Quantifying effects of EU antidumping duty on vietnam footwear

UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS HO CHI MINH CITY INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM VIETNAM THE NETHERLANDS VIETNAM - NETHERLANDS PROGRAMME FOR M.A IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS Quantifying Effects of EU Antidumping Duty on Vietnam Footwear By NguyễnTrườngToan A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Development Economics Under the Supervision of: Assoc.Prof Dr.PhamHoàngVăn and Assoc.Prof Dr.NguyễnTrongHoài HO CHI MINH CITY, April 2014 DECLARATION This is to certify that this thesis entitled “Quantifying effects of EU antidumping duty on Vietnam footwear”, which is submitted by me in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Art in Development Economic to the Vietnam – The Netherlands Programme The thesis constitutes only my original work and due supervision and acknowledgement have been made in the text to all materials used Nguyễn Trương Toan ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would never have been able to finish my dissertationwithout the help and support of people surrounding me First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude tomy mentors Assoc Prof Dr PhamHoàngVăn, and Assoc Prof Dr NguyễnTrongHoài for the continuous support of my M.A study and research; for their patience, encouragement, erudite knowledge Their excellent guidance encouraged me in all the time of doing this study I have been strikingly lucky to have supervisors who cared so much my thesis, and answered to all my questions and queries punctually I could not have imagined having better supervisors and advisors for my research Besides my mentors, I would like to thank Dr Pham Khanh Nam and Prof Jame Riedel for their thorough comments and worthy ideas that help to enhance my thesis’s value My sincere thanks also goes toall the lecturers at the Vietnam – NetherlandsProgram for their knowledge of all the courses, during the time I studied at theprogram.I would like to offer my special thanks to Dr LêVănChơn, Dr, TrươngĐăngThuy, Dr Lorenzo pellegrini who help me significantly in the courses and thesis writing processes In addition, I would like to express my great appreciation to my friends for their motivations Last but not the least;I owe a very important debt tomy family: my parents NguyễnVănTô and Đô Thi Liễu, for giving birth to me at the first place and supporting me spiritually throughout my life Hô Chi Minh city, April 2014 NguyễnTrườngToan iii ABBREVIATIONS AD Antidumping Duties GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade WTO World Trade Organization EU European Union U.S United States EC European Commission C.I.F cost.insurance freight CN8 8-digit Combined Nomenclature code HTS Harmonized Tariff Schedule F.O.B Free on Board GSO Vietnam General Statistics Office BTA Bilateral Trade Agreement USITC United States International Trade Committee EUROSTAT European Commission Statistic Office W.P.T wood and wooden, papers and textiles ABSTRACT This paper examines effect of EU antidumping on Vietnam footwear firms We find that EU AD causes a 52.8% decline of Vietnam targeted export products, at least Besides value, there is 42.2% reduction of the least affected scenario For the most impacted images, it leads to a fall of 105.6% and 107,1% for value and volume in five years after AD, respectively This paper also indicates that there is no association between AD and price of Vietnam export We find very little evidence that Vietnam footwear firm’s revenue, labor payroll and jobs have association with AD It is only small firms decline revenue, but small firms contribute only 1.65% total revenue of footwear And, there is no evidence that footwear firm discharge their employees because of AD We find the explanation for this interesting phenomenon from trade diversion story There is no evidence of product diversion of Vietnam firms to EU But, it is strongly evident that Vietnam firms significantly diverse their markets toward U.S Keywords: Antidumping, Vietnam Footwear LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1 Home Import Demand Figure 2.2 Foreign Export Supply Curve Figure 2.3 Impact of tariff on import price and volume Figure 2.4 Effect of tariff on social welfare in case of large country 11 Figure 2.5 Effect of tariff on Home demand in case of small country 11 Figure 2.6 Effect of export subsidy on export country 13 Figure 2.7 Infant Industry Protection 14 Figure 2.8 Impact of reciprocal dumping on welfare 18 Figure 2.9 Conceptual framework 24 Figure 3.1 Top five Vietnamese export goods exclude oil in 2004 26 Figure 3.2.Top five footwear exporters to EU 27 Figure 3.3 EU import Vietnam AD footwear and non-AD footwear 29 Figure 4.1 Difference in Difference Method 41 Figure 4.2 Trend of export value, quantity, price of Vietnam AD Footwear and control groups to EU 44 Figure 4.3 Some main Vietnamese export goods 55 Figure 4.4 Trend of export value, quantity, price of Vietnam Non-AD Footwearand control groups to EU 64 Figure 4.5 Trend of export value, quantity, price of Vietnam Footwear and control groups to USA .70 LIST OF TABLE Table 1.1 Merchandise exports by selected economy (USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, China, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italia) in billion USD Table 1.2 Vietnam Merchandise Trade in percent over GDP Table 1.3 Vietnam export to EU in million USD Table 3.1 EU AD on Vietnam and People Republic China Footwear 28 Table 3.2.Vietnam AD footwear export value, volume, price to US compareto control groups .30 Table 3.3.Vietnam Non- AD footwear export value, volume, price to US compareto control groups 32 Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics of Vietnam Firms Characteristics 33 Table 3.5.Vietnam footwear export value, volume, price to US compareto control groups 37 Table 4.1.Vietnam AD footwear export value to EU compares to control groups .46 Table 4.2.Vietnam AD footwear export volume to EU compares tocontrol groups 47 Table 4.3 Vietnam AD footwear export price to EU compare tocontrol groups .48 Table 4.4 Footwear firm’s revenue compares to Apparel over period 2004-2006 50 Table 4.5 Footwear firm’s revenue compares to Apparel over period 2003-2007 .51 Table 4.6.Footwear firm’s revenue compare to W.P.Tover period 2004-2006 52 Table 4.7.Footwear firm’s revenue compare to W.P.Tover period 2003-2007 54 Table 4.8.Footwear labor’spayrollcompare to Apparelover period 2004-2006 57 Table 4.9 Footwear labor’spayrollcompare to W.P.Tover period 2004-2006 58 Table 4.10 Footwear firm’s sizecompare to Apparelover period 2004-2006 60 Table 4.11 Footwear firm’s sizecompare to W.P.Tover period 2004-2006 61 Table 4.12.Vietnam non-AD footwear export value to EU compares to control groups 65 Table 4.13 Vietnam non-AD footwear export volume to EUcompares tocontrol groups 67 Table 4.14.Vietnam non-AD footwear export price to EU compares to control groups 68 Table 4.15 US Import value of Vietnam footwear compares tocontrol groups 72 Table 4.16.US Import volume of Vietnam footwear compares tocontrol groups .73 Table 4.17.US Import price of Vietnam compares tocontrol groups 74 Table A.1Footwear labor’spayrollcompare to Apparelover period 2003-2007 87 Table A.2 Footwear labor’s payroll compare to W.P.T over period 2003-2007 .87 Table A.3 Footwear firm’s size compare to Apparel over period 2003-2007 88 Table A.4Footwear firm’s sizecompare to W.P.Tover period 2003-2007 89 vii Contents Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Research context and problem statement 1.2 Research objectives 1.3 Research questions: 1.4 Research methodology, data and scope 1.5 Thesis structure Chapter 2: Literature Review 2.1 Theoretical Review 2.1.1 Market analysis in context of Trade in a single industry 2.1.2 Effect of a tariff 2.1.3 Export subsidies 12 2.1.4 Dumping 13 2.1.5 Antidumping Duties 18 2.2 Empirical Review 21 2.3 Conceptual Framework 23 Chapter 3: An overview of Vietnamese Footwear Industry 26 3.1 EU tax rising on Vietnamese footwear 26 3.2 Data Description 29 3.2.1 EU Import 8-digit (CN8) Data 29 3.2.2 Vietnam Enterprise Survey Data 33 3.2.3 US Import 10-digit (HTS10) Data 36 Chapter 4: Model Estimation and Research Findings 39 4.1 Double Difference Approach 39 4.2 Double Difference in Multiple Years 41 4.3 Estimation Impact of EU Antidumping on Vietnam Footwear Export 42 4.4 Estimation Impact of EU Antidumping on Vietnam Footwear Firms .49 4.4.1 Firm revenue 49 4.4.2 Firm size and labor payroll 56 4.5 Trade Diversion 62 4.5.1 Product Diversion 62 4.5.2 Market Diversion 68 viii Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 76 5.1 Conclusion Remarks 76 5.2 Policy implications 77 5.3 Limitation and future direction 77 References 79 Appendix 83 Appendix 87 viii Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Research context and problem statement Trade has been growing significantly in recent decades Basic statistics given by World Trade Organization (WTO) demonstrates undoubted evidence of impressive upward trend in export and import merchandises products (Table 1.1) Consequently, international economics study is getting more and more important Some economists indicate trade as momentum of growth (Frankel & Romer, 1999; Irwin & Terviö, 2002; Wacziarg & Welch, 2008) This might be explained by some main channels Firstly, labor division could lead to efficiency gains In addition, trade growth lead to larger market; thus, firms could get more benefit from economy of scale Also, contract with foreign partners could import modern technology while competition creates more motivations to enhance skills and performance Trade openness could bring capital investment to low-capital countries as well Why trade expands? Causes of trade openness were examined by (Baier & Bergstrand, 2001; P Krugman, Cooper, & Srinivasan, 1995).They points out technology improvements, leading to cutting transportation cost and communication cost, are one of reason for trade enhancement Furthermore, governments has been changing policies which aims to more integrated instead of bounded off; for example, joining bilateral trade agreement and multilateral trade agreement; boost international trade Although, general trend of policies target to more opened for trade Nations exercise more temporary barriers such as Antidumping (AD) or technology barriers to bring up domestic producers in short-term Table 1.1 Merchandise exports by selected economy (USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, China, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italia) in billion USD 1948 1953 1963 1973 1983 58.5 83.82 156.77 578.79 1837.563 3675.596 7376.506 17816.37 62.25 85.06 163.6 593.71 1881.53 10 1993 2003 2011 3785.863 7694.738 15076.52 Brander, J A (1981) Intra-industry trade in identical commodities Journal of International Economics, 11(1), 1-14 Brander, J A., & Spencer, B J (1984) Trade warfare: tariffs and cartels Journal of International Economics, 16(3), 227-242 Brenton, P (2001) Anti-dumping policies in the EU and trade diversion European Journal of Political Economy, 17(3), 593-607 C166/14/2006, C R E N Commission Regulation (EC) No C166/14/2006, Official Journal of the European Union, European Commission, 7.July 2005 Cuyvers, L., & Dumont, M (2005) EU Anti‐dumping Measures against ASEAN Countries: Impact on Trade Flows* Asian Economic Journal, 19(3), 249-271 Dale, R (1980) Anti-Dumping Law In A Liberal Trade Order: St Martin's Press, New York Dixit, A (1984) International trade policy for oligopolistic industries The Economic Journal, 94, 1-16 Dixit, A (1988) Anti-dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly European Economic Review, 32(1), 55-68 Egger, P., & Nelson, D (2011) How bad is antidumping? Evidence from Panel Data Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(4), 1374-1390 Feenstra, R C (2003) Advanced international trade: theory and evidence: Princeton University Press Finger, J M., & Artis, N T (1993) Antidumping: How it works and who gets hurt: University of Michigan Press Frankel, J A., & Romer, D (1999) Does trade cause growth? 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Assessing national trade policies during the crisis of 2008 The Review of Economics and Statistics(0) Konings, J., & Vandenbussche, H (2005) Antidumping protection and markups of domestic firms Journal of International Economics, 65(1), 151-165 Konings, J., Vandenbussche, H., & Springael, L (2001) Import diversion under European antidumping policy Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 1(3), 283-299 Krueger, A O., & Tuncer, B (1982) An empirical test of the infant industry argument American economic review, 72(5), 1142-1152 Krugman, P (1984) Import protection as export promotion: International competition in the presence of oligopoly and economies of scale Monopolistic competition and international trade, 180-193 Krugman, P., Cooper, R N., & Srinivasan, T (1995) Growing world trade: causes and consequences Brookings papers on economic activity, 1995(1), 327-377 Krugman, P R (1979) Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade Journal of International Economics, 9(4), 469-479 Krugman, P R., & Obstfeld, M (2008) International Economics: Theory And Policy, Chapter 8: Pearson Education India Krupp, C M., & Pollard, P S (1996) Market responses to antidumping laws: some evidence from the US chemical industry Canadian Journal of Economics, 199-227 Mankiw, N G (2012) Principles of microeconomics: Cengage Learning Messerlin, P A (1989) The EC antidumping regulations: A first economic appraisal, 1980– 85 Review of World Economics, 125(3), 563-587 Moore, M O., & Zanardi, M (2009) Does antidumping use contribute to trade liberalization in developing countries? Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 42(2), 469-495 Park, S (2009) The trade depressing and trade diversion effects of antidumping actions: The case of China China Economic Review, 20(3), 542-548 Pierce, J R (2011) Plant-level responses to antidumping duties: Evidence from US manufacturers Journal of International Economics, 85(2), 222-233 Prusa, T J (1992) Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn? Journal of International Economics, 33(1), 1-20 Prusa, T J (1994) Pricing behavior in the presence of antidumping law Journal of Economic Integration, 260-289 Prusa, T J (1996) The trade effects of US antidumping actions: National Bureau of Economic Research Prusa, T J (2003) On the spread and impact of anti‐dumping Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 34(3), 591-611 Prusa, T J (2005) Anti‐dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade The World Economy, 28(5), 683-700 Prusa, T J (2006) East Asia's Anti‐dumping Problem The World Economy, 29(6), 743-761 Sabry, F (2000) An analysis of the decision to file, the dumping estimates, and the outcome of antidumping petitions The International Trade Journal, 14(2), 109-145 Schott, J J (1994) Uruguay Round: An Assessment Peterson Institute Press: All Books Staiger, R W., & Wolak, F A (1992) The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly Journal of International Economics, 32(3), 265-287 Staiger, R W., & Wolak, F A (1994) Measuring industry specific protection: Antidumping in the United States: National Bureau of Economic Research Viner, J (1966) Dumping: A problem in international trade New York: AM Kelley Wacziarg, R., & Welch, K H (2008) Trade liberalization and growth: New evidence the world bank economic review, 22(2), 187-231 Appendix No Referen ces (Pierce, Objectives Data Impact of antidumping on US firm level data in Using in Antidumping drives price go up that 2011) Home firms productivity manufacturing industries for the years 1987, 1992, 1997 Difference Method Treatment group includes all firms in industries that received government protection Control group includes firms that similar to treatment but don’t receive protection leads to revenue productivity of Home firm increase However, physical performance of Home firm declines Data is published by IMF over period 19482001 at country level; including GDP, bilateral trade export volumes OLS regression relies on gravity model and Difference Effects of AD on world trade volume and welfare are very little However, authors argue that this result should not be seen as reason to consider or neglect AD Authors compiled dataset from reports submitted to WTO of its members over period 1980-2002 Applying Poisson regression model East Asian is region suffers highest number of AD cases Also, time trend of this region is positive while the others are negative Using mathematic formula in combination of reciprocal dumping model and Game theory Author give proofs for both Cournot and Bertrand cases There are two main results (1) if government focuses only on domestic welfare: consumer surplus producer surplus, it will be expected to have no AD (2) Firms have trend to lobby government to rises AD law since they have more benefit and behaviors (Egger & Nelson, 2011) Investigate effect of antidumping on effect on world trade volume and welfare (Prusa, 2006) Investigate the east Asian’s problems with AD Prove two things (1) suffer extreme number of AD cases, (2) account for a significant contingent of growth of increase AD (Anders on et al., 1995) Investigate the motivation of government to raise AD and who gains from them Methodology Difference Key conclusions in Difference (Prusa, 2003) Impact of AD on Foreign export, and Home countries might be addicted in using AD US data is employed, the case of AD, year of filings, outcome are getting from USITC and previous studies Compare results of (1) panel fixed effects regression and (2) Instrument variable (IV) regression with lagged value is chosen as When countries used AD as protection solution, it is difficult to stop using it (2) AD causes a substantial declines in import from “named” country, around 30%-50% (Hansen & Prusa, 1995) Prove the widespread of using AD under article VII of WTO Author collection from USITC annual report information related to AD cases Meta-analysis in combination with some mathematics formulas (1)Provide a framework to understand phenomenon of extraordinary rising of usage article VII, (2) appearance of article VII seem not matter to US producers under EU protection Compare before and after article V2 Compensation reduces 21% before and 17% after, total employment declines 22% before and 18% after (Blonige n & Prusa, 2001 survey & classify previous study on AD Collect previous studies from well-known journal Meta-analysis (Herand er & S c h w a r t z , ) (Sabry , 200 0) Give an very worthy summary of previous study related to AD Inspect impact of intimidati on of US to establish AD on partners Collect from USITC & US Census Bureau over period 19761981 Most of estimation used data at 3-digit SIC industry level, however, evaluation of foreign firm pricing behavior used firm level data Twostage OLS with Instrume nt variable is used Foreign firms adjust their behaviors if they recognize that there is a threat of usage AD from USITC on their pricing behaviors In other words, less than fair value is striking concern of firm while material injury is contribute very little to firm’s decision Associat ion between acceptan ce of imposin g AD and reason leading to the investiga tion, and determin ants of rising tariff US data over duration 1986-1992 at fourdigit SIC level, 360 industries were collected Data of AD was collected from USITC Probabili ty success of agreeme nt of AD and is estimated by univariat e and a bivariate probit model Tariff impositio n is calculate by tobit model Market share of Foreign exporters, tariff margin calculated by DOC and space utilization subject to the result of claims e (Prusa, r 1994) and Starting no t firm’s with tar a profit iff ri pricing im ff maximization initial po t assumption period sit h profit in io a n combination aft t game er t equilibrium thi h is s e mathematics pe y rio m d i ( g h ) t F f o a r c e e i w g it n h fi i r n m p s e h ri a o v d e tr e ( n d ) t E o ff i e n c c ts r o e n a D s o e m p e ri st c i e c t fi o r l m o w 10 d e c i s i o n a r e q u i t e c o m p l e x I t m i g h t l e a d t o i n c r e a s e i n p r i c e o f D o m esti c in cas e of ther e are no stra tegi es to aim at gett ing mat eria l inju ry req uire me nts Ho wev er, in som e cas e Do mes tic fir ms mig ht low er thei r pric e to low prof it in this peri od so that gov ern m e n t w il l a 1 E v al ( u C at u e y i v m e p r a s ct & o Dumo f nt, E 2005U A D a g n st A S E A N o n tr a d e fl o w s b et w e e n t h e t w o c c e p t “ m a teri al inju ry” diti on tic L o n g pa ne l da ta o ve r pe ri o d 02 0 ar e co n d uc te d b y O E C D In te rn at io na l Tr ad e by Com modi ties Statis tics The data is avail able at 6digit of Stan dard Inter natio nal Trad e Class ificat ion at (SIT C) level and level Besi des that data from EU trade statis are empl oyed 10digit Com bined Nom encla ture (CN) classifica tion First difference Generalize d Method of Moment (GMM) is employed Lagged values are used as Instrument variables Authors also control for year fixed effects and countries fixed effects A 10% AD impositi on of EU leads to 1.6% reductio n in import from “named ” ASEAN countrie s in year right after tariff and 2.7% in next year Including fixed effects to model those numbers are 2% and 3.3% respectively It also found that there is a phenomenon of trade diversion toward nonnamed countries as well 12 (Brambill a et al., 2012) Evaluate impact of US AD on income of catfish (Tra&Basa fish) household in Mekong delta of Vietnam And Investigate how catfish household change their income activities to adapt with AD duty Panel data of two years 2004-2006 of Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) This survey is collected by Vietnam General Statistics Office (GSO) with technical support and partial fund from world bank Data is available at household level Using Difference in In Four provinces of Mekong Delta Difference model with (An Giang, Can Tho, Dong Thap, treatment group are and Vinh Long), AD causes a catfish household and 12.8% decline of total household control group are income for households contains households which 5.5% of catfish in their income not contains catfish in activities The effects on household income activities which contain 11.2% and over 20% Authors have of catfish in their income activities adjustment to includes are -22.9% and -33.8%, households fixed respectively This paper also effects and control for indicates that household have trend time-variant to adjust their behavior to reduce households investment in catfish activities characteristics For robustness, authors (Br Esti Indu Met Importe change control group en mat stry ad from and function forms to e level anal targeted n, the data ysis countri 20 imp from with es 01 act Euro grap decreas ) of stat hs ed even EU and To tariff is AD USI rein not on TC forc applied the data e Import trad resu from e lts, intradive auth EU rsio ors nonn use named fro d countri m sim es nam ple promot ed OL e but cou S less ntri regr than es essi outside to on EU intr mod nonael named EU countri and es extr aEU non nam ed cou ntri es 14 ( G a n g u l i , 0 ) I n v e s t i g a t e i m p a c t o f I n d i a A D t o b i l a t e r a l t r a d e f l o w s o f I n d i a w i t h t a r g e t e d c o u n t r i e s i n n a m e d i n d u s t r i e s I n s p e c t e f f e c t Se o ver f al so A urc D es of o dat n a: (1) aut d hor i s v col e lec r t s 4i dig o it, n 6dig t it, o 8w dig a it r lev d el of n Ha o rm n oni - ze d n Sy a ste m m e (H d S) Co c des o of u 28 n t Ind r ia i e A s D cas es (2) Im por t tra de d a t a w a s c o l l e c t e d f r o m U n i t e d N a t i o n s ’ C o m m o d i t y T r a d e S t a ti st i c s D a t a b a s e ( C o m tr a d e ) I m p o rt i n f o r m a ti o n a r e d e fl a t e d b y u si n g co ns u m er pr ic e in de x (C PI ) (1 98 lla rs) (3 ) da ta of A D fil in gs w er e co lle ct ed by su b mi tte d re po rt to W T O of In di a to c o n st r u ct p a n el d at a fr o m 9 to 0 Auth or used gene raliz ed meth od of mom ents (GM M) follo wed Arell ano and Bon d, lagg ed valu es are empl oyed as Instr ume nt varia ble (IV) A D u p l e a d s r i g h t a f t e r i n i t i a t i o n t o % d e c r e a s e o f t a r g e t e d g r o ( P a r k , 0 ) y e a r a ft e r i n i n it ia ti o n p e ri o d i m p o rt v al u e c o ll a p s e s 1 i n v e s t i g a t i o n , i n ect s of Ch ina A D on tra de e de f pr f ess Q u a n t i f y % A f t e r i m p o s i t i o n o f A D , t h e r e i s % d e c r e in g an d tr ad e di ve rsi o n ase In total , AD caus es 29% decl ines of imp ort fro m targ eted grou p Besi des that, nonnam ed cou ntrie s incr ease exp ort to Indi a 11.2 5% after two year s of AD Data at 8digit of Harm onize d Syste m (HS) of indus t r y l e v e l T i m e s e r i e s d a t a o v e r p e r i o d 9 0 w a s e m p l o y e d G e n e r a l i z e d A re ll an o an d B o n d; m la e g t ge h d o va d lu es ar o e f e m m pl o o m ye e d n as t In s st ru ( m G en Mt M va ) ri ab i le s (I V a ) p A p ut l h i or e s d co m r pa e re l re i su e lt d of fir st o n r fix % ed effe ct A esti D mat ion d u Sys t tem y gm c m a rec u ord s ed e a d 14 7% dec line in im % por t d whi r le o firs p tdiff o ere f nce gm m i m sa p w o 11 r 0% fall t in firs i t n yea r f Im i por r t s sha t re of y tar e get a ed r cou ntri f es o fall % i n fi rs t y ear if fixe d esti mat ion is em plo ye d When author uses systemgmm, it is difference-gmm , system-gmm and fixed effects for robustness result 15.3% drop 16 (Krupp & Pollard, 1996) Estimate effec antidumping dut import Try to evidence of diff behavior b named countries non-named co through several of AD 17 (Prusa, 1996) Explore effectiven usage of AD in c United States g ( b o t diversion, there is occurrence 18 (Kon Che in ck gs infl & uen Vance denof bu AD sschon e, mar 200ket5 pow er of Do mes tic firm (2) s Two sourc es of data: (1) AD cases were colle cted from offici al EU journ al; sampl e of 4000 EU produ cers from 1992 to 2000, which was sold by AM ADE US OLS regressio n base on model that Roeger (1995) indicate d in his paper : “Can imperfec t competit ion explain the differenc e between primal and measures? dual productivit y Estimates from 19 Explore trade diversion phenomenon caused by AD (Ko ning s et al., 200 1) manufacturing” (1)In average, AD cause a 26% increase of Domestic markups if there is now trade diversion toward non-named countries (2) diversion toward non-named countries dwindle increase of Domestic markup Line-items products data at 8-digit Harmonized System (HS) codes over period 1985-1990 was employed There are 246 observations in which, 105 cases have tariff imposition after investigation In principle, authors apply Difference in Difference method with some adjustments There is a limitation appearance of trade diversion story created by EU AD US period (42%), 61 cases of priceundertaking (25%) and 80 cases rejected tariff (33%) Appendix Table A.1Footwear labor’s payroll compare to Apparel over period 2003-2007 Variables Small Fw ddFw Large (1) (2) (3) (4) -.064 118 -.204 -.093 (-0.35) (0.47) (-0.34) (-0.18) -.0547 -.044 -.002 (-0.51) (-0.42) (-0.03) LnL Lnk LnFemale Constant Medium (5) (6) 058 149 -.048 (0.64) (1.29) (-0.45) -.381* -.625* -.719* (-6.85) (-16.00) (-6.76) 019 017 -.105 (0.48) (0.52) (-0.85) -.001 080 -.078 (-0.02) (1.01) (-0.59) 2.379* 3.464* 2.495* 5.525* 2.645* 8.724* (49.06) (8.11) (24.74) (12.78) (71.57) (6.53) Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 3203 3203 2637 2637 935 935 0.0487 0.1919 0.0506 0.3154 0.0638 0.3749 Prob(F-test) No.Obs R-Square Note: *, **, *** indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively (* p