External Evaluation of OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit

External Evaluation of OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit Final Report Elizabeth Stites Victor Tanner 21 January 2004 The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and not necessarily represent those of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Table of Contents Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations Introduction OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit This Evaluation Methodology Main Argument of the Evaluation Evaluation Findings The Unit in Context: Challenges of Internal Displacement Findings on Institutional Relationships Performance Findings Management Findings Gender Conclusions Specific Conclusions Concluding Thoughts Nine Recommendations To the Emergency Relief Coordinator To the Unit To OCHA To the Operational Agencies To the Donors Annexes Evaluation Terms of Reference List of People Interviewed List of Acronyms Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation OCHA IDP Unit Evaluation Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations In September and October 2003, a team of two independent external consultants (‘the team’) evaluated OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit (‘the Unit’) They conducted interviews with a wide array of informants in Geneva, Rome, Belgrade, Prishtina, Nairobi, Kinshasa, Goma, London, Kabul, New York and Washington, DC The two case studies selected by OCHA and the Unit were Serbia and D.R Congo, with additional fieldwork in Nairobi and Kabul In keeping with its independent nature, the evaluation’s conclusions are to be self-standing and public All interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis Findings Challenges the Unit Faces It is necessary to place the findings of this evaluation in context Many of the difficulties faced by the Unit reflect broader and more systemic problems: the inherent difficulties dealing with internal displacement, systemic failings of the UN system, problems OCHA itself has experienced over the past years, and finally the Unit’s difficulties are those of every new entity trying to show added-value yet stay focused Institutional Relationships The Unit has suffered from a number of fraught institutional relationships  Partners on the Senior Network complain of meetings that revolve around a one-way flow of after-the-fact information, of lack of dialogue and lack of consultation  Strong currents of opinion exist within OCHA headquarters that the internally displaced are OCHA’s business and that Unit activities should be mainstreamed  The Unit’s most valuable asset is its direct link to the ERC, the Secretary General’s focal point on internal displacement, but this link has not been fully realized  The operational agencies reproach the alleged lack of consultation on the part of the Unit, and complain that the Unit shows too much operational involvement in the field  Despite recent efforts, the respective roles and responsibilities of the Unit vis-à-vis the Office of the RSG and the Norwegian Refugee Council remain unclear to many Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Performance Findings Field Support:  Unit and Inter-Agency Missions: The Unit has undertaken nearly 40 missions to more than 20 countries These missions have varied in their effectiveness, often because of exogenous reasons: the political sensitivities of national authorities, lack of follow-up by UN country teams, or overly ambitious TORs  IDP advisors: The Unit has helped articulate the need for, identify, recruit, and in some cases fund IDP advisors in the field in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq, Liberia, Serbia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and soon in Uganda Protection:  Response Matrix, Protection Survey: The Unit developed and conducted the Response Matrix and Protection Survey, the former country-specific, the latter thematic, both ready in draft form (The Protection Survey was conducted together with the Brookings SAIS Project.) They should become powerful advocacy tools for the Unit to advise the ERC on how RC/HCs, UN agencies, and their partners can more effectively meet the needs of the internally displaced  Protection coalition: The protection coalition was designed to consist of a core group of partners with protection expertise who would act to support the Unit’s protection efforts, to be activated in specific countries when needed A protection coalition had limited success in Liberia prior to the resumption of conflict Unsuccessful efforts were made in Iraq Capacity Building and Training:  Training and seminars The Unit’s training and seminar activities are well received in the field by local and international partners There is limited progress in getting national authorities to understand the UN Guiding Principles, notably in Serbia and D.R Congo However, the lack of follow-through (not necessarily the responsibility of the Unit) has meant lost momentum Strengthening the Institutional Framework for IDPs:  National strategies and mechanisms: Working groups were established in Serbia, D.R Congo, and Sudan (since disbanded), and draft strategies on internal displacement have been established or are being worked on in Uganda and Serbia Advocacy and Public Information:  The Unit recently released the book No Refuge: The Challenge of Internal Displacement (with the Migration Policy Institute), a thematic overview of the issues and challenges and the first UN publication on internal displacement Regardless of the quality of the book, many question whether such a publication was the best use of the Unit’s time and energy  Upcoming projects: The Unit plans to commission a documentary to shed light on internal displacement in “forgotten crises” such as Sudan, D.R Congo, or Georgia The Unit also has plans for a photographic exhibit of pictures taking by displaced individuals and depicting the lives of the internally displaced Additional Performance Findings: Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation  Mainstreaming internal displacement issues: The team found that the Unit had not achieved substantial progress in mainstreaming internal displacement issues into the work of IASC partners and OCHA branches This may be because the Unit is still relatively new, or because the Unit’s focus on internal displacement “excuses” other agencies from addressing the issue  Monitoring internal displacement: The Unit is knowledgeable on situations of internal displacement around the world It should seek to improve the collection of information from outside sources and the dissemination of information to other agencies and actors Management Issues Terms of reference: The Unit’s TOR not contain specific objectives, leading to confusion on what the Unit is “supposed to do.” Staffing: The secondment arrangement confers the Unit its inter-agency nature, but also brings unique difficulties as staff members are thought to favor their ‘mother’ agency while often being suspected of disloyalty by this very agency The Unit is trying to too much with not enough staff (The solution is not an increase in staff, but better focused activities.) Unit staff display on the whole considerable skills, experience and commitment Awkward internal management arrangements: The structure of the Unit is flat—a structure which could encourage flexibility and initiative But there are too many managers and not enough management This has resulted in lack of strategic vision, thrust and follow through The Unit’s planning process lacks method and transparency, notably in selecting countries for intervention Gender The Unit has not been effective to date in integrating a gender perspective in its work Not one interviewee was able to recall a specific focus on gender in the trainings, missions, or in any other interaction with the Unit Mission reports vary in the extent to which they address gender issues; there is no systematic method of examining gender when conducting missions Interviewees who specialize in gender spoke of a lack of receptivity on the part of the Unit to broach gender issues The Unit is clearly aware of these shortcomings, and has already drafted a training module dealing specifically with gender issues Conclusions Specific Conclusions Busy, committed, but scattered: In its 22 months of existence, the Unit has initiated a wide array of activities Unit staff has demonstrated energy, hard work, commitment, even enthusiasm in their efforts to promote the cause of the internally displaced Some of their initiatives have been more successful, better received or better understood than others Some are objective successes The problem is that these activities have not amounted to positive change in how the UN responds to internal displacement Lack of impact on the UN system To date, the Unit has not had the impact on the UN system that it was intended to achieve The Unit has not been able to capitalize on its direct link to the ERC, it has failed to get RC/HCs to follow its recommendations, and has not been effective in reporting egregious failures of the system The Unit should be aggressively identifying needs and gaps and Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation making clear, practical suggestions to the ERC on how to remedy these gaps The ERC’s explicit, tangible support is a sine qua non condition for any Unit success Lack of strategic vision: The Unit lacks strategic vision, clear objectives and a sense of thrust Examples included the Unit’s choice of geographic areas of intervention (the criteria are unclear), of activities (too many), and of advocacy efforts within the UN system (too few, too shy) The Unit has been overly output-oriented, and has scattered its energy in too many different activities Lack of follow-through: The Unit has lacked follow-through on many of its initiatives, from reporting to training, to inter-agency missions Sometimes this has been because the Unit itself has not followed up, sometimes because other actors have been unable or unwilling to follow up Bitter lessons from Iraq: The ERC sidelined the Unit in the planning of how internal displacement would be handled by the UN in Iraq This was an important lost opportunity to assert the Unit’s input, notably on protection It also weakened the Unit’s credibility, as operational agencies and others drew the conclusion that the Unit was irrelevant to decisionmaking on critical issues The Unit can more to promote protection: The Unit has made valuable contributions to promoting the notion of protection, but much remains to be done The Unit has yet to take on the leadership role it is expected to play in promoting protection (though the Protection Survey is an important step in that direction) The Unit lacks the security of a continued existence: In the fraught inter-agency context of the UN, the natural concern of a new unit to demonstrate relevance has morphed into pervasive feelings of insecurity that have hobbled the Unit’s internal advocacy role Support from the ERC will help address this Also necessary is longer-term support from donors Where to? Looking forward, what should the Unit be? A technical support Unit that provides training and advisory services, identifies IDP advisors, collects lessons learned, etc.? Or the premier advocate for internal displacement issues within the UN system, capitalizing on its direct SG-mandated link to the ERC, who himself is the SG’s focal person on internal displacement issues? In the past, the Unit has tended towards the former It is the strong conclusion of this evaluation that the Unit should gravitate towards the latter Advocacy within the UN to improve the system’s response, both overall and case by case, making the collaborative approach work, is the single greatest contribution the Unit can make to the well-being of internally displaced populations This is the Unit’s most powerful comparative advantage Recommendations Recommendation One: The ERC must activate and empower the Unit as a critical tool in fulfilling his mandate as the Secretary General’s focal point for internally displaced persons  The ERC must clearly state his intention to seek, endorse and follow through on the recommendations of the Unit concerning the shortcomings of the UN system He must then act along those lines This recommendation is the single most important recommendation in this report Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Recommendation Two: The Unit must focus all its energy on increasing its impact on the UN system  The Unit must revitalize its link to the ERC It must, within the privacy of its relationship with the ERC, name and shame agencies that are failing the internally displaced in specific situations, and advise on practical remedies The Unit should ensure that its voice in New York is more senior, forceful and articulate, and pursue its effort to re-energize the Senior Network as a working group for consultation Recommendation Three: The Unit must develop strategic vision and thrust  The Unit must try to less and achieve more This will include abandoning activities that may have been successful but are not central to the Unit’s role as premier advocate for the internally displaced within the system The Unit should consider reorganizing its management structure to include a non-traveling deputy director and two main pillars: internal (UN) advocacy and protection Recommendation Four: The Unit must improve follow-through on existing initiatives  The Unit should consult with OCHA, the office of the RSG and the NRC to improve followup of activities that is has decided to maintain The Unit must aggressively and proactively follow through on the Protection Survey and the Response Matrix Recommendation Five: The Unit must play a strong advisory role in unfolding crises  Iraq shows that large, unfolding crises are where bad decisions can be made The Unit must make its voice relevant to the ERC in these decision-making processes Recommendation Six: The Unit must strengthen its visibility and impact on protection  The Unit should make protection one of its two main pillars (with internal advocacy) It should use the Protection Survey and Response Matrix to identify gaps in the international response to protection The Unit should explore why the protection coalition failed and make appropriate adjustments in other protection mechanisms Recommendation Seven: OCHA must empower the Unit as a distinct entity in its midst  OCHA headquarters (New York and Geneva) should recognize the Unit’s distinct interagency nature and seek to enhance the Unit’s work as critical to the ERC’s ability to fulfil his mandate as the SG’s focal point for internal displacement OCHA should help follow up on Unit activities and recommendations in the field Recommendation Eight: Operational UN agencies must show real commitment to the Unit as the inter-agency embodiment of the collaborative approach  The operational agencies must fund their secondees fully and maintain a tight relationship with them They should invest in the Senior Network process They should seriously consider, if not follow, the recommendations made by the Unit and endorsed by the ERC Recommendation Nine: The donors must provide the Unit with breathing space  Donors should make a pluri-annual commitment to the Unit, to afford the Unit breathing space, but only if both the Unit and the ERC follow through on the recommendations above If these changes are not enacted, the Unit cannot be successful and should not be supported Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Donors should consider forming a ‘Friends of the Unit’ group to galvanize support for the Unit’s efforts to improve the UN response to the internally displaced In short, this evaluation recommends that the Unit be granted a two-to-three-year time frame to make a positive impact on the UN’s collaborative approach to internal displacement, but only if three things happen: (i) the Unit must demonstrate a strategic ability, so far lacking, to identify and clearly articulate gaps in the UN’s response to specific internally displaced crises and bring them to the attention of the ERC; (ii) the ERC in turn must unequivocally pledge his determination to follow through on the Unit’s findings, including by calling on the authority of the Secretary General when appropriate; and (iii) the operational agencies must demonstrate real commitment to making the collaborative approach work If, over the course of the next three years, there is no tangible progress in the UN’s accountability for meeting the needs of the internally displaced, then the existence of the Unit becomes a distraction from the real problem, and not longer part of a possible solution The path then becomes clear Shut the Unit down Write up the collaborative approach’s post-mortem Take stock of failure Seek new solutions Move forward At that point the Unit will have to disappear so that the cause of the internally displaced may advance Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Introduction OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit: The last decade has witnessed mounting awareness of the plight of people who are displaced within the borders of their own state – mounting awareness of both the inherent vulnerability of these populations and of the constraints in the international system’s ability to provide them with assistance and especially protection A number of initiatives – some donor-led, some private, some focusing on the responsibilities of national authorities, others on the ability of aid agencies to help – have in recent years sought to improve conditions for the internally displaced But a real difference required dramatic change in the UN system By the turn of the millenium, it had become clear that, as far as the UN system was concerned, there were in essence three options to improve the response to the needs of internally displaced populations: (i) create a new agency with a mandate for the internally displaced, (ii) extend the mandate of an existing agency to cover the internally displaced, or (iii) create a mechanism that would ensure a greater focus on the needs of the internally displaced In April 2001, the Special Coordinator of the Senior Network on Internal Displacement recommended the third option in his final report The Internal Displacement Unit, a non-operational, inter-agency unit within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), was thus born, launched by the Secretary General in January 2002 Some saw the Unit as the best solution the international system would allow at that point in time Critics saw the decision to create the Unit as a common denominator so low as to be meaningless – in essence, a non-decision The Unit provides advice and support on issues of internal displacement to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), and the director of the Unit reports directly to the ERC The Unit is composed of professional staff seconded by agencies and partners, including UNDP, UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, an NGO consortium, and the office of the RSG The Unit sits in OCHA/Geneva and has a liaison in the office of the ERC in New York As well as assisting the ERC in his coordinating role, the Unit provides technical expertise and advisory support to UN country teams in the field The Unit has undertaken missions to more than 20 countries since its establishment, including inter-agency missions Nearly two years after its creation, has the Internal Displacement Unit succeeded in “promoting more effective inter-agency, operational responses to internal displacement?” That is the question this evaluation seeks to answer This Evaluation In early 2003, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, through its Policy Development and Studies Branch, commissioned a team of two independent external consultants (‘we,’ ‘the team’) to evaluate OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit (‘the Unit’) The evaluation was mandated in the Unit’s terms of reference The evaluation was to assess the “relevance, efficiency and effectiveness” of the Unit “Terms of Reference for an IDP Unit Within OCHA,” OCHA, no date: p Elizabeth Stites and Victor Tanner (team leader) make up the evaluation team Ibid.: p “Internal Displacement Unit Evaluation, Terms of Reference (final version),” OCHA, 15 July 2003: p Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation The evaluation, initially slated for Spring 2003, was postponed until autumn because of the Iraq crisis and reasons pertaining to the Unit’s schedule Throughout the evaluation, the team operated under the clear understanding that its conclusions and recommendations were to be independent and public The evaluation’s terms of reference (TOR) state that the “results of the evaluation will be made public on OCHA’s website.” In the course of its research, the team found high levels of interest in the evaluation’s outcome The evaluation followed a review exercise conducted by an external analyst in September 20026, and an internal review prepared later in 2002 There is substantial agreement between the conclusions of this evaluation and those of the September 2002 review We would like to thank all who agreed to share their time and insights with us Special thanks go to OCHA staff in Geneva, Belgrade, Prishtina, Nairobi, Kinshasa, Goma and New York who worked so hard to keep our days full and our travel pleasant Methodology The team conducted roughly 200 interviews with individuals from UN agencies, nongovernmental and international organizations, diplomats and donor representatives, and local authorities in Geneva, Rome, Belgrade, Prishtina, Nairobi, Kinshasa, Goma, London, Kabul, New York and Washington, DC The team also reviewed numerous public and internal documents 10 OCHA and the Unit selected Serbia and D.R Congo as the two main case studies that best reflected the breadth of the Unit’s work The team’s initial discussions with OCHA had settled on Sudan and West Africa as case-studies, with a third, non-African country to be determined After the evaluation was postponed, OCHA decided that Serbia and D.R Congo were better casestudies, due to logistical and institutional concerns The team agreed to these substitutions, with some reservations.7 11 By design, the team met with few of those most directly affected by whether the Unit – and the UN system above it – is successful in its job: internally displaced persons themselves The reason for this is that the Unit deals with the system, not with the displaced themselves Our research focused on the dynamics of institutional relationships, which are remote to most internally displaced populations Also, we felt that they should be spared having to dedicate time to another set of ignorant visitors 12 The team conducted most interviews in person and followed a semi-structured interview format We spoke to key informants who had worked directly with the Unit, been involved in the initial debate on the creation of the Unit, focused on internal displacement or related issues in their own work, funded the Unit, participated in the Unit’s workshops, been debriefed by the Unit, or simply followed the evolution of the Unit since its inception OCHA and the Unit developed the original lists of key contacts for the evaluation team in each country, and this list Ibid.: p “Internal Displacement Unit, Interim Review,” Jon Bennett, Oxford Development Consultants, Oxford, September 2002 OCHA has explained that the choice of West Africa was not practical or preferable due to the large number of missions to West Africa in summer 2003 and the focus of UN agencies on the crisis in Liberia It was felt that it was not appropriate to deploy another assessment mission to this region The arrival of a new HC in Sudan with plans for reforming the response to internal displacement made the recent work of the Unit in the country less relevant The team accepted OCHA’s argument for the change in case studies, and found value in the case studies eventually selected (especially Congo), but does wish to point out that OCHA did not retain the team’s original choice of cases 10 Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation 80 The bitter lessons from Iraq: Both the ERC and the UNCT disregarded the Unit’s contributions to pre-war preparations in Iraq The Unit was subsequently sidelined in the planning of how internal displacement would be handled The Unit should have been the leading advocate for ensuring that protection was the central consideration in assigning responsibility, and also should have served as a resource for other agencies on pre- and post-war planning on internal displacement In reality, the Unit was neither, and, in our analysis, appears to have been unable to exert its leadership at a critical and highly visible moment This was an important lost opportunity to assert the Unit’s input, notably on protection It also weakened the Unit’s credibility, as operational agencies and others drew the conclusion that the Unit was irrelevant to decision-making on critical issues in large-scale crises and could safely be ignored The large unfolding crises can be daunting because the stakes for the operational agencies are high and therefore these agencies are likely to be at their least collaborative Nevertheless, and precisely because of that, the Unit must seek to fulfil its advisory role to the ERC in such situations, as it can make a difference before problems become ossified 81 More to be done on protection: Protection is the most pronounced gap in the international response to internal displacement The Unit has had made valuable contributions to promote protection by deploying internal displacement advisors, conducting the Protection Survey (with the Brookings - SAIS Project), and attempting to get the Protection Coalition off the ground However, based on the importance of protection in addressing the needs of the internally displaced, a great deal more needs to be done As the UN entity tasked with improving the international response to internal displacement, the Unit should be viewed as an invaluable resource on protection issues In order to accomplish this, the Unit needs to provide technical advice on protection, to work more closely with agencies with strong protection mandates (e.g., ICRC, UNICEF), and to offer leadership in coordinating protection, improving protection mechanisms, and fostering dialogue on protection within the international system and with country governments To date, the Unit has not adopted the leadership role it is expected to play in promoting protection (though the Protection Survey is an important step in that direction) 82 The Unit lacks the security of a continued existence: Every new entity is concerned with demonstrating value added This is also true of the Unit, which was established for an undetermined period of time and relies on yearly contributions from donors In the fraught interagency context, this natural concern has morphed into a pervasive feeling of insecurity that has hobbled the Unit’s internal advocacy role A stronger link to the ERC and the IASC will help created a greater sense of security and validity Also necessary is longer-term support from donors, which will enable the Unit to develop a strategic plan over a longer period and to tailor objectives accordingly Concluding Thoughts: Whither the Unit? 83 Looking forward, what should the Unit be? A technical support Unit that provides training and advisory services, identifies internal displacement advisors, collects lessons learned, etc.? Or the premier advocate for internal displacement issues within the UN system, capitalizing on its direct SG-mandated link to the ERC, who himself is the SG’s focal person on internal displacement issues? 84 In the past, the Unit has tended towards the former Most interviewees, even some operational agency staff, said they strongly felt the Unit should gravitate more towards the latter Advocacy within the UN to improve the system’s response, both overall and case-by-case, making the collaborative approach work, is the single greatest contribution the Unit can make to 28 Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation the well being of internally displaced populations This is the Unit’s most powerful comparative advantage 85 These two activities – technical support and internal advocacy within the UN system – need not be mutually exclusive In fact, they build on one another: support activities (training, policy resources, best practices, advisory services, etc.) are key to obtaining access and offering support once gaps have been identified But it is critical that the Unit not focus on deliverable-oriented activities to the exclusion of its internal advocacy role This seems to have been the case so far The Unit’s comparative advantage lies in its link to the ERC, and the Unit should use this position to capitalize on internal advocacy within the UN system This does not mean sidelining technical support activities, but rather focusing on internal advocacy—making the system work where it is not working in responding to internal displacement—as the first order of business A concluding caveat: 86 Those who argued that the creation of the Unit was an arrangement too flimsy to really address the inadequacy of the UN’s response to the problem of the internally displaced, yet one that relieved pressure for real change, made a powerful point, one that continues to resonate The Unit’s record of the past 22 months has so far failed to prove them wrong Some of this has to with the Unit’s own shortcomings But mostly it must be chalked up to the UN system’s broader failures, as a whole, to address crises of internal displacement The fact remains that the mechanisms that exist within the UN system for assisting and protecting the internally displaced not function No one can ensure the effectiveness of the collaborative approach, and indeed by and large it does not work 87 If change has not taken place over the course of the next three years—if there is no tangible progress in the UN’s accountability for meeting the needs of the internally displaced—then the existence of the Unit ceases to be acceptable At that point, it will become a distraction from the problem, rather than part of a possible solution For the UN system, NGO partners and concerned donors, the path then becomes clear Shut the Unit down Write up the post-mortem of the collaborative approach Take stock of failure Seek new solutions Move forward At that point the Unit may needs to disappear so that the cause of the internally displaced may advance 88 The evaluation team proposes a two-to-three year time frame as a trial for the Unit This would give the Unit sufficient time to set concrete goals with clear and transparent benchmarks and to seek to meet these goals Based on our conversations with donors and other partners, we believe that OCHA will be able to garner support for a further three years of support for the Unit, with the understanding that new solutions will be necessary if the collaborative approach (as embodied in the work of the Unit) has failed to make a difference in the systematic response to the needs of the internally displaced 29 Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Nine Recommendations 89 Common sense would dictate that the sequence of recommendations start with the most immediate target audience – the Unit itself – and proceed further afield from there However, this evaluation has concluded that the ERC – and his commitment to following through on the Unit’s recommendations – is the single most important factor in the determining whether the Unit will have impact or not Therefore the first recommendation, the most important one, is to the ERC To the Emergency Relief Coordinator: 90 Recommendation One: The ERC must activate and empower the Unit as a critical tool in fulfilling his mandate as the Secretary General’s focal point for internally displaced persons  The new ERC must emphasize that he perceives his role as the lead on internal displacement within the UN system  The ERC should use the Unit as his eyes and ears in the field, his constant reference on internal displacement The ERC should be able to request the Unit to undertake specific missions The ERC should indicate to the Unit director how that direct link will be handled (e.g., regular phone conversations)  The ERC must unequivocally articulate his determination to follow through on the Unit’s recommendations to improve the UN response to the internally displaced The ERC will receive widespread support from outside the UN for such a move He in turn must generate the necessary support within the UN system  The ERC must be prepared to engage with heads of agencies to ensure that they act upon his recommendations and, if and when necessary, to enlist the Secretary General’s support to that end  The ERC must use his authority to hold the RC/HCs accountable for implementing the recommendations of the Unit, as endorsed by him  The ERC must ensure that the rest of OCHA recognize and support the Unit’s efforts to improve the collaborative approach The Unit should not be mainstreamed into OCHA The ERC should continue to have the Unit director report directly to him  The ERC must take any management measures he deems necessary to make the Unit a more effective, more proactive advocate on behalf of the internally displaced To the Unit: 91 Recommendation Two: The Unit must focus all its energy on increasing its impact on the UN system  30 The Unit must strengthen its link to the ERC, be more forceful in articulating its recommendations and findings to the ERC, and seek to get the SG involved when necessary The Unit must, within the privacy of its relationship with the ERC, name and shame Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation  The Unit must strengthen its link in New York with the appointment of a senior, forceful and articulate advocate of the Unit’s recommendations  It is critical that the Unit Director push harder within the system (heads of agencies, RC/HCs), and more aggressively develop support within and outside the system to so  The Unit Director should proceed with his plans to revitalize the Senior Network as a substantive forum for consultation and consensus building on substantive and thematic issues relating to the Unit and to internal displacement There is no need to re-work the Network’s TOR, but rather to make the Senior Network function as originally designed  The Unit should encourage an active relationship between Unit staff and seconding agencies 92 Recommendation Three: The Unit must develop strategic vision and thrust  The Unit should focus on what it (and no one else) can do: advocate within the system for a more effective, accountable, predictable, and collegial UN response to the needs of the internally displaced The Unit should focus this analysis at UN country team level and call individual agencies on their failures  The Unit should consult with other partners (NRC, Office of the RSG, IASC members on the Senior Network) to jettison activities in a specific sector or a specific country that others can just as well (or better, or cheaper)  The Director of the Unit should tirelessly reiterate what the Unit is able to and what the Unit is not able to within the UN system  The Unit should seek consensus at the Senior Network with IASC partners on country criteria and other issues (such as inter-agency missions) The Unit should seek to make a difference on a limited number of countries  The Unit should seek clear benchmarks of progress in every country in which it works, such as the establishment of an active internal displacement working group or a dialogue with national authorities on internal displacement The Unit should experiment, analyze and mainstream these mechanisms country by country  The Unit should incorporate a gender perspective in all areas of its work – in training, missions, and reporting The Unit should be sure to highlight country-specific gender issues in its briefings and recommendations The Unit should consider bringing in experts to provide training for Unit staff to ensure that all Unit staff members are well versed on gender and internal displacement, and are able to adequately incorporate a gender perspective in trainings, field research, and report writing The Unit should seek greater gender balance in its professional staff at senior levels  The Unit needs to re-think its structure (i) The Unit should appoint a non-traveling deputy director to manage day-to-day management operations (ii) The Unit should streamline its thematic clusters: the Unit’s two most important ‘pillars’ are protection and internal UN advocacy, and these should have more emphasis (iii) The Unit should identify one or two traveling staff who have less responsibility for day-to-day policy and advocacy work 93 Recommendation Four: The Unit must improve follow-through on initiatives 31 Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation  The Unit must initiate a proactive, open debate within OCHA on how to follow up on missions, training and workshops, report writing, etc Key agencies and RC/HCs should also be included in these discussions The Unit should take into account the likelihood or capacity for follow-up before committing to work in a given area  The Unit must improve its collaboration with NRC and the Office of the RSG on follow-up on training and workshops  The Unit must proactively and aggressively follow through on conclusions of the Response Matrix and the Protection Survey, using them as advocacy tools to show gaps in UN response 94 Recommendation Five: The Unit must play a strong advisory role in unfolding crises  The Unit should engage in strategic thinking on what crises will be next (Palestine? Sudan? Korea?) and be more proactive in discussions over designation of responsibilities, at the Senior Network and with the IASC  The Unit Director as advisor to the ERC must be proactive in seeking greater input and involvement in major decisions  If Unit does not have the expertise on a given topic or area, the Unit must not hesitate to look outside: consult with key partners and hire expertise for the short term 95 Recommendation Six: The Unit must strengthen its visibility and impact on protection  The Unit should make protection one of its two main pillars (with internal advocacy) and hire an individual who is widely recognized in the humanitarian field as a leading thinker and practitioner on protection This person could then divide responsibilities (field versus policy) with the current protection focal point in the Unit  The Unit should use the tools of the Protection Survey and the Response Matrix to identify gaps in international response to protection and should seek broad inter-agency support for filling these gaps  The Unit should take stock of the failure of the efforts of the Protection Coalition, a promising mechanism at country level, to make appropriate adjustments in other protection mechanisms To OCHA: 96 Recommendation Seven: OCHA must offer greater support to the Unit  OCHA must recognize the Unit’s inter-agency nature, and cease to see the Unit as a threat to its reputation or funding  OCHA must, to the extent possible, seek to follow-up on Unit initiatives as part of the ERC’s effort to coax greater collaboration from the operational agencies 32 Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation To the Operational Agencies 97 Recommendation Eight: Operational UN agencies must show real commitment to the Unit as the inter-agency embodiment of the collaborative approach  Agencies must act upon recommendations made to them by the ERC on internal displacement issues at the headquarters and especially the field level  Agencies must send to Senior Network meetings staff who have the experience and seniority to represent their agencies and provide the Unit with guidance  Agencies should always send highly qualified and senior secondees to the Unit It is imperative, if their commitment to the collaborative approach is to be taken seriously, that agencies maintain regular, positive contact with their secondees  Agencies should fully fund their secondees No reimbursable loans, no partial payments, no donor-funded secondees The commitment to the collaborative approach of agencies that refuse to put their money where their mouth is cannot be taken seriously  OHCHR should send a secondee to the Unit To the Donors: 98 Recommendation Nine: The donors must provide the Unit with breathing space  Donors should make a pluri-annual commitment to the Unit, to afford the Unit breathing space, but only if both the Unit and the ERC commit to the main points of the recommendations above If these changes are not enacted, the Unit cannot be successful and should not be supported.30  Donors should consider forming a ‘Friends of the Unit’ group to better mobilize their action in support of the Unit’s recommendations to improve the UN response to the internally displaced Elizabeth Stites Victor Tanner January 21, 2004 30 33 When canvassed, a number of donors expressed support for this point Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Annex One: Evaluation Terms of Reference Background In July 2000, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)31 established a Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement Comprising senior focal points from key humanitarian organisations, the Network was mandated to review a selected group of countries experiencing crises associated with internal displacement and propose ways of improving the international response to internally displaced persons (IDPs) needs OCHA served as the Secretariat of the Network In April 2001, the Special Coordinator of the Network on Internal Displacement issued a report on the activities and findings of the Network The report found that the United Nations (UN), international organizations and NGOs need to increase their focus on, and support to IDPs To ensure increased focus, the Special Coordinator recommended the establishment of a nonoperational IDP office within OCHA Based on the Special Coordinator’s recommendation, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) proposed to the Secretary-General (SG) the establishment of such an office, which was endorsed by the SG on 25 May 2001.32 The Internal Displacement Unit was established in the Geneva office of OCHA in January 2002 for an initial one-year period with the primary aims of promoting an improved inter-agency response to the needs of the displaced, and supporting the ERC in his role as the coordinator of the international humanitarian response to IDPs’ needs In order to preserve the system-wide approach of the Senior Inter-Agency Network, the staff for the IDP Unit was seconded from UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, IOM, and the NGO community During its first year of work the IDP Unit has particularly focused on the following five activities:     Field Support: In close collaboration with its various partners, the Unit encourages greater emphasis on protection of IDPs, undertakes targeted field visits to provide assessment and guidance in situ, and lends its support to resource mobilization efforts for IDP activities Protection: Based on the widespread concern about the insufficient protection for internally displaced persons, the Unit created a “coalition” of like-minded actors interested in working together to improve protection at the country level as well as to ensure a more predictable and efficient institutional response Capacity Building/ Training: A basic training course on IDPs is provided to IASC actors in selected countries and aspects of the training have also been integrated into existing training initiatives of individual UN agencies and NGOs Strengthening the Institutional Framework for IDPs: Enhancing the system wide approach to IDPs in order to provide a complete and coherent response 31 Current membership includes: FAO, InterAction, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the Representative of the Secretary-general on Internally Displaced Persons (RSG/IDPs), Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNFPA, World Bank, WFP, WHO in addition to ICRC, IFRC and IOM under a standing invitation 32 Visit www.reliefweb.int/idp for further information on background 34 Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit  External Evaluation Advocacy and Public Information: Targeted campaigns will contribute to increase awareness on the plight of IDPs, and serve as tools to improve their welfare Additional public information tools include the Unit’s website and the publication of a thematic volume examining internal displacement challenges Purpose of Evaluation The terms of reference for the IDP Unit call for an evaluation of the IDP Unit in 2003 to assess its relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness To that end, and at the request of the ERC, the Policy Development and Studies Branch of OCHA is commissioning an evaluation Issues to be addressed by the Evaluation: A The performance of the IDP Unit in its five core areas of activities (see background), with a focus on: i The degree to which the IDP Unit has achieved the objectives established in its Terms of Reference ii     iii The extend to which the IDP Unit’s activities produce desired outcome regarding: The degree to which its work shapes the planning of the humanitarian community in countries with which it has been engaged Whether and how the work of the IDP Unit stimulates further or additional action by the humanitarian community in countries with which it has been engaged The level of implementation, by IASC members at headquarters and in the field, of recommendations from the IDP Unit What impact the IDP Unit has had on the policies of members of IASC The functioning of the IDP Unit, with regard to:    The planning process employed by the IDP Unit, including its methods for determining priorities within its major area of work The criteria used by the IDP Unit to target its support to specific countries Indicators the IDP Unit has established to measure its impact in the five core areas of activities (see background) B Inter-Agency & Management Issues, with a focus on: i The nature and quality of the IDP Unit’s key inter-agency relationships with:      ii The organizational structure of the IDP Unit, particularly with regard to:  35 The Senior Inter-Agency Network IASC (all members and standing invitees) OCHA The Emergency Relief Coordinator The RSG on Internally Displaced People The advantages and or drawbacks of the IDP Unit’s inter-agency staffing composition Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit The appropriateness of the IDP Unit’s staffing structure given its stated aims and other emerging issues relating to IDP crises (e.g post-conflict transition and administration of justice) The role of seconded officials within the IDP Unit in communicating findings and recommendations to their “home” agencies Line-management and reporting relationships    iii External Evaluation Sustainability of the Unit with regard to: Funding Staffing with secondments   C Integration of a gender perspective:  How has the IDP Unit worked to implement the call in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement for special efforts to promote the full participation of IDP women in the planning and management of relocation, assistance, return or resettlement and reintegration efforts33 Outputs i Context – The evaluation will briefly establish the context within which the IDP Unit works by identifying the principal characteristics and emerging issues (including postconflict transition) relating to the global IDP crisis, and the major challenges facing the humanitarian community in addressing that crisis ii Findings and analysis (conclusions) – The evaluation will provide direct responses to each of the specific matters raised in section above (“Issues to be addressed by the Evaluation”) iii Recommendations – The evaluation will provide practical, action-oriented recommendations that complement its analysis and findings iv Reporting - The evaluation team will submit a succinct and fully edited report in English of no more than 15,000 words in a printed and an electronic version The report will include an executive summary (up to 2,500 words) and will address all of the key issues indicated above The report should be structured to provide succinct conclusions for each issue as well as specific, targeted and action-oriented key recommendations The annex will include a description of the method used, a bibliography, list of persons interviewed and the terms of reference Implementation of the evaluation The evaluation will be organized and managed by OCHA’s Evaluation and Studies Unit, who will carry out ad hoc consultations on its scope and focus with members of the IASC, the Senior Inter33 ) OCHA is committed to bringing a gender perspective into the mainstreaming of the humanitarian response: In 1999 the IASC adopted a Policy Statement on “The Integration of a Gender Perspective in Humanitarian Assistance”, see http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/IASConGender.doc ECOSOC Humanitarian Segment agreed conclusions, direction from the SG, Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), etc 36 Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Agency Network on Internal Displacement, OCHA staff and relevant Government officials Preliminary findings will be shared with IASC members as well as the Senior Inter-Agency Network at the November 2003 IASC working group meeting in Geneva Proposed Method To be specified by the consultants, but will include desk review of relevant literature, reports, document, etc., interviews with key stakeholders, as well as case studies (field work in two countries which were visited by the IDP Unit during its first years of work) Composition of the Team The team will be composed of two members with a thorough understanding of the UN humanitarian system, familiarity with the working of humanitarian agencies and an in-depth knowledge of issues related to IDPs One member will be appointed team leader and be held responsible for the timely production of the evaluation report Timing: It is foreseen that the evaluation will require two consultants to work for a period of 37 days The fully edited report shall be submitted to OCHA’s Evaluation and Studies Unit no later than 20 November 2003 The report will be shared with IASC members as well as the Senior InterAgency Network Deliverables:  an inception report describing the proposed evaluation method – submitted in June 03  a short briefing note for the IASC, highlighting key findings, conclusions and recommendations – to be submitted by 27 October, 2003  a draft report to be submitted by November  A final, edited report submitted by 20 November 2003 10 Use of the evaluation: The evaluation is expected to provide input to a strategic planning process and should translate into an IASC supported and IDP Unit owned plan of action The results of the evaluation will be made public on OCHA’s website 37 Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Annex Two: List of People Interviewed We have divided the interviewees into five groups: (i)Unit staff, (ii) other OCHA, (iii) United Nations operational agencies, (iv) non-governmental organizations, (v) governmental bodies (donors, diplomatic missions, national authorities) Unless otherwise indicated, the interview was conducted in person If only one of the evaluation team consultants conducted the interview, this is indicated by the consultant’s initials (es = Stites, vt = Tanner) A number of interviewees were interviewed several times UNIT: Asomani, Kofi Bagshaw, Simon Baiocchi, Allegra Bélanger, Julie van Heese, Carmen Linde, Anne-Marie Neussl, Peter Peterson, Geoffrey Rogge, John Suzuki, Shigehiro Vincent, Marc Vidal, Denis Geneva Geneva Geneva (now OCHA New York), New York (vt) Kinshasa Geneva (by email) Geveva (vt, by phone) Geneva (es) Geneva (es) Geneva (es) New York (vt) Geneva (also vt, by phone) Geneva Other OCHA: Abbashar, Amjad, Bessler, Manuel Bidder, Mark Boutroue, Joel Bowden, Mark Bungudu, Musa Clark, Christian Deck, Peter Delbreuve, Thierry Duthoit, Eliane Gaouette, Mike Gentiloni, Fabrizio Gleason, Stephen Groves, Robyn Hebert, Paul Heymans, Luc Hilfiker, Claude Julliand, Valerie Keane, Brian Patrick Khalikov, Rashid Loupforest, Christelle Madi, Kirsi Marjanovic, Jelena McGoldrick, Jamie McLean, Calum Mensah Kumah, Opia 38 PDSB, New York (vt) PDSB, New York (vt) IRIN, Nairobi RCB, Geneva (vt) PDSB, New York (vt) OCHA Eritrea, (vt, by phone) IMB, New York (vt) UNAMA, Kabul (es) RCB, Geneva (es) OCHA Uganda (es, by phone) OCHA (former Save the Children UK), New York (vt) RCB, Geneva (vt) HEB, New York (vt) PDSB, New Yorl (vt) OCHA`Ethiopia (fmr OCHA Belgrade) (es, by phone) OCHA Kinshasa PDSB, Geneva RSO-CEA Nairobi PDSB, New York (vt) OCHA Geneva HEB, New York (vt) IASC, Geneva (es) OCHA, Belgrade RCB, Geneva (es) OCHA Somalia, Nairobi IMB, New York (vt) Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit de Meritens, Jahal Stankovic, Nenad Scott, Megan Simba Dunia, Lucien Susuri, Bashkim Todorovic, Alex Tsui, Ed Tull, Stephen Ushiyama, Hiroko Wahlstrom, Margareta External Evaluation RCB, Geneva (vt) OCHA consultant, Belgrade (vt) OCHA Goma (vt) OCHA Goma (vt) OCHA Prishtina (vt) OCHA, Belgrade OCHA New York (vt) PDSB, Geneva OCHA New York (vt) UNAMA, Kabul (es) OPERATIONAL AGENCIES (and Peacekeeping Operations): Aasen, Bernt d’Almeida, Lohic Alain Berner, Patrick Bertrand, Pierre Boneva, Danila Brandstrup, Nina Bugandwa Zigabe, Innocent Carminati, Dario Cels, Johan Cisse, Cheikh Tidiane Cisse-Gouro, Mahamane de Clercq, Peter Conan,Claire Costy, Alexander Crowley, Peter Deng, Francis Dimond, Marie Elhag, Hassan Endres, Daniel Eriksson, Anne-Christine Fisher, David Forsythe, Maureen Gonzalez, Gustavo Grandi, Filippo Gruden, Sheila Hagona, El-Balla Hicks, Peggy Hossaini, Reza Jury, Allan Kapila, Mukesh Khan, Sikander Lazic, Maja Leclerc, Philippe Lippman, Betsy Loretti, Alessandro Lund, Michael M’cleod, Herbert McNamara, Dennis Mihoubi, Isabelle Mimica, Misko Narayan, Geeta 39 UNICEF OLS, Nairobi MONUC, Kinshasa FAO, Nairobi UNHCR New York (vt) UNDP, Kinshasa FAO, Rome OHCHR Goma (vt) UNHCR Belgrade UNHCR New York (vt) UNFPA Kinshasa OHCHR Kinshasa UNHCR, Geneva (es) WFP, Rome UNAMA, Kabul (es) UNICEF New York (vt) Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the internally Displaced, Washington DC (vt) UNDP New York (vt) UNAMA Jalalabad, Kabul (form OCHA Somalia) (es) UNHCR, Kabul (es) UNHCR Prishtina (vt) Office of the RSG, Geneva (vt) WFP Herat, Afghanistan (es, by email) UNDP Kinshasa (vt) UNHCR, Kabul (es) WFP, Rome UNDP Somalia, Nairobi (vt) UNMIK Prishtina (vt) UNICEF, Kabul (es) WFP, Rome UNDP Sudan, Nairobi UNICEF Geneva (vt, by phone) OHCHR, Belgrade UNHCR, Kabul (es) UNDP, Geneva (es) WHO, Geneva (es) UNDP, Nairobi UNDP, Kinshasa UNHCR, Geneva (es) UNHCR, Belgrade UNHCR Prishtina, (vt) UNICEF New York (vt) Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit Norton-Staal, Sarah O’Donnell, Francis Oduol, Elly Poole, Sarah Renson, Jean Pierre Rodehaver, James Singer, Hanaa Sleewenhoek, Tanya Strippoli, Francesco Sundh, Lena Symington, Rebecca Towle, Richard Vincent, Charles Weisberg, Laurie de Wilde, Jan Yacoub, Rukia Zulu, Leonard External Evaluation UNICEF, Nairobi (es, by phone) UNDP, Belgrade (es) UNDP, Nairobi UNDP New York (vt) FAO, Kinshasa UNMIK Prishtina (vt) UNICEF Geneva (es, by phone) WHO, Geneva (es) WFP, Rome MONUC, Kinshasa UNMIK, Belgrade UNHCR Geneva (formerly Belgrade), Geneva (vt) WFP New York (vt) OHCHR, Belgrade IOM Geneva (vt) FAO, Rome UNHCR, Nairobi NGOs, IOs: Alarcon Diaz, Adriana Anonymous One Anonymous Two Aruna, Alain Asante, Edwin Barriga, William Bishop, Jim Charny, Joel Cohen, Roberta Contat Hickel, Marguerite Danevad, Andreas Emes, Paul Fawcett, John Fenton, George Fenton, Hugh Golic, Vesna Guiton, Philippe Hawkins, Peter Keserovic, Dejan Kibira, Elizabeth Kostic, Ivanka Linde, Thomas Lumsdon, Sarah Mabrucky, Evaristes Markovic, Dragan McClellan, Joel Miruha, Baudouin Mitchell, Sandra 40 International Committee of the Red Cross, Prishtina (vt) International Committee of the Red Cross, Goma (vt) International Committee of the Red Cross, Goma (vt) Norwegian Refugee Council Goma (vt) World Vision, Nairobi (vt) International Organization for Migration, Geneva (vt) InterAction,Washington DC (vt, by phone) Refugees International, Washington DC Brookings-SAIS Project, Washington DC International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva (es) Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva (es) International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, Belgrade Consultant, New York (vt) World Vision, Nairobi (vt) Danish Refugee Council, Belgrade Group 484, Belgrade (es) World Vision, Nairobi (vt) Save the Children (UK), London (vt) IOM, (formerly Deputy Commissioner for Refugees), Belgrade Plateforme des femmes du nord Kivu pour un développement endogène Goma (vt) Norwegian Refugee Council, Belgrade MSF Switzerland (formerly OCHA focal person for internally displaced), Geneva (vt) Oxfam Goma (vt) Solidarité pour l’assistance et défense des droits des déplacés, Goma (vt) Danish Refugee Council, Belgrade SCHR, Geneva (es) Association des jeunes pour la défense des droits de l’enfant et la lutte contre le racisme et la haine, Goma (vt) International Rescue Committee, Wash DC (vt, by email) Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit Multanen, Elina Norlov, Steen Pack, Mary Rankovic, Dragana Rasmusson, Elisabeth Schenkenberg, Ed Sevrin, Eric Thomas, Manisha Turner, Neil Zeender, Greta External Evaluation Group 484, Belgrade (es) Danish Refugee Council, Belgrade InterAction, Washington DC ICRC, Belgrade Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva (es) Int’l Council of Vol Agencies, Geneva (vt) Norwegian Refugee Council Oslo, Goma (vt) Int’l Council of Vol Agencies, Geneva (vt, also by email) Save the Children (UK), Nairobi (vt) Norwegian Refugee Council, Geneva (es) GOVERNMENTAL BODIES (donors, diplomatic representations, national authorities): Callan, Peter Clements, Kelly Davidse, Koen Faber, Euwlke Gamal-el-Din, Ihab Gorjance, Mary Hong-Won Yu Jensen, Michael Bremerskov Jones, Brett Kuehnel, Richard Nikolaus Lindvall, Mikael Lundemo, Merete Mackler, Roderick McClelland, Stephen Menghetti, Anita Neustrup, Ole Spliid Norton, Leslie Nzuzi-wa-Mbombo Perkins, Catherine Pollack, Margaret Rivas, José Nicolas, Amb Salazar, David Shimamori, Shikeyuki Simic, Predag Smith, Peter Svirca, Baki Todorovic, Milorad 41 Australian Permanent Mission to the UN, Geneva (es) State Department, PRM, Washington DC (es) Netherlands Mission, New York (vt, by phone) Netherlands Mission, Geneva (vt, by phone) Permanent Mission of Egypt, New York (vt) State Department, PRM, Washington DC (es) CIDA Québec, Geneva (vt) Permanent Mission of Denmark, Geneva (es) State Department PRM, Prishtina (vt) Permanent Mission of Austria, NY (vt) Permanent Mission of Sweden, Geneva (es) Permanent Mission of Norway, Geneva (vt) State Department, PRM, Washington DC (es) DFID, London (vt) USAID Washington DC (vt, by phone) Permanent Mission of Denmark, Geneva (es) Permanent Mission of Canada, Geneva (vt) Min de la Solidarité et des Affaires Humanitaires, Kinshasa State Department, PRM, Washington DC (es) State Department, PRM, Washington DC (es) Mission on Colombia, New York (vt) State Department, PRM, Belgrade Permanent Mission of Japan, New York (vt) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade House Int’l Rel Committee, (fmr NSC), Washington DC (es) PM’s Office, “Gov’t of Kosovo,” Prishtina (vt) PM’s Office, “Gov’t of Kosovo,” Prishtina (vt) Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Annex Three: List of Acronyms CAP CIDA DFID ERC ESU HEB IASC ICRC ICVA IDP IOM IRIN MONUC MOU MSF NGO NRC NSC OCHA OHCHR PDSB PRM RCB RC/HC RSG RSO-CEA SCHR SG TOR UNAMA UNCT UNDP UNFPA UNHCR UNICEF UNMIK USAID WFP WHO 42 Consolidated Appeals Process Canadian International Development Agency UK Department for International Development Emergency Relief Coordinator Evaluation and Studies Unit, OCHA Humanitarian Emergency Branch, OCHA Inter-Agency Standing Commission International Committee of the Red Cross International Council of Voluntary Agencies Internally Displaced Person International Organization for Migration Integrated Regional Information Networks, OCHA United Nations Organization Mission in the D.R Congo Memorandum of Understanding Médecins sans Frontières Non-governmental Organization Norwegian Refugee Council National Security Council UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Policy Development and Studies Branch Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Response Coordination Branch Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator Representative of the Secretary-General Regional Support Office for Central and East Africa Standing Committee for Humanitarian Response Secretary-General Terms of Reference United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan United Nations Country Team United Nations Development Programme United Nations Population Fund United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Children Fund UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United States Agency for International Development World Food Programme World Health Organization Final Report, 21 January 2004 ...OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Table of Contents Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations Introduction OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit This Evaluation Methodology... failures of the system 12 Final Report, 21 January 2004 OCHA Internal Displacement Unit External Evaluation Evaluation Findings The Unit in Context: Challenges of Internal Displacement 21 This evaluation. .. team of two independent external consultants (‘we,’ ‘the team’) to evaluate OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit (‘the Unit? ??) The evaluation was mandated in the Unit? ??s terms of reference The evaluation