S Immigration Policy
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, America's immigration policy significantly limited the ability of individuals fleeing Nazi persecution to enter the U.S This restrictive approach, rooted in laws established in the 1920s, including the Immigration Act of 1921 and the Johnson Act of 1924, drastically reduced immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe, specifically impacting countries like Poland and Russia.
43 Morse, While Six Million Died, 61
44 Hertzberg, The Jews in America, 290
Before World War I, Romania and the Baltic countries provided around 100,000 Jewish immigrants each year; however, this number drastically dropped to just 9,443 after the war In stark contrast, Germany's immigration quota was established at 51,000 annually These quota changes significantly impacted Jewish immigration patterns.
America Between 1924 and 1931 only 73,000 Jewish immigrants settled in the United States, which represents only a small fraction of the 656,000 Jews who had come between 1907 and
Between 1933 and 1937, Jewish immigration to the U.S was severely limited, with only 33,000 immigrants, primarily from Germany As conditions in Europe deteriorated, particularly due to escalating Nazi persecution and territorial expansion, the number of Jewish immigrants from Germany surged to 124,000 between 1938 and 1941 Despite this increase, restrictive immigration quotas significantly hindered Jewish migration to the U.S during a critical period when many sought refuge from Nazi oppression Additionally, a specific provision in the 1924 immigration law further obstructed Jewish immigration efforts.
Section 7 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1924 mandated that applicants provide a police certificate of good character for the past five years, a record of military service, two copies of their birth certificate, and two copies of all other available public records from their home country Although the law stipulated that these documents were required only if available, many American consuls enforced strict compliance, insisting that all necessary paperwork be submitted.
45 Feingold, The Jewish People in America, 29
46 Arthur Hertzberg, The Jews in America – Four Centuries of an Uneasy Encounter: A History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 242
47 Feingold, The Jewish People in America, 29.
48 Fishman, The Jews of the United States, 69
49 Arthur D Morse, While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy (New York: The Overlook Press, 1983),
During the period from 1933 onwards, the systematic extermination of Jewish individuals by the government severely limited the likelihood of Jews obtaining essential records This grim reality contributed to the failure to meet many of the established quotas.
In 1943, there were 1,244,858 unfilled immigration quota spots, with 341,567 designated for individuals from countries occupied by Germany or its allies Despite the logical expectation for American Jewish organizations to protest these restrictive immigration laws to aid their European counterparts, they lacked the influence necessary to persuade President Roosevelt to change the United States' immigration policy.
Jewish organizations faced significant challenges in persuading President Roosevelt to take action on immigration due to rising anti-immigration sentiment in the United States By 1938, opposition to relaxing immigration restrictions had surged, with public disapproval increasing from 75% to 83% Roosevelt was wary of alienating the labor movement, which opposed further immigration, and he sought to avoid losing support from anti-Semitic voters concerned about the number of Jews in his administration This prevailing public sentiment was mirrored in Congress, where, by 1943, there was a strong push for even stricter immigration policies As a result, Jewish organizations struggled to convince Roosevelt to raise immigration quotas amidst a climate of overwhelming anti-immigration sentiment.
51 Robert Dallek, Franklin D Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press,
52 Hertzberg, The Jews in America, 287
53 Morse, While Six Million Died, 61 and the A.J.C to the conclusion that an indirect approach to saving the European Jewry was in the best interests of American Jews.
J.C.’s Aid to European Brethren
The president of the A.J.C., Rabbi Stephen Wise, was actually against any direct Jewish action that would challenge the status of American’s immigration laws When a Jewish
Congressman Emanuel Celler from Brooklyn proposed a bill to eliminate restrictions on refugees seeking entry into the U.S., but Rabbi Wise opposed this initiative, fearing it would provoke anti-immigration sentiments and hinder potential presidential support for refugees Many Jewish leaders shared Rabbi Wise's concerns, recognizing that public opinion largely opposed foreign immigration They worried that advocating for more liberal immigration policies could exacerbate anti-Semitism and lead to stricter anti-alien laws This apprehension significantly influenced the American Jewish Committee's strategies for supporting European Jews during that period.
Before and during World War II, the A.J.C concentrated on opposing anti-Semitic laws that threatened both foreign refugees and those already in the U.S The American public's strong resistance to immigration spurred a surge of anti-alien legislation aimed at restricting immigration and enforcing alien registration Organizations such as the Alien Deportation and Exclusion League advocated for stringent deportation measures and a complete stop to immigration.
54 Hertzberg, The Jews in America, 290
55 Feingold, The Jewish People in America, 228
56 American Jewish Congress to Nathan Sand, 6 April 1939 Box 1, Folder 5 Nathan Sand Papers, 1914-1947
57 Feingold, The Jewish People in America, 229
For example, in 1941 the A.J.C publically opposed the Alien Bill H.R 4873 which stated:
Aliens interned in a foreign country during wartime are ineligible to apply for admission to the United States for one year after receiving unconditional release from their internment.
The American Jewish Committee (A.J.C.) actively advocated for legislation to allow refugees to remain in the United States, notably endorsing a 1939 bill by Senator Robert Wagner that aimed to permit 20,000 refugee children to enter the country This public support for legislation was seen as a means to assist Jews suffering under Nazi oppression However, following the U.S entry into World War II in 1941, the A.J.C shifted its focus to supporting the war effort, with Rabbi Wise asserting that an Allied victory was essential to ending Nazi terror and potentially saving countless lives.
During World War II, American Jews were hesitant to seek direct U.S intervention for the rescue of European Jewry, fearing the perception of requesting "special treatment." Instead, they believed that an early Allied victory was essential for their brethren's survival In response, the American Jewish Committee (A.J.C.) organized the United Jewish War Effort, aiming to support the Allied forces while providing relief to Britain, Russia, and China The A.J.C effectively utilized mass protest rallies to raise funds for this initiative, including a significant demonstration in July 1942 to rally support for their cause.
Hitler atrocities at the Madison Square Garden in New York City to raise awareness about the
58 Action Bulletin from American Jewish Congress to Nathan Sand, June 1941 Box 1, Folder 3 Nathan Sand Papers, 1914-1947.
59 Nathan Sand Secretary Notes, 12 March 1939 Box 1, Folder 2 Nathan Sand Papers, 1914-1947.
60 Morse, While Six Million Died, 28
61 Fishman, The Jews of the United States, 74
62 United Jewish War Effort to Nathan Sand, 1942 Box 2, Folder 4 Nathan Sand Papers, 1914-1947. plight of Jews in Europe and also raise funds for the United Jewish War Effort 63 The
M.D.A.J.C would eventually be called upon by the national office to orchestrate local rally meetings in order to also raise funds for the United Jewish War Effort
The American Jewish Committee (A.J.C.) did not directly intervene to save Jews during the Nazi era but sought to assist them through indirect means The Milwaukee Division engaged in various policies established by the A.J.C to support European Jews; however, their effectiveness was constrained by neglect and a lack of initiative, limiting their success in these efforts.
In February 1936, the M.D.A.J.C received communication from national headquarters regarding legislation aimed at permitting refugees to remain in America This marked the initial effort by the A.J.C to encourage the Milwaukee Division to adopt the organization's national policies locally In a letter from Stephen Wise to the M.D.A.J.C that year, he emphasized the importance of this initiative.
We recently requested you to take steps to promote the passage in Congress of the
The Kerr Deportation Bill (H.R 8163) is crucial for providing relief to innocent resident aliens facing deportation due to technicalities in current law It is essential for individuals who understand the urgency of this legislation to voice their opinions to their representatives.
Congress If you have not already approached your Congressman, it is not too late to do so now 64
63 Mass Demonstration Against Hitler Atrocities Flyer, July 1942 Box 2, Folder 4
64 Stephen Wise to Nathan Sand, 3 February 1936 Box 2, Folder 1 Nathan Sand Papers, 1914-1947
There is no evidence that the M.D.A.J.C engaged in a letter-writing campaign, as Nathan Sand, the secretary, maintained records of correspondence but did not show any efforts to contact Congress regarding the Kerr Bill Additionally, the organization displayed a similar lack of initiative when requested to assist in preventing the passage of anti-alien legislation.
On June 30, 1941, the M.D.A.J.C received an Action Bulletin urging them to contact their congressmen to oppose the Alien Bill (H.R 4873) This bulletin included a letter from Nathan D Perlman, Chairman of the A.J.C.’s Commission on Law and Legislation, emphasizing the importance of taking action against the proposed legislation.
We have detailed our objections to the bill and proposed specific actions to address these concerns We recommend that your organization duplicate this bulletin and distribute it to your members and other collaborating groups.
The A.J.C.'s request to contact Congress met the same lack of response as their earlier appeal, with no evidence showing that the M.D.A.J.C made any effort to reach out to their Congressmen or distribute the bulletin to their members Furthermore, the M.D.A.J.C consistently ignored the A.J.C.'s calls to establish a Committee on Law and Legislation.
On January 24, 1941 the Milwaukee Division was requested to establish a local
Committee on Law and Legislation which was to comprise qualified representatives who could
65 Action Bulletin from Stephen Wise to Nathan Sand, 30 June 1941 Box 2, Folder 1 Nathan Sand Papers, 1914- 1947.
On June 30, 1941, Nathan D Perlman communicated with Nathan Sand regarding the need for representation of the Jewish community in legal and legislative matters However, this request seems to have been overlooked, as there is no evidence suggesting that the M.D.A.J.C made any efforts to address this issue.
The Committee on Law and Legislation in Milwaukee initially overlooked the A.J.C.'s policies related to current refugee legislation However, the onset of World War II prompted them to take decisive action.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor and the U.S entry into World War II, Stephen Wise called on local A.J.C branches to support the United Jewish War Effort On June 19, 1942, Wise outlined the responsibilities of the M.D.A.J.C.
As agreed upon, the tasks of supporting the United Jewish War Effort should include: (1) Participation in the Victory Drive of the United Nations, by which we mean –
(a) the sale of War Bonds, (b) The stimulation of contributions to the American Red Cross,
D.A.J.C Aid to European Brethren
Delegates from membership organizations frequently declined to engage in the activities of the Milwaukee Division of the M.D.A.J.C., often due to their involvement in their own initiatives This lack of participation was particularly evident before and during World War II, with several organizations choosing not to send delegates to Milwaukee Division meetings Sand addressed this issue in a letter to the national headquarters, highlighting the ongoing challenge of low engagement from these membership organizations.
In 1938, Sand noted that a significant number of delegates failed to attend the executive meetings of the M.D.A.J.C., resulting in a lack of progress for the organization Although the specific reasons for their absence were not provided, it is likely that these delegates were engaged with their own organizational activities or overwhelmed with other commitments.
91 Nathan Sand to American Jewish Congress, 14 June 1940 Box 1, Folder 6 Nathan Sand Papers, 1914-1947.
92 Nathan Sand’s Secretary Notes, 27 February 1938 Box 1, Folder 2 Nathan Sand Papers, 1914-1947.
In February 1938, Nathan Sand addressed a letter to the American Jewish Congress headquarters, highlighting the tensions arising from his participation in activities organized by other Jewish organizations This correspondence, dated January 20, 1938, reflects the complexities faced by community leaders during that period.
Please be advised that we have arranged a conference for the date stated [February
On March 27, 1938, a conference was organized featuring a speaker to address critical issues However, the situation has become complicated due to the emergence of the "Jewish People’s Committee against Fascism" in Milwaukee, which has introduced new dynamics to the event.
Anti-Semitism gained momentum as it organized a competing conference on the same date as the Congress Conference, diverting delegates and bolstering its own agenda Many members of the Milwaukee Division were not fully committed to the Congress, as they were engaged in various other pursuits, resulting in a lack of dedicated participants focused solely on the Congress's work.
The Milwaukee Division struggled to fully implement A.J.C policies due to a shortage of executives dedicated to the Congress's work This issue was highlighted in a letter from Nathan Sand to Rabbi Morton M Berman, the speaker at a mass meeting held by the Milwaukee Division in December 1939.
I sincerely apologize for not being able to meet you at the station before our meeting and for not seeing you off afterwards As one of only two members of Congress involved in organizing the event, our responsibilities made it impossible for me to be there.
94 Nathan Sand to American Jewish Congress, 21 February 1938 Box 1, Folder 4 Nathan Sand Papers, 1917-1947 to attend every detail We have not enough workers in the Congress movement in Milwaukee 95
The Milwaukee Division struggled to attract dedicated individuals, likely due to its financial constraints, which diminished the incentive for active participation Volunteers, like Nathan Sand, were essential for organizing activities, as the lack of funds meant no financial rewards for commitment Additionally, the division's members may have been preoccupied with other Jewish organizations, further contributing to the limited engagement in the division's activities.
In the early 1940s, the president and chairmen of the Milwaukee Division were reportedly preoccupied with the activities of various Jewish organizations, which led to a neglect of their responsibilities within the Congress In 1941, Sand addressed the reasons behind the new president's focus on these external engagements.
M.D.A.J.C., Arthur Shutkin, did not have enough time to devote to Congress activities In a letter to the president of the Chicago Division of the Jewish Council, Sand Wrote:
A Shutkin has been appointed as chairman, but his extensive involvement in various aspects of Jewish life, including his role as State Chairman of the National Fund “Nachlath” and chairman of the Seven State District of the J.N.W.A., limits his ability to dedicate sufficient time to our organization.
It appears that many of the Milwaukee Division’s chairmen during the early 1940s were just as negligent towards the M.D.A.J.C as the organization’s president was In a letter to A.J.C
95 Nathan Sand to Rabbi Morton M Berman, 4 January 1940 Box 1, Folder 5 Nathan Sand Papers, 1914-1947.
In a letter dated May 5, 1941, Nathan Sand addressed Max A Kopstein, expressing concerns about the negligence exhibited by certain chairmen within the organization and detailing the overall condition of the M.D.J.A.C This correspondence, found in the Nathan Sand Papers from 1914 to 1947, highlights significant issues impacting the organization's effectiveness.
I now realize fully that as far as Milwaukee is concerned, we have no branch here
Mr Speidlman and Mr Weinrod, both delegates to the American Jewish Conference and leaders of the Zionist Emergency Committee, show little interest in Congress work.
Fund Council It seems that their time and effort are directed to those particular activities 97
The Milwaukee Division faced challenges in fully implementing A.J.C policies during the early 1940s due to the neglect of responsibilities by many of its chairmen This lack of focus from both members and executives contributed to the organization's struggles.
While the chairmen of the Milwaukee Division chose to prioritize other Jewish organizations, it would be inaccurate to suggest they were indifferent to the welfare of Jews both in America and internationally They believed that their time and resources could be better utilized elsewhere, possibly due to concerns over limited funding that restricted the organization’s capacity to assist effectively Ultimately, the lack of financial support and dedicated individuals significantly hindered the Milwaukee Division's ability to carry out the policies of the American Jewish Congress (A.J.C.).
97 Nathan Sand to American Jewish Congress, 19 January 1945 Box 2, Folder 7 Nathan Sand Papers, 1914-1947.
The years from 1933 to 1945 were marked by significant turmoil for Jews in Europe and the United States, particularly due to Hitler's rise to power, which heightened concerns about anti-Semitism In response, Jewish organizations in the U.S sought to unite and support their counterparts abroad However, the Milwaukee Division of the American Jewish Congress (M.D.A.J.C.) struggled to effectively combat anti-Semitic policies due to local constraints and internal issues, leading to a lack of response to national requests Their limited success stemmed from inadequate funding, as financial agreements directed resources to the national office, and a shortage of dedicated personnel caused by membership structure conflicts This context highlights the challenges faced by the M.D.A.J.C and the broader American Jewish Congress in their efforts to resist Nazi oppression.