Backlash against American psychology An indigenous reconstruction of the history of German critical psychology (2)

History of Psychology 2013, Vol 16, No 1, 1–18 © 2013 American Psychological Association 1093-4510/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0030286 BACKLASH AGAINST AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY: An Indigenous Reconstruction of the History of German Critical Psychology1 Thomas Teo York University After suggesting that all psychologies contain indigenous qualities and discussing differences and commonalities between German and North American historiographies of psychology, an indigenous reconstruction of German critical psychology is applied It is argued that German critical psychology can be understood as a backlash against American psychology, as a response to the Americanization of German psychology after WWII, on the background of the history of German psychology, the academic impact of the Cold War, and the trajectory of personal biographies and institutions Using an intellectualϪhistorical perspective, it is shown how and which indigenous dimensions played a role in the development of German critical psychology as well as the limitations to such an historical approach Expanding from German critical psychology, the role of the critique of American psychology in various contexts around the globe is discussed in order to emphasize the relevance of indigenous historical research Keywords: indigenous psychology, critical psychology, culture, Americanization, German psychology Issues of indigenization and indigenous psychologies have been discussed in cross-cultural and cultural psychology, as well as in the history of psychology since the early 1980s (Adair, 1999; Kim & Berry, 1993; Pickren, 2009) Despite lingering debates, there is little consensus on how these terms should be defined (see also Allwood & Berry, 2006) The term indigenization might refer to a process whereby (psychological) ideas, imported from the colonizer or the West, are adapted in colonized, nonWestern localities The argument that “the need for indigenization of psychology will be greatest in Asia and Africa, much less in Latin America, even less in Europe, and probably least in Canada” (Adair, 2006, p 470) is based on the belief that American psychology is the cultural and academic norm Yet, indigenization can also signify a general process, by which theories and concepts from outside of a particular cultural setting are accommodated into any local context Historians of psychology have demon- strated that the concept of indigenization applies equally to American psychology when, for instance, German psychology (Danziger, 1985; Pickren, 2009) or later Piagetian psychology (Burman, in press) were indigenized in the American academic landscape The terminological problem applies to indigenous psychologies2 as well The term could refer to psychologies after or before the process of indigenization For instance, one could argue that only pre-Columbian “psychologies” in Latin America (psychological ideas before 1492) are indigenous; or one could maintain that indigenous psychology refers to a unique Latin American psychology, which appeared after American and European psychologies were indigenized in this geographic locale Danziger (2006), aware of the complexities of the terminology, argued, applying a distinction This article is based on a paper presented at the 2011 APA Annual Convention in Washington, DC The research has been supported by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Standard Research Grant (410-2011-1196) The term is used in its plural due to the fact that multiplicities of indigenous psychologies exist and that it is impossible to reduce them to a unified or singular approach (this is in opposition to traditions in this line of research that use the singular) This article was published Online First February 4, 2013 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Thomas Teo, York University, Department of Psychology, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M3J 1P3 E-mail: tteo@yorku.ca TEO between center and periphery, that indigenous psychologies attempt “to develop variants of modern professional psychology that are more attuned to conditions in developing nations than the psychology taught at Western academic institutions” (p 215) Using this meaning one might associate notions of indigenous psychologies with Chinese psychologies (Hwang, 2012), Indian psychologies (Sinha, 1986), Filipino psychologies (Enriquez, 1992), and so on (for an overview see Kim, Yang, & Hwang, 2006) Yet, if indigenous psychologies refer to the study of the psyche of native humans and are used for and derived from particular groups of people (see Kim & Berry, 1993), then American (or German) psychology needs to be included as an indigenous psychology The argument of the more or less indigenousness of all psychologies can be based on the study of psychological categories that form and inform theories and empirical research Historians of psychology, cultural psychologists, and theoretical psychologists have pointed out that all psychologies (including mainstream varieties) contain “indigenous” elements (Allwood & Berry, 2006; Arnett, 2008; Bhatia, 2002; Pickren & Rutherford, 2010; Teo & Febbraro, 2003) For the history of psychology, Danziger (1997) has demonstrated convincingly that psychological concepts are embedded in cultural and historical traditions The difference between Filipino and American psychology cannot be found in the magnitude of the indigenous character of their categories, but in the inequality of power For a critical analysis of indigenous psychologies, researchers need to understand differences in economic, military, and cultural dominance and dependence In addition, an understanding of all psychologies as indigenous provides implications for theoretical and historical psychologists: (a) one’s own psychological work needs to be decentered and accompanied by epistemological reflexivity, an idea that is popular in recent literature (e.g., Finlay & Gough, 2003; Morawski, 2005; Sundararajan, 2008) and that specifically challenges “the taken for granted quality that so many psychological categories possess” (Danziger, 1997, p 191); and (b) it is possible to provide indigenous reconstructions in the history of psychology that may provide new insights into the development of psychology as a discipline and practice The fact that “one cannot dispute that the 20th century was the century of American dominance of psychology” (Pickren, 2009, p 87) provides a starting point for indigenous questions regarding the historical consequences of this reality Answers can be developed and found within the notion of an indigenous reconstruction With this term, I refer to a historical analysis of contexts, intellectual sources, traditions, expressions, historical and personal trajectories of local psychologies under the historical reality of the dominance of American psychology The reconstructions of local psychologies in relation to the power of American psychology need not be limited to nations of the periphery but may include countries that are perceived as being part of the dominant world A significant case example is the history of German psychology after WWII, a psychology that had a long and proud tradition that included the claim to be the birthplace of academic psychology But after 1945 (beginning in 1933) German psychology moved from the center to the periphery, which represented a unique historical and cultural situation for German psychology North American psychologists or historians of psychology appear not to know much about German psychology after WWII as it is assumed that no worthwhile psychologies have existed in Germany since that period, or it is believed that only those psychologies that contribute to mainstream American psychology are of interest I intend to show that German critical psychology can be reconstructed as a unique indigenous psychology, and more precisely, as an indigenous German response to the Americanization of German psychology after WWII, on the background of distinctive historical, social, and cultural developments As a historian of psychology I am aware of the complexities of historical developments I am not suggesting that an indigenous reconstruction is the only possible way to write a history of German critical psychology However, I argue that such an indigenous reconstruction allows for an understanding of aspects of theory dynamics that are traditionally not captured Clearly, critical psychology was indebted to a whole set of circumstances that include the post-WWII German experience, the Cold War, the isolation of West Berlin, the enduring class system that survived the war, the “Wirtschaftswunder” (the rapid economic devel- BACKLASH opment of West Germany after the war), and the partitioning of Germany and its university system These historical developments were and indeed still are embedded in German and European histories, cultures, and politics.3 I suggest that indigenous reconstructions are able to justice to such complex issues and that the foci here on intellectual, biographical, institutional, and social sources, as well as the use of the lens of Americanization, allows one to justice to some important features of critical psychology without trivializing its achievements Critical psychology developed, as did any other indigenous psychology, through the enactment of theoretical tools that have had relevance and have provided meaning to this local culture and subculture (and beyond) Personal Experience as a Starting Point Here, I locate my topic in my own experiences After I moved from Germany to Canada, I made two observations relevant to my academic interests: (a) The history of psychology, including the history of German psychology—as it was told in English-speaking North America—was different from the history that I had learned in Austria and Germany I also noticed that there was not much interest in the history and achievements of German psychology after 1945; (b) The form and content of critical psychology that had emerged after WWII in Germany was different from what I encountered in the United States or Canada, and from what has been written in other English-speaking countries For example, the role of theory development was much more important in academic German critical psychology than in North America, whereas in North America the primacy of practice was frequently emphasized Many North American self-identified critical psychologists have backgrounds in community, clinical, or health psychology, or in other applied social settings (see Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997).4 These noted differences not express random developments Rather, they can be theorized within a meaningful, indigenous, historical reconstruction Regarding the history of psychology, it would be futile to argue that German historians of psychology got it right, or vice versa, that the North Americans have provided more accurate accounts of the history of the discipline or profes- sion It would be antithetical to the thesis of indigenousness to assume that social objects, including reconstructions of human sciences, can display an unselected objectivity Histories of psychology are written from particular perspectives that privilege certain players and outcomes for specific reasons (see also Brock, 2006) Although excellent historiographies have been published on both sides, they present diverging accounts and trajectories The argument becomes more complex once one realizes that significant variations within German and North American historiographies of psychology exist—synchronically and diachronically Indeed, it might have been the case that a critical perspective had already influenced my own knowledge about German histories of psychology, whereas in North America I encountered widely used textbooks written from traditional points of view (e.g., see the recent editions of Schultz & Schultz, 2008, and Hergenhahn, 2009) In Germany, I had read among other works the critical histories of Jaeger and Steauble (1978), who identified historiography that used Wundt as a temporal anchor as traditional, whereas their own reconstructions focused on the time before Wundt as sources for the discipline of psychology More complexity is introduced if one makes a distinction between pre- and postwar psychology: The Americanization of German psychology after WWII includes the Americanization of the historiography of German psychology (see Benetka, 2002).5 From Wilhelm Wundt to Klaus Holzkamp The historically challenging question remains whether the variation within German or within North American historiography of psychology is smaller than the variation between these two contexts Wilhelm Wundt (1832Ϫ1920) may serve as a test case for this problem As Danziger (1979, 1983) has argued, Wundt was made the founding father of psychology in North American historiography by repressing Wun3 I thank one of the reviewers for emphasizing this point Although the group around Holzkamp discussed the theoryϪpractice problem and recognized the importance of practice, German Critical psychology, as it was taught and developed at academic institutions, sided strongly with theory Benetka (2002) pointed out that the Americanization of German historiography was a result of Boring’s influence 4 TEO dt’s Völkerpsychologie.6 But Wundt has not been singled out as the most important figure in German psychology Yet, due to the Americanization of historiography, postwar German historiography of psychology is required to discuss his “foundational” role (e.g., Benetka, 2002) I am not suggesting that Wundt was unimportant in German psychological historiography But Wundt was one among many figures who helped establish the academic field of psychology In my own education, the focus was on Herbart as a founder of scientific psychology with his mathematical approach to mental phenomena More recently, Gundlach (2004) listed August 21, 1824, as the birth date of the discipline of psychology, when Prussia established psychology as a required pedagogical course at its universities (an argument that is totally neglected in North America) Within the geisteswissenschaftliche tradition, which has similarly been neglected in postwar mainstream German psychology since the 1960s, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833Ϫ1911) is considered nearly as important as Wundt The Austrian historian of psychology, Benetka (2002), in his history of psychology in the 19th century dedicated about 10% of the book to Dilthey’s program (7% less than he does to Wundt) In German-speaking countries, despite their ambivalent assessments of this important figure, Sigmund Freud (1856Ϫ1939) is still considered a pioneering psychological figure In Klemm’s (1911) History of Psychology, Wundt was one figure in a much larger network of differing approaches He discussed experimental psychology as a branch among many other psychological approaches and began the discussion with Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795–1878), Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801Ϫ1887), Johannes Müller (1801Ϫ1858), and Hermann Helmholtz (1821Ϫ1894), before he discussed Wundt, and then moved to Karl von Vierordt (1818Ϫ1884), Narziß Ach (1871Ϫ1946), Karl Marbe (1869Ϫ1953), and others Wundt is considered important but not the most important figure in this tradition That he became such a central figure in American historiography can be explained by the role of personal knowledge transfer, when American psychologists who studied and worked in his lab, brought his ideas and practices, somewhat distorted, back to the US (not to mention Boring’s (1929) influence).7 Another factor in the supremacy of Wundt can be found in an individualistic historiography that dominated for a long time in psychological histor- ical writing In identifying pioneers in the establishment of a discipline (Fancher, 1996; Watson & Evans, 1991), American differed from German historiography where in the latter ideas, concepts, or problems in psychology (not necessarily social context) were equally as important— demonstrating the legacy of German philosophy in psychology Klemm (1911) dedicated large sections of his book to the development of psychological categories and psychological theories Pongratz (1984) provided a history of problems in psychology, and organized his material accordingly, specifically challenging Boring’s approach to historical problems (p 18) More importantly, Pongratz considered a history of problems in psychology to be part of basic research in psychology without envisioning a historical psychology (see Jüttemann, Sonntag, & Wulf, 1991; Jüttemann, 2011) Klaus Holzkamp (1927Ϫ1995) is arguably the most important postwar German psychologist who created collaboratively a unique system of psychology that was influential for more than three decades (see Teo, 1998; Tolman, 1994; Tolman & Maiers, 1991) In the 1960s he influenced philosophy of science debates in Germany with his constructivist ideas In the 1970s he attracted large numbers of students and psychologists to his critical psychology Braun and Holzkamp (1977) reported that the first congress of critical psychology in 1977 attracted 3,000 participants, a much higher number of delegates than at the congress of the German Society of Psychology (DGFP) Reasons for its appeal can be found in the left-leaning Zeitgeist among many intellectuals and students, the reverberating student movement, the promises of critical psychology that attracted many psychologically and politically active people, but also in the indigenous character of this psychology that included a critique of Americanized mainstream psychology, culture, and politics Beginning in the 1980s, Holzkamp led German discussions to the idea of a genuine science from the standpoint of the subject (Schraube & Osterkamp, in press; Tolman, 2009) Yet, within current North American historiography or psy6 Boring’s (1929) role in this context cannot be underestimated I suggest that Danziger’s (1990) impactful deconstructions of Wundt are precisely based on the constructed centrality of Wundt; had Danziger accomplished the same for Herbart or Dilthey, or even Freud, his histories would have had less influence BACKLASH chology, Holzkamp does not have a standing even close to Wundt One reason is that postwar German psychology is no longer seen as original, which is to a certain degree justifiable, based on a shift of innovation from Europe to North America and on the fact that personal knowledge transfer in psychology has moved in the opposite direction (see examples below) From these preliminary reflections I develop a historicalϪtheoretical thesis within this indigenous reconstruction: In order to understand the history of German critical psychology, one needs to reconstruct the development of German psychology after WWII, the relevance of the Cold War, the Americanization of German mainstream psychology and its critiques, and personal career trajectories I will argue that critical psychology can be understood as an indigenized backlash against American psychology, or more precisely, as an indigenous response to the Americanization of German psychology after the war.8 I use German critical psychology as a case example for this analysis, and provide sketches for an indigenous reconstruction of other international critical psychologies The Cold War and the Americanization of West German Psychology The reference to German psychology during the Cold War requires one to distinguish between West German, East German, Austrian, and German Swiss psychologies In this argument I focus on West German critical psychology It should be mentioned that Austrian critical psychology has its own trajectory, which has led to the establishment of a recognized professional association with headquarters in Vienna (see Lobnig, Schuster, & Trinks, 1988) With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, American historians of science have attempted to identify the significance of the Cold War for the development of the social sciences (Solovey, 2001; Solovey & Cravens, 2012), as well the legitimacy of the concept of Cold War Science (Engerman, 2010) Germany is paradigmatic for studying the political, economic, cultural, and academic divisions of a country and the differing trajectories that science in general and psychology in particular took in these two contexts (there are several studies on the history of East German psychology; e.g., see Schönpflug & Lüer, 2011) A Stalinist example of intellectual diverging paths is Peter G Klemm’s (1953) introduction to Teplow’s textbook Psychology, translated from Russian to German, and used in the German Democratic Republic In his introduction, Klemm criticized the lack of progressive literature in psychology after 1945 and argued that Teplow’s book demonstrated the superiority of a dialectical-materialist conception of the psyche, insofar as it was based on the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mitschurin, Lysenko, and Pavlov The translator argued that psychology was impacted by the findings of Lysenko, according to whom “the reactionary views” of Mendel were exposed; the research of Pavlov, who led psychology to the development of a “truly progressive psychology”; and by the “brilliant works of Stalin,” who revealed new ways of studying thought and language (Klemm, 1953, p 5).9 Historians of psychology and science are, of course, aware of the deadend impacts of these three figures on psychology Before the events of the 1960s and 1970s that led to the emergence of critical psychology, West German psychology had a unique trajectory of Americanization During the early postwar years American psychology did not have an impact on psychological discussions and West German psychologists continued their established programs According to Mattes (1985), Gestalt-psychologists (Wolfgang Metzger, Johannes von Allesch, and Edwin Rausch) focused on experimental perception research; Ganzheit-psychologists (Friedrich Sander, Albert Wellek) oriented their human-sciences research toward the ideas of Eduard Spranger (1882Ϫ1963), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833Ϫ1911), and Edmund Husserl (1859Ϫ1938); and characterological psychologists (Albert Wellek, Ernst Kretschmer, Erich Jaensch, Gerhard Pfahler, and Eduard Spranger) studied personality from a holistic perspective, where interpretation and hermeneutic methods were seen as valid tools of research (for a detailed account, see e.g., Ash, 1995) Ash (2006) called it a “striking continuity from the Nazi period” (p American psychology itself can be understood as an outcome of indigenization in that once it reached its selfconsciousness it was exported to the rest of the world This is my translation as are all German quotes in the rest of the article 6 TEO 148) when “nearly all those who had held professorships in 1943 also did so in 1953” (p 148) Lück, Grünwald, Geuter, Miller, and Rechtien (1987) concluded that personal continuity was combined with a continuity of content into the late 1950s (p 146) Mattes (1985) argued that the diversification of social needs after 1950 led to a diversification of psychological approaches, but also that psychology served conservative functions in German society In 1953 at the Congress of the German Psychological Society (DGP) ruptures between German holistic personality and Americanized quantitative personality psychologists appeared for the first time (Mattes, 1985, p 219) They had not yet impacted the nomination of professors in psychology In 1955, Albert Wellek (1904Ϫ1972) confidently argued: “A further increase of the methodological influence of the U.S.A cannot be expected” because “hermeneutic psychology which is perceived as a historical mission in continental Europe would exclude this one-sided approach” (quoted from Mattes, 1985, pp 219 –220) Yet, the “methodological dispute” in the middle of the 1950s represents the beginning of the end of traditional German psychology The debates between Albert Wellek and Peter Hofstätter (1913Ϫ1994) can be considered symptomatic and stemmed from the psychological problem of personality Whereas Wellek favored a holistic, phenomenological approach to the problem, Hofstätter privileged statistical, factor-analytical models, based on the operationalization of measures (see Métraux, 1985, p 237) Hofstätter published a series of works in the 1950s that introduced and promoted a quantitative Americanized approach to psychology This Americanization happened on the background of personal knowledge transfer: The Austrian Hofstätter, during the war years firmly embedded in the German fascist mission (as was Wellek), first as an army psychologist and then in the ministry of justice, had the opportunity to lecture from 1949 until 1956 in the United States and so became acquainted with quantitative models of personality research When he became chair at the University of Hamburg in 1959, he fortified the relevance of Americanized psychology in Germany.10 Métraux (1985) argued that the Americanization of German psychology reached its peak between 1960 and 1965 (p 225) and reflected a generational change (p 227) Americanization meant adopting American psychology and accepting the leadership of American psychologists It sometimes meant importing ideas and methods that had already reached their zenith in the United States (see below the discussion on behaviorism) However, Ash (2006) argued that the term Americanization is inadequate in order to describe what had happened in West Germany, and instead advocated for understanding the phenomenon as a general process of psychologization of society, a process that happened with delay in the German context (see p 150) However, from a historical perspective this argument would need to explain why the psychologization of German society did not happen using German traditions In addition, the psychologization argument also does not explicate the emergence of a powerful counterpsychology in Germany that could have contributed to a different psychologization of German society Americanization in the postwar German context meant that students and faculty could assimilate new knowledge Zimbardo’s (1983) textbook of psychology, which in Germany was not marketed as a textbook but rather as a general compendium of psychology, with its first German edition in 1974, allowed German readers, for instance, to discuss whether they should trust reports that Whites are mistreated more than Blacks in the United States (p 9) Despite the book’s critical approach to this topic, the everyday issues clearly reflected an American life-world and would lead to what later psychologists labeled the need of American psychology to become less American (Arnett, 2008) But more importantly, a new generation of researchers and teachers was able to study and to conduct research in the United States with financial support from American academic or cultural organizations These individuals brought American theories, concepts, and methods back to West Germany The issue of personal knowledge transfer led to several historically realized options, which explain to a certain degree theoretical and methodological preferences as discussed below 10 Mattes (1985) appears to be agnostic when it comes to the importance of knowledge transfer (p 220) but it is evident that students and scholars who were invited to research fellowships in the United States had an impact on the development of German psychology after the war BACKLASH Developmental psychologist Paul B Baltes (1939Ϫ2006) was an exchange student at the University of Nebraska in 1963–1964 before receiving his PhD in Germany at the University of Saarland in 1967 From 1968 to 1980 he progressed through the ranks, from assistant professor at West Virginia University, to full professor at Pennsylvania State University, before returning to Germany in 1980 where he became one of the directors at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education in Berlin (MPI) Endorsing an American model of psychology, promoting citation analyses, publishing in English and in American journals, and being able to compete with the best American institutions constituted his vision for the Institute His contributions to developmental psychology are internationally acknowledged A different career path and reception can be shown for Klaus Riegel (1925Ϫ1977) (Vollmers, 1995), who moved to the United States and remained there A Fulbright grant allowed Riegel to study at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis where he received his Masters degree in 1955 He received his PhD from the University of Hamburg in 1956 In 1958 he moved to the United States, and in 1966 he became full professor at the University of Michigan He remained in the United States and never returned to his country of birth for an academic position Because of his dialectical approach, he was largely ignored in German mainstream psychology, but interestingly was also discounted within critical approaches, although Hegel and Marx, central to German critical approaches, influenced his writings His writings could be used to illustrate that German critical psychology did not appreciate psychology emerging from the United States Holzkamp’s academic biography is significantly different from those of Baltes and Riegel He made his career not only within the German university system, but also within the same university, the Free University of Berlin Holzkamp began his psychological studies in 1949 at the Free University, where he received his doctoral degree in 1956 His dissertation focused on a combination of empathy research and the experimental psychology of expression He became chair and professor at the same institution and retired from it as well In his first theoretical monograph (Holzkamp, 1964/1981), and aware of the new practice of doing psychological research, he analyzed the relationship between experiments and theories and argued that experiments in psychology only vaguely represent the theories that they supposedly test He attributed these problems to an inappropriate empiricist philosophy of science, and consequently promoted a new philosophy of science known as constructivism (Holzkamp, 1968) After being influenced by the German student movement of the late 1960s, Holzkamp (1972) reflected on critical-theoretical and emancipatory issues in psychology, and personal and institutional experiences led him to develop a new psychology without compromise with the mainstream Holzkamp experienced the Cold War and anticommunist rhetoric in a personal way His name was “scandalized” on national TV, in newspapers, and in magazines (Autorenkollektiv am Psychologischen Institut der Freien Universität Berlin, 1971) for being responsible for a student research project on disadvantaged schoolchildren from the Kreuzberg district in West Berlin After the termination of what had been labeled an unsuccessful project, the German mass media started a campaign against Holzkamp, publishing stolen notes showing that children used sexualized language in their accounts The association of children with sexuality, and the alleged political manipulation of pupils by communists, led to headlines that captured the public’s imagination Although Holzkamp survived the media campaign and was not removed from the university (as politicians had demanded), the attack had institutional,11 personal as well as theoretical implications (Holzkamp, 1972; Teo, 1993) The ideological endorsement of Marxism posed a unique problem for critical theorists and critical psychologists alike in West Germany, who endorsed some of the same sources as their East German colleagues and faced discrimination exactly for that reason.12 In 1980 the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, where Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) worked as director, moved to Munich Although directors at Max Planck Institutes were regularly appointed as honorary professors at adjacent universities, Habermas was refused this position at the tra11 The attack led to the establishment of a second “traditional” institute of psychology in the Faculty of Education at the Free University of Berlin 12 Critical theorists expressed dissatisfaction not only with the American but also Soviet political system, especially after the war (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1947/1982) 8 TEO ditionalist university because of his left leanings in the student movement of the 1960s (Doch net den, 1980) Yet, it is known that the radicalized student movement in Germany condemned Habermas (1969) for calling their activism “fascism from the left” (p 148).13 Habermas was an example of how Cold War mentality affected high-profile German intellectuals on the left Following public exposure and a period of theoretical self-criticism, Holzkamp entered a critical-conceptual phase (from 1973 to 1983) during which he emphasized the principles of the cultural-historical school (A N Leontiev) and of classical Marxist literature (Marx, Engels) as an alternative to Americanized German psychology During this time, Holzkamp concentrated on a critique and clarification of the conceptual foundations of psychology In his reconstruction of perception, Holzkamp (1973) argued that an understanding of psychological concepts was only possible by including the natural history, prehistory, and history of humans Holzkamp summarized and elaborated the results of his research group in Foundation of Psychology (1983).14 From 1983 to 1995 Holzkamp demonstrated the significance of his analyses by elaborating on a science of the subject, that is, a psychology from the standpoint of the subject Psychology in this sense was understood as conducting research for people and not about people In his last monograph, Holzkamp (1993) elaborated a learning theory from the standpoint of the subject In contrast to Americanized German psychologists, Holzkamp was not concerned with imported American psychologies, but first with a critique of existing research practices, later with a critique of mainstream psychology, and finally with the development of his own system On the other hand, German-speaking mainstream psychologists, who did not have the opportunity to study or work in the United States, imported American psychology from the literature but not from embodied and materialized practices Some of these “normal” psychologists imported American knowledge that was already outdated in the United States Americanized German psychology became the target of critique for critical psychologists, who emerged during the period of Americanization in the 1960s in Germany This target differs from earlier prewar versions of critical reflection in Germany When the critical theorist Max Horkheimer (1937/1992) “deconstructed” the concept of traditional theory, he had mostly European theories in mind, from Descartes to Husserl, and from the empiricists to the positivists When Holzkamp critiqued traditional psychology after WWII, he had in mind American theories and methods that had become dominant in German discussions in the 1960s On this background the critique of behaviorism became a prototype for theoretical and methodological critiques.15 Critique of Americanization Holzkamp represented a generation who experienced prewar as well as postwar German society and psychology The student movement of the 1960s was influential for Holzkamp’s critique of psychology and in developing his own system (Teo, 1993) The German student movement in the 1960s was occupied with national as well as international problems National discussions included the perceived neglect of West Germany in dealing with its Nazi past and, when it came to academia, students condemned what they perceived as outdated hierarchical structures In terms of international debates, the American war in Vietnam and American imperialism were of special concern For example, the student association at the Free University in West Berlin, a leading organization of student movements in Germany, argued that the United States, a democracy, pro- 13 The refusal more than a decade after the student movement’s peak happened at a time when Habermas was considered to be the most important postwar German philosopher, who had no objections to incorporating American philosophy and sociology into his own theoretical system and was offered a position at Berkeley 14 The German title “Grundlegung der Psychologie” could also be translated as “Laying the Foundation for Psychology” that emphasizes the active, dialectical nature of this work 15 It should be mentioned that the Americanization of psychology followed a different trajectory from that of philosophy, which was less influenced by Americanization German postwar reflections in philosophy still reached an international audience (e.g., Gadamer, Adorno & Horkheimer, Habermas) Whereas German postwar philosophy books are translated into English, German psychology books are usually not translated into English— unless they are at the margins of the discipline such as Geuter’s (1984/ 1992) history of German psychology’s professionalization during the Nazi era BACKLASH duced the same “barbarism and crimes as fascist Germany” (AStA, 1967, p 7).16 It would be misleading to suggest that Holzkamp (1972) targeted American psychology; rather he criticized mainstream psychology, which had become an Americanized psychology during the 1960s in Germany, and which, from his socialist perspective, could also be labeled bourgeois psychology The critique of behaviorism became an important part of this project because behavioristic theories influenced the mainstream in Germany, but more importantly, psychology’s methodology The critique of behaviorism as an indigenous psychology of America became a key concern for critical psychology It should be mentioned that German critical psychology was unaware of the American critique that understood the American nature of behaviorism perfectly well: “The ‘behaviorist revolution,’ as it has so often been called, marks the point at which the ‘new’ psychology achieved full American citizenship” (Koch, 1985, p 25) Holzkamp found a common methodological denominator, characteristic of all of mainstream psychology and rooted in American behaviorism: The notion that psychology had become a psychology of variables (Holzkamp, 1985) Even if mainstream psychology was not behavioristic in the 1980s or 1990s, from a methodological point of view, researchers were still required to divide mental processes into variables in research and in doing so conceptualized human mental life as conditioned by (external) stimuli For Holzkamp (1989) this psychological naturalism, the notion that the external world provides stimuli to which humans are exposed, united S-R psychology with cognitive psychology In doing so the experimentalϪstatistical approach to human mental life excluded intersubjectivity (of human relations) as well as subjectivity and agency, from its analyses (Holzkamp, 1983) Human actions have reasons and not causes (Holzkamp, 1991), and, thus, mainstream psychologists were trapped in an S-R methodology when they conceived of behavior and experience as a function of stimulus conditions This analysis allowed Holzkamp (1972) to argue: “Not only American psychology, but psychology in general, can in its important areas be characterized as functionalist” (p 45).17 Behaviorism became the target in the East as well In 1979 East German authors published their work on the critique of behaviorism in a critical psychology book series (Friedrich, Noack, Bönisch, & Bisky, 1979) The West German critical psychologist Wolfgang Maiers (1979) argued in the introduction to the book that an engagement with behaviorism was necessary because of the “stimulus response scholasticism,” which still haunted psychology (p 8) The East German authors saw pragmatism and behaviorism as an outcome of American capitalism and the critique of behaviorism became a critique of American lifestyle and politics The authors emphasized the hypocrisy they saw in the fact that the proclamation of human rights went hand in hand with institutionalized slavery American psychology and American society were also understood as interconnected when it came to the role of racism in American culture Klaus Jürgen Bruder (1982), a widely published professor of psychology at the University of Hannover, wrote a history of behaviorism in 1982 He called Watson’s position “metaphysical behaviorism” (p 173) and argued that the “propaganda of behaviorism” (p 165) “became an intrinsic part of the American ideology of conditioning” (p 173) Arguing without using the term he suggested an indigenous understanding of behaviorism, while he concluded that the American public needed Watson as “the hero of American mediocrity” (p 173).18 Bruder was aware of the rapid decline of the behaviorist brand in psychology, but he argued that behaviorism had influenced “our” thinking and acting with the notion that control was part of psychology’s mission Whereas Holzkamp emphasized the methodological and mechanistic heritage of behaviorism, Bruder, emerging from a different critical-psychological fraction 16 Such statements show the students’ lack of awareness about German history 17 Winston (2001) has shown that this “functionalist” scheme goes back to the Austrian proto-positivist Ernst Mach 18 Bruder is a German psychology professor who wrote a monograph about the history of American psychology that was published by a prestigious German publisher (Suhrkamp) This situation reflects again the changes that have taken place since the Americanization of German historiography: While German historians of psychology engage with English-speaking literature, there is no need for American historians to deal with German-speaking histories of American psychology, despite the fact that an outsider view could provide new insights 10 TEO (see Teo, 1993), emphasized the social consequences of behaviorism Bruder arose from the radical student movement Some students in this movement believed that psychology should be abandoned completely This younger generation of psychologists and psychology students distanced themselves from Holzkamp because he not only critiqued psychology, but attempted to develop an improved psychology Rexilius (1987) used the metaphor of the Russian Revolution to suggest that psychology would not need a new tsar, referring to Holzkamp’s ambitions for a new psychology Leaders evolving from the student movement demanded detailed critiques of the social functions of mainstream psychology Grubitzsch and Rexilius (1978) were highly influential German critical psychologists who opposed Holzkamp’s brand of critical psychology In its place they developed and edited their own journal and published a successful book on testing and measurement from a critical perspective Again, the authors in the book connected the theory and practice of testing with capitalism and American society, and made a historical link between the “testing movement in the U.S.A.” and “social Darwinist streams in conjunction with eugenic and racist considerations” (Schmid, 1978, p 34) But while these so-called lower case critical psychologists challenged, on the background of a student movement that critiqued mainstream and American social science, West German politics, and Americanized psychology, Holzkamp moved to the development of his own psychological system that included subjectivity, which had been a core concern of German reflections since Hegel Holzkamp’s system was based on a combination of Marxist, hermeneutic, and phenomenological traditions His psychology from the standpoint of the subject (Holzkamp, 1983) was integrated with the idea that the individual can only be understood contextually The inclusion of German and Marxist traditions, the focus on a historicalϪempirical methodology rather than traditional empirical methods, explains to a certain degree his lack of success in the United States The fact that the German concepts that he developed were nearly impossible to translate into English, did not make his case easier.19 Critical Psychology as an Indigenous Psychology As emphasized above, when using the term “indigenous” psychologies I not find it useful to limit the term to non-Western human sciences Rather, I find it analytically helpful to take the perspective that all psychologies have cultureϪcentric dimensions (Teo & Febbraro, 2003), and thus the term applies to American as well as to critical psychologies Holzkamp’s critical psychology is particularly apt for this type of analysis because he developed a new system of psychology rooted in historical German intellectual contents and tools Indigenization, according to Allwood and Berry (2006), is motivated by the need to avoid influences and domination by American psychology and by the need to develop a psychology that is relevant to the existing cultural context The stages of indigenization that Adair (2006) proposes—importation, implantation, indigenization, autochonization—might apply better, from a historical point of view, to American than to German psychology.20 Psychology as an original German discipline was imported to the United States through knowledge transfer of American psychologists In the United States it was implanted in the academic system, indigenized, for example, by the British-born Edward Titchener, and then rejected and abandoned for a “better psychology.” Thus, functionalism and behaviorism became the autochonized new psychologies of the United States However, if one takes a historical perspective, any indigenization process is more complex than schematic stages suggest For example, Sinha (1998) argued that the Indian indigenization of social psychology occurred on the background of the crisis of mainstream social psychology This indigenization process drew on uniquely Indian sources and provided innovative ideas that were lacking in mainstream social psychology In addition, historians of psychology have shown that processes of indigenization in the United States 19 For example, Handlungsfähigkeit (agency) was translated as action potence by Tolman (1994) 20 Adair did not have the United States in mind when he discussed indigenous psychologies BACKLASH include nonacademic factors such as spirituality and religion (e.g., Taves, 1999) A schematic process hardly applies to German critical psychology: Holzkamp did not assume that he was developing a psychology for German culture, but a universal psychology and in that ambition is not different from the mainstream Holzkamp (1983) even suggested famously that all of traditional psychology was preparadigmatic and that his own critical psychology would be grounded in a way that it had the character of a first scientific paradigm in the history of the discipline All of psychology would have to orient itself according to the conceptual and methodological standards of this new paradigm, if the discipline did not want to fall behind a new level of scientific progress and knowledge (see Holzkamp, 1983, p 35) I would suggest that the idea that critical psychology would be a general psychology for all persons around the world reflects an indigenous German mindset of wanting to be preeminent, second to no other Although the indigenization of German critical psychology needs to be understood in the context of culturalϪhistorical and politicalϪeconomic developments, I will focus in the next passages on intellectual contexts I will discuss five elements that reflect German critical psychology’s indigenous, cultureϪspecific character I not debate whether these elements have universal relevance, but rather understand them as emerging from a German tradition: (a) the reliance on German sources, (b) the application of a Kantian analysis of categories, (c) the importance of a system of concepts in science, (d) the foundational attempt in social science, and (e) the focus on subjectivity (a) The argument regarding the use of German sources is not completely accurate It would be better to argue for a preponderance of German sources in Holzkamp’s works His early metatheoretical, constructivist works (until 1968) listed the names of Pierre-MauriceMarie Duhem (1861Ϫ1916), Henri Poincare (1854Ϫ1912), Hugo Dingler (1881Ϫ1954), Karl Popper (1902Ϫ1994), and Eduard May (1905Ϫ1956) as primary nonempiricist influences on his philosophy of science His early critical work (1968 –1972) was inspired by some of the ideas of German critical theory, including Habermas’s works, whereas his mature critical work (1973–1983) was certainly 11 grounded in a Marxist tradition However, the literature that he covered in his book on perception took the international literature into account (Holzkamp, 1973) His methodological approach was Marxist and was influenced by the Soviet psychologist Aleksei Leontiev (1903Ϫ1979) who attempted to develop a dialectical materialist approach in reconstructing the psyche The Foundation of Psychology (Holzkamp, 1983), dedicated to Leontiev, integrating the large amount of critical psychological knowledge within his research program in 600 pages, and arguably the intellectual centerpiece for a general psychology, astonishingly listed only two sources in the English language.21 (b) A Kantian strain in Holzkamp’s work (see also Teo, 1995) can also be found in the Foundation of Psychology Holzkamp (1983) referred frequently to the notion of a Kategorialanalyse (analysis of categories) a term usually attributed to Kant’s (1781/1965) Critique of Pure Reason where he deduced famously 12 categories through which experiential objects are organized.22 Holzkamp (1983) translated this idea for psychology and argued that categories prescribe what researchers actually see and understand, and what they are able to observe and interpret about a specific object Thus, one of Holzkamp’s primary goals in his criticalϪconceptual period became the development of scientifically qualified categories (core concepts) In contrast to Kant’s deduction, Holzkamp’s (1978, 1983) method for developing and constructing categories of psychology was based on a historicalϪempirical method, which needed to be distinguished from an actualϪempirical method.23 Holzkamp’s historicalϪempirical method encompassed a genetic reconstruction of the development of the psyche up to its human level Reconstructing the evolutionary development of the psyche, its differentiation and qualifications on different levels, a network 21 It should be mentioned that the book is short on references in general as it lists only four pages of references 22 Aristotle (1983) already provides an analysis of categories 23 The former is used to develop categories in order to justice to the subject matter of psychology, whereas the latter is related to actual research on the basis of these categories 12 TEO of categories was constructed by matching processes and categories.24 Using this realist method, qualitative transitions in the development of the psyche could be identified such as the emergence of the societal nature of human beings Furthermore, general definitions of human subjectivity and their meaning in capitalist societies could be derived This philosophical, dialectical materialist part of critical psychology is often incomprehensible to Englishspeaking psychologists (c) The importance of a network or system of integrated concepts was emphasized by Hegel and adopted by Marx For Hegel (1807/1967) the notion of truth was realized in concepts and its true form was the scientific system Thus, Hegel emphasized a system model of science and developed it in his own works as opposed to, for instance, a (physiological) research model that most academic psychologists adopt Holzkamp (1983, p 45) argued that mainstream psychology (Americanized psychology) was in a state of crisis because of the indeterminate status of its basic concepts (categories; American operationism was considered a cause for this ontologically indeterminate state of affairs) A real crisis intervention program, according to Holzkamp’s analyses, needed to tackle the subject matter of psychology systematically and to develop scientifically qualified categories that adequately grasp the subject matter of psychology Holzkamp’s attempt to reconstruct the psyche’s evolutionary and social development was clearly indebted to such a system model of science and was combined with a realist Marxist ontology that suggested that it would be possible to match processes and their concepts in an objective network of concepts (see Teo, 1998) (d) Holzkamp expressed a foundational need and the necessity to overcome arbitrariness in psychological research in many of his works His early constructivist works were composed to develop clear criteria in order to assess the value of empirical research (Holzkamp, 1964/ 1981, p V) and Holzkamp’s monograph from 1968 was subtitled Essay on a New Foundation of the Philosophy of Science In the 1970s, Holzkamp (1978) published an article on how critical psychology had overcome scientific arbitrariness in psychology, and his book that integrated the categories into a system was called the Foundation of Psychology (Holzkamp, 1983) It is difficult to attribute this foundational goal solely to the German tradition because such an approach not only appeared outdated to (critical) psychologists outside of Germany, but also within Germany This foundational need expressed a modern attitude that had a longer mainstay in Germany than, for instance, in France, where some of the most important postmodern reflections were developed Critical approaches that expressed affinity with the postmodern critiques of psychology were accepted later in Germany Rather than aiming at the development of foundational concepts, Danziger (1997), who was very familiar with the German context, demonstrated the sociohistorical embeddedness of the concepts that psychologists use (which is diametrically opposed to what Holzkamp intended) (e) The focus on subjectivity concurs with a German tradition, apparent in writings from fictional literature that regularly focused on selfreflexivity to philosophy where the term subjectivity did not have negative connotations The concept subjectivity plays a significant role in Hegel’s writings, in hermeneutic and phenomenological psychology, as well as in psychoanalysis, all of which can be located within German-speaking traditions These competing approaches were acknowledged in their significance for critical psychology, but were rejected because of their subjectivism and their lack of objectivity (Holzkamp, 1984) In contrast Holzkamp’s science of the subject, a scientific psychology from the standpoint of the subject, was intended as scientific, as overcoming arbitrariness, even when focusing on subjectivity Objectivity for Holzkamp meant to embrace subjectivity rather than to exclude it International Indigenous Reconstructions Critical psychologies have emerged using multifaceted approaches in theory and practice outside of the mainstream of psychology in many countries around the globe (Fox, Prilleltensky, & Austin, 2009; Hook, 2004; Parker, 2002; Walkerdine, 2002) A core goal for many critical psychologists has been to transform psychology into an emancipatory, socialϪjustice seeking, or status24 To avoid arbitrariness of reconstruction, Holzkamp (1978) introduced the term functional relevance BACKLASH quo-resisting approach that understands psychological phenomena as taking place in specific politicalϪeconomic or culturalϪhistorical contexts Although the term critical psychology was claimed by the German school of thought, as discussed in this article, it was self-applied by psychologists from the English-speaking world and from other linguistic regions who gave the term their own meanings The emergence of critical psychology in many countries followed a process of indigenization and a critique of American and Americanized local psychology Rather than Adair’s (2006) mechanistic schema that is more assimilative than accommodative, one could use Hegel’s (1807/1967) discussion of the master and slave dialectic Critical psychologies in various countries needed a thorough understanding of American psychology for social and institutional reasons, while at the same time they understood American psychology’s limitations for their own contexts based on a solid knowledge of their culture On the other hand, American psychology, as a master psychology, does not need to know them nor their contexts Detailed historical and cultural reconstruction would be needed for countries, in which critical psychologies emerged; here, I can sketch only some of the historical issues The United Kingdom has become one of the centers for critical psychology (e.g., Parker, 2002) More recently Billig (2008) published a book on the roots of critical psychology Billig focused on three individuals who had played a significant role in the history of (British) critical psychology: John Locke (1632–1704), the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), and Thomas Reid (1710 –96) According to Billig, Shaftesbury was an “English author, born into an aristocratic family, using the concept of ‘alienation’ exactly a century before Marx” (p 119) and who developed an early form of ideology critique Important to the indigenous argument would be that Billig claims exclusively British sources in his reconstruction of critical psychology reflecting certain shapes that critical psychology took in the United Kingdom Outside of Europe, we find critical psychologies in many countries but particularly in Latin America (Montero & Christlieb, 2003) Martín-Baró’s (1994) liberation psychology is often considered to be a crucial part of this tradition Embedded in the social, political, 13 and economic reality of El Salvador, MartínBaró demanded that psychology should make a contribution to the social development of Latin America and that liberation psychology should free itself from the perspectives of Western Europe and North America He argued that Latin American psychology should not be concerned about whether it would be recognized in the rich countries, but rather should focus on whether it provided a service to the majority of Latin Americans In his critique of mainstream Euro American psychology he rejected the idea of valueϪneutral science and the primacy of research in academia Yet, this example also shows that pure indigenous psychologies, in this case pre-Colombian psychologies, are no longer conceivable His liberation psychology contains Roman Catholic principles, liberation theology, and socialist ideas as well as local reflections and practices Any historical reconstruction would have to take such interwoven factors into account In South Africa, critical psychologists have some standing as well Derek Hook (2004) edited a textbook on Critical Psychology in which mostly South African perspectives and realities are discussed The indigenous element expressed in the book, suggests that South African critical psychology must be based on the background of the South African context, and developed into specific local forms of knowledge and practice South African critical psychology draws on neglected thinkers such as Frantz Fanon and Steve Biko and indigenization entails the appropriation of theoretical frameworks within the particular culture of South Africa, and includes, for instance, the application of concepts such as Ubuntu, understanding of the role of ancestors (inyanya), the hierarchy of beings, an organic view of the universe, the role of community, and its relation to personhood However, it would be wrong to suggest that an indigenous psychology dominates the local discussions in South Africa The unique transitions in South African psychology led to the publication of its history (van Ommen & Painter, 2008) Critical reflections on the relevance of mainstream psychology and challenges to the meaningfulness of Americanized concepts of mental life on the background of an understanding of local traditions have been expressed by Holdstock (2000) and, from a West 14 TEO African perspective, by Nsamenang (e.g., 2006) The latter points to the fact that individual human development takes place in a social ecology and that psychology can be empowering to local communities once the Eurocentric nature of mainstream psychology is identified and challenged Conclusion Indigenous reconstructions are possible and useful in psychological historiography and in critical psychology Because psychological theories and concepts are of a human and not a natural kind, they reflect the culture and history from which they emerge I attempted to highlight indigenous dimensions in the development of German critical psychology and proposed some ideas on how an indigenous reconstruction could be extended to other critical psychologies as well When historiography concerns Freudian psychoanalysis it is usually accepted that it reflects to a certain degree turn of the century Vienna This does not mean that depth psychology is solely restricted to the Viennese context or to a certain time But an understanding of those dimensions helps to contextualize concepts and theories, and if necessary, allows for their modification and advancement Indigenous psychologies are not only particular, but may extend beyond their original borders due to the appeal that they possess, the local truths they express, their power of psychologization, or their supporters’ economic impact and marketing efforts In that sense indigenous psychologies may be both cultureϪspecific and cultureϪtranscending Yet, a discussion of the possibilities and limits of various forms of critical or indigenous psychologies is beyond the task of this indigenous reconstruction References 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New York, NY: Harper Collins Winston, A (2001) Cause into function: Ernst Mach and the reconstruction of explanation in psychology In C D Green, M Shore, & T Teo (Eds.), The transformation of psychology: Influences of 19th-century philosophy, technology, and natural science (pp 107–131) Washington, DC: American Psychological Association doi:10.1037/ 10416-006 Zimbardo, P G (1983) Psychologie [Psychology] Berlin: Springer Received February 23, 2012 Revision received July 9, 2012 Accepted August 23, 2012 Ⅲ Members of Underrepresented Groups: Reviewers for Journal Manuscripts Wanted If you are interested in reviewing manuscripts for APA journals, the APA Publications and Communications Board would like to invite your participation Manuscript reviewers are vital to the publications process As a reviewer, you would gain valuable experience in publishing The P&C Board is particularly interested in encouraging members of underrepresented groups to participate more in this process If you are interested in reviewing manuscripts, please write APA Journals at Reviewers@apa.org Please note the following important points: • To be selected as a reviewer, you must have published articles in peer-reviewed journals The experience of publishing provides a reviewer with the basis for preparing a thorough, objective review • To be selected, it is critical to be a regular reader of the five to six empirical journals that are most central to the area or journal for which you would like to review Current knowledge of recently published research provides a reviewer with the knowledge base to evaluate a new submission within the context of existing research • To select the appropriate reviewers for each manuscript, the editor needs detailed information Please include with your letter your vita In the letter, please identify which APA journal(s) you are interested in, and describe your area of expertise Be as specific as possible For example, “social psychology” is not sufficient—you would need to specify “social cognition” or “attitude change” as well • Reviewing a manuscript takes time (1– hours per manuscript reviewed) If you are selected to review a manuscript, be prepared to invest the necessary time to evaluate the manuscript thoroughly  ... understood as an indigenized backlash against American psychology, or more precisely, as an indigenous response to the Americanization of German psychology after the war.8 I use German critical psychology. .. this analysis, and provide sketches for an indigenous reconstruction of other international critical psychologies The Cold War and the Americanization of West German Psychology The reference to German. .. relevance, but rather understand them as emerging from a German tradition: (a) the reliance on German sources, (b) the application of a Kantian analysis of categories, (c) the importance of a