INTRODUCTION
Understanding is widely regarded by ethicists as a fundamental aspect that enriches life, while philosophers of science emphasize it as a key objective of scientific inquiry Moreover, epistemologists, who traditionally focused on knowledge and justification, are increasingly recognizing understanding as a significant epistemic asset deserving of dedicated exploration.
Although understanding is widely acknowledged as important in both scientific and everyday contexts, there is a notable absence of philosophical discussions regarding its nature Epistemologists frequently assert that individuals who possess understanding exhibit a deeper grasp of concepts than mere knowledge alone.
1 See, for example, Griffin (1986, ch 4), Crisp (1997, pp 60-61), and Raz
According to Hempel (1965), the primary focus of science is to address explanatory why-questions and to define the understanding it provides (p 488) This sentiment is echoed by various scientists who also recognize understanding as a key objective of scientific inquiry, as noted by Weinberg (1994, 2004) and Atkins (2003, pp 357-63).
Representative works on the concept of understanding include Stroud (2000), Zagzebski (1996, 2001), Elgin (1996, 2004), Sosa (2000), Greco (2001), Kvanvig (2003), Riggs (forthcoming), and Alston (2005) These works often emphasize the ability to "see" or "grasp" how elements within a subject cohere or fit together, yet the specifics of this grasping process are frequently left vague Wayne Riggs (2003) highlights that while understanding involves seeing how things fit together, this notion is often considered uninformative, noting a lack of literature that distinctly addresses understanding beyond linguistic comprehension.
Philosophers of science have long explored the epistemic value of explanations, yet there remains a surprising scarcity of in-depth analysis on the nature of understanding Michael Friedman highlighted this gap over thirty years ago, observing that while philosophers articulate clear proposals regarding the explanation relation, they often neglect to address how these proposals relate to scientific understanding This raises important questions about what aspects of their proposed relations contribute to our comprehension of the world.
Writing a decade ago, Jaegwon Kim (1994) observed that the situation had hardly improved:
Current theories of explanation, including Hempel’s covering-law theory and the causal theories proposed by Salmon, Lewis, and Humphreys, as well as the pragmatic theories from Bromberger, Achinstein, and Van Fraassen, often overlook the concept of understanding as a form of knowledge While explanatory understanding is occasionally referenced, it tends to be overshadowed during the development of more rigorous theoretical frameworks, leading to a diminished focus on the term ‘understanding’ in serious theoretical discussions.
‘intelligibility,’ and ‘explanatory knowledge’ seldom make an appearance once the initial stage-setting is over (p 52) 4
Finally, bringing the picture up to date, Nancy Cartwright (2004) has recently insisted that the need for a philosophical account of understanding is urgent:
The urgent need for a philosophical approach to understanding the implications of false models in science raises critical questions about their utility Specifically, we must consider when a false model can still yield meaningful insights, the nature of the understanding it provides, and the practical applications of such knowledge These inquiries are essential, as they pertain to a prevalent scientific practice that often shapes policy decisions, yet we currently lack satisfactory answers.
Philosophers like Friedman and Kim have recognized a significant gap in the literature regarding theories of understanding and have made attempts to address it, though none claim to have fully satisfied this need Kim highlights the challenge of developing a comprehensive theory, stating, “Producing a usable account of understanding is the hard part; one scarcely knows where to begin” (p 69).
1.1 The Scope of the Project
Kim emphasizes a critical issue in the theory of explanation, stating that essential concepts have been overlooked, akin to a theory of justice that fails to address justice itself or a theory of numbers that neglects numbers This highlights a significant anomaly in our understanding, revealing that while we possess models of explanation, we lack comprehensive theories that adequately encompass these fundamental ideas.
This dissertation aims to address an existing gap by providing a modest account of understanding, acknowledging its limitations in several respects.
While the concept of understanding encompasses a wide range of topics, this article will focus on a specific aspect Our ability to understand varies across different subjects, highlighting the complexity of comprehension As Catherine Elgin (1996) insightfully points out, the nuances of understanding are significant.
We comprehend various elements such as rules, reasons, actions, and objectives, along with the associated obstacles, techniques, and tools Our understanding extends to forms, functions, fictions, and facts, as well as images, words, equations, and patterns Typically, these components are not standalone achievements; instead, they merge to create a cohesive understanding of a particular subject, discipline, or field of study.
This article focuses on our understanding of natural phenomena, intentionally setting aside the exploration of how this understanding may relate to linguistic concepts or meanings.
This dissertation does not aim to provide a formal analysis of understanding through necessary and sufficient conditions While some may view such an analysis as the ultimate goal in philosophy, this work can be seen as a preliminary exploration of the concept of understanding, akin to a temporary stop on a journey up a philosophical mountain.
While concepts and meanings can be considered natural phenomena, they are not supernatural It is important to recognize this distinction clearly.
THE STATE OF THE QUESTION
Knowing something and understanding why it is so are distinct cognitive achievements that often do not align For instance, one can recognize that the sky is blue or that a garbage disposal is malfunctioning without grasping the underlying reasons Similarly, in scientific contexts, one might acknowledge that tiny particles in a liquid are in motion without comprehending the principles of Brownian motion Regardless of the explanations for their movement—whether due to external pressures or internal dynamics—one can still assert knowledge of the particles' motion.
6 At least, the difference seems clear in the modern world As Michael
In the ancient world, the classical conception of knowledge was both rich and demanding, as noted by Williams (2000) He emphasizes that understanding how a proposition derives from simple, self-evident necessities allows us not only to acquire evidence of its truth but also to comprehend why it is true and why it could not be otherwise This association of knowledge with demonstration links it intrinsically to explanation and understanding.
It is possible to reframe the concept of non-factive epistemic gains by suggesting that my belief in a proposition (p) may not qualify as knowledge if it is false or not properly aligned with the truth Alternatively, one could argue that the epistemic benefit I receive is inferior to true understanding, as it relies on a false explanation The challenge lies in accurately defining these non-factive epistemic gains.
When we move from knowing that p to understanding why p we therefore experience an epistemic gain of some kind So how should we think about this gain?
A common initial thought is that the "something more" I perceive is an explanation; that understanding why p involves grasping the reason behind p While this idea may not be extensively supported in academic literature, it serves as a useful starting point for exploring the relationship between explanation and understanding.
The challenge in defining the epistemic gain associated with understanding lies not in its accuracy but in its lack of informativeness While it is generally accepted that understanding involves grasping an explanatory narrative, the existence of various types of explanatory stories complicates matters These range from simplistic explanations to those that attempt to describe the world's fundamental structure This raises critical questions about why certain stories appear explanatory and provide epistemic gain, while others do not—a topic that will be explored further.
The concept of "dormitive virtues," popularized by Molière, illustrates how certain narratives aim to rationalize an individual's current state, such as drowsiness, by attributing it to the sleep-inducing qualities of a recently consumed drink.
The quality of explanatory stories is closely linked to their capacity to foster understanding, making comprehension a key criterion for evaluating their effectiveness As noted by James Woodward (2003), the ability of a story to generate understanding serves as a vital test of its goodness.
An effective explanation must enhance understanding, meaning that any information deemed as part of an explanation should contribute to this clarity Therefore, the elements included in an explanation play a crucial role in fostering a deeper comprehension of the subject matter.
This suggestion clarifies the normative relationship between explanation and understanding, positing that the primary goal of explanatory stories is to foster understanding Consequently, an explanatory story is deemed effective only if it successfully leads to comprehension This implies that, similar to how utilitarianism requires a foundational understanding of the good to define right action, we must first establish a clear concept of understanding to evaluate what constitutes a satisfying explanatory narrative.
The literature on explanation highlights the normative priority of understanding, as illustrated by Wesley Salmon's (1998b) critique of Bas van Fraassen's (1980) assertion that a quality explanation should "favor" the subject being explained.
According to van Fraassen, the goodness of an explanatory story
Paul Humphreys (2000) emphasizes that scientific understanding offers a more profound landscape compared to scientific explanation, suggesting that explanation should be seen as a means to achieve understanding rather than as a final goal.
John Haugeland (1998) suggests that while philosophers of science often prioritize explanation, the ultimate aim is understanding, as to explain is to render something intelligible This perspective implies that an effective explanation should demonstrate that the event in question is more probable than its alternatives However, Salmon challenges this view, arguing that we can understand improbable events, such as brown-eyed parents having a blue-eyed child, just as well as probable ones He contends that the quality of an explanation cannot solely depend on its ability to show increased probability compared to relevant alternatives.
The favoring requirement results in a notable asymmetry; while we can better explain the more probable outcomes, we struggle to do the same for less probable ones This suggests that our understanding of each alternative is either equally strong or weak, highlighting the unsatisfactory nature of this asymmetrical approach.
The discussion surrounding Salmon's view on the understanding of the brown-eye to blue-eye connection versus the brown-eye to brown-eye connection can be set aside for now Instead, it is important to highlight his approach to evaluating van Fraassen’s proposal To determine if a specific account of explanatory goodness is sufficient, we should examine whether an explanatory narrative that embodies the proposed good-making features can indeed foster understanding.
Some of the most famous counterexamples to Hempel’s
The Deductive-Nomological model of explanation follows a similar methodology, illustrating that, according to Hempel’s theory, the shadow of a flagpole can serve as a valid explanation for determining the height of the flagpole.
(rather than vice versa), or that a man’s failure to get pregnant can be explained by the fact that he faithfully took his birth control pills
THE NEED OF EXPLANATION
In this chapter, I will explore two key questions: what makes a situation require explanation for an individual, and what fulfills that need for understanding For instance, when your refrigerator breaks down, its non-functioning state prompts a desire for explanation But what underlies this need? Furthermore, once a situation demands clarification, what process leads to the fulfillment of that need? Essentially, I will examine what one comprehends that transitions them from seeking an explanation to having their curiosity satisfied.
In a sense that will become clearer as we go, one way to think of this chapter is as an attempt to make progress on both of these
Peter Menzies (1989, 2004) defines a "situation" as a broad concept that includes both states of affairs and events, encompassing causes and effects like events, states, absences, omissions, and nonoccurrences For example, a state of affairs may involve Uncle Albert having lung cancer, while an event could be his death This inclusive definition allows for a nuanced understanding of situations, as the factors explaining why Uncle Albert died may differ from those explaining why he died in his sleep rather than awake This perspective builds on insights from Robert Nozick (1981) in his work, Philosophical Explanations.
Explanation reveals the actual connections of a subject, while understanding situates it within a broader network of possibilities This distinction highlights how explanation enhances understanding by showcasing both actual and potential relationships By categorizing an actual entity within a typology or matrix, one gains significant insights into its alternative possibilities, enriching the overall comprehension of the subject.
Nozick emphasizes the link between the quest for understanding and an individual's perception of possibilities In addressing the first question, I argue that a situation requires explanation when a person recognizes that it could have unfolded in multiple ways Consequently, the answer to the second question becomes clear: fulfilling this need for understanding involves discerning the factors that differentiate these various alternatives.
I will contend that Nozick's concept of "a network of possibility" is crucial for achieving a deeper understanding To effectively support this assertion, further elaboration will be necessary.
In his 1980 work, Brain Skyrms suggests that an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive possible states, denoted as {S i }, includes a specific state S* He emphasizes that the degree of explanatory power is crucial in determining why S* is chosen over other possibilities, highlighting the importance of understanding the network of possibilities This topic will be further explored in Section 3.3.
Understanding the underlying reasons for the need for explanations is our primary objective Individual background beliefs influence which aspects of life appear to require clarification, highlighting that some matters seem more in need of explanation than others.
Understanding the reasons behind a situation's need for explanation is essential, as it enables us to address that need effectively If we assume that explanations aim to enhance understanding, it follows that identifying what fulfills the need for explanation is closely linked to the process of comprehension itself This connection will be explored further in Chapter 4.
The inquiry into why a situation requires explanation is complex, as it can be understood in two distinct ways: pragmatically and epistemically.
The necessity of explaining a situation is subjective and depends on individual valuation; for instance, my leaky roof requires an explanation for me due to its personal significance, while it holds no value for you.
Situations often require explanation not only for practical reasons but also from an intellectual standpoint As Carl Hempel highlights in his work, there exists a fundamental human desire for understanding, driven by intellectual curiosity This deep-seated need to comprehend oneself and the surrounding world can be so compelling that, in the absence of reliable knowledge, myths frequently emerge to bridge the gaps in our understanding.
According to Hempel, a situation's ability to evoke our curiosity serves as an indicator that it requires explanation from an epistemic perspective While this notion does not specify the underlying reasons for a situation's need for explanation, it reframes the inquiry to focus on what distinguishes situations that captivate our curiosity from those that do not This approach opens up a more manageable avenue for exploring the factors that influence our curiosity regarding different situations.
Roger White (2005) highlights that our inclination to ask "why" questions stems from a deep-seated curiosity, as we seek to understand and make sense of the world around us While we often frame these inquiries in their original form, emphasizing their epistemic nature, it is also useful to consider them as expressions of our curiosity Keeping this curiosity-driven need for explanation in mind is essential as we explore these questions further.
Elliot Sober (1986) presents an example that highlights a scenario which fails to spark our curiosity, illustrating the nature of questions that do not engage our interest.
The inquiry into why Kodály is identified as a Hungarian rather than a vegetarian raises questions about the necessity of prioritizing one identity over the other It seems unnecessary to dismiss one aspect of his identity to understand the other, as there is no inherent conflict in being both a Hungarian and a vegetarian This perspective invites a broader exploration of identity without the need for exclusion.
THE GOAL OF EXPLANATION
The primary goal of explanation is to foster understanding This activity, integral to both scientific inquiry and everyday communication, involves our efforts to clarify and make sense of various concepts and phenomena.
Research by Baillargeon, Kotovsky, and Needham (1995) indicates that even infants as young as four months possess an innate proto-understanding of the physical world When shown a block that appears to float without support, these infants gaze longer at the suspended block than at those that fall, suggesting that they have an early grasp of object behavior This implies that from a very young age, humans are equipped with an intuitive sense of how objects should interact based on their characteristics—heavy objects are expected to fall, and their unexpected suspension challenges this fundamental understanding.
In the ancient world, explanation was fundamentally aimed at achieving understanding, as noted by scholars like Julius Morazcisk and Myles Burnyeat Contemporary advocates, such as Peter Lipton and Roger White, echo this sentiment, emphasizing that individuals, including engineers and car mechanics, often seek to comprehend the reasons behind various phenomena The primary goal of this inquiry is to foster a deeper understanding of the world around us.
In recent decades, the assertion that understanding should be the primary goal of explanation has faced significant criticism Philosophers like Mario Bunge, David Lewis, W H Newton-Smith, and J D Trout argue that understanding is primarily a psychological state, rather than an epistemic one, challenging its validity as an explanatory objective.
The charge in question suggests a disconnect between understanding and truth, as it highlights that individuals, regardless of their beliefs—ranging from CIA conspiracy theorists to alchemists and astrologers—often possess a strong sense of understanding These individuals confidently draw connections among their beliefs and feel certain about their interpretations of reality, raising questions about the nature of understanding itself.
Several scholars, including Bunge (1973), Lewis (1986), Newton-Smith (2000), and Trout (2002), have explored the concept of understanding in relation to scientific explanations Hempel (1965) offers critical insights into the psychological aspects of understanding, yet he acknowledges that effective explanations ultimately foster comprehension, suggesting a nuanced view of the relationship between explanation and understanding.
Critics argue that the concept of understanding is too individualistic to be the primary aim of scientific explanation Paul Humphreys (1989) contends that emphasizing understanding leads to a relativization of explanations based on individual perspectives He advocates for shifting the focus away from defining understanding and instead concentrating on the essential qualities that an explanatory candidate must possess, which may or may not facilitate understanding.
The article suggests that if psychological components influence knowledge, then knowledge cannot be considered an epistemic state Additionally, it argues that understanding should not be dependent on the actual state of the world.
The objection posits that if understanding is not aligned with the truth, it must stem from purely psychological factors David Lewis (1986) suggests that understanding may arise from an explanation feeling "familiar," "illuminating," or "simpler." However, Lewis argues that these perceptions cannot be the ultimate goal of explanation, as the primary aim should be the pursuit of truth; psychological responses can occur even when truth is absent.
In this chapter, I will examine the "psychological objection" and assess the argument that understanding is the ultimate goal of explanation To do this, I will first clarify what we seek when we engage in the process of explanation By establishing a clearer understanding of our objectives, I will then evaluate how well this defined goal aligns with the concept of understanding throughout the remainder of the chapter.
In this chapter, I will explore the often-overlooked psychological aspect of explanation, arguing that the pursuit of understanding has been dismissed due to neglect of this dimension While the Aha! experience and the feeling that an explanation "feels right" are frequently highlighted, they do not capture the full richness of the psychological and phenomenological elements involved My aim is to address these exaggerations and emphasize that the goal of explanation encompasses a deeper psychological understanding than is typically recognized.
I will claim, understanding has a far stronger truth connection than is generally acknowledged
Understanding the claim that "understanding is the goal of explanation" requires clarification, particularly due to the ambiguity of the term "explanation," which can refer to both a process and a product in multiple contexts.
Claiming that Newton's explanation of the tides is accurate involves asserting the validity of a specific set of propositions or claims that define this explanation.
Newton’s theory If, however, you were to claim that Newton’s explanation of the tides is long-winded and tedious, the noun
“explanation” here would be picking out Newton’s act or performance
The term "science" can be ambiguous, referring both to the process of conducting scientific inquiry and the outcomes it produces As noted by Kelly and Glymour (2004), the primary aim of science is to uncover true answers to questions about nature To clarify this distinction, I will refer to the outcome of scientific inquiry as an "explanatory story" and the process of presenting this outcome as the "act of presenting an explanatory story."
The claim that understanding is the primary goal of explanation introduces a nuanced perspective on the concept of explanation In this context, "explanation" refers to an activity distinct from merely recounting a pre-existing explanatory narrative Rather, it embodies a dynamic process of inquiry, emphasizing the active pursuit of knowledge and comprehension.
RELIABILITY AND UNDERSTANDING
The reliability of our grasping faculty is questionable, especially when we consider historical evidence Even if we accept that understanding is factive, the insights derived from this faculty may lack significant epistemic value due to its weak connection to the truth.
J D Trout (2002) cites the following historical examples as evidence against the reliability of the faculty
Pierce highlights the unique cognitive experience of explanatory understanding by emphasizing the moment of acceptance, likening a good explanation to a key turning in a lock However, this metaphor offers little reassurance to those who believe that good explanations are epistemically reliable, as exemplified by alchemists who felt the key turn only to discover misleading causal mechanisms Similarly, Galen's diagnosis of melancholy attributed to black bile provided him with such a gratifying sense of understanding that it likely influenced his own balance of humors.
Later he is even more emphatic:
Throughout history, we have encountered numerous misconceptions that were once widely accepted as truths, such as the belief in demonic possession as a cause of mental illness and the humoral theory of disease This tendency to cling to flawed explanations can lead to harmful consequences, making individuals hesitant to embrace accurate claims they do not fully comprehend Conversely, it often results in an overconfidence in false claims that seem appealing due to their anecdotal or theoretical allure.
Trout argues that the unreliability of our "sense of understanding" is evident, as demonstrated by the history of science Notable figures such as Ptolemy, Galen, alchemists, and astrologers confidently identified connections that were either nonexistent or unrelated to their intended explanations, highlighting the persistent inaccuracies in scientific interpretation.
Trout's objection highlights that the "sense of understanding" we experience with certain explanatory stories may not accurately reflect their truthfulness He suggests that our phenomenological responses—how certain narratives resonate with us—are often misaligned with reality Consequently, when an explanatory story feels correct, it frequently proves to be incorrect, indicating a lack of reliability in our intuitive judgments about these narratives.
In our previous discussion, we can reinterpret the objection by noting that, as Trout suggests, our overall understanding is inadequately aligned with the truth This implies that our cognitive processes are significantly influenced by various dependencies that hinder our perception of reality.
“sees” (grasps, identifies) turn out to be false more often than not 101
In Chapter 4, we discussed how the act of grasping or seeing is accompanied by a unique phenomenology, which makes it feel inherently correct to us that such dependency exists While Trout is correct in noting these phenomenological elements, our perspective suggests that any unreliability does not stem from the phenomenology itself, but rather from the way we exercise our grasping faculty that accompanies it.
If our ability to discern genuine dependencies is as unreliable as Trout suggests, we face a significant issue On the rare occasions when we do identify a true dependency, the identification may be coincidental and lack substantial epistemic value For instance, if someone claims to assess honesty merely by appearance, but consistently misclassifies deceitful individuals as honest, their occasional correct identification of a genuinely honest person would not hold much credibility To establish a reliable connection to the truth, a stronger basis for identification is essential.
This chapter argues that initial armchair empirical research indicates Trout may significantly overstate the unreliability of our grasping faculty Current clinical studies support this notion, showing we are generally proficient at identifying dependencies However, I contend that concluding our grasping faculty is entirely reliable is also misguided Instead, a balanced perspective is necessary, acknowledging the generally positive epistemic status of our grasping abilities while explaining why individuals like astrologers and conspiracy theorists can consistently err.
To assess the reliability of our grasping faculty, we must consider how we typically evaluate reliability in other contexts For example, a thermometer's accuracy is not diminished by its inability to provide readings in sunlight Similarly, Ichiro Suzuki's prowess as a hitter is not undermined by his inability to make contact with the ball in the dark or while blindfolded Understanding these nuances is crucial in determining the reliability of our cognitive abilities.
Assessments of reliability are inherently context-dependent, and for this discussion, I will focus on the "normal" world as the relevant environment for evaluating our understanding This excludes scenarios like a Cartesian demon world or one distorted by funhouse mirrors, which would skew our perceptions.
Trout's objection raises concerns, particularly regarding his lack of a defined reference class for his claim of unreliability He highlights that individuals such as astrologers and alchemists have purportedly "seen" phenomena, yet does not clarify the specific group or criteria against which their reliability should be measured.
The reliability of an individual's understanding is significantly influenced by the accuracy of their background beliefs It is important to note that defining what constitutes "normal" background beliefs is not within the scope of this discussion.
The attribution of unreliability in perceived dependencies to the overall grasping faculty is misguided Just as the visual system of cataract sufferers does not reflect the reliability of vision in general, the unreliability observed in a specific subgroup's grasping ability does not imply that our collective grasping faculty is inherently unreliable.
A further problem is that even at the individual level the reliability of someone’s grasping faculty is apt to vary Consider
Ptolemy again Trout, needless to say, is right to point out that
Ptolemy's keen observational skills occasionally led him to significant misjudgments, yet these spectacular failures overshadow the many instances where his insights proved beneficial While we can only speculate about the specifics, it's reasonable to assume that Ptolemy successfully identified various situations, such as recognizing that wet wood was hindering a fire from catching or that a limping horse had recently sustained an injury.
IS UNDERSTANDING A SPECIES OF KNOWLEDGE?
IS UNDERSTANDING A SPECIES OF KNOWLEDGE?
Philosophers of science widely agree that understanding is a form of knowledge Peter Lipton (2004a) emphasizes that an effective theory of understanding should define the subject matter clearly.
To achieve a clear and objective understanding, it is essential to recognize that understanding is not an extraordinary form of knowledge but rather an accumulation of knowledge about causes This perspective aligns with Peter Achinstein's insights, emphasizing the importance of deepening our knowledge base to enhance comprehension.
Understanding is often defined as the act of expressing something with the aim of making it comprehensible, which is considered a form of knowledge However, philosophers of science continue to debate the specific type of knowledge that constitutes understanding, such as whether it stems from knowing the cause of an event or from recognizing its relation to established laws Despite these ongoing discussions, the notion that understanding represents a distinct kind of knowledge remains largely accepted within the field.
122 Other philosophers of science who seem to assume, essentially without argument, that understanding is a species of knowledge include Wesley Salmon
(1989, pp 134-35), James Woodward (2003, p 179), and Philip Kitcher (2002, passim).
123 This is to set to one side issues raised by those who, like J D Trout (2002), claim that understanding is not really an epistemic good at all but rather merely a
“subjective feeling.” I will not be dealing with that sort of understanding skepticism
That makes it all the more striking that virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about the nature of understanding—including Catherine Elgin (1996, 2004), Linda
Zagzebski (2001) and Kvanvig (2003) argue that understanding should not be classified as a type of knowledge They highlight key differences, noting that understanding is immune to Gettier problems, is transparent, and can exist without truth, while knowledge cannot Overall, they contend that the distinctions between understanding and knowledge are significant enough to prevent understanding from being considered a subset of knowledge.
In this chapter, I will critically assess the argument that understanding should be considered a form of knowledge, focusing on the perspectives of Zagzebski and Kvanvig I will challenge the prevailing epistemological view that understanding, like knowledge, necessitates truth, lacks transparency, and is susceptible to Gettier problems While understanding shares similarities with knowledge, I aim to demonstrate that the existing arguments supporting this claim are insufficient.
According to John Haugeland (1998), understanding is inherently tied to objects, but it differs from beliefs and desires, indicating that it is not synonymous with knowledge or a specific type of knowledge This distinction raises important questions about the nature of understanding, which will be further explored in this chapter.
Zagzebski (2001) highlights a key distinction between knowledge and understanding, noting that understanding is transparent while knowledge is not She asserts that understanding involves grasping the relationships between various pieces of information, essentially making connections and recognizing how they fit together This leads to the conclusion that the object of understanding—what we perceive as connections—must be internal, as it is challenging to "grasp" or "see" something that is not immediately accessible to our mental view.
In this as well as other respects, however, Zagzebski claims that understanding differs from knowledge As she writes:
Understanding requires internalist conditions for success, unlike knowledge, which can exist independently of internal criteria Even when knowledge is defined as justified true belief, its truth condition makes it a concept that cannot be fully demonstrated from within In contrast, understanding involves conscious transparency and accessible criteria, making it a state where one is aware of what they comprehend While one can possess knowledge without being aware of it, true understanding necessitates awareness of that understanding Consequently, individuals grappling with skepticism can find greater confidence in their understanding states compared to other cognitive states.
Zagzebski highlights the inherent connection between understanding and the ability to articulate it, suggesting that true understanding often involves a direct apprehension of the subject This articulacy is seen as a defining characteristic of comprehension Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that certain forms of understanding, particularly our grasp of concepts, exemplify the transparency Zagzebski refers to.
While certain aspects of understanding may exhibit transparency, this does not imply that understanding as a whole, particularly in relation to natural phenomena, aligns with the complete transparency described by Zagzebski The notion that some forms of understanding could be transparent does not extend to a general acceptance of transparency in all understanding contexts.
A common scenario illustrates the importance of accurate understanding: upon discovering that your refrigerator's light is off and the interior feels warm, you may initially conclude that the appliance simply became unplugged However, this assumption could be misleading, as the refrigerator might have actually malfunctioned due to a short circuit, and the cord was unplugged as a precaution against fire hazards Thus, while you believe you comprehend the situation, you may actually be misinterpreting the true cause of the refrigerator's failure.
Zagzebski’s account faces a fundamental issue: our understanding of natural phenomena is inherently factive, meaning we seek to comprehend the true state of the world, which may not be consciously transparent to us While one might argue that even in cases of misunderstanding, such as with refrigerators, we can still grasp valuable insights—like the fact that refrigerators rely on electricity—these generalizations are substantive claims about real-world dependencies Ultimately, we lack transparent access to verify whether these dependencies genuinely exist.
125 Zagzebski has more to say here, about how understanding is internal to (what she calls) practices, and about how practices allow us to identify and correct
Kvanvig’s (2003) perspective on understanding enhances Zagzebski’s by emphasizing the factive nature of understanding, asserting that true beliefs are essential for a mental state to qualify as understanding He argues that the essence of understanding lies in how individuals interpret their true beliefs, highlighting the importance of recognizing connections among these beliefs While Kvanvig agrees with Zagzebski that understanding involves grasping these connections, he contends that the origins of one’s beliefs—specifically, external factors influencing their acquisition—are irrelevant in determining whether one truly understands.
Kvanvig illustrates his argument by presenting a scenario where a reader engages with a textbook on Native American History, gaining a genuine understanding of Comanche dominance in the southern plains However, if the reader were to choose a different book filled with inaccuracies, their beliefs about the Comanches would be largely misguided This example highlights the potential pitfalls of relying on flawed sources, suggesting that even accurate information can be overshadowed by the prevalence of erroneous texts on the same subject.
The status of your beliefs about the Comanche people raises the question of whether they constitute true knowledge Critics argue that these beliefs do not amount to knowledge, as their alignment with reality appears to be coincidental This situation exemplifies a Gettier problem, where a fortunate encounter with accurate information offsets the disadvantage of being surrounded by misinformation.
EPISTEMIC GOALS AND EPISTEMIC VALUES
In a thought-provoking moment, former Miami Dolphins running back Ricky Williams expressed his commitment to discovering the truth, stating, “Everything I’m doing in my life is about finding the truth.” This sentiment echoes the philosophies of great thinkers like Socrates, who valued truth above all else in discussions, often losing patience with those more concerned with reputation than genuine inquiry Williams' journey into holistic medicine exemplifies a growing trend of individuals prioritizing authentic understanding over material success.
Epistemologists often conclude that truth serves as the primary objective of inquiry, highlighting its intrinsic value for cognitive agents Additionally, they may argue that, from an epistemic perspective, truth is the sole element that possesses inherent or enduring worth.
While truth is often regarded as the ultimate intrinsic value from an epistemic perspective, this raises significant concerns Specifically, it prompts the question of why knowledge is considered superior to mere true belief, and why justified true belief is deemed more valuable than unjustified true belief.
The distinction between justified true beliefs and unjustified true beliefs raises intriguing questions about the value we place on truth For instance, a justified belief that it is raining does not hold more truth than a lucky guess about the same fact This leads us to ponder why we prioritize justified beliefs over unjustified ones Additionally, if truth is inherently valuable, why do we often remain indifferent to numerous truths? For example, if I choose not to memorize the phone book for Topeka, Kansas, does that mean I have missed a valuable opportunity for epistemic enrichment? The notion that truth has a standing value implies that I have, yet this conclusion seems absurd.
This chapter proposes a novel perspective on the significance of truth in our epistemic experiences, aiming to elucidate our epistemic objectives and provide solutions to previously identified challenges.
7.1 Truth for Its Own Sake
144 For more on the so-called value problem in epistemology see, for example, DePaul (1993, 2001), Zagzebski (2003), Sosa (2003), and Greco (2003)
Our pursuit of truth is frequently driven by practical objectives, such as determining flight times and gate locations when traveling to South Bend Beyond these practical concerns, we also possess an intrinsic epistemic interest in uncovering the truth, as highlighted by Alvin Goldman (1986).
The pursuit of truth is often valued for its intrinsic worth rather than for any ulterior motives Consequently, it is not surprising that intellectual standards recognize true belief as an independent value, separate from its benefits to biological or practical objectives.
Goldman (1999, 2001) posits that truth acquisition holds intrinsic value, suggesting it is often sought for its own sake He contends that, from an epistemic perspective, truth is the sole intrinsically valuable element While various epistemic traits, such as holding beliefs from reliable sources, are valued, Goldman argues that their worth is contingent upon their ability to guide us toward the truth.
Understanding our intrinsic interest in the truth prompts us to consider its inherent value beyond mere utility Richard Foley (1987) and Marian David (2005) provide insights that illuminate this perspective, suggesting that truth holds significance that transcends its practical applications.
The pursuit of truth may not align with the goal of avoiding falsehoods, as this could be inherently challenging Most individuals possess a natural curiosity about the world and a fundamental desire to hold true beliefs.
We seek truths not only out of curiosity but also because we believe that understanding these truths can enhance our ability to achieve other important objectives Specifically, we are particularly interested in discovering the most effective methods for reaching our goals.
The essence of both claims lies in the appeal to human curiosity Foley and David argue that our intrinsic desire for truth, independent of practical objectives, stems from our natural curiosity Even when a subject appears to have no immediate practical implications, we possess a fundamental, epistemic interest in understanding the nature of things.
Curiosity plays a crucial role in our pursuit of truth, as we often seek truths for their intrinsic value, even when they appear to have no practical significance This desire for knowledge stems from our natural inclination to be curious, making the exploration of truth an appealing endeavor.
Curiosity drives us to seek truth for its own sake, reflecting an open-ended desire for knowledge From an epistemic perspective, this suggests that all truths hold intrinsic value and merit our interest As John Stuart Mill articulates in *Utilitarianism*, the pursuit of truth is a fundamental aspect of our natural curiosity, emphasizing that any truth can be worthy of exploration.
A cultivated mind, not limited to philosophers but encompassing anyone exposed to knowledge, discovers endless fascination in the world around them This includes the wonders of nature, artistic achievements, poetic imaginations, historical events, and the diverse behaviors of humanity, both past and present, as well as their future possibilities.