1. Trang chủ
  2. » Ngoại Ngữ

Views from Abroad Changing European Attitudes toward the United States of America between Utopia and Dystopia

25 2 0

Đang tải... (xem toàn văn)

Tài liệu hạn chế xem trước, để xem đầy đủ mời bạn chọn Tải xuống

THÔNG TIN TÀI LIỆU

Thông tin cơ bản

Định dạng
Số trang 25
Dung lượng 219,5 KB

Nội dung

REINHOLD WAGNLEITNER (University of Salzburg) Views from Abroad: Changing European Attitudes toward the United States of America between Utopia and Dystopia GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP: The United States of America and the World International Study Program for Community College Faculty Salzburg Seminar 19 June 2004 © with the author Setting the (Back-)Stage During a lecture tour through the US in 1958, the British journalist Malcolm Muggeridge, a master of the English prose and outragoues wit, whose late conversion to Catholicism made him a satirist in search of salvation, quipped It's quite easy to explain why America is unpopular in Europe It's because you are rich, powerful and unbeatable Everyone hates you if you are rich, powerful and unbeatable A hundred years ago everyone hated the British Empire because it ruled the world Now it is the turn of the Americans It comes with the job The only difference is that we British seemed to quite enjoy being disliked, whereas you Americans don't like it at all.1 If only it were that simple! In the spring of 2003 one of my colleagues told me completely flabbergasted that she had overheard her two small children play war games in their garden – and both wanted to be Iraqis, neither son nor daughter wanted to play the Americans And another friend was quite surprised when he overheard an Austrian boy telling his mother in front of the McDonald´s in the Getreidegasse of Salzburg that he wanted to go somewhere else for a bite because he did not want to support the war against Iraq So what is going on here? Is this a short term aberration in an otherwise unproblematic set of relations or something that goes quite deep? I suggest we first take a magical history tour and then interpret some recent poll results The History of Mentalities The history of mentalities is always a history of ambiguities, and the history of the meaning of America in Europe especially so Since Columbus, the European reaction to America was situated between condescension and fear, ignorance and fascination, superiority complexes and inferiority feelings At best, it resembled a marriage of convenience where alienation (on both sides) was programmed, at worst a dangerous mixture of a love-hate relationship – and it should be noted that in the German word Hassliebe hate comes first For centuries, the term America has been ambivalently placed in the landscapes of European minds: on the one hand it has represented the prime example of modernity and a laboratory for global social change On the other hand it has stood for a nostalgia longing for a pioneering past, freedom and individualism The list of the appropriation of various modules of "typical American" images and their rearrangement by Europeans is endless "America" (probably more as construct, invention, and simulation than as "reality") has functioned as a distorting mirror on which European social, economic, political and cultural changes were reflected and often misinterpreted European dreams See the entry “Anti-Americanism” in Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Americanism [accessed 21 July 2003] and nightmares about America are as old as her discovery and conquest They clearly predate the foundation of the United States but later were projected on the US after it had assumed a hegemonic position – first in its own hemisphere and then globally America became a metaphor for total enthusiasm, but also for total rejection already in the 16th century The mental baggage of Europeans filled with images in which the New World was situated between El Dorado and barbarian wilderness, paradise and hell, noble savages and bloodthirsty cannibals The phantasmagorias provoked by America´s existence show that the discovery of the New World was accompanied by a simultaneous invention of America A Fata Morgana in the West America appears to be filtered through a distorting mirror of European inadequacies, frustrations, and failures For the most part, we find an America only in the eyes of others, the image of a Strange New World as a European vision The creation of European images of America shows that there exists no cognitive hierarchy between the reality of America and the symbolic invention of the New World The European helplessness vis-àvis the enigma "America," this fata morgana in the West, is further deepened by extremely complex interactions between European clichés about America and US prejudices toward Europe, between auto- and hetero-stereotypes: the US-cowboy and the Euro-wimp have a long tradition, they clearly belong to the realm of the longue-duree Naturally, European stereotypes have become modified as a result of an increase in geographic knowledge, colonization, emigration, economic, political, and military interdependence However, technical progress has mostly increased the quantity of information available while doing little to change the quality of stereotypes It is of vital importance to understand that the increase of infotainment emanating from the United States does not necessarily facilitate a better understanding Undoubtedly, the communication possibilities have been dramatically improved – from the caravels of Columbus to the Internet It would be much too optimistic, though, to expect the disappearance of geocentric and ethnocentric stereotypes, just because of technological improvements The European images of America were produced by a time machine that transformed European myths of the past and the future America mostly was seen in two ways: either as a part of Europe's illusionary past, namely, in the sense of a paradise granting a second chance, or as anticipatory dreams of America as Europe's future, which, more often than not, turn into nightmares "The West," an ambiguous conception of both space and time, had fascinated since antiquity Long before Columbus set sail, "the West" had already become a fundamentally fixed image These anticipations of America range from the Greek science fiction of Atlantis to the medieval legend of the Golden Epoch The Pillars of Hercules did not prevent the New World from casting its shadow as magical reality By no means was this mythical West limited to Elysium, the blissful empire of the dead It also included Eden, the Island of the Enchanting Women, El Dorado, Ultima Thule, Arcadia, eternal life (which, in its most recent version, turned into “Forever Young”), total happiness, and immeasurable wealth The identity of America as a frontier, as the New Canaan, as the New Jerusalem, is a European creation Augustine's City of God became the City upon the Hill, and the profanity of the Old World found its reflection in the holiness of the New For many Europeans America, therefore, represented a territorial map rather than a geographic reality The Construct America America represented a massive intellectual challenge Thomas More's Utopia and Francis Bacon's New Atlantis initiated the discussion about the ideal Republic, the ideal Commonwealth, with America as the background However, Utopia meant not only a good place or an ideal state but, in an ironic inversion, a place that did not exist, a noman's-land, a cloud-cuckoo-land The construct "America" in European imagination all too often denoted something that America never was and never could be – Asia, Utopia, paradise on earth with gold lining the streets When America failed to fulfil these European dreams, the disillusionment became even more intense Instead of correcting them, instead of admitting that the European dream of the American dream had always been unreal, the disillusioned now accused America of fraud The dialectical tension of America as Utopia and as Dystopia runs through all literary discussions The image of the young, innocent, and mythical New World of Shakespeare, Marlowe, and Spenser soon found its counterpart in accusations of barbarism, degeneration, immaturity, soulless materialism, and cultural inferiority Georges Leclerc Comte de Buffon`s outrageous accusations about the absolute degeneration of all life in America remained influential until well into the twentieth century Although the contours of European images of America became more precise after 1776, they still maintained the character of magical reflections fluctuating between total hope and complete rejection While liberals and republicans, socialists and even communists, directed many of their hopes toward the land of freedom, virtue, and prosperity, for the representatives of the ancien regime, many conservatives, and the 20th century extreme right, the US became the horrific example for the insurrection of the mob and barbaric excesses of democracy, whose influence on the European order must be hindered at all cost Even in the nineteenth century, most European authors perceived America as a continent untouched by culture, as natural wilderness The United States remained outside of history and the most important opposition read soulless uprooted techno-civilization versus traditional culture Now alienation became the major theme Americans became especially suspect with regard to their outward appearance, tastelessness, pluralistic conformity, superficiality, naive optimism, and infantilism The European accusation against US culture as being uniquely based on a denial of any limitation of human existence is quite absurd, especially when such an accusation was made by the inhabitants of a continent, whose people Europeanized large parts of the world, including North, Central and South America The “American Century” Already forty years prior to the proclamation of "The American Century," the power of the United States of America could no longer be ignored In 1901, the year in which Great Britain became the first European nation to receive credit from the US, W T Stead's cautionary book Americanization of the World; or, The Trend of the Twentieth Century was published in London The book created a sensation, was published in German immediately and set a trend After the First World War, the USA stood for a distorted vision of mass democracy, consumer abundance, standardization, mass production, automation, Taylorism, Fordism, and – most important – it stood for mass culture, especially jazz and Hollywood US economic dominance transformed the City on the Hill into the Factory on the Hill The total rationalization of human society by Fordism again was interpreted as a purely American phenomenon and not as a general possibility inherent in every capitalist culture Many Europeans, especially those who felt to have a monopoly on high, pure, and true culture, were convinced that the US was a cultural wasteland It is also interesting to note that those US artists and intellectuals who were accepted by the modernist European elite were precisely those who were labeled as un-American in the US It was the United States of America, European authors implied, that was the original version of and metaphor for modernity From Charles Dickens to Gerhard Hauptmann, from Rainer Maria Rilke to Franz Kafka, from Vladimir Majakovsky to Salvador de Madariaga, from Georges Duhamel to Bert Brecht, America stood for vulgarity and emptiness, coldness, anonymity, loneliness, and the inhumanity of modern business The United States, dominated by predatory capitalist exploiters, appear as the futurist nightmare of a streamlined doomsday Synonymous with the pending destruction of culture, Americans were either accused to be all little boys or otherwise they populated the global stage with the violence and greed of ur-capitalist gangsters Ultimately, with Evelyn Waugh's Loved One, we come back to the point of departure: the European conception of the West as the kingdom of the dead The Elysian Fields found their real equivalent in the cemetery culture of Southern California 6 European interwar images of the US were quite similar to those existing before British ideas about the US seemed so misguided and miserable to Ambassador Joseph P Kennedy, even on the eve of the Second World War that an intensive cultural enlightenment campaign seemed necessary "so that the people in England would believe that something happens here besides gangster shootings, rapes and kidnappings." A poll taken in October 1940 showed that only 27 percent of Britons were positively disposed toward the US The popularity rating of Americans was ranked behind that of Greeks, Poles, and Jews Immediately after its entry into war, the US may have been in the number-one position on the popularity scale, but already the friction that had arisen toward GIs who were in Britain in massive numbers during the Second World War ("oversexed, overpaid, and over here") indicated the postwar trend After 1945 the popularity of the United States sank back to the prewar level The prevailing French prejudices were somewhat more qualified because of a longer and deeper interaction with US themes Although US capitalism was vehemently rejected, many intellectuals nevertheless admired the American myth of freedom French authors introduced American art, literature, film, and jazz in Europe and praised le style americain The situation in Italy was similar to that in France Despite twenty years of fascism, primitive anti-Americanism did not take hold in Italy National Socialist propaganda against the US marked a low point of European lack of understanding America was seen as a boundless continent that wanted to usurp world rule as part of the Jewish world conspiracy; as a world power of trivialities; as a standardized homogenous and canned civilization The streamlined imperialism of Americanism was denounced as the absolute death of culture Anti-American sentiments surely reached their peak during the reign of the Nazis, but the propagandists of the "Third Reich" hardly invented new prejudices They could easily build upon deep-seated stereotypes, and these, mixed in with a shot of extreme anti-Semitism, were driven to the height of paranoia During the Cold War the American Century blossomed – especially when we consider not only its political, military, and economic character but also its profound cultural implications If we understand the Cold War years as a period of essential crises for traditional European cultures as a result of the immense human and material losses and moral depravation after the Second World War then the endless flow of "American" goods and ideas into European life and consciousness acquires a different dimension However important the military power and political promise of the United States were for setting the foundation for American successes in Cold War Europe, it was the American economic and cultural attraction that really won over the hearts and minds of the majorities of young people for Western democracy David Reynolds, “Whitehall, Washington, and the Promotion of American Studies in Britain during World War II” in Journal of American Studies 16 (August 1982); 165-188, 171 7 To be sure, abstract American freedoms had their attraction for quite a few, but how much greater was their appeal when they came in a new package – as Liberty Corn, Freedom Grain, and Equality Beans However alien some American practices seemed, however much US naiveté and pragmatism were mocked, however strongly US civilisation was despised, the century-old attraction the United States had held especially for the European poor was now bolstered by one decisive factor Since 1945, more than ever before, the United States signified the codes of modernity and promised the pursuit of happiness in its most updated version: as the pursuit of consumption Whenever real consumption climbed into the ring chances were high that real socialism had to be counted out The End of the Magical History Tour… …and the Beginning of an Academic Debate? Of course, this magical history tour of traditional European America-stereotypes does not mean that the United States should not have provoked criticism in a great variety of social, economic, political, military, and cultural matters, just to the contrary Still, many European accusations against “typical American phenomena” clearly have a different quality than criticism toward similar developments in Europe They usually reveal two dimensions of unease, a double alienation: they are similar to accusations made by disillusioned lovers who themselves had lost their innocence long ago and simply would not acknowledge that the supposed virginity of their transatlantic mistress had never been anything else but a European fantasy if not a European folly, which, to be sure itself found fertile grounds in America and were easily transplanted Because seen from a vantage point from outside the United States of America as well as Europe, that is from the vantage point of the large majority of the world´s population, these differences actually become quite academic, really representing two sides of the same coin – the Janus face of the Euro-Americanization of the world Robert Kagan´s much quoted characterization of US-Americans living on Mars while Europeans supposedly are inhabiting Venus certainly holds some entertainment value (and may be representative for a majority of the present economic, political and media “elites” in a number of countries), this dichotomous division – if not Manichean vision – itself only is further proof for the longevity and shallowness of clichés as well as the durability of stereotypes.3 Furthermore, the juxtaposition of US-Americans as warmongers and Europeans as peace-lovers neglects the fundamental reality that millions of US citizens opposed the war against Iraq while millions of Europeans, though not the majorities, supported it Especially Europeans, as Gary Younge argued in The Guardian should realize that Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness” Policy Review Online June 2002 http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html the split between Europe and the US is strategic, not moral There is nothing inherent in European political culture that makes it more liberal and less imperial than America European leaders and commentators are right to criticise the US for its brutality and imperialist pretensions But they must so with sufficient self-awareness to see what most of the rest of the world has seen: that their nations have acted in similar and even more pernicious ways whenever they have had the opportunity… The difference between Europe and the US is significant and has been accentuated in recent months, but to the vast majority of the developing world American domination represents a development in the narrative of European empire, not a break from it.4 The Polls So what about the post-Cold War world? While the image of the US in Europe already experienced a strong boost during the Clinton-years it skyrocketed after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 – only to fall into a massive dive as a reaction to some of the policies of the administration of president George W Bush Polls clearly are tricky instruments, instruments of politics themselves and highly unreliable historical sources The following data – for whatever polls are worth, if carried through properly they still indicate tendencies of shifts within public opinion – certainly reveal that traditional stereotypes continue to hold their power Still, many results also clearly indicate that it is not the United States of America as such or highly esteemed US-values which are opposed by many people around the globe but rather specific actions and decisions carried through by the administration of president George W Bush Here we are potentially confronting a new development that cannot simply be explained as primitive residues of anti-Americanism It is the unilateral application of the global use of force, the military, economic, cultural and political power of the United States that produced these shifts – not any opposition to traditional liberal values of US-democracy in Europe This is proven as a matter of course by the growing number of millions of US-citizens exactly opposing the same strategies as non-Americans because they fear that the unprecedented domestic and foreign policy measures introduced after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, instead of defending endangered liberties will actually result in a weakening of democracy instead – within and outside the United States Robert D Kaplan hit the bull´s eye recently when he mentioned the obvious “It is a cliché these days that the United States possesses a global empire – different from Britain’s and Rome’s but an empire nonetheless It is time to move beyond a statement of the obvious… How should we operate on a tactical level to manage an unruly world?”5 Gary Younge, “Twin Visions of Empire” The Guardian Online 10 February 2003 http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,5673,892465,00.html [accessed 21 July 2003] Robert D Kaplan, “Supremacy by Stealth,” Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2003, 66-83 9 All of the following data therefore have to be read in this context These results document various reactions to the more and more pervasive realization of the existence of a global US empire And they also reveal increasing doubts about the compassionate character of the benevolent global hegemon – the USA The German Marshall Plan Fund of the United States and Chicago Council of Foreign Relations Poll, 2002 In this poll more than 6,000 Europeans (in Great Britain, France, Germany, Poland, Italy, and the Netherlands) and roughly 2,000 US-citizens were interviewed about their opinions about US-European relations.6 While a majority of Europeans, in contrast to UScitizens, believed that US foreign policy contributed to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and Europeans generally were more critical of the foreign policy of the Bush administration, other results of this poll demonstrate that, generally speaking, the similarities of opinions on both sides of the Atlantic are more striking than the differences Some of the most interesting results: It is clear that Europeans were more critical of the Bush administration's handling of foreign policy than US-Americans Only 38% viewed its foreign policy as "excellent" or "good," 56% saying it is "fair" or "poor" But the Bush administration got much higher marks for its handling of terrorism (47% "excellent" or "good") and the war in Afghanistan (35%) than for its handling of the Arab-Israeli conflict (20%) or the situation in Iraq (21%) These differences of opinion are even stronger when the following results about the future role of the United States and Europe as super powers are compared The German Marshall Plan Fund of the United States and Chicago Council of Foreign Relations Poll, 2002 http://www.worldviews.org/key_findings/transatlantic_report.htm#kf1 [accessed 22 July 2003] 10 In contrast, Europeans and US-citizens mostly agreed about respective strategies against international terrorism It is interesting to note though that more US-citizens (77 percent) proposed immigration restrictions as a remedy against terrorism than Europeans (63 percent) US-citizens and Europeans generally also shared threat perceptions to a high degree The greatest aberrations in their views can be found in their perception of the dangers emanating from Iraq and the development of China as a world power 11 Even more interesting are the results of this poll when comparing European and US attitudes in regard to a potential war against Iraq Contrary to the perception created by the media during 2002, the interviewees on both sides of the Atlantic came closer in their approval or disapproval whether Iraq should be attacked or not than in any other sample – with great majorities favoring UN approval US-citizens (65 percent) came second only to the French (69 percent) in their support for an invasion only with UN approval and support of allies Consequently, it needed more media hype as well as sexed-up threats about weapons of mass destruction in the following months 12 THE IMAS INTERNATIONAL POLL, February 2003 IMAS International in a representative poll, which was published in February 2003, asked Austrians and Germans aged over 16 years: The American way of life, US policies and economics represent a model for Europe Is that correct or not?7 German answers: 15 percent correct 42 percent partially correct 35 percent incorrect The question who are the most disliked politicians was answered by Austrians: Saddam Hussein 59 percent George W Bush 45 percent By Germans: Saddam Hussein 77 percent George W Bush 47 percent While these results clearly showed a massive decline of positive opinions in regard to the foreign policy of the United States since the Clinton years, this was not only typical for Austria or Germany In a Dutch poll of October 2002 US-Americans were counted as one of the most unpopular nationalities, besides Moroccans and Turks And in a British poll of February 2003 the United States were deemed to be the most dangerous nation on the globe, even ahead of Iraq and North Korea Austrians answered: percent yes 28 percent partially correct 53 percent incorrect Austrians in 2004: percent yes 27 percent partially correct 57 percent incorrect IMAS POLL May/June 2004 What you think: did the general attitudes towards the United States recently Umfrageberichte von IMAS International Nr 4, February 2003: Amerika aus der Sicht der Deutschen und Österreicher: Nur Wenige betrachten USA als ein Vorbild für Europa http://www.imas-international.com/report/2003/04-02.pdf [accessed 21 July 2003] 13 improve, deteriorate or remain the same? Improve Deteriorate Same  Feb/Mar 1998 13 25 62  Oct/Nov 2001 12 32 56  March 2002 10 36 54  June 2004 73 22 1026 persons over 16 had been polled face to face and the analysis closed with the following: „The downright dramatic growth of criticism towards the United States since March 2002 leaves no doubt at all that it is based on the US-war against Iraq and the violent occupation policies of the Americans A crushing majority of nearly 80 percent of Austrians followed the torture of Iraqi POWs More than 50 percent of the adult population discussed these events with friends or relatives These discussions were especially intensive among the better educated groups with high school diploma and academics as well as top managers and civil servants While 25 percent believe that these torture cases represent individual cases, 37 percent of those polled think that these occurrences represent typical American behavior towards their opponents Independent of the question of proportion and causes of the torturing the great majority of Austrians think that they constitute criminal behavior, which has to be sanctioned with legal consequences 56 percent of the Austrians are of the opinion that these actions constitute war crimes, which have to be punished accordingly Only 11 percent of the Austrians are of a contrary opinion (the others undecided).” The title of the report was revealing: “Disappointment with the world power USA”.8 Furthermore in a Canadian Youth Poll in June 2004 over 40% of Canadian teens thought America is "evil„ and that number rose to 64 per cent for French Canadian youth Why? The International Herald Tribune on July 2004 commented, “U.S is seen as losing its moral authority.” And the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Musa Hitam, brought the meaning home: “Leadership by example is in tatters now, as far as the U.S is concerned”.10 A Snapshot from a Salzburg Gymnasium, March 2003 A small poll of 26 Austrian gymnasium pupils, aged 12 and 13, in Salzburg in March 2003 IMAS Report 12, Jun2 2004: Enttäuschung über die Weltmacht USA http://www.imas-international.com/institut_report.htm [accessed July 2004] Can West News Services: Canadian Youth Vote June 2004: http://www.torontofreepress.com/2004/weinreb063004.htm [accessed July 2004] 10 Thomas Fuller and Brian Knowlton, International Herald Tribune, July 2004 14 shows that people below 16 already have their opinions, revealing quite astonishing results.11 While this tiny survey in no way can be interpreted as representative for all Austrian children of that age group it nevertheless constitutes an interesting snapshot Asked to write down associations coming to their mind when thinking about “America” they produced the following: stupid politicians who have no clue Saddam Hussein, Iraq, George Bush, September 11, World Trade Center The president of the United States is George Bush – I´d rather not voice my opinion President George Bush – a blithering idiot Bush is a dumb president addicted to war budget deficit world power, biggest companies, biggest crimes many dangerous weapons death penalty, lethal injections, electric chair ghettoes, racism, street gangs, KKK know-it-alls, election fraud low pensions capitalism dollar CIA, FBI, NHL, NFL, NBA, CNN statue of liberty, Super Bowl, White House, Manhattan, Pentagon stars and stripes, cowboys, highways fear, modern and conservative life in the fast lane war, hatred, strife, diseases violence, drugs, poor people bad English fast food, bad food, fat food, fat people American Dream Disney World, Burger King, McDonalds Coca-Cola, peanut butter Hollywood, American music, stars Baywatch, Broadway, Cadillac, Chevrolet astronauts alligator farms sky scrapers 11 This survey was written in German by the pupils of class 3a of the Bundesgymnasium und Europagymnasium Salzburg-Nonntal on 10 March 2003 The entries repeated most often appear at the top of the list 15 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Polls, December 2002 and March 2003 In contrast to the above minimalist snapshot, the results of two impressive polls carried through by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press really are representative in a rather monumental way For the two polls, “What the World Thinks in 2002: How Global Publics View: Their Lives, Their Countries, The World and America” and “America´s Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties, But Post-War Iraq Will Be Better Off”, presented in Washington in December 2002 and in March 2003 respectively, the Pew Research Center had interviewed more than 44,000 persons in 44 nations, the questionnaires having been translated into 63 languages.12 Although the introduction and summary of the first poll was headed “Global Gloom and Growing Anti-Americanism” and the second poll could be summed up in a nutshell with the title “U.S Image Plummets”, the polls did not only reveal regional differences but also proved that the interviewees could very well distinguish between the United States, US values and US foreign policy Furthermore, these results prove that but even differentiated their opinions with regard to the policies of the Bush administration Some examples from these polls, which can be downloaded from the Internet December 2003 U.S Image Slips 12 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press “What the World Thinks in 2002: How Global Publics View: Their Lives, Their Countries, The World and America” http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165 [accessed 21 July 2003] “America´s Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties, But Post-War Iraq Will Be Better Off” http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=175 [accessed 21 July 2003] 16 March 2003 U.S Image Plummets 17 The question whether the diplomatic and security ties between the United States and Europe should remain or become more independent after the unilateralist steps of the Bush administration created an interesting trend towards wishes for more independence among Europeans who were polled between 2001 and 2002 Even more interesting were the answers given to the question whether the problem was “mostly America” or rather president Bush While Russian and Turkish interviewees predominately saw the problem as a general American one (even the British coming out with a strong 31 percent in disfavour of the United States as a whole), exactly those who were most heavily accused of mongering general anti-Americanism sentiments, the French and the Germans, clearly opined that their problems did not lay with the USA but simply with the policies of the Bush administration Although it already was the Clinton administration that embraced the principle “with 18 partners if we can, alone if we must” and in reality “there is far more continuity between the Clinton and Bush foreign-policy doctrines than Democrats [and foreign observers] usually like to concede”, 13 interestingly enough Bill Clinton´s foreign policy is still achieving much higher ratings than those of George W Bush Furthermore, the interviewees even could clearly differentiate between different measures of the Bush administration President Bush´s policies therefore achieve mixed grades and cannot simply be filed under the label of anti-Americanism While his policies toward environmental questions, the withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the development of missile defence as well as his performance in regard to the death penalty met with strong disapproval, his decision to keep troops in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as his stance on free trade was clearly supported by strong majorities of those polled 13 David Rieff, “Good Bye, World Order” in motherjones.com July/August 2003 http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2003/28/ma_442_01.html [accessed 22 July 2003] 19 It is also not surprising to note that worries about a potential future US military threat were strongest in predominately Islamic countries as well as in Russia: Finally, one question regarding these Pew Research Center polls about the importance of religion for the lives of those interviewed certainly reveals a deep trench of faith between Europeans, in the West as well as in the East, and US citizens Only Latin America and Islamic countries produced higher results than the United States in this field and this fundamental(ist) gap between the United States and Europe may well influence the development of future grievances and difficulties 20 The BBC-ICM Poll, May and June 2003 Another more recent poll, conducted after the war against Iraq among 11,000 people polled across 11 countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) during May and June 2003, also offers interesting comparative data, which may be perused in their entirety online 14 This survey of global attitudes about the USA conducted by ICM for the BBC is important evidence for anybody trying to explain, as The Guardian noted, “why America both fascinates and infuriates the rest of the world.” As in the polls above, the interviewees 14 BBC-ICM Poll, June 2003, “What the World Thinks of America” http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2003/wtwt%20excl%20usa.pdf [accessed 21 July 2003] 21 again clearly showed their ability to chose between what they deem to be positive or negative about the United States and her global power The following commentary of the British Guardian is quite worthwhile to contemplate in our context While the United States may (or may not yet) have won the Iraq war, it is losing the battle for global public opinion on issues like nuclear proliferation, world poverty and climate change… Many recognise America's idealism, its wealth and its freedoms as the nation's greatest strengths… Interestingly, while the rest of the world admires much in the US, most people would not actually want to live there Its food and drink were deemed unpalatable, although its movies and music scored highly… The world appears to be fracturing between an English-speaking one and a non-English-speaking one Canada, Australia, Britain and America are on one side (along with Israel), with countries like France, Russia, Jordan and Korea on the other The former regard America as ´a force for good in the world´; the latter not What does all this tell us? American values are not the problem, Washington's actions and policies are The fault lies with George Bush… The message is clear: the world has less of a problem with America than it has with Mr Bush.15 America always has meant more for the rest of the world than the rest of the world has meant for America This text, published by The Guardian, one of the leading newspapers of the major USally in the war against Iraq, is a perfect example of the political split of published and public opinion within the United Kingdom And while the great majority of USmainstream media supported the line of the Bush-administration rather uncritically there is no lack of evidence that a large number of US-citizens refused to toe Washington´s line The domestic critics of the government of Tony Blair and the Bush administration may be right or wrong but are they unpatriotic? Only if those governments resembled the United Kingdom and the USA totally, which they certainly not The critics are only exerting their democratic right to oppose strategies of foreign policy which they deem dangerous if not catastrophic for global stability as well as domestic measures endangering exactly those democratic rights which they purport to defend Of course, the same fundamental democratic rights apply to the citizens of the rest of the world, no less than 95 percent of humanity The global reach of the United States of America and the impact of the decisions of her government which is felt in every corner of the world has created a situation in which practically every citizen of the globe has become a quasi-American, albeit without the right to vote in US-presidential elections But the world´s citizens not only have the right to voice their opinions in questions which touch upon their most vital interests – but also a duty to so It is, of course, correct that primitive anti-Americanism does not only exist but also even may have 15 “BBC´s World Service”, The Guardian, 19 June 2003 http://www.guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,3604,980222,00.html [accessed 21 July 2003] 22 been strengthened as a result of recent developments – but so have the most primitive forms of anti-Europeanism in the United States Still, the polls presented in this essay demonstrate, that the international publics are less gullible and misinformed than the played up media hype before, during, and after the war against Iraq seamed to portray America always has meant more to the rest of the world than the rest of the world has meant to America – and while this may be a platitude, it is a platitude holding immense political dynamite for the future Because there exists a strange disparity between the (quite necessary) interest of the world in the USA while the rest of the world for a majority of US-citizens hardly seems to exist at all In regard to this self-centeredness of the United States Mark Hertsgaard, author of The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World recently stated:”People worldwide actually like Americans, and they continually think of us, yet we barely recognize they exist… We see everything through the prism of our own experience We've been self-contained for a long time.”16 This disinterest and lack of education in world history and global affairs of many US-Americans has created an immense dialectical tension with enormous future political implications: while over the last hundred years US-power has become global an ever larger number of US-citizens have become ever more insular One example may suffice: while European (and other) cinema screens have become occupied by US-movies like never before (between 90 and 95 percent) during the last two decades of the 20th century, since the mid-1980s movies from all countries of the world taken together hardly have made up one percent of US-box offices (art and college cinemas excluded) One thing is certain This huge disparity neither can be explained by the quality of the movies nor by the soft power hegemony of the United States alone: it also is a powerful indicator for a general lack of interest in foreign film production within the USA During the last hundred years the United States of America have become the undisputed leader in the production and distribution of signs and myths globally They have become the most audible and visible country in human history – but that does not necessarily mean that they also are the best understood It is true that the transformation and morphing of the Monroe Doctrine into the Marilyn Monroe Doctrine resulted in tremendous advantages for the United States It remains to be seen, though, whether the fact that the majority of the poorer and uneducated citizens of the world are getting most of their information about the United States nearly exclusively via Hollywood will be advantageous for US-interests in the long run 16 Jennifer Harper, “Americans not ruffled by world's contempt”, The Washington Times, 20 June 2003 http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20030620-120850-2509r.htm [accessed 23 July 2003] 23 Envy, even hate, may all be part of the imperial job description Still, in the long run Uncle Sam probably would be better off by substituting his gigantic loudspeakers and amplifiers with better hearing aids SELECTED LITERATURE Günter Bischof, “Das amerikanische Jahrhundert: Europas Niedergang – Amerikas Aufstieg“ in Zeitgeschichte 28 Jg., März/April 2001, Heft 2: 75-95 James Ceaser, Reconstructing America The Symbol of America in Modern Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) Horst Dippel, "Faszination und Wandel im europäischen Amerikabild: Vom Eldorado zum Paradigma," in Zeitschrift für historische Forschung Beiheft 1989: 83-96 24 Albert Doering-Manteuffel, "Dimensionen von Amerikanisierung Gesellschaft," in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 35/1995: 1-34 in der deutschen Umberto Eco, Apokalyptiker und Integrierte Zur kritischen Kritik der Massenkultur (Frankfurt, 1984) Philipp Gassert, "Amerikanismus, Antiamerikanismus, Amerikanisierung Neue Literatur zur Sozial-, Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des amerikanischen Einflusses in Deutschland und Europa", in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 39 (1999): 531-561 Philipp Gassert, "Was meint Amerikanisierung? Über den Begriff des Jahrhunderts" in Merkur 54:9/10 (September/Oktober 2000): 785-796 Ulf Hannerz, Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places (London, 1996) Mark Hertsgaard, The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 2002) Franz M Joseph (Hg.), As Others See Us (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959) Richard F Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley, 1993) Rob Kroes, "Americanisation: What Are We Talking About?" in Rob Kroes, Robert W Rydell and Doeko F.J Bosscher (eds.), Cultural Transmissions and Receptions American Mass Culture in Europe (Amsterdam, 1993): 302-318 Rob Kroes, "America and Europe – A Clash of Imagined Communities" in John Dean and Jean-Paul Gabilliet (eds.), European Readings of American Popular Culture (Westport, 1996): xxv-lii Rob Kroes, If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall Europeans and American Mass Culture (Urbana and Chicago, 1996) Denis Lacorne et al (eds.), L'Amérique dans les têtes Un siècle de fascinations et d'aversions (Paris, 1986) Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marßolek, Adelheid von Saldern (eds.), Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20 Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1996) Kaspar Maase, Grenzenloses Vergnügen Der Aufstieg der Massenkultur 1850 - 1970 (Frankfurt: Fischer 1997) Phil Melling and Jon Roper (eds.), Americanization and the Transformation of World Cultures (Lampeter, Wales: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996) Berndt Ostendorf, “Why Is American Popular Culture So Popular? A View from Europe” in Amerikastudien/American Studies 64.3 (2001): 339-366 Richard Pells, Not Like Us How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II (New York: Basic Books 1997) Bernd Polster (ed.), Westwind: Die Amerikanisierung Europas (Köln: Dumont 1995) Horst Eberhard Richter "Amerikanismus, Antiamerikanismus oder was sonst." Psyche 40 No Juli 1986, 583-599 George Ritzer, The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the Changing Character of Contemporary Social Life (Pine Forge Press, 1995) Philippe Roger, Rêves et cauchemars amộricaines Les ẫtats-Unis au miroir de l'opinion publique franỗaise, 1945-1953 (Paris, 1996) 25 Roger Rollin (ed.), The Americanization of the Global Village: Essays in Comparative Popular Culture (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Press, 1989) W T Stead, Americanization of the World; or, The Trend of the Twentieth Century (London, 1901) Nancy Snow, Propaganda, Inc.: Selling America's Culture to the World (New York, 1998) John Tomlinson, Globalisation and Culture (Chicago, 1999) Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1st ed 1994, 2nd ed 2001) R Wagnleitner, "The Empire of the Fun, or Talkin´ Soviet Union Blues: The Sound of Freedom and U.S Cultural Hegemony in Europe" in Michael J Hogan (ed.), The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S Foreign Relations in the "American Century"(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999):463-499 R Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May (eds.), “Here, There and Everywhere”: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2000) R Wagnleitner, "´No Commodity Is Quite So Strange As This Thing Called Cultural Exchange´: The Foreign Politics of American Pop Culture Hegemony" in Gerhard Bach, Sabine Broeck and Ulf Schulenberg (eds.), Americanization - Globalization - Education (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2003): 153-181 R Wagnleitner, "Back to the Future Revisited: Changing European Attitudes Toward the United States Between Utopia and Dystopia” in ONE CULTURE OR TWO? Problems and Prospects of Transatlantic Dialogue Diplomatische Akademie Wien FAVORITA PAPERS 01/2003: 40-63 ... in the eyes of others, the image of a Strange New World as a European vision The creation of European images of America shows that there exists no cognitive hierarchy between the reality of America. .. including North, Central and South America The “American Century” Already forty years prior to the proclamation of "The American Century," the power of the United States of America could no longer... to the point of departure: the European conception of the West as the kingdom of the dead The Elysian Fields found their real equivalent in the cemetery culture of Southern California 6 European

Ngày đăng: 18/10/2022, 00:15

TỪ KHÓA LIÊN QUAN

TÀI LIỆU CÙNG NGƯỜI DÙNG

TÀI LIỆU LIÊN QUAN

w