enough to refute his view at a more concrete level This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1464 A N HALTER Metaphysical Level Theoretical Level Technological Level Instruments Social Institutions and Practices DIAGRAM F S C NORTnEOP's POINT OF VIEW mative postulates of nature and natural man."l The blank lens of ST PT is consistent with the blank lens of SF and PF That there is a connec- tion between the postulates of natural man and normative theory can be shown by a line drawn between the two crosses To justify this connection one must look to the metaphysical level While Northrop does not use the word metaphysical there is little doubt that he is making a presupposition when he says: The philosophy defining a particular normative social theory has two apparently paradoxical properties of designating both an "ought" for culture which introduces choices, moral values and ideals, and an "is" for nature which permits verification Thus we can add to our diagram the metaphysical level and a line of presupposition to the connection between natural man and normative " From this and a Northrop diagram I inferred that the lens between ST and NT must be cross-hatched Ibid., p 339 This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 1465 theory In philosophical literature this metaphysical relation is called the "naturalistic fallacy." According to G E Moore these so-called naturalistic truths which Northrop says are verifiable assert a relation between an existing thing and an intrinsically "good" thing.l2 That is, according to Moore, any attempt to define the "good" in terms of the actual is fallacious and hence no scientific method can be formulated to prove or disprove assertions making attributions of "good." To complete Northrop's view I have inserted the level of technology.13 He makes a distinction between technological instruments and social techniques Thus, only physical theory contributes to technological development while only normative theory contributes to the institution of social practices I conclude that he claims: (1) that engineering has no normative aspect and (2) that social theories which explain social facts not contribute to the formulation of social institutions and practices However, I not understand why on one hand physical theory contributes to instrument technology while on the other social theory does not contribute to the practices and institutions which influence social facts Since Northrop's purpose was mainly that of justifying the metaphysical presupposition to which I referred above, he may have overlooked this latter point However, that examining his view in this pictorial way leads to questions of omission shows the merit of the device Based upon the above demonstration, I would be more reluctant than the subcommittee to recommend Northrop's "frame of reference" for analyzing agricultural economists' efforts My belief that the subcommittee did not in fact accept Northrop's point of view in identifying problems will be considered in the following section The Subcommittee's Problems Time does not permit examining each problem identified by the subcommittee and hence I will consider only their first, technological change I have presented in Diagram my conception of the subcommittee's point of view In order that you can follow the discussion I have numbered each line and will provide, in that sequence, direct quotes to bear witness to my conception (1), (2), (3) That physical theory and existing ends contribute to technological instruments which in turn influence social facts: "Technological change, defined as the effects secondary to the accumulation and application of knowledge, is at once the source of hope for the future and the cause of most of the adjustment problems faced in the present." (4) That theory springs from the facts by induction: "An array of useful " G E Moore, Ethics (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 1912) I inferred this from a diagram, Northrop, op cit., p 339 This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1466 A N HALTER Metaphysical Level ) Level / I \\ I c (2) C x 1/ /6) | \ (5) (6) Technological Level (4)E C \ C rnstruments \ |J/ X j / Social Institutions DIAGRAM SUBCOMMIrTTEE'S POINT OF VIEW questions center on the measurement of technological change These questions concern levels and rates of change, and are significant at all degrees of aggregation A second interest area concerns the factors that are strategic, at various times in various societies and industries, in determining the development and adoption of technology." (5) That valuations are basic to social their rol e in formula- tion of social techniques: " related is the question of relevant beliefs and value systems of farm and nonfarm people in an increasingly specialized, highly technical system of agricultural production Are modifications occurring in the image of the farmers' role as regards, for example, the scope of independence of management decision that is feasible, or as regards the degree of personal responsibility for economic security in a rapidly changing world? Shifts in value patterns related to such things can enlarge the range of acceptable choices in responding to problems that accompany technological advances." This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 1467 (6) (7) That imperative ends from a normative theory contribute to social techniques which influence social facts: "On the side of income distribution there is need for more accurate measurement of the incidence of the gains and losses to various groups from new technology It is not enough to say that all society gains in the long run Interest in the question of incidence implies interest in how to shift the gains and losses flow- ing from technological change Thus questions arise concerning how to control the impacts of technological change and how to shift them."'4 To maintain that this is the way most agricultural economists view the problem of technological change and perhaps most other problems would imply a knowledge beyond my capacity However, I would ask, now that the viewpoint is exposed by the structure of the device, are there weaknesses which could give rise to pseudo-problems? Let us consider the circuit (2), (3), (4) or as the subcommittee called it the "Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde facets."'5 This conception considers existing ends as basic to technological change and to explaining social facts In this regard Northrup points out, "As long as valuations are taken as the fundamental concept of the science, an economic dynamics will be impossible for two reasons."16 These he says are: (1) the subjective relative character of valuations necessitates leaving the state of a system at a given time unprecisely designated and (2) the failure of the total quantity of valuations to obey a conservation law prevents the prediction of a future state Thus, following Northrop, the 'lack of an adequate theory of growth or economic development [as] the most obvious need of agricultural economists " can only be a pseudo-problem.'7 Although the subcommittee remarks that "The direct quest of such a theory does not appear promising ." Northrop says it is "ruled out." Thus we can complete Diagram by inserting the metaphysical ellipse and the presupposition that the system is in the state of constant change, i.e., its Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde characteristic This does not imply that agricultural economists must continue to engage in an unproductive pursuit My conception if correct demonstrates merely that this is the case within the point of view of the subcommittee This, however, has important implications It means considering a different point of view Proposed Point of View I not intend to provide a fully developed point of view; rather I will show an outline of one which could be followed in searching for research All quotes from: Brinegar, et al., op cit., pp 606-08 Emphasis mine Ibid., p 607 The circuit (4), (5), (7) gives rise to similar difficulties Northrop, op cit., p 245 Notice in this regard, the crosshatched lens between ST and NT of Diagram That this point is well taken see Diagram "1 Brinegar, et al., op cit., p 606 This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1468 A N HALTER DIAGRAM PROPOSED POINT OF VIEW problems.18 Using Diagram 4, I will comment on four points: (1) the cross-hatched section between ST and NT, (2) the E relations between ST, PT, and SF, PF, (3) the technological level and (4) the metaphysical Cross-hatched section between ST, PT, and NT The cross-hatched lens between PT and NT is consistent with the elim- ination of teleological concepts from the theories of physical science It has been recognized by physical scientists that the "motives" or "purposes" of tornadoes, bacteria, and some higher animals are no longer of help in explaining physical facts The cross-hatched section between ST and NT implies that purpose can be eliminated as an explanatory variable in societal theory.19 Arguments which use ends and purposes to "ex- 18 The argument at this stage must be abstract because it would take a book to fill in the outline Also specific examples may be difficult to find at present 19 For some discussion of this point see C West Churchman and Russell L Ackoff's Methods of Inquiry (St Louis: Educational Publishers, 1950) This is an excellent in- This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 1469 plain" human behavior often appear quite convincing However, they are just as often of an ex post facto character and hence lack predictive powers Thus the worth of an explanation must be judged upon other grounds than "familiarity" (empathy) The E relations The E relations proposed between theory and fact run in one direction, i.e., the method of science is hypothetical-deductive-testable and hence induction has no place in it The criterion of a scientific theory is its falsi- fiability or refutability The method of science is one of trial and error(1) proposing hypotheses, (2) deducing predictions, (3) attempting to refute the theory by "risking" a comparison between prediction and observable facts This is the program proposed by the empiricists to set scientific endeavors apart from technological Thus induction, i.e., inference based on many observations, according to K R Popper, is a myth.20 It is often lamented that social scientists in general and economists in particular lack sufficient numbers of observations to "induce" generalizations about social phenomena If Popper is correct the actual procedure of science is to operate with conjectures, i.e to jump to conclusions often after only one single observation Then repeated observations can serve the useful purpose of testing the conjectures or hypotheses, i.e as attempted refutations I believe it would be worthwhile for us to examine critically some of our research efforts which seek only confirming evidence Rather more of our efforts should be expended in testing our theories, i.e in attempts to falsify them or refute them The technological level That social, physical and normative theory contribute to the technology of instruments and institutions is made clear by proposing that the propositions of practical worth are of the same character, hence social institutions and technological instruments can be included in one ellipse The methods of technology are different from science in that causal chains which link what is known of social and physical theories to what is prescribed by normative theory are desired.21 troduction to philosophy and scientific method in that it summarizes and contrasts different points of view Also see Ernest Nagel, "Teleological Explanation and Teleological Systems," in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (eds.) Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, Inc., 1953), pp 537-58 20 Karl R Popper, "Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report," in C A Mace (ed.), British Philosophy in the Mid-Century (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957), pp 155-91 For some discussion of this point I refer you to Stephen Toulmin's book, The Philosophy of Science (London: Hutchinsons University Library, 1953) and in particular the relationship between the theories of science and the practices of applied science Also see C Hillis Kaiser, An Essay on Method (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ Press, 1952), pp 62-68 This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1470 A N HALTE The metaphysical That something must be presupposed for science and techno clearly pictured in the proposed view That the methods of scien not be applied to judging the results of science and technology is e from the downward direction of all the arrows However, that som method can evaluate the results is the intent of the presupposing tions (P) The examination of these metaphysical relations is the fu of philosophy.22 Conclusions The question-Where problems arise and how are they identified? -now can be examined from this proposed point of view While each level gives rise to research problems, whether or not agriculture economists should work on them is not clear I expect we could get an argument concerning the status of agricultural economics, i.e., is it entirely concerned with technological and applied matters or is it an empirical science concerned with the development of social theory? I personally would argue that if it is entirely technological then it begs the question, "From what source we get the social theory?" If the answer is from Economics and Sociology, I would want to question their status.23 With little difficulty, references can be found which claim that all social sciences are technological.24 This, of course, begs the question again: From what source we get the theory? Hence, I conclude that agricultural economists must be concerned with scientific matters of theory formulation and testing To identify problems in this area one examines the gap between our present knowledge of tested theory and facts yet unexplained Working problems arise from a background of established theory and the tentative hypothetical statements intended to explain the subjects of doubt Problems at the technological level are identified by the gap between what normative theory prescribes and what the facts show is the real situation However, the identification and subsequent solution of problems by the technologist is hampered by the lack of social theory Until answers are given to explanatory questions which only societal theory formulation can provide, the status of agricultural economics as technology remains shaky Hence, the technologist must be prepared to confine himself to problems which are at best approximately solvable within the realm of existing theory The engineer always will be limited to the extent Cf Ibid., pp 89-116 28 This has been started Cf A N Halter and H H Jack, "Toward a Philosophy of Science for Agricultural Economic Research," J Farm Econ., Feb 1961 2Wm Oliver Martin, The Order and Integration of Knowledge (Ann Arbor: Univ Mich Press, 1957), p 76 This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS BSFRARCH-DISCUSSION 1471 that theory theory is is known known to to explain explainthe thefacts facts.To Tothis thisthe thecritic critic might might reply reply that people people were were building buildingbridges bridgeslong longbefore beforetheoretical theoreticalphysics physics was was known known To To which which II would wouldreply: reply:Not Notonly onlydid didsome someofofthe thebridges bridges colcollapse, as as they they do today, today, but butthen thenthere therewasn't wasn'tananengineering engineering association association to tell tell us us that that engineers engineers are arethe thebest bestequipped equippedtotosolve solveour our"bridge "bridge buildbuilding" problems problems DISCUSSION: THE IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH W B BACK Oklahoma State University Robert Hooke, scientist and astronomer who constructed the compound microscope, set down the purpose of the Royal Society as "to improve the knowledge of natural things, and all useful Arts, Manufactures, Mechanick Practices, Engines and Inventions by experiments-(not meddling with Divinity, Metaphysics, Moralls, Politicks, Grammar, Rhetoric or Logick)." The New York Times, July 31, 1960 Halter has developed a classification useful in describing methodological viewpoints of science, but of little value for identifying problems in agricultural economics research In discussing his paper, I consider it necessary to defend the philosophy of Northrop, the views expressed by the subcommittee of the Social Science Research Council Committee on Agricultural Economics, hereafter called the subcommittee, and eco- nomics The subcommittee recommended: "A careful study of agricultural economics by agricultural economists An analysis of the intellectual efforts of agricultural economists in the frame of reference of F S C Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities."' Halter's paper could be interpreted as an effort to contribute to this objective, except he chose not to develop his analysis in the frame of reference of F S C Northrop Furthermore, the parts of his paper dealing with ideas of Northrop indicate he and I have a different understanding of this frame of reference What is the frame of reference of Northrop? I believe the main characteristic of Northrop's frame of reference is a philosophical method for resolving ideological conflicts underlying problems of value within or among societies or problems of method in the sciences I interpret his method to be about as follows: (1) analyze the ideologies or viewpoints to designate the basic theoretical assumptions from which they proceed, (2) specify a common, single set of assumptions Brinegar, et al., "Reorientations in Research in Agricultural Economics," J Farm Econ., 41:618 (Aug 1959) This content downloaded from 86.59.13.237 on Tue, 17 Aug 2021 14:46:02 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms .. .PROBLEMS OF METHOD IN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH CHAIRMAN: JOHN M BREWSTEm, AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVIC THE IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH* A... before examining the subcommittee's view, let us gain some facility in applying the device by examining the view set forth in Northrop Northrop separates theory into three kinds: (1) theory of natural... study of agricultural economics by agricultural economists An analysis of the intellectual efforts of agricultural economists in the frame of reference of F S C Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences