SUCCESSFUL TERROR PREVENTION POLICY OR HAPPY FORTUITY,
AND ANYWAY How Do You KNOW?
What to Make of Counterterrorism Success Since 9/11 ?
Nearly seven years after 9/11, the war on terror has evolved into a complex and expansive government initiative Despite its growth, it suffers from poor coordination and lacks coherence, raising concerns about its operational effectiveness.
The War on Terror is characterized by a complex web of policies and measures aimed at addressing the multifaceted nature of terrorism This includes analyzing terrorist organizations, anticipating threats, and collecting intelligence to inform decision-making Key actions involve electronic monitoring, securing ports, detaining and interrogating suspected terrorists, and disrupting their funding sources Coordination with allies and pressure on states that support terrorism are also crucial, alongside efforts to prevent the connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction Ultimately, these initiatives aim to protect the United States and uphold the Constitution against all forms of threats, both domestic and foreign.
Since 2001, the United States has not experienced a successful homeland attack, despite numerous plots and attempts identified by law enforcement and intelligence agencies Notable incidents include the Richard Reid "shoe bomber" attempt shortly after 9/11 and the 2006 plot targeting Fort Dix, New Jersey Additionally, there are likely undisclosed attempts aimed at U.S territory Former officials from the Bush administration highlight the constant stream of alarming threat assessments, emphasizing the ongoing concerns about potential attacks.
The current Attorney General, Michael Mukasey, has expressed his astonishment at the severity of daily threats, highlighting the challenges posed by limited knowledge of terrorists' objectives and the vast array of potential targets, coupled with uncertainty regarding the timing, location, or method of future attacks.
2 See, e.g., Shoe Bomb Suspect to Remain in Custody, CNN.coM, Dec 25, 2001, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001[US/12/24/investigation.plane/index.html (last visited Oct 20, 2008).
3 See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Dale Russakoff, Six Charged in Plot to Attack Fort Dix,
4 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
5 See Terry Frieden, Mukasey "Surprised" by Scope of Terrorist Threats,
CNN.coM, Mar 21, 2008 available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/21/- mukasey.terrorism (last visited Oct 20, 2008).
Despite significant challenges, the U.S government's response to terrorism—both domestically and internationally—has likely prevented attacks similar to 9/11 or worse, such as one involving weapons of mass destruction While counterterrorism efforts may appear disorganized and haphazard by modern management standards, there is a potential benefit in their organic development, offering overlapping protection Friedrich Hayek highlighted that capitalism's seemingly chaotic growth is, in fact, its strength and efficiency, a notion that could also apply to the effectiveness of America's complex counterterrorism policies, especially since terrorism itself evolves opportunistically.
Despite the lack of successful attacks since 9/11, skeptics argue that it's challenging to prove causation between US counterterrorism policies and the absence of such events Alternative explanations suggest that the threat of terrorism was never as significant as perceived in the post-9/11 environment, and the likelihood of a massive follow-up attack was low Some skeptics even propose a conspiracy theory, implying that the government's overwhelming response was a pretext to expand presidential power, rather than a genuine attempt to combat terrorism.
While concerns about terrorism are valid, it's crucial to recognize that public safety isn't the sole priority; civil liberties and human rights are equally important.
6 See generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 1 (2nd ed 2006) (1944).
ASSUMPTIONS IN THE WAR ON TERROR safety gains are properly set against liberty costs, then many counterterrorism policies, programs, and institutions-Guantanamo, waterboarding, warrantless wiretapping, etc.-are not justified.
Those who conclude that safety risks from terrorism are overstated must confront skepticism regarding their stance Are they genuinely empirical skeptics weighing safety against liberty, or are they hidden moral absolutists who undervalue safety but hesitate to admit it? While Kantian moral purity is commendable, if this is their true belief, it should be openly acknowledged Most people do not adhere strictly to Kantian principles and expect safety to be balanced with civil liberties and human rights; thus, those with differing views should clearly express them.
Assumptions Behind the Assumptions in the War on Terror
M AGNITUDE AND LIKELIHOOD
In my recent review of Jack Goldsmith's The Terror Presidency for the Times Literary Supplement, I explored contentious topics like executive power and the Justice Department's torture memos Interestingly, reader feedback centered primarily on one statement I made: "Many people today believe that the terror threat is overrated; the problem is to 'manage' rather than defeat it." This perspective, while anecdotal, resonates with many, suggesting a widespread sentiment that the threat of terror may be overstated.
9 Kenneth Anderson, Going it Alone, TIMES LIT SupP (London), Dec 21 and 28,
2007, at 32-33 (reviewing GOLDSMITH, supra note 4).
Many readers have expressed their views on Goldsmith's book, arguing that while it accurately reflects his experiences, it does not represent reality They believe it highlights the government's exaggerated portrayal of risks associated with the War on Terror Consequently, despite its engaging narrative, the book fails to provide a meaningful basis for rational policy discussions.
The views expressed in Goldsmith's work reflect the prevailing elite opinion in the United States, highlighting a government still fixated on the threat of terrorism long after 9/11 Readers were intrigued by the portrayal of a government consumed by risk assessments and fears of potential attacks, yet this fascination was detached from actual policy implications Instead, they perceived the administration as an echo chamber amplifying its own irrational fears, resulting in bureaucratic hysteria Goldsmith's book was seen not as a reflection of external realities but as a glimpse into a closed world of institutional madness, where a self-referential consciousness creates its own distorted version of reality.
Effective counterterrorism policy requires thorough risk assessments, as the chosen methodology significantly influences the outcomes If government risk evaluations are consistently overstated, whether deliberately or inadvertently, the extensive resources allocated to counterterrorism may be squandered and could even hinder progress Additionally, this raises important concerns regarding the trade-offs between civil liberties and individual rights.
10 See, e.g., Bret Stephens, Global View: An Inordinate Fear of Terrorism? WALL
11 See Clive Crook, Just Brainless, Mr Bush, FT.cOM, Oct 15, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/34275ce0-7ab9-11 dc-9bee-0000779fd2ac.html (last visited Oct 20, 2008) (stating that he had read the book overnight in a single sitting, but was not especially convinced that the risks were so great as government made them out to be).
12 REMY DE GOURMONT, SIXTINE, quoted in BLAISE CENDRARS, MORAVAGINE epigraph (Alan Brown, trans., Peter Owen 1968) (1926).
13 Those seeking a good non-technical introduction to the fundamental ideas of risk, presented as intellectual history, might consult PETER L BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (John Wiley & Sons 1996); see also Kenneth Anderson, The Uses and Abuses of Risk Management: How Men Learnt to Bet Against the Gods, TIMES Lrr SUPP., (London) Feb 21, 1997 (reviewing PETER L BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (John Wiley & Sons Inc 1996)).
The Wayne Law Review suggests that the prevailing view on terrorism's threat to public safety and national security may be flawed, particularly concerning laws and regulations like the Patriot Act, surveillance measures, and airport security implemented post-9/11 Misjudging the actual risks associated with these policies could lead to catastrophic consequences.
Seven years post-9/11, American society finds itself at a unique juncture in risk assessment, where many elites—including intellectuals, academics, and politicians—believe that perceived risks are significantly overstated, potentially for political motives.
European elites and policymakers have historically approached terrorism as a manageable social issue rather than an existential threat, drawing on experiences with groups like the IRA and ETA They perceive terrorism as a form of deviancy that requires management, similar to other crime-related challenges, rather than a "war on terror." This perspective has influenced American opinion, leading to a shift in how risks are assessed in relation to terrorism.
The American public perceives the risks of terrorism as significant but feels a sense of complacency, trusting that the government is effectively addressing these threats This belief leads to a passive attitude towards prioritizing terrorism, as reflected in various public opinion surveys.
14 Not in every single instance, that is, at least not rhetorically Then-French President Jacques Chirac, in a remarkable speech during his visit to the French Strategic Air and Maritime Forces at Landivisiau in January 2006, expressed this mentality when he noted that, while "combating terrorism is one of our priorities [o]ne should not, however, yield to the temptation of restricting all defense and security-related considerations to this necessary fight " See Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, Speech During His Visit to the Strategic Air and Maritime Forces at Landividiau, L'lle Longue (Jan 19, 2006), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/- wmd/library/news/france/france-060119-elysee0l.htm (last visited Oct 20, 2008) It was unsurprisingly widely and quickly repudiated by the European political establishment.
15 See Bruce Ackerman, Response, This is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J 1871 (2004) (discussing the voluminous literature believing the "war on terror" to be absurd, and comparing European and American approaches).
16 Niall Ferguson, The War on Terror Is Not New, N.Y TIMES, Sept 20, 2001, at A3 1.
In the ongoing War on Terror, there has been a notable decline in how Americans perceive terrorism as a pressing issue This trend arises not from a belief that terrorism is unimportant, but rather from the public's confidence that the government is effectively managing the threat Consequently, citizens may overlook the complexities of a large democracy, where politicians often mirror the priorities communicated by voters As highlighted by Goldsmith, the public tends to focus on visible issues, such as false alarms, the alienation of allies, and misallocated resources, while underestimating the benefits of counter-terrorism efforts This dynamic illustrates a disconnect between perceived costs and the underlying advantages of ongoing government action against terrorism.
Assessing risk can lead us to two contrasting approaches: one focuses on the tangible methods used by the intelligence community for threat assessments, while the other delves into abstract theories related to information relevance and predictive accuracy This article emphasizes the latter approach, beginning with the fundamental dimensions of magnitude and likelihood.
John Mueller on Terrorist Threat Magnitude and Likelihood
Political scientist John Mueller asserts that the perceived risks of terrorism are significantly exaggerated, a claim that has garnered considerable attention from both media and policy circles Since the events of 9/11, he has elaborated on this thesis through numerous scholarly and policy discussions, culminating in his 2006 book, "Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate Threats."
The book presents a compelling intellectual argument regarding national security threats, emphasizing the significant danger posed by terrorism, especially the potential for catastrophic events that could impact the United States.
One month post-9/11, 85% of Americans feared another imminent attack, but by summer 2007, this concern decreased to 40% Concurrently, the percentage of citizens identifying terrorism as the nation's top issue plummeted from 46% to just 4%.
During my initial time as the first general counsel for George Soros' Open Society Institute, he introduced me to a gathering of several hundred civil society activists in Eastern Europe, highlighting the differences between two risk dimensions.
"Mr Anderson is the foundation's lawyer-he advises me of catastrophic risks of extremely low likelihood."
20 JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: How POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM (Free Press 2006).
The threat of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction is minimal, suggesting that it does not warrant a full-scale "war" on terror Instead, it should be addressed through effective policing and modest intelligence efforts, both domestically and internationally.
The policy implications of excessive counterterrorism investment are multifaceted and far-reaching A significant allocation of resources to counterterrorism efforts is often a misallocation, as it fails to strike a balance between security and liberty Furthermore, radical actions undertaken in the name of combating terrorism can be counterproductive, driving individuals to support or engage in terrorism Ultimately, the persistence of this counterproductive approach can be attributed to the political and economic interests of politicians and the "terrorism industry," which perpetuates a cycle of fear and reaction.
The desire to shift political discussions away from the lingering effects of 9/11 towards domestic issues like the economy, health care, and foreign policy concerns such as the genocide in Darfur is comforting to some Notably, Mueller, a respected political scientist and security scholar, presents sweeping claims that challenge the perception of the current threat level, prompting readers to reconsider their intuitive beliefs about security risks.
In Stendhal's "The Red and the Black," Mademoiselle Mathilde de La Mole expresses her fears of a looming Revolution and the Terror in 1830 Paris, warning her companions that they will live in perpetual fear, only to be dismissed later as mere shadows of their former selves.
John Mueller's earlier career showcased a consistent perspective on the Cold War, particularly emphasizing that the West and Reagan's responses were exaggerated This viewpoint is elaborated in his work, "Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War."
John Mueller's works, including "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons" and "The Art of a Deal: No Rewards for Iraqi Aggression," highlight his accommodationist perspective on international security, particularly during the first Gulf War His views, which emphasize a non-threatening approach to security, were evident long before the rise of Islamist terrorism and have faced criticism both during the Cold War and in contemporary discussions Critics argue that adhering to Mueller's Cold War policies could have prolonged the conflict, suggesting that his framework may not align with current geopolitical realities.
ASSUMPTIONS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
" In general, terrorism, particularly international terrorism, doesn't do much damage when considered in almost any reasonable context
" The likelihood that any individual American will be killed in a terrorist event is microscopic.
" Just about any damage terrorists are likely to be able to perpetrate can be readily absorbed To deem the threat an
"existential" one is somewhere between extravagant and absurd
Addressing the terrorist threat often leads to self-inflicted harm, as the costs of response typically exceed those of the attacks themselves, ultimately providing terrorists with the validation and attention they seek.
" Chemical and radiological weapons, and most biological ones as well, are incapable of perpetrating mass destruction.
* The likelihood that a terrorist group will be able to master nuclear weapons any time soon is extremely, perhaps vanishingly, small
While the possibility of further terrorist attacks in the United States exists, the absence of such incidents since 2001 may be attributed to a lack of significant international terrorist presence within the country.
" Policies that continually, or even occasionally, focus entirely on worst-case scenarios (or worst-case fantasies) are unwise and can be exceedingly wasteful.
" In fact, much, probably most of the money and effort expended on counterterrorism since 2001 (and before, for that matter) has been wasted.
" Seeking to protect all potential targets against terrorist attack is impossible and foolish In fact, just about anything is a potential terrorist target.
" Terrorism should be treated essentially as a criminal problem calling mainly for the application of policing methods, particularly in the international sphere, not military ones.
Terrorism poses a relatively limited threat, suggesting that an effective policy should focus on enhancing our capacity to absorb its immediate impacts and reduce its long-term effects, while also maintaining support for international policing initiatives, especially abroad.
This recitation serves as a comprehensive overview of skeptics' claims regarding the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups It notably reassures us that the likelihood of such groups acquiring nuclear capabilities in the near future is "vanishingly small." However, it raises the question of whether we should fully trust these assertions.
Mueller argues that international terrorism, including events like 9/11, inflicts minimal damage when assessed in a broader context He suggests that the perceived threat and impact of transnational terrorism are exaggerated by both government narratives and what he terms the "terrorism industry."
Moral Agency Constraints on Agentless Risk Comparisons
Opportunity cost is a key factor in making relevant comparisons, particularly within the framework of homo economicus instrumentalism However, it's essential to recognize that moral constraints also play a significant role in determining what constitutes a relevant comparison.
The moral evaluation of harm differs significantly based on intentionality and human agency, as intentional actions carry criteria of culpability that unintentionally caused harm does not Mueller's criteria for assessing likelihood and magnitude notably include natural disasters like lightning strikes, earthquakes, and asteroid impacts, which may, in some cases, result in greater overall harm than terrorism While accepting Mueller's death toll figures, it's essential to recognize that societies face complex cost-benefit analyses regarding the prevention of unpredictable natural events The opportunity cost considerations relevant to social harm apply equally to these natural occurrences.
Despite efforts to mitigate various harms, society perceives a moral distinction between unintentional and intentional human agency harms, influencing the allocation of resources towards each This observation highlights the moral identity prevalent in our society As the neoconservative democracy project faltered, liberals chose to embrace a more cynical realism instead of reclaiming idealistic values, a shift reflected in the perspectives of figures like Mueller and Fallows This transition underscores a broader critique of the political landscape and its implications.
Kenneth Anderson discusses "new liberal realism" in his works, notably in "Goodbye to All That: A Requiem for Neoconservatism," where he critiques the evolution of neoconservative thought (22 AM U INT'L L REV 277, 293-98, 2007) Additionally, he examines U.S counterterrorism policy and its alignment with international human rights norms in "U.S Counterterrorism Policy and Superpower Compliance with International Human Rights Norms" (30 FORDHAM INT'L L J 455, 466-70, 2007).
31 Meaning, more or less, that it can be easily graphed.
In the context of the War on Terror, moral evaluations often involve resource tradeoffs that prioritize non-moral consequences while also considering the moral rights and duties of individuals Although some may argue for a strictly consequentialist approach, it is evident that our moral reasoning encompasses a broader perspective that includes deontological principles and psychological convictions.
Mueller's analysis highlights that society does not strictly adhere to consequentialist principles in everyday public life, particularly in the realm of criminal justice Even outside the context of terrorism, his insights raise questions about the allocation of resources, such as funding for murder cases, which could be more effectively utilized for child vaccination or healthcare This examination of our criminal justice system reveals its inefficiencies and challenges the justification of its resource expenditures While Mueller employs a consequentialist framework to critique the war on terror, it underscores a broader ethical debate regarding the rationality and morality of our resource distribution in public safety and justice The consequentialist perspective argues that we must also consider the long-term implications of neglecting crime prevention and investigation.
Mueller's analysis of the war on terror primarily focuses on the direct costs and benefits, neglecting the secondary and tertiary impacts that could arise He limits his discussion to a straightforward comparison of the primary costs of the war versus the potential benefits of reallocating those resources Additionally, he does not explore how his argument could extend to various social programs or instances of justice, which often seem unjustifiable unless one acknowledges a societal commitment to the concept of justice itself The pursuit of justice for its own sake is not just a sociological observation; it is a moral imperative While Mueller may argue that he is only addressing surplus resources, the broader implications of his argument deserve further consideration.
For a clear and accessible introduction to fundamental concepts in moral philosophy, such as consequentialism and deontology, refer to Lawrence B Solum's Legal Theory Lexicon, which can be found at http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/.
The Wayne Law Review discusses counterterrorism, highlighting that the arguments presented are not uniquely applicable to the war on terror This raises concerns that the reasoning may be overly broad, potentially weakening the foundations of any justice system that relies on agent culpability.
Society often allocates excessive resources to unproductive endeavors due to an irrational attachment to justice, a notion that pure consequentialists might argue While Mueller specifically critiques the war on terror for its irrational consumption of social resources, he overlooks the broader implications of his argument, which could apply to any institution driven by intentionality, guilt, or justice His stance implies that rationality requires a consequentialist viewpoint, yet a more accurate perspective is that we function as permissive deontologists, acknowledging consequences without being entirely bound by them.
Mueller Proving Too Much About Chemical and Biological
Comparisons of Moral Rights and Non-Moral Consequences? 525 B The Limits of Opportunity Cost Comparison: The Special
CONCLUSION: OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS
This essay has made three over-arching points.
US counterterrorism responses, whether termed counterterrorism policy or a war on terror, are fundamentally influenced by underlying assumptions, particularly the cost-benefit analysis that shapes operational strategies.
Second, cost benefit analysis itself depends upon further assumptions These further assumptions have a large impact on the
60 See RUTH CHANGE, INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL
In the context of the War on Terror, the assumptions underlying cost-benefit analysis present challenges in comparing policy options amid risk and uncertainty Unlike financial analyses in the private sector, which can simplify comparisons to monetary values, the social and political landscape is characterized by diverse and plural values that resist such reduction This complexity complicates the effort to ensure that analyses are truly comparable, highlighting the limitations of traditional analytical frameworks in addressing multifaceted societal issues.
Cost-benefit analysis offers valuable insights for moral decision-making regarding responses to terrorism, but it often does not conclude the ethical debate for many in American society People tend to adopt a 'permissive deontologist' stance on intentional acts like murder and terrorism, prioritizing justice over strict cost considerations Consequently, we allocate significant resources to combat crime, a practice that cost-benefit analysis might not fully justify This inclination extends to counterterrorism efforts, where arguments suggesting excessive resource allocation could similarly apply to the criminal justice system's focus on ordinary crime.
Cost-benefit analysis often oversimplifies complex social values by relying on the concept of 'commensurability,' which assumes that diverse societal values can be reduced to a single measure This analysis depends on the comparison of 'opportunity costs,' which are only valid if they reflect genuine social choices available in our current context When opportunity costs are based on unrealistic or politically unfeasible alternatives, their relevance diminishes significantly, highlighting the limitations of cost-benefit arguments that do not consider the actual social landscape.
This essay has focused on the writings of one particular analyst, John Mueller, and his book Overblown, as an example of the deeply flawed
The Wayne Law Review critiques the use of cost-benefit analysis, arguing that citing "Overblown" as a case study exemplifies a flawed strawman argument While the book has garnered attention from influential journalists and policy analysts, such as James Fallows, it lacks the rigorous analysis expected from serious academic discourse on cost-benefit analysis This essay does not intend to position "Overblown" as a representative example of the field, as it falls short of the depth and seriousness required for a comprehensive understanding of cost-benefit analysis.
Overblown highlights the fundamental mistakes that can occur when the underlying assumptions of cost-benefit analysis are overlooked, particularly in its simpler forms This essay aims to clarify the nuanced limitations of cost-benefit analysis in the context of counterterrorism, rather than dismissing its value It emphasizes the importance of carefully defining and articulating the factors involved to ensure that comparisons made are truly valid and relevant to counterterrorism policies.
America's approach to terrorism appears to prioritize cost-benefit analysis over the complete eradication of its perpetrators Rather than allocating significant resources to prevent terrorist acts, it seems to focus on managing the consequences instead.
"center around creating the potential to absorb its direct effects," and
The boldness of the claim, which reached radical conclusions through cost-benefit analysis, highlights both the capabilities and limitations of the method, as well as the assumptions it relies upon While there are sophisticated applications of this method in counterterrorism, examining simpler, less methodologically rigorous examples can often provide valuable insights However, it is essential to recognize that while critiques may arise, the fundamental value of cost-benefit analysis should not be dismissed entirely.
A crucial observation regarding cost-benefit analysis, especially in the context of terrorism and counterterrorism, highlights the significance of its underlying assumptions Understanding these assumptions is essential for effectively applying cost-benefit analysis to the complexities of security measures and their impacts on society.
61 See MUELLER, supra note 20; see, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note I.
62 See generally Declaring Victory, supra note 30; Act as if Mueller Is Right, supra note 30.
63 See MUELLER, supra note 20, at 5.