Organizational Fields and International Regimes

Organizational Fields and International Regimes Michael Lipson Political Science Department University of Pennsylvania June 2001 Christopher H Browne Center for International Politics University of Pennsylvania Working Paper Series #01-03 Organizational Fields and International Regimes Michael Lipson* Introduction The study of international regimes has been a central area of research into international relations in the last twenty years.1 This literature has grown exponentially in the quarter century since the phrase “international regimes” was coined.2 Yet fundamental questions remain unanswered or inadequately explained This paper focuses on two such questions First, how interactions between regimes affect their development? I suggest an answer, derived from sociological institutionalist theory and based on empirical research into recent nonproliferation export control cooperation This answer also holds implications for a second gap in regime theory: explaining the development of issue-areas, to which regimes correspond In recent decades, multilateral export control regimes addressing nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional technologies with weapons applications have come to interact amongst themselves with increasing regularity This interaction has produced marked convergence in export control structures and processes across regimes and their member states Rationalist explanations portray this convergence as driven by optimization to the most efficient means of export control This account, however, is * I would like to thank Michael Barnett, Roland Paris, Rudy Sil, Avery Goldstein, Mark Pollack, Mark Suchman, and Bruce Cronin for comments on drafts of this paper and the dissertation from which it is derived I have also benefited from comments on presentations of this research at the University of Colorado and the University of Pennsylvania All errors of fact and interpretation are, of course, my own Ruggie 1975: Krasner 1983; Haggard and Simmons 1987, Rittberger 1993; Hasenclever, et al 1997; Levy, et al 1995 Ruggie 1975, 569 incomplete and only weakly supported by available evidence A better explanation can be found in the concept of “organizational fields,” drawn from sociological institutionalism Within organizational fields—communities of related organizations—common practices are adopted across organizations based on conformity with legitimized standards rather than evidence of effectiveness Multilateral export control, I will show, constitutes such an organizational field, and the process of institutional isomorphism by which standard practices are diffused within fields better accounts for convergence across export control regimes than rationalist explanations This suggests that cross-regime interactions can have profound effects on regime development and functioning Furthermore, interaction between the export control organizational field and the various export control regimes has also redefined the boundaries of the nonproliferation issue-area, suggesting a mechanism by which issue-areas, which define regime scope, can develop: Fields and issue-areas can coevolve In the sections that follow, I address these gaps in extant regime theory by illustrating effects of cross-regime linkages in export control on issue-area development and regime dynamics In the first section, I describe recent developments in multilateral export control, and show why they are puzzling from a rationalist perspective and how they highlight gaps in theories of international regimes I then outline an “organizational field” approach to this puzzle, and explain how it addresses both the empirical puzzle and gaps in regime theory regarding cross-regime linkages and issue-area development In the next section, I describe the emergence of an export control field among international regimes and their members in the nonproliferation issue-area I show how the institutional character the organizational environment of export control regimes was conducive to the development of a field, and document the development of the field through regime membership growth and cross-regime organizational convergence As a growing number of actors came to interact more routinely and intensively, standard processes and structures diffused through the field based on their legitimacy-conferring properties rather than their efficiency The next section explains the mechanisms by which the export control field developed Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the theoretical implications of this model for our understanding of international regimes, issue-areas, and international cooperation Section I: Competing Perspectives on Export Control a The Empirical Puzzle The first multilateral export control regime, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Control (CoCom), was established by Western states in 1949-50 to coordinate controls on trade with the Soviet Union.3 An East-West trade regime rather than a nonproliferation regime, CoCom remained the sole international export control organization until the establishment of the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group in the 1970s The 1980s and 1990s, however, saw a burst of activity in multilateral export control, with the establishment of new regimes to address chemical and biological weapons (the Australia Group), ballistic missile technology (the Missile Technology Control Regime), an EU dual-use technology control system, and a nonproliferation- Both CoCom and COCOM are acceptable spellings I follow Mastanduno 1992, among others, in using the alternate case spelling, which is also used in published Congressional hearings Various dates are given for CoCom’s founding, from 1944 (Buchan 1994) to 1951 (Cleverly 1989) Mastanduno 1992 and Yasuhara 1984, among others, give the conventional account–that states agreed to establish the regime in late 1949, and that CoCom began to function in January 1950 oriented replacement for CoCom (the Wassenaar Arrangement) In addition, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was revived in 1991, after having been dormant since 1978 This broader range of cooperation was matched by striking levels of organizational convergence across both regimes and export control agencies of member states, especially in the 1990s.4 Regimes have converged in both membership and in their structures and processes National control systems have increasingly adopted standardized practices Figure demonstrates that the membership of the various regimes became increasingly congruent throughout the 1990s Figure Regime Membership Growth 40 35 30 25 20 15 Membership 10 CoCom Zangger NSG AG MTCR WA 1949195319571961 196519691973197719811985 198919931997 EU Year AG: Australia Group CoCom: Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls EU: European Union Community Regime for Dual-Use Export Controls MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group WA: Wassenaar Arrangement Zangger: Zangger Committee Sources: Sipri Yearbook and www.sipri.se (various years) Convergence in organizational form and practice has not been matched by equivalent convergence in the content of national control lists and licensing policies However, the focus of this article is the form of export control agencies and regimes See Deltac/Saferworld 1995 on variation across national control lists Of the 41 states that are members of at least one of the five main control regimes, 26 are members of all.5 Of the remaining 15 states, are members of at least regimes.6 Moreover, while data is spotty, evidence suggests that the structures and procedures of member states’ national export control systems have increasingly converged on a common standard The following data, compiled by the Center for International Trade and Security, demonstrates increased congruence of national export control systems of four former Soviet states with an ideal score representing an international standard Table Longitudinal Evaluation of Export Control Development in Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine (percent of ideal score) Belarus Kazakstan Russia Ukraine 1992 32.5 29.5 40.4 39.5 1994 76.4 38.6 70.5 69.0 1996 81.3 67.6 83.0 77.8 Source: Craft and Grillot 1997, 14 The EU dual-use control system is not included here, as only the 15 EU members are eligible Sipri, “Table of membership of multilateral military related export control regimes,” , Accessed April 13, 2001 (Information current as of October 5, 2000); Mutimer notes that regime membership overlaps closely with the 28 states of the OECD Mutimer 2000, 87 Craft and Grillot 1997, 14 In Craft and Grillot 1997, the data in this table is labeled “preliminary results.” Date from 1999 show regression since 1996 in the scores for Belarus, (73.22), Kazakhstan (59.26), and Russia (76.29), with Ukraine showing further improvement (85.79) All except Belarus, however, still score substantially higher than their 1994 scores Belarus’s 1999 score approximates its 1994 score Scores for Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine can be found in the table at http://www.uga.edu/cits/ttxc/nat_eval_nec_table.htm I thank Michael Beck for providing me with a more complete table of 1999 results Richard Cupitt has recently argued that export control cooperation reached a plateau around 1996 Richard T Cupitt, “Multilateral Nonproliferation Export Control Arrangements in 2000: Acheivements, Challenges, and Reforms,” Working Paper No 1, Study Group on Enhancing Multilateral Export Controls for US National Security, April 2001 Available from http://www.stimson.org/ tech/sgemec/paper1.pdf, Accessed May 22, 2001 This raises the question, not addressed in this working paper, of the limits to convergence in organizational fields Structural and procedural convergence is exemplified by the diffusion of so-called catch-all clauses These clauses, which originated as a rule in the 1991 U.S Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), were rapidly adopted by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), EU system, and in national regulations of states such as Russia.8 Regimes such as the MTCR and NSG, which had been limited to controlling technologies related to the production and delivery of nuclear weapons, extended their controls to cover non-nuclear payloads (in the MTCR’s case) and dual-use technologies (in the NSG’s), thereby conforming more closely to the other regimes In the 1990s, the NSG, AG, MTCR, and Wassenaar Arrangement all adopted variants of “no undercut” rules preventing members from allowing export licenses refused by another member Mainstream theories of international relations—realism and neoliberalism— explain development in export control cooperation as the product of rational, interestdriven behavior.9 The creation of new regimes and membership growth of existing regimes is explained as a response to a perceived increase in proliferation threats, or to provision of side-payments And the standardization of organizational form and procedures is explained as driven by optimization: agencies and regimes converge on the most efficient methods of export control Empirical evidence discussed below provides only mixed support for these claims Though more incomplete than wrong, these explanations are ultimately unsatisfactory First, converging export control practices not appear to be driven by a common perception of an increased proliferation threat Common threat perception should produce Anthony and Zanders 1998, 396; Cornish 1995, 41; Anthony and Zanders 1998, 398 I use the terms neoliberalism or rational institutionalism to refer to the rational-choice approach to the study of international institutions championed by Robert O Keohane (1984, 1993), who now calls the approach “institutionalist.” In this paper, “institutionalist” refers to sociological institutionalism agreement on items to be controlled and targets to be proscribed National control lists, however, vary significantly, and states’ decisions to join regimes often seem driven by considerations other than security threats.10 The efficiency-driven convergence thesis is further weakened by the near absence of evidence that standard practices are, in fact, more efficient than alternatives (More on this below.) Finally, the claim is counterintuitive It’s not clear why the same methods would be most efficient for the different tasks undertaken by the different regimes It is a very different thing to control the export of a chemical with commercial application than to limit transfer of complete weapons systems or production facilities One would expect different methods to be appropriate for each task Thus, rationalist explanations are, at best, incomplete An alternative explanation, based on constructivist theory, holds that states develop national export control systems meeting international standards, and join multilateral regimes, due to their identification with the liberal international community Empirical research has found mixed support for this “liberal identity” explanation, and its explanatory power seems to vary over time and across countries.11 However, national identity does not, in any case, explain the content of the standard practices adopted by states Even if the adoption of certain export control practices is norm-driven, how those particular practices acquire this normative sanction? Organizational field theory was developed to explain precisely the sort of puzzle presented here: the diffusion across organizations of practices and structures only loosely 10 On national list variation, see Deltac/Saferworld 1995 On non-security reasons for joining regimes, see the studies in Bertsch and Grillot 1998, which find that “military security concerns play little role in state export control decision-making in the FSU.” Bertsch and Grillot 1998, 219 These findings are supported by responses in interviews I conducted with current and former U.S government officials in January of 1999 11 Bertsch and Grillot 1998 See also Cupitt and Grillott 1997; Chafetz 1995; Mutimer 2000 coupled to efficiency criteria Field theory, a branch of sociological institutionalism, explains the process by which these organizational features acquire legitimacy and become widely adopted Field theory is particularly well suited to the study of the export control developments discussed above for two reasons First, it is a research program focused on just the kinds of interorganizational processes encountered in cross-regime interactions such as those among export control organizations Also, field theory focuses on cognitive and intersubjective aspects of organizational environments And it is in intersubjectively constituted aspects of these environments—issue areas and organizational fields—that conventional regime theory exhibits gaps b Gaps in the Regimes Literature Regime theory is seriously underdeveloped in its understanding of the effects of crossregime linkages and the origins of issue-areas As one recent review asserts, For the most part, analyses of international regimes have focused on individual arrangements on the assumption that they are self-contained or stand-alone institutions to be studied in isolation from one another…Yet it is apparent that institutional linkages are widespread—and becoming more so—in international society.12 Regimes not exist in isolation In an increasingly institutionalized international society, regimes routinely interact with other regimes, and are affected by each other’s activities Such cross-regime interactions have received little scholarly attention, and their consequences are poorly understood Recognizing this, Oran Young and others have recently called for greater attention to such institutional linkages across regimes.13 12 Levy, et al 1995, 317-8 13 Young 1996 Regime theory’s lack of an account of issue-area development is particularly serious given the fact that the concept of issue-area is a central element in the conventional definition of regimes: “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.” 14 While the existence of an issue-area is a precondition to regime creation, we know little about the processes by which issue-areas emerge, or what implications this may hold for regime formation Noting this gap, a leading scholar of international relations has observed that “[T]he way in which issues become aggregated into an issue-area has to become an explicit part of regime analysis.”15 Thinking of cross-regime interactions in terms of organizational fields links the two problems, showing how cross-regime linkages and issue-area evolution are related phenomena.16 Through the development of an organizational field the one can, in fact, produce the other c Rationalist Explanations of Export Control Cooperation 14 Krasner 1983, 1, 15 Kratochwil 1993, 83, paraphrasing Haas 1975, 1980 16 An organizational field roughly corresponds to Young’s concept of a nested institution Young 1996 There are, however, sources of normative isomorphism—and even signs of nascent professionalization—in the export control field For example, one source of normative isomorphism is the development of common training activities According to DiMaggio, “Commonly accepted structures or administrative approaches may be diffused through a field if…organizations learn by sending their staffs to common training sessions or workshops.”115 The proliferation of such events—such as the Foreign Export Control Officials Symposia and other seminars and exchanges—has been discussed above Similar activities are conducted regularly at the domestic level to train corporate officials in the establishment and operation of firm-level export management systems (EMS) These officials are trained in the various export control laws and regulations, in the control lists and target categories assigned different countries, and in “know your customer” guidelines The multilateral programs also promote a set of common norms and practices among export control officials of different states As one official relates, “You don’t get to understand common interests and goals unless you get a chance to travel and work together for some time, so to these [NEC] programs allows opportunities to work together.”116 Even in the absence of an export control profession, such contacts build a set of common practices and expertise As Paul Cornish notes, “With so many EU members involved in both CoCom and the various weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology control initiatives, there is a great deal of experience of multilateral technology export control within the EU.”117 Normative pressures, then, are active in the export control field, though not the predominant cause of isomorphism 115 DiMaggio 1983, 158 116 Author’s interview with U.S government official, Washington, D.C., January 8, 1999 117 Cornish 1997, 81 42 c Mimetic isomorphism Mimetic processes are the most important of the isomorphic mechanisms in the export control field Mimetic isomorphism arises from the copying of perceived success under uncertainty Organizations in institutional environments lack reliable measures of effectiveness, and often respond by simply adopting structures and procedures used by other organizations in the same field that are perceived as legitimate and successful.118 In the export control field, states establishing export control systems copy internationally promulgated models For example, according to a Belarussian official, in the development of Belarus’ export control law, “the export control Acts of Poland, USA, Germany, and Russia were carefully studied, and a number of meetings and consultations were conducted in the process of working out this project.”119 A further example of the diffusion of export control practices through mimetic processes is the widespread adoption of so-called “catch-all” clauses This rule, which originated in the U.S Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), “is that, if an exporter is aware that an item will contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the export should be prevented whether or not it conforms to technical parameters in a commodity control list.”120 Catch-all clauses, in other words, place a greater burden on exporters to “know your customer” and to shoulder the responsibility 118 DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 70 Though not strictly an export control matter, Mutimer’s observation that the wording of sections of the Ottawa Landmines Convention are identical to that of the Chemical Weapons Convention (with the words “anti-personnel mines” replaced with “chemical weapons”) illustrates mimetic isomorphism Mutimer 2000, 70 119 U.S Department of Commerce 1997, 32 120 Anthony and Zanders 1998, 396 Catch-all clauses vary in their breadth, with some requiring license application only if competent authorities inform the exporter of a potential end-use problem and others placing a greater burden on the exporter 43 for monitoring the end-uses of exports Following the 1990 EPCI in the U.S., catch-all clauses were incorporated into the rules of various regimes and national systems The MTCR adopted a catch-all requirement in its 1993 guidelines revisions.121 The EU incorporated a catch-all clause in Article of the 1994 dual-use technology export control regulation (and such clauses have thereby been introduced into the various national systems of EU states).122 Russia has added a catch-all clause to its dual-use regulations.123 Although catch-all clauses have not been specifically demonstrated to reduce proliferation threats, they are widely regarded as a necessary feature of an effective control system, having been adopted by leading actors in international export control It is not hard to find other instances of modeling in the export control field For example, the EU criteria for an effective export control system appear to have been based on the CoCom standard A 1991 European Commission communication to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament lists five key elements of “an operational and effective system at the community level,” which are strikingly similar to the CoCom standard of effective export control.124 Conversely, the EU export control system has itself been copied, as the U.S Commerce Department in 1996 adopted the EU’s export control 121 Anthony and Zanders 1998, 396 122 Cornish 1995, 41 123 Anthony and Zanders 1998, 398 124 Cornish 1997, 83 These were: a common list of controlled dual-use goods and technologies which are subject to control; a common list of destinations, although the nature of this list, i.e., whether it should be a list of ‘proscribed’ or of ‘special facilities’ destinations will require further reflexion; common criteria for the issuing of licenses for exports from EC; a forum or mechanism in which to coordinate licensing and enforcement policies and prodecures; administrative cooperation Note the similarity to CoCom’s common standard, discussed above 44 numbering system in place of Commerce’s old numbering system used in control lists and license applications Thus, there is clear and widespread evidence that mimetic processes are an important factor in the development of the export control field Given the lack of a central coercive actor or a distinct export control profession, mimetic processes stand as the primary, though by no means dominant, source of isomorphism in the export control field Conclusion Organizational fields represent a form of what Oran Young has called “institutional linkages.”125 When an organizational field encompasses organizational elements of more than one international regime, cross-regime linkages within the field will produce institutional isomorphism across the regimes, leading to structural and procedural convergence This convergence will be legitimacy-driven, and largely unrelated to effectiveness concerns Such dynamics are likely to occur primarily, if not exclusively, in highly institutional environments Intra-field linkages may have further implications for the regimes involved, however, through their effects on the issue-areas within which the regimes are embedded As Hasenclever et al note, regime analysts have paid surprisingly little attention to the concept of issue-area, which forms part of the early consensus definition of regime as well as most of the alternatives that have been proposed since Yet, if issue-area is an essential attribute of regimes, the concept of regime can only be as clear as the concept of issue-area has been made.126 125 Young 1996 126 Hasenclever et al 1997, p 60 Hasenclever et al discuss problem structuralism the branch of regime theory which has given the most sustained attention to the issue-area question However, problem-structural work focuses more on the effects of issue-area variation than on issue-are formation and change 45 Regime theory, however, lacks an explanation for the formation and evolution of issueareas The analysis of export control cooperation presented above offers a contribution to this question While not proposing a full-blown theory of international issue-areas, I argue that the export control case suggests a mechanism of issue-area development potentially applicable to other cases Specifically, in the export control case, the developing organizational field coevolved with the proliferation issue-area “Proliferation” was initially understood to refer solely to nuclear weapons and technologies As export control techniques developed in CoCom were applied first to nuclear export control (in the Zangger Committee and NSG) and then to chemical and biological warfare (AG), delivery systems (MTCR), and conventional arms and dual-use technologies (Wassenaar, EU system), the concept of proliferation was broadened and the issue-area expanded Mutimer has described this as the “reimagining of all forms of military technology in terms of the proliferation image and the embedding of that image in a series of control practices,”127 of which export control is “the central practice.”128 In other words, the development of the export control organizational field changed the issuearea within which the various control regimes operated The most fundamental possible effect of this change has not yet been realized, however As the existence of an issue-area is a precondition for a regime, this broader conception of the proliferation issue made possible consideration in the early 1990s of the unification of the specific Hasenclever, et al., pp 60-67; Efinger and Zurn 1990 For other discussions of issue-areas and regimes, see Kratochwil 1993 and Hass 1975, 1980 127 Mutimer 2000, 63 128 Mutimer 2000, 83 46 nonproliferation export control regimes within a single overarching regime The redefinition of the proliferation issue-area fed back into the development of the export control field, supporting the sense that the field’s organizational elements were engaged in a common project, but also separating CoCom from the field’s common enterprise, which was being redefined from technology denial to nonproliferation export control It became common to refer to the NSG, AG, and MTCR as the “nonproliferation regimes,” distinct from CoCom, still seen as a Cold War economic containment entity CoCom’s replacement with Wassenaar reconciled this disjuncture, and cemented the congruence of the export control organizational field and the nonproliferation issue-area Thus, organizational field theory can help shed light on the process by which issue-areas develop, and the implications of issue-area change for associated regimes The analysis presented in this paper offers important improvements to our understanding of international regimes It begins to address the need, noted by leading regime scholars, for explanations of both institutional linkages and issue-area development In fact, the organizational field framework ties these problems together, demonstrating how cross-regime linkages and issue-area formation are related The organizational field approach explains how cross-regime linkages can produce convergence across organizations within different regimes Field theory also explains the mechanisms by which institutional isomorphism produces this convergence And it points to a potential consequence of this intra-field isomorphism Since institutional isomorphism is driven by legitimacy criteria rather than efficiency measures, isomorphism can lead to standardization of suboptimal structures and practices The 47 construction of an organizational field, then, is a mechanism by which organizational pathology can arise.129 In addition, the export control case illustrates a mechanism by which issue-areas can develop and evolve: the structuration of organizational fields.130 The boundaries and structure of the nonproliferation issue-area were altered by the development of the export control field, through the formation of export control regimes with increasingly broader nonproliferation-related functions This produced greater integration of specific regimes within the nonproliferation issue-area, to the extent that their unification as a single formal regime has been considered Field theory also suggests possibilities for synergistic blending of constructivist and sociological approaches to research into international organizations While constructivist IR scholars have recently expressed interest in sociological institutionalism, most such discussions have neglected field theory, or treated it as a mere appendage of another branch of institutionalism, the world polity approach.131 Field theory and world polity institutionalism, however, are relatively distinct literatures, operating at different levels of analysis and employing different sets of concepts.132 World polity research explains the diffusion of institutional forms across different settings in terms of “world culture”—the Western liberal aspirations of progress, justice, and rationality 133 129 Barnett and Finnemore 1999 130 The process is more accurately described as one of coevolution of field and issue-area, rather than simply issue-area evolution Baum and Singh 1994 131 Finnemore 1996 is the most prominent example 132 Ron 1997 illustrates links between the two approaches, treating world polity theory as field theory applied to the organizational field of nation-states Mutimer 2000 can be read as a world cultural analysis of the nonproliferation issue-area, though he draws on critical theory rather than world polity institutionalism 133 Boli and Thomas 1998 48 Organizational field analysis focuses on particular communities of organizations rather than world culture Though the two approaches are complementary, field theory is better suited to the analysis of specific features of particular institutional environments that may not be explicable in terms of such abstract concepts as “progress” or “rationality.”134 And field theory has much to offer constructivist students of international organizations, sharing ontological and epistemological commitments with constructivism, but tailoring its concepts specifically to the study of organizational dynamics Thus, the concept of organizational field promises new insights to students of international institutions and regimes References Anthony, 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Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland Van Ham 1994, 15 58 Van Ham 1994, 16 Article IV of the NPT calls for “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological