SUBSTANCE_DUALISM_AND_THEOLOGICAL_ANTHRO

SUBSTANCE DUALISM AND THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY A Theological argument for a Simple view of Persons Joshua R Farris University of Brisol Abstract Presently, there remains an aversion for substance dualism in both philosophical and theological literature However, there has been a renewed interest in substance dualism within philosophical literature In the present article, I advance substance dualism as a viable position that persuasively accounts for the Scriptural and theological data within Christian thought I make a specific argument in favor of a metaphysically simple substance Along the way, I note the overlap between the philosophical and theological literature and suggest that a simple soul as substance is a metaphysical presupposition grounding the data But that which is intelligible and without dimension is neither contracted nor dispersed, she said Contraction and dispersal are proper to bodies The soul, however, is equally present according to its own invisible and incorporeal nature at the aggregation of the elements into the body and at their segregation (Gregory of Nyssa, On The Soul and the Resurrection, chapter 2, 47) Introduction In the contemporary literature on theological anthropology there is an aversion for both substance ontology and substance dualism on the grounds that the Christian Scriptures presume a relational and monistic ontology.1 I seek to respond to this general aversion by offering some persuasive lines of reasoning that provide the foundations for Scripture and theological construction In this way, I show that we have good philosophical reasons for a simple view of persons (which I suggest is likely a soul) that shape and form both our reading of Scripture and basic theological development Assuming we not have good defeaters for a simple substance Most notable is Joel Green in Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2008) view, I argue we have good reasons to affirm it as a theological position within Christian theology I address some of the philosophical evidence corresponding to the Scriptural and theological desiderata I this for two reasons First, coming from the epistemic standpoint of phenomenal conservatism, I take it that we have prima facie evidence for human beings being a particular kind of thing Second, I take it that a natural reading of Scripture’s teachings on the self (assuming God has revealed truth that corresponds to naturally revealed truth) will either yield the same conclusions or be made sense of in light of this foundational material I work through the literature on personal identity arguing in favor of a ‘simple‘ view, which probably entails a soul view (however, one could affirm an absolutely simple material particle) Third, I work through the theological literature on human persons and argue in favor of a simple substance view as satisfying the theological data In this way, relational and functional views, arguably, presuppose simple substance.2 I suggest that there is a good deal of overlap between the theological and philosophical literature Why Accept Substance Dualism as a Theological Position? I offer three reasons for accepting substance dualism and specifically the idea that I am a simple thing I give a reason from my knowledge by acquaintance and two arguments The first argument is from the simplicity of the self; the second is an argument for my being simple and not identifiable with the material aggregate I call my body Notice, I am not making an explicit argument for the ‘image’ nor am I specifying its nature I suggest that I have a basic and direct experience of myself.3 I am simple and absolute because I cannot be broken down into parts I cannot be reduced to my essential constituents or properties I am the kind of thing that exists in and through my thinking and the stages of my bodily existence I am fully present at each stage of my existence I know this through introspection I know when something is crawling on my arm as I am thinking about myself I know that if I were to lose one limb I would still be me Even if I lose part of my brain it seems that plausibly, I still exist If I were to lose my memory of past events this would in no way nullify my existence I know that I would still exist because distinct memories are not essential to my being who I am I know that I am not as an inference of my thinking, but as a precondition of my thinking When I think upon anything, it presupposes a thing thinking f I am thinking about eating a burrito or a pizza, then I have knowledge by acquaintance—with myself and my thinking According to my phenomenal seemings, I exist at every point through change and there is a property of self-presentation that bears itself at every moment of my conscious existence The point is that I have a kind of existence that is absolute and simple The nature I have undergirds thinking and bodily existence Stewart Goetz and E.J Lowe have put forth an argument, in keeping with the intuitions above, in favor of a simple self not dependent on the material body or non-essential properties This is an argument from intuition Goetz has argued elsewhere that one’s consciousness of See Roderick Chisholm, “The Problem of The Criterion,” The Foundations of Knowing (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 61-75 Chisholm develops this notion of ‘seeming’ more fully Also see Chris Tucker, “Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology” in Evidence and Religious Belief Ed By Kelly James Clark and Raymond J VanArragon (Oxford: OUP, 2011), chapter 4 Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (Lasalle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1979), chapter Chisholm offers a very convincing argument in favor of our being directly acquainted with our self through having an individual proposition that uniquely identifies the person From this basis we are able to individuate I am able to individuate myself and others What I have done here is asserted that I have direct acquaintance with my self, which seems to be a natural perception Furthermore, it seems this is the common sense view of self actual states of affairs grounds the intuitive logic of possibility.5 His argument is essentially this: 1) I am essentially a simple entity (having no parts that can be separated 2) A physical body is essentially complex, and, thus, has parts able to be separated 3) The Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals This principle says that for identity to take place x must have every property had by y, and the same goes that y must have every property had by y 4) Therefore, on the basis of these premises, I am not identical with my (or any) physical body It is still possible I am a proper part of my body or depend on some minimal bodily composition or something of the sort.6 This is possible from this argument, but if there is a distinct kind of thing thinking and thinking is not material it is more likely I am a non-material thing over and against a proper physical part of my body.7 A more modest argument, which might be accepted as promising by a wider audience, is an argument from replacement To indicate that I am a distinct kind of thing that has a simple nature not dependent on the material body I refer to the argument called the replacement argument given by Alvin Plantinga Plantinga argues along these lines: I am a substance, but if I am a physical substance I would be a proper part of my physical body, composed of my body or collocated with my body I am not my body or a proper physical part of my body I am not composed of my body or collocated with my body Therefore, I must be an immaterial kind of thing Plantinga offers some thought experiments to bring out this argument He begins by asking Stewart Goetz, ‘Modal Dualism: A Critique’, in Soul, Body and Survival (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 89-104 E.J Lowe, “Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self” in Soul, Body and Survival (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 139-158 Lowe gives an argument for my being a simple self that leaves open the possibility that I am minimally dependent on part of my body The problem with Lowe’s ontology of human persons is that it leaves no place for Near Death Experiences or the intermediate state wherein the self can exist apart from the body This is problematic I will take this issue up later in the dissertation Goetz, 102 Goetz in discussing the possible conclusions of the argument mentions this possibility that I could be a physical proper part Being aware of one’s simplicity is a strong intuition It is not my intention to look at all that has gone into this discussion or the whole of the discussion in this one essay Alvin Plantinga, “Against Materialism” in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology vol II: Providence, Scripture, and Resurrection ed by Michael Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) Originally published in Faith and Philosophy, vol 23 (2006) the question, if I am a physical thing what kind of physical thing am I? The argument begins with an intuition conceiving possibility; that I have the property possibly to exist when B (my body) does not.9 We know from experience that surgeons can replace organs with new organs We know from the present state of medicine that this is possible We know of people who have had liver, heart, knee, hip, ankle, and lung replacements What about my brain? Can I exist apart from my brain? It seems at least conceivable that I am distinct from my brain, and possibly could exist apart from my brain 10 It seems possible that I could exist with all my bodily parts destroyed and I still exist 11 If this is possible, I cannot be identical with the whole of my body that I presently have or the composition of my body Then Plantinga asks the question of speeding of the process of replacing each part of my body down to the cellular level at a rapid pace Would the rate change my being modally distinct from my body and all the body’s parts? It seems not If these are possibilities at a much slower pace, why should it matter if the rate is much faster? Plantinga’s point is that it is likely that we are not identical with our bodies, nor parts of bodies compose or collocate with our bodies.12 At the end of the day this seems plausible If these arguments work, we have reason to reject various forms of materialism, in favor of the view that human persons are a soul with a body.13 These arguments listed above give some grounds for thinking that persons are not material things, identified with a physical part, or composed of material things, but is a different kind of thing This kind of thing has different persistence conditions than material kinds of things and are distinct from the other It is important for my purposes to establish a prima facie case in favor of substance dualism Any Ibid, 388 Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, chapter and New Appendix C This is one version of the argument for substance dualism from modality It fits very well with the argument from replacement with respect to conceivability and modality 11 Alvin Plantinga, “Against Materialism,” 388-389 12 Ibid, 390-391 13 For a useful cataloguing of these arguments and others like these see Moreland in The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (London, UK: SCM Press, 2009) 10 philosophical or theological anthropology ought to accept the notion that the human substance or soul as substance is a simple immaterial thing.14 I believe this is not only philosophically true but also assumed in the Scriptural portrayal of man Hence, this provides a basis for approaching the Scriptures Additionally, if my basic experiences interface with that of the text of Scripture and accords with the traditional understanding, then we have additional justification for affirming a theological notion of persons as simple souls PHILOSOPHICAL, BIBLICAL, and THEOLOGICAL DESIDERATA Personal Identity I begin the approach to theological anthropology by considering some of the philosophical foundations It seems to me that a particular conception of personal identity undergirds and grounds a Scriptural and theological understanding of persons In the following, I address the philosophical literature on personal identity and I argue in favor of the simple view It is common within the literature to read of four views on personal identity, namely the body view, brain view, the memory or character view, and the simple view 15 16 The views other than the simple view are not sufficient for personal identity, but have their place in both philosophical and theological developments of persons Later in the discussion, I suggest that each view helpfully relates to the simple view in two ways, but that a simple/soul view (as I 14 Again, this is the most common view throughout history and Ecclesiastical history The notion that the person or soul is a simple immaterial thing is not foreign to Ecclesiastical history In fact it is very common among the Patristics and the Medeivals For one very thoughtful example see Gregory of Nyssa in Soul and the Resurrection, trans Catharine P Roth (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002), 40-44 15 Consider a few resources in the literature on personal identity John Perry, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company; 1978) James Baillie, Problems in Personal Identity (New York, NY: Paragon Publishing; 1993) John Perry, ed., Personal Identity (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press; 2008) David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics (Toronto, Ontario: Broadview; 2009) 16 Apart from the simple view the others seem to presuppose a relational ontology, generally speaking describe it) provides the pre-conditions for theological anthropology First, each view helps fill out a more comprehensive picture of persons Second, each view provides evidential support for identifying one soul over another soul I will look at each view in turn and offer reasons why I not accept it as sufficient for personal identity The first position is known as the ‘body view’, which is often associated with Aristotle.17 The bodily criterion for personal identity is the view that persons are identified with their bodies or with a bodily constitutional relation Broadly speaking, the view does not say that I identify with one aspect of my body or one physical part connected with my body In fact the ‘I’ is a linguistic reference for the body or biological organism Alternatively and related to this, one could say that the body constitutes and makes me—me.18 Thus, I am my body This is one popular view held by philosophical and theological physicalists, respectively.19 A helpful illustration of the intuitive problems found with the body view or some similar view is seen in the Harry Potter books In book two, The Chamber of Secrets and book seven Deathly Hallows J.K Rowling introduces the reader to the polyjuice potion This potion can turn one’s body into the body of another by simply dropping the hair of the organism into which the person attempts to transform Added to this, I could conceive of a similar state of affairs Lets say my wife of years had massive cosmetic surgery in order to take on the tone of voice, the face, and the body of Giselle Bundchen Would this then make my wife Giselle Bundchen? Not at all You might press the conceivability of the state of affairs further wherein scientists could change the DNA of a person - in this case my wife’s DNA Would she then cease 17 A similar view is called Animalism See Eric T Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 18 See David Shoemaker’s Personal Identity and Ethics (Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press, 2009), chapter Also see David DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 19 A monist of a sort that is not a materialist could hold this if he held that there is something more fundamental to matter and non matter The body might be of this sort of thing This is beyond what we normally think of as a body, though On this kind of view, physical matter would be more than gunk, physical-stuff and chemicals to be the person I once married? I not believe so We know from the intuitive reasons given above, and the arguments from the previous section, that a person is not strictly identical with her body, bodily constitution or her own biological organism I wish to mention one problem, which is the problem of the persistence of identity It is difficult to see how persistence in and through time works on a bodily/bodily constitution view The body changes every day and takes on new cells; it seems that it is in fact not the same body after a phase of time The idea of personal identity with the body rubs against some basic intuitions about personal identity Intuitively, from our basic experience of the self, I am something distinct from my body in virtue of the persistence conditions of the self I realize that materialists affirming something like a body view have responses to this sort of problem, but it appears that the materialist must trade in what is an obvious given for what is a confused and complex notion of personhood Why should one be inclined to reject what is given for what is confused and complex? There is no pre-philosophical or intuitive reason for doing so even if materialists can offer a coherent explanation for the above-mentioned intuitions.20 A second common materialist view of personal identity is the view often termed the ‘brain view’ The brain view is similar to the bodily criterion view because persons are identical to a material object It seems very natural indeed for proponents of materialism to link the self or the linguistic ‘I’ with the brain on the basis that the brain is responsible for much of the “goings on” in the biological organism, e.g body.21 The ‘brain view’ is the view that the person identifies with the brain in a holistic sense or identifies with some aspect of the brain, say, the cerebral cortex, wherein the brain controls the functioning of the rest of the body—call this the ‘control center’ Here again philosophers seem to assume a linguistic reference ‘I’ as identical with the 20 This is not a sufficient refutation for denouncing these versions of the bodily view, but they are reasons I am putting forth here It is not my intention to offer a full-proof case against these positions here 21 Peter Van Inwagen in Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), chapter 15 brain controlling the body This, as well, seems to have problems Let me ask a couple of questions and explicitly draw out the implicit answers of those questions Am I a brain? Do brains think? At first glance these two questions seem very odd The question “Am I a brain?” seems to immediately imply a response of “no;” but I have a brain The second question seems very odd as well, “Do brains think?” This is unusual in itself It seems that a brain does not seem to think Usually, when speaking of thinking we refer to a person doing the thinking We could say it this way, “I use my brain to think.” This seems much more natural I can hardly imagine what it means for a brain to think It is similar to someone saying, “Hand picks up the cup.” A hand may pick up a cup, but it is someone’s hand picking up the cup I use my hand to pick up the cup As a result, the brain view will not work as a satisfactory view of personal identity, either 22 The memory or character theory of personal identity is a third and prominent view Historically, the memory and/or character continuity theory is associated with John Locke.23 Ultimately, I think these two views are one view but could be distinguished one from the other I will take each in turn and critique both the memory and character views as one set Proponents of this theory might come from the camp of materialism/physicalism or from the position that persons are immaterial kinds of things A noticeable difference between this view and the previous two views is that personal identity, according to the memory-character theory, is not, and cannot be reducible to some physical thing This requires a materialism of a non-reductive sort The memory or character view of personal identity associates the person with his memories or character The idea is that the person cannot be strictly identified with a physical thing or a 22 See John Foster, The Immaterial Self: A Defence of a Cartesian Conception of the Mind (New York: Routledge Publishing, 1991) 23 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed by Roger Woolhouse (London: Penguin Publishers, 1997) physical part, but personhood itself must be more than a physical kind of thing Personhood must be something of a non-physical kind, namely, thoughts and memories Arguably, then, mental items comprise personhood, and these are continuous with one another 24 It is not unusual for philosophers to associate the character theory with the memory theory Similar to the memory view it states that personal identity is found in the connection between the mental states/properties that make up the character in question with present mental states/properties The similarity is that there is a continuous link of memory states or character states that comprise the person On the character continuity theory of personal identity a person identifies with his or her character states These are states of being the person has For example, Johnny exists as a person with the state of being irresponsible because by not paying his bills Johnny conditions habits of irresponsibility Another example, Sammy has the character state of developing a weak will with respect to alcohol This is so because Sammy has in times past given in one too many times to having an excess of drinks One can see this in a thought experiment Consider person A, who lives a long life full with memories of himself in family, in school, and at work Person A is fully aware of his past life and experiences day after day He believes he exists day after day somehow connected to the past events that he recalls in his memory Consider Person B, Person B wakes up one day after having surgery on his brain When he awakens he has the exact thoughts and memories of Person A This is verifiable because the memories and thoughts of both Persons A and B are identical in historical recall Person B has no recollection of having thoughts or memories of a pervious person or historical accounting of another person he just thinks as if he has been Person A Hence a problem with the memory view because we know that Person A is not Person B The 24 It seems that this almost assumes a kind of event-ontology preceding a substantial ontology, possibly This view requires a causal/relational link between memories It is also, arguable, that this view really is a materialist view of persons at all There is no relation made to the body/brain, but to mental items 10 manner of one’s thinking does not necessitate the reality of the situation My belief that I have climbed Mount Everest does not mean that I have done so My memory is not sufficient for personhood, although, it might be helpful for evidentiary reasons Memory plays a large role in the formation of personhood and as such it offers a great deal of evidential support for the reality this person is this person and not that other person 25 The character view does not, at least immediately, run into the same problems as the memory view The character view avoids the subjective criterion found in the memory view by requiring states of affairs to comprise personhood Character states comprise the person, and cannot be as easily altered or manipulated as seen with memories.26 Having said this, both seem to run into the problem of fully satisfying our common-sense ideas and intuitions about human persons Intuitively, it is wrong to identify persons as a bundle of memories Instead when we think and speak of human persons owning memory and developing character states we speak as if there is a person or a thing owning the memories and having the character states, thus it seems that both views are unsatisfying 27 Although these views are insufficient for personal identity they still have a place in the discussion on personal identity For example, the bodily-continuity view might count as empirical evidence for the reality of the same person/soul Also theologically, it has a role in accounting for the resurrected body 25 Recall the classic example of Thomas Reid’s Whipping Boy See Thomas Reid’s “Of Mr Locke’s Account of Our Personal Identity in Personal Identity ed by John Perry (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2008), chapter 26 Consider Personal Identity ed by John Perry, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008) Perry, John A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978) Baillie, James Problems in Personal Identity (New York: Paragon, 1993) 27 Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul: Revised Ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), chapter and Also, a useful argument is found in Swinburne’s essay entitled “Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory” in Metaphysics: The Big Questions ed by Peter Van Inwagen and Dean W Zimmerman (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Press, 1998) 11 Next the memory-character continuity view has a place in theological discussion Like bodily-continuity it has a place of supporting the belief in a person as a particular person.28 It also has a role in the development of souls/persons The memories we have from our past shape and form the quality of life we have Character states have a positive role in human flourishing If an individual substance is obeying God he will have a more enjoyable and flourishing life, as promised in Scripture in contrast to those who continue in patterns of unrighteousness 29 Fourth, the defender of the simple or ‘soul’ view identifies persons with souls 30 The simple view is distinguishable from various materialist constructions of human persons and the memory-character view of human persons On the variation of the simple view I advance for theological purposes, I take it that persons are identical with a soul or an immaterial mental thing.31 In this case, I am distinct from my body, my brain, and the memory-character view In keeping with the arguments given earlier, I take it that I as a person must exist for mental items to exist, memories, and states of character The simple view, I offer, of persons says that persons are not reducible to a material object and are not a bundle of properties (as on the memorycharacter view) Persons are irreducibly simple, as argued above from phenomenology, introspection (the simple argument) and conceivability and replacement (the replacement argument).32 Some of the benefits that follow from the simple view include the feature of 28 The Evolution of the Soul, chapter See Swinburne develop a similar argument Jerry L Walls, Heaven (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 111 Walls makes this argument when speaking of personal identity in the afterlife within the context of Trinitarian identity and relational ontology 30 A person may hold to a proper physical part or something of the sort and does not have to hold to the soul view as synonymous with the simple view Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul: Revised Ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), chapter and See also Swinburne, Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory Also E.J Lowe’s essay entitled “Identity, Composition and the Simplicity of the Self” in Soul, Body and Survival (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001) 31 A materialist could develop a simple view by saying that ‘I’ exist somewhere in my brain as a simple self that is not divisible For reasons I have already mentioned I not accept a materialist view of persons because it requires rejecting what is most apparent or what is an experiential given 32 This can be brought out be distinguishing intrinsic properties and relational properties Intrinsic properties are those properties that are essential to the substance and are constituents of its essence Relational properties are nonessential properties 29 12 independence, endurance, and absolute identity The philosophical benefits overlap with and parallel what we find in theological literature on persons To this we turn.33 The distinct features of the simple view of personhood include independence and the endurance of the substantial soul The soul is independent with respect to non-dependence for the soul’s identity on anything else The soul has a kind of identity not dependent on or reducible to other properties or substances The soul precedes its properties in some sense, thus having a kind of independence from them Next the soul is an enduring kind of thing It endures through time If the soul were a bundle of properties that fluctuates, then identity would fluctuate, or so it seems On a simple view, predicating properties, and identity of the thing is possible It has a stable kind of identity that does not fluctuate according to the various sortal-phases it encounters Sortal-phases are non-essential properties wherein a substance exists in and through various moments of existence.34 Theologically this is important in accounting for human persons in general as well as individual persons in particular A simple substance exists in and through the various stages of time as substantially the same thing On this view the person is still the same person even when going through various phases of existence Predicating properties of a person at two different phases of existence is possible For example, John may exist with a full head of hair at one phase, yet persist as the same person while losing his hair As a metaphysical simple, John is able to exist at differing phases When persons encounter the Scriptures for theological development, the simple view seems to make sense of one’s reading of Scripture It is not my brain or even eyes that read the Scriptures, but it is I that persists absolutely through the stages of my reading various aspects of 33 With the simple view one is able to say that persons can be numerically identical through change, yet can change qualitatively 34 I have written a similar section surveying personal identity with some distinctions in application as a part of a completely different argument in a purely philosophical context elsewhere See Joshua Farris, “The Soul-Concept: Meaningfully Embrace or Meaningfully Disregard,” Annales Philosophici (2012), 64-67 13 Scripture This, then, is presupposed in our reading of Scripture and provides other theological benefits Turning to the feature of independence, we find one theological benefit following the assumption of a simple view The criterion of independence has theological significance If there is an absolute self that has independence there is the possibility of predicating properties of the substance/person Theologically, one can predicate properties of goodness or badness of the individual substance in question When Paul says in Romans 6:17: “But thanks be to God that, though you used to be slaves to sin, you wholeheartedly obeyed the form of teaching to which you were entrusted You have been set free from sin and become slaves to righteousness.”35 Paul in effect is ascribing two properties to the person Once the person was a slave to sin, wrongdoing or badness, and presently the person is a slave to righteousness One is a property of badness, and the other is a property of righteousness Other properties, for instance, having wisdom and the freedom to actualize one’s latent capacities naturally presuppose the distinction of an independent substance and its properties It seems to me that a person is still the same person even if there is some significant accidental change On this view the person is substantially the same person, yet accidentally different The criterion of endurance (namely, where an entity persists substantially the same through change; an entity wholly persists through change) has theological significance, as well I will give an example here Substances, at least on this construal, have the theological advantage of identifying a substance/person in and through the stages of time Persons, again, are not reducible to properties, events, or relations In fact we can make sense of the reality that persons in redemptive history exist through sortal-phases.36 This means that in and through the 35 36 NIV, emphasis mine Swinburne, Richard The Christian God (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1995), 13-14 14 experience of time and change human persons identify with persons at differing stages of time by enduring So, Chris is a thief and swindler, but upon hearing the gospel of Jesus Christ through his friend Jerry comes to know Jesus and is no longer a thief and a swindler There is a real and important sense in which this person Chris is the same person, yet there is an important sense in which Chris is different.37 This is a view commensurate with most forms of substance dualism and the simple/soul view naturally entails substance dualism It naturally entails substance dualism because it posits a simple substantial ‘I’ that has a body My intent here is to demonstrate the philosophical truthfulness of the simple soul view as the metaphysical substance accounting for personal identity Additionally, the philosophical literature, here, seems to find many parallels with the theological literature I believe this view coheres with the nature of the theological literature on personhood and the imago Dei Theological Literature and Dualism I put forward that a soul as substance that bears the features of being simple, independent, absolute, and enduring accounts for the theological data In fact, I suggest that than overlap is present in both the philosophical literature and theological literature that buttresses one’s prima facie beliefs about herself being a simple soul as substance a Substantive Views On substance views of persons and the imago Dei, persons just are substances that bear properties In the theological literature on substance, persons are the kinds of entities that persist across time and undergird changes through the Fall, Redemption, and Glorification In this way, 37 I not think the other views of personal identity ground this important distinction allowing for change and sameness 15 there is a fact of the matter that is presumed in and through the Scriptural delineation on persons Having said this, the best accounting for these changes is not just any substance but a soul as substance as I argued above Next, I argue that souls (i.e simple immaterial substances) undergird and account for functional and relational views of persons b Functional Views Functionality has also taken the center stage having a venerable tradition of support in Ecclesiastical history.38 According to this view, persons and the imago Dei are identical to functions or pragmatic purposings and doings The passage often cited in favor of this view is Genesis 1:28, “Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it, Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground.” Notably, this is known as the Creation Mandate This is God’s command to man The argument is something like the following In the Genesis narrative immediately after God creates man in the image and likeness of God, he gave man a special work Work in the Creation Mandate includes procreation, subduing, and caring for the earth Proponents of a functional view argue that Colossians 1:15-20 support their view This text has two parallels with the Creation Mandate First, it speaks of Christ being in the “image of the invisible God.” Second, immediately following it describes Christ as being head over all creation having subdued all things—in the sphere of redemption Therefore, functionalist proponents argue that Genesis 1:26-28 and Colossians 1:15-20 teach a functional view of the imago Dei because the image is in man’s functioning most fully actualized in Christ’s functioning as head over his Church and ruler over 38 J Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005), 25-29 Gerhard von Rad is usually associated with this interpretation See Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, rev ed., trans John H Marks (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), 60 ff.; and Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, s.v.“eikon,” by Gerhard von Rad, et al., ed Gerhard Kittel, trans Geoffrey W Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 2:381-397 16 the world.39 The problem for this view is that it merely captures what man was created to do, and seems to miss what underlies functionality and other aspects of the Scriptural narrative Whether or not one assumes that the Scriptures teach a functional view of persons and the image does not mitigate against the fact that functionality presupposes substantiality In order to make sense of human beings as functional entities our phenomenological experience of the self is such that it is a substance of a particular kind Philosophically, one must make a distinction between what a thing is and what a thing does A metaphysically simple substance accounts for the person’s capacity to act at differing times and in differing ways c Relational Views Relational Views of the imago Dei abound these days The most notable proponent in history is Karl Barth.40 Trinitarian language normally follows as the chief example of the relational view The image of God is a relational reality and presupposes a relational ontology On this view, there is a strong connection between the Trinity and man’s relational nature Some suggest that the Trinity serves as a foundation for and an analogy for human relations Thus, human persons are reflective of the Trinitarian nature by their relations One specific example includes relationships one has with a spouse Human persons exemplify relational oneness and unity in a spousal relationship Arguably, humans are a finite representation of the Trinity Man and wife are in relationship They are in a deep and intimate relationship There is a kind of diversity and oneness manifest Additionally, the procreative act of bearing fruit and multiplying 39 There is another function worth noting often seen in connection with Christ’s functional position in the Trinity Christ is fulfilling his subordinate role of functioning under the Father in completing this work 40 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: III/I translated by G.W Bromiley and T.F Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936-69),183ff Also consider Barth’s The Humanity of God Translated by J.N Thomas (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1960) Also see Shults, F LeRon Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn To Relationality (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003), see especially chapter Also see Robert W Jenson’s Systematic Theology: The Works of God vol.2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch 18, “The Image of God” 17 reflects this creative action It is natural then to see this as a manifest imaging of the Trinitarian God because both the Trinity and a marital relationship reflect oneness and diversity Functional and relational views are similar to the memory-continuity view and bodily view found in the discussion over personal identity Both have a place in the discussion but are insufficient in accounting for personal identity Functional and relational views are similar in that they provide evidence for the individual substance as the memory-continuity and bodily view provide evidence for the simple view of human personhood The two views offer important data that fleshes out a fuller and more holist picture of human persons, but in themselves require and presuppose something substantial that is able to persist through change, namely a metaphysical simple.41 Relations and functions presuppose relata.42 Relational properties require and depend on substances and cannot stand on their own.43 Relations are also causally conditional and depend upon an individual’s entering the real world within a social-communal context of existing In this sense, relations are causally necessary for the substance Thus, relations are significant in the world and in an overarching theological framework.44 I as an individualized substance necessarily enter into relationships in virtue of my being a person, but this is not the same as saying relations are foundational to what and who I am.45 Additionally, functions are 41 In fact, one might argue, this logic is borne out in Genesis 1:27-28 wherein the functions and relations that occur, whether they be causal necessities or conditional realities, so as distinct from the created entity that God created There is certainly a distinction made in text between “product” or object created and the processes that that object might be involved in In this passage there is a clear chiasm common to the Hebrew Canon wherein the image of God as God created humans is connected to their being responsible for taking dominion over the earth and their being male and female is connected to being fruitful 42 A term used in ontology in reference to a thing in relation The thing in relation that is presupposed as logically necessary and ontologically prior 43 See a defense of this in Reinhardt Grossmann The Existence of the World (London: Routledge, 1992), 5157 44 This is often referred to as a traditional view of general ontology See R Harre and E.H Madden, Causal Powers (Basil: Blackwell publishing, 1975) Brian Ellis, Scientific Essentialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, and Free Will (Oxford, UK: OUP, 2013), chapter Also see E.J Lowe, Personal Agency (Oxford, UK: OUP, 2008), see especially the introduction and chapter 45 It does not seem to me that this undermines the notion that relations are not important or significant I am also not saying that there are not essential and internal relations that are part of the substance in question 18 helpful for filling and fleshing out a theological understanding of man’s purpose, but this is the subject of another article.46 In the discussion concerning persons and the imago Dei these views have another place in philosophical and theological development In recent philosophical-theological literature Jerry L Walls has argued for a relational ontology that seems to fit in line with what I argue here That is, his view is commensurate with a substantive view of the imago Dei having both stative and dynamic realities or teleological properties when discussing personal identity in his recent work Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy What is difficult in Walls treatment of personal identity in theology is his initial defense of substance ontology, he later moves to defending a relational ontology Walls argues for substance dualism at the beginning of his work.47 Then he argues in favor of a relational ontology regarding personal identity and the imago Dei in the context of speaking about the Trinity Substance ontology focuses on what a thing is internally, while relational ontology puts emphasis on external and accidental relations Thus, the two ontological descriptions are distinct In the context of further elaborating on personal identity Walls moves to a relational ontology because of the perceived connection between the imago Dei and the Trinity Walls explicitly affirms this saying, “The discussion of this section reveals that our individual identity is finally a relational matter Who we are is defined by our relationships with others.”48 After affirming this Walls later states, “only substances with certain given powers and potentialities can relate to each other in the ways we have been considering Thus, the relational account of identity complements and provides depth and texture to the ontological account of identity I discussed 46 Human beings, in Scripture, have a telos and according to the ontology here I suggest an internal teleology Walls, Jerry L Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (New York: Oxford University Press; 2002), 92-102 He draws from Colin Guntin in The One, the Three, and the Many (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) This is common parlance in more dynamic views of God, namely Process Theology and Open Theism It seems to be prevalent and growing in evangelical theological circles as well A recent treatment is found in Kevin Vanhoozer Remythologizing Theology (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 2010), see especially chapters 3, 4, and 48 Ibid, 108 47 19 earlier in this chapter.”49 What is difficult to determine is whether Walls is holding to a substantive ontology and a substantive view of the imago Dei or a relational ontology and a relational view of the imago Dei Either way, there is something insightful about his move As I stated above, both functional, and relational views have a place in fleshing out our understanding of the self Both views reveal more about the substance/person and his potentiality, all the while giving ontological priority to the substance The reality of the matter is that we can have relationships with God and other human persons in virtue of who we are, and a metaphysically simple substance seems to make sense of the various relationships we enter into A similar view to the Wall’s view is a view developed by Richard Mouw Richard Mouw in a recent article has argued for a particular philosophical anthropology in relationship to the image of God What is insightful about his article is his emphasis upon the essentials of a Christian philosophical anthropology and what is needed for the imago Dei or what is required for our covenant partnership with God (construed as a grid for understanding human composition) Richard Mouw comments that it is not so much the properties that are identical with the image of God, but the appropriate properties that actualize the image He states this: “I argued earlier that it would not simply to equate the image with the possession of such things as a soul or free will or rationality Instead, we need to ask what properties of that order are necessary in a human being if that being is to actualize the functional-relational roles and actions associated with the divine call to engage in covenant parternerships.”50 Mouw does not come down on a particular view concerning the image for the purpose of his essay is to develop the relationship between philosophical anthropology and the imago Dei What he does is lay the framework for moving in a particular direction that establishes the appropriate conditions for the 49 Ibid, 109 See Richard Mouw, “The Imago Dei and Philosophical Anthropology,” 264 In Christian Scholar’s Review Spring 2012; XLI:3 50 20 imago Dei along relational and functional lines whereby the image is a representation tied to covenant partnership in doing actions we were called to I believe this move is significant in that it recognizes the substantial nature that is necessarily presupposed in relational and functional views The view I put forth is able to give a metaphysical accounting of the imago Dei that is essentialist in nature that is grounded in an immaterial human soul as substance By extension, this satisfies the holistic nature of the imago Dei that is portrayed in Scripture affirming its immutable nature Again, the significance of the Wall’s and Mouw move is that the ‘image’ has certain metaphysical pre-requisites.51 What is significant about the Wall’s and Mouw views is that substance is required for making sense of relational and functional views Here I have made the argument that a soul as a simple substance underlies the Scriptural teaching on human beings and the theological data on human persons Conclusion In the present article, I have argued that we have a pre-philosophical conception of the self that seems to undergird and metaphysically account for both the Scriptural portrayal of human beings and the theological literature on humans In this way, I suggest that we come to the Scriptures with this pre-philosophical intuition and that there is an interface between the direct knowledge we have of self and Scriptural teaching I have also argued that the authors of Scripture assume this about themselves and others resulting in a basic hermeneutical control on our readings of Scripture 51 This is not to say that there are not substantive variations awaiting the eschaton, as we see in Eschatological or Christological views 21