Concern for self image and social image in the management of moral failure rethinking shame

European Journal of Social Psychology, Eur J Soc Psychol 41, 468 – 478 (2011) Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.803 Research article Concern for self‐image and social image in the management of moral failure: Rethinking shame† NICOLAY GAUSEL1* AND COLIN WAYNE LEACH2 Østfold University College, Fredrikstad, Norway; 2University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA Abstract Moral failure is thought to damage self‐image when people appraise it as indicating a global self‐defect This appraisal is thought to be associated with the feeling of shame and thus self‐defensive motivation However, a damaged social image better explains self‐defensive motivation to hide from and avoid others Based on an integrative review of theory and research, we offer a conceptual model of how concern for self‐image and social image guides the experience of moral failure The model distinguishes the appraisals (of self‐defect and other‐condemnation) and feelings (of rejection, inferiority, and shame) embedded in the shame concept Concern for a damaged social image is represented in an other‐condemnation → rejection combination, whereas concern for a damaged self‐image is represented in a (global) self‐defect → inferiority combination As these appraisal–feeling combinations are concerned with damage done to one’s image, they should be linked to self‐defensive motivation As the (specific) self‐defect → shame combination is concerned with a repairable defect in self‐image, it should be linked with self‐improvement motivation Thus, our model explains why “shame” is sometimes tied to self‐defensive motivation and sometimes tied to self‐improvement motivation after moral failure Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd Despite our best intentions, we sometimes fail to be honest, trustworthy, or fair Such moral failures are central to our social image because they sour others’ evaluations of us (see Braithwaite, 1989; de Waal, 1996; Wojciszke, 2005) Our moral failures also sour the social image that we imagine others have of us (see Cooley, 1902; Goffman, 1959) Given their interest in social relationships and society, social sciences like anthropology, economics, and sociology have paid great attention to peoples’ concern for their social image in instances of moral failure (for reviews, see de Waal, 1996; Scheff, 2000) The concept of shame has been central to much of this work For instance, the symbolic interaction tradition in sociology has long examined shame as the experience of a social image damaged by moral failure (e.g., Cooley, 1902; for a review, see Scheff, 2000) Generally, avoidance of others and withdrawal from the social scene are thought to follow from shame about a badly damaged social image This is because people are thought to be motivated to defend their social image from further damage by limiting others’ opportunities to further condemn them for their moral failure (Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff, 2000) One’s morality is also of the utmost importance to one’s evaluation of oneself (e.g., Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002; for a review, see Wojciszke, 2005) Thus, moral failure is also central to self‐ image In psychology, it is concern for one’s self‐image that is emphasized in most work on the experience of moral failure Thus, psychology tends to view shame as the emotional experience of a badly damaged self‐image (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 1995) This view is buttressed by the fact that a good deal of research finds self‐reports of chronic shame to be moderately to strongly correlated with depression, negative self‐evaluation, and low self‐esteem (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 1995) At least since Lewis’s (1971) Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, shame has been thought to be so devastating to self‐image because individuals view their failure as indicative of a global, and thus unalterable, self‐defect (for reviews, see Lansky, 1995; M Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) Given this conceptualization, it is presumed that shame leads people to defensively protect their self‐image from further harm by hiding, avoidance, and withdrawal (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; M Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) Whether shame is viewed as concerned with self‐image or social image, there appears to be agreement across the disciplines that shame is detrimental socially and/or psychologically This is because shame is typically linked to an appraisal of irreparable damage to self‐image or social image We offer a contrasting view By reconceptualizing how concern for self‐image and social image guides the experience of moral failure, we re‐conceptualize shame Based on a review of theory and research, we develop an integrative model that distinguishes the appraisals (of self‐defect and *Correspondence to: Nicolay Gausel, Østfold University College, Halden, Norway E‐mail: nicolay.gausel@hiof.no † Both authors contributed equally to this article Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd Received July 2010, Accepted April 2011 Rethinking shame other‐condemnation) and feelings (of rejection, inferiority, and shame) embedded in the shame concept (see also Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) By identifying three specific appraisal–feeling combinations, we are able to specify when and why the experience of moral failure leads to self‐defensive motivation For example, we review theory and research that suggests that it is the appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection combination that is especially tied to self‐defensive motivation, such as hiding and avoidance Where people appraise their moral failure as damaging their social image to such a degree that others will condemn them, they are likely to defend their social image from further damage by avoiding others’ opprobrium This has little to with the feeling of shame THE MANY MEANINGS OF “SHAME” Because moral failure is so important to social image and self‐ image, people can feel very bad about it Shame has received the most attention in the study of how moral failure is emotionally experienced However, what scholars mean by the term “shame” is often unclear For instance, in her influential view of shame, Lewis (1971) identified more than seven different appraisals, feelings, and motivations as part of a single shame concept Most contemporary researchers conceptualize shame as including at least several of the facets discussed by H.B Lewis However, there is little agreement about which appraisals and feelings are necessary to define the concept of shame A great deal of work views shame as necessarily including the appraisal that one suffers a global, unalterable, defect of the whole self (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006) Some work views the shame concept as including the appraisal that others are likely to condemn one for a moral failure (Braithewaite, 1989; Keltner & Harker, 1998; Scheff, 2000) The shame concept is sometimes thought to include the painful feeling of rejection and isolation that is associated with the appraisal of other‐condemnation (MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Retzinger & Scheff, 2000) In addition, the shame concept is sometimes said to include the debilitating feeling of inferiority that is associated with the appraisal of a global self‐defect (Smith et al., 2002; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006) Finally, some approaches go so far as to include the self‐defensive motivation thought to be based on the experience of shame within the shame concept itself (see M Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) Including so many different appraisals and feelings about moral failure in a single concept of shame obscures the precise (social and psychological) meaning conveyed by each appraisal and feeling As a result, contemporary theory and research on individuals’ experience of moral failure cannot distinguish concern for self‐image from concern for social image (see also Ferguson, 2005; Smith et al., 2002) This is important because concern for social image is likely to promote different appraisals and feelings from concern for self‐image In addition, including the self‐defensive motivation of hiding and Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 469 avoidance in the shame concept makes it difficult to know why “shame” might motivate self‐defense Is self‐defensive motivation tied to the feeling of inferiority that indicates a concern for damaged self‐image? Or, is self‐defensive motivation tied to the feeling of rejection that indicates a concern for damage to one’s image in the eyes of others? As feelings of inferiority and rejection are both embedded in the common conceptualization and measurement of shame, it is unclear why such an ambiguous “shame” should be tied to self‐defensive motivation, such as wanting to hide, run away, or cover up (see also Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b) A Conceptual Model One way to re‐conceptualize an overly broad concept like shame is to dissect it into its constituent elements (see Leach & Spears, 2008 regarding envy) A dissection of the shame concept yields at least two distinct appraisals and three feelings (Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) Figure shows our model of how these appraisals and feelings connect to each other and to self‐ defensive and self‐improvement motivation Specifically, a moral failure can be appraised as indicating either that others will condemn one or that one suffers a self‐defect If the self is appraised as suffering a self‐defect, this self‐defect may be viewed as either global (and thus unalterable) or specific (and thus potentially alterable) These appraisals are the central subjective meaning that people give their moral failure (for general discussions, see Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988) We view these appraisals as representing two distinct concerns: social image and self‐image When people appraise a moral failure as indicating other‐condemnation, they show a concern for their social image (these are the constructs with a white background in Figure 1) Appraising a moral failure as indicating a self‐defect shows a concern for their self‐image (these are the constructs shown with a lightly shaded background in Figure 1) Rather than debating whether “shame” is based on concern for self‐image or social image, we specify the ways in which each concern guides the appraisal of, and feeling about, moral failure For instance, the appraisal of a moral failure as making condemnation by others likely should be most tied to a feeling of rejection The appraisal (e.g., “lying to my best friend yesterday will lead her, and others, to condemn me”) is linked closely to the feeling (e.g., “rejected,” “rebuffed,” “isolated”) This is why the path between this appraisal and feeling combination is thick in Figure The appraisal of other‐ condemnation suggests that one views one’s social image as damaged (i.e., “people will no longer think well of me”) If this damage could still be prevented, one could be motivated to defend one’s image in the eyes of others But, because one believes that the damage to one’s social image is already done, one is likely to feel rejection This painful feeling of social devaluation and isolation should be associated with a self‐ defensive desire to escape other’s condemnation Thus, we expect the feeling of rejection to best predict wanting to cover up one’s moral failure and to (physically and psychologically) avoid the moral failure, those affected by it, and those likely to condemn one for it Eur J Soc Psychol 41, 468– 478 (2011) 470 Nicolay Gausel and Colin W Leach Figure Conceptual model of the experience of moral failure Note: Top half of figure shows concern for social‐image; shaded, bottom half of figure shows concern for self‐image As shown in Figure 1a, our model proposes that the appraisal of a specific self‐defect (e.g., “lying to my best friend yesterday shows that I am not as honest a person as I should be”) is most tied to the feeling of shame This appraisal–feeling combination shows a concern for self‐ image As Ferguson (2005) argues, shame is a feeling about who one is; it is about one’s identity (see also Ferguson, Brugman, White & Eyre, 2007) However, as the self‐defect is specific, it is potentially alterable One can improve a defect by reforming the faulty aspect of the self and by repairing one’s relationship to those affected by one’s moral failure This is why we view the feeling of shame as important to the motivation to improve the self and social relations The feeling of inferiority that should be most associated with the appraisal of a global self‐ defect also shows concern for self‐image However, in the feeling of inferiority, one believes that one’s whole self‐ image is severely damaged This is because a global self‐ defect is viewed as unalterable (Lewis, 1971) Indeed, there is little that one can if one believes that lying to one’s best friends shows that one is generally “a liar.” As such, the feeling of inferiority should be more debilitating than the feeling of shame Our model of the experience of moral failure eschews the overly broad conceptualization of shame that prevails at present in favor of a more elemental approach We see the two appraisals and three feelings often embedded in the shame concept as forming specific appraisal–feeling combinations Each appraisal–feeling combination gives a distinct meaning to the moral failure that is guided by concern for either one’s social image or self‐image As such, each appraisal–feeling combination represents a Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd particular way of experiencing one’s moral failure Our focus on specific appraisal–feeling combinations is inspired by Lazarus’s (1991) view that “core relational themes” should define emotion concepts, not (English) emotion words like ‘shame’ Words like ‘shame’ make poor emotion concepts because they are defined by everyday (English) language use rather than formal analysis (Ortony et al., 1988) Thus, researchers, and the participants in their studies, may mean many different things when they describe the experience of moral failure with the polysemous word ‘shame.’ In specifying three distinct appraisal–feeling combinations, we are better able to specify the motivation that should be tied to each experience of moral failure (see Figure 1) For instance, the feeling of rejection should be most tied to the self‐ defensive motivation to withdraw, hide, or avoid because the feeling of rejection is an experience of social isolation based on the appraisal that others will condemn one for a moral failure This motivation is the most logical, and thus most likely, implication of the concern for a damaged social image that is the core relational theme underlying the appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection combination Although our model is novel in many respects, each of its elements has been examined in previous theory and research In the sections below, we review the empirical support for our model offered in previous work Although most previous thinking views shame as debilitating and thus detrimental to self and to social relations, a good deal of research is consistent with our view that this is more true of the feelings of rejection and inferiority than of shame Indeed, a good deal of prior work is consistent with our view that shame is associated with the motivation to improve the self and social relations Eur J Soc Psychol 41, 468– 478 (2011) Rethinking shame CONCERN FOR SELF‐IMAGE Appraisal of Self‐defect Global In psychology, the widely held view is that the feeling of shame is closely linked to an appraisal that a failure indicates that one’s whole self‐image is damaged (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Lansky, 1995; Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) This conceptualization of shame informs numerous measures of the concept For example, four of the 16 items of the Test of Self‐Conscious Affect (TOSCA) measure of chronic proneness to shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) refer to global self‐defects (e.g., “I am… terrible, … incompetent, … irresponsible, … lazy) Some recent work on in‐group moral failure has also incorporated the appraisal of a global self‐defect into measures (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi & Cehajic, 2008) and manipulations (Iyer, Schmader & Lickel, 2007) of the shame concept For example, Brown and his colleagues measure “collective shame” about discrimination and violence with statements such as “we are …racist and mean, … predisposed to be racist” and “I feel ashamed for the racist tendency of…” Lewis (1971) viewed the appraisal of a global self‐defect as the most central element of the shame concept What was most important for her is that people believe that it is extremely difficult to improve a self‐image that is wholly defective It is this appraisal of a global self‐defect as unalterable that makes shame debilitating in Lewis’s (1971, p.40) view: “Shame is about the whole self […] This global target of hostility makes it difficult to find a solution short of a sweeping replacement of self by another, better one.” In psychology, Lewis’s view has been examined by assessing whether shame is strongly tied to internal, stable, and global attributions for failure Although most of this research represents itself as consistent with Lewis, measures of “shame” tend to be only weakly correlated with the attributions that suggest an appraisal of a global, unalterable, self‐defect (for reviews, see Ferguson, 2005; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; but see Miller & Tangney, 1994) Tracy and Robins (2006) is the most elaborate examination of this issue In a first study, they found chronic “shame proneness” to correlate with chronic internal and stable attributions (r = 24–.39) as well as chronic external attributions (r = 36–.44) In a second study that asked students to reflect on their academic performance, reported shame was weakly correlated to internal (r = 12) and stable (r = 15) attributions In a third study, past experiences of shame were no more likely to be attributed to stable causes than past experiences of guilt A fourth study asked students to imagine how they would feel if they did badly on an exam because of self‐ attributes that varied in stability and controllability Failure due to stable or unalterable attributes (e.g., low ability) did not lead to greater imagined shame In contrast to the prevailing view in psychology, shame is not closely tied to an appraisal of the self as globally, stably, and thus irreparably, defective (see also Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007) Even when measures of shame include Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 471 chronic appraisal of global self‐defect, shame’s association with a view of the self as irreparably damaged is moderate at best (e.g., Tracy & Robins, 2006, study 1; for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002) In actuality, internal, stable, and global attributions for failure are more strongly linked to depression, dispositional pessimism, and low self‐esteem than shame (for reviews, see Ferguson, 2005; Gilbert & Andrews, 1998) Unfortunately, the presumed linkage between the feeling of shame and an appraisal of a global self‐defect has prevented attention to the more circumscribed appraisal of a specific self‐defect that is more logically linked to the feeling of shame Specific Rather than viewing oneself as globally, and thus irreparably, defective, one may interpret a specific failure as indicating a specific self‐defect Although this appraisal is discomforting, its focus on a specific aspect of the self should make it less debilitating than a more global and stable attribution for failure (Lewis, 1971) This is because the appraisal of a specific self‐defect shows concern for damage to a specific aspect of one’s self‐image One may more easily imagine improving one’s emotional honesty with intimates than improving one’s whole self, for example A specific self‐ defect is potentially alterable in a way that a global self‐defect is not Appraising a moral failure as indicating a specific self‐ defect goes beyond appraising oneself as responsible for the failure and its consequences (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) The appraisal of a specific self‐defect indicates a serious criticism of the specific aspect of the self that is found wanting (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) Thus, the appraisal of a specific self‐defect focuses on one’s identity as a person who wishes to be moral but has failed to so In other words, this appraisal is based on a concern that one’s self‐image is at stake in one’s moral failure (for a general discussion, see Lazarus, 1991) The appraisal of a specific self‐defect is about one’s moral identity rather than one’s moral behavior (see Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007) As the feeling of shame is also about one’s identity (Ferguson et al., 2007), shame and the appraisal of a specific self‐defect should be closely linked Feeling of Shame The feeling of “shame” is often associated with strong self‐ blame and self‐anger (e.g., Miller & Tangney, 1994; Pettersen, 2009; Smith et al., 2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996; Tracy & Robins, 2006) Consequently, people report that “shame” and cognate emotion concepts are intensely unpleasant experiences (e.g., Miller & Tangney, 1994; Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Tangney et al., 1996) This is underlined by the fact that out of the 135 English emotion words that Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O’Connor (1987) had students evaluate, few were more negative than “shame.” The three English emotion words that are most commonly used to express shame are “ashamed”, “disgraced”, and “humiliated” (see Lewis, 1971; M Lewis, 1992; Retzinger & Scheff, 2000) These three words are very similar in meaning Eur J Soc Psychol 41, 468– 478 (2011) 472 Nicolay Gausel and Colin W Leach (Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011; Shaver et al 1987) As a consequence, “ashamed”, “disgraced”, and “humiliated” are found in many established measures of the feeling of shame (for reviews, see Robins, Noftle & Tracy, 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002) However, there is great variation in the semantic content of measures of shame (for reviews, see Robins et al., 2007) This likely reflects variation in the conceptualization of shame Interestingly, none of the 16 items of the widely used TOSCA measure of individual’s proneness to shame makes explicit reference to “shame;” four items refer to global self‐defects, seven items refer to a general feeling of inferiority, one item refers to a feeling of rejection, and five items refer to avoidance motivation (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002) Research that assesses “shame” and related feelings show a small link to self‐defensive responses The feeling of shame is correlated to wanting to physically avoid the failure (Roseman et al., 1994; Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Tangney et al., 1996) and other people (Frijda, Kuipers & ter Shure, 1989; Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 1996) The feeling of shame is also correlated with wanting to psychologically avoid one’s failure by not thinking about it and wanting to cover it up (Miller & Tangney, 1994; Roseman et al., 1994) The TOSCA measure of shame proneness tends to yield small to moderate correlations with self‐defensive motivation (e.g., O’Connor et al., 1999; for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002) However, the inclusion of self‐defensive motivation in the TOSCA itself likely exaggerates this link In addition, our conceptual model suggests that by emphasizing the appraisal of a global self‐ defect, and feelings of rejection or inferiority, the TOSCA exaggerates its association with self‐defensive motivation It should be clear from this brief review that the feeling of shame is not as closely linked to self‐defensive motivation as is commonly claimed (see also de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Ferguson, 2005) What is even more difficult to reconcile with the prevailing conceptualization of shame in psychology are the small to moderate correlations that the feeling of shame has with the motivation to improve the self and social relations, which we describe in the following paragraphs By viewing the feeling of shame as closely tied to the appraisal of a specific self‐defect that is potentially alterable, our model explains why shame is linked to the motivation to self‐improve Self‐improvement Motivation The feeling of shame is based on concern for the damage done to one’s self‐image by a failure Although self‐ defensive motivation can temporarily alleviate the unpleasant feelings produced by this concern, it cannot address the concern directly Avoiding one’s moral failure, and the self‐ defect it indicates, does nothing for a damaged self‐image A concern for one’s self‐image is most directly addressed by facing one’s self‐defect and identifying the means by which it can be improved (see Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite, & Braithwaite, 2001; Ferguson et al., 2007) Although it can be unpleasant to recognize a self‐defect, it is a necessary first step in the motivation to improve the self (e.g., Miller & Tangney, 1994; for discussions, see Ferguson et al., 2007; Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002) Of course, if one does not feel bad about one’s specific self‐defect, one has little reason to try to improve it When based on an appraisal of a specific self‐defect, the serious self‐criticism of shame should motivate effort to improve this particular aspect of the self‐ image (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) Conceptualizing the feeling of shame as based on an appraisal of a specific self‐defect that is potentially alterable serves to explain why shame is linked to the motivation to improve a self‐image damaged by moral failure For instance, Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski (1994) asked participants in four studies what they would change if they had experienced a shame‐eliciting event Participants reported most wanting to change themselves rather than simply changing their behavior Consistent with this, Roseman et al (1994) found recalled experiences of shame to be characterized by a moderate degree of wanting to undo and correct one’s mistake, improve one’s performance, and try harder However, the most direct evidence of a link between shame and self‐improvement motivation comes from several recent studies by de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans (2010) Here participants recalled, or experienced, shame about an achievement‐related failure de Hooge et al found felt shame to predict moderate levels of the motivation to restore a positive self‐evaluation Shame was also associated with wanting to achieve in the face of failure and with making greater effort to achieve In most of the studies of de Hooge et al., shame was more strongly linked to the motivation to restore self‐image than to protect it from further damage by responding self‐defensively Social‐improvement Motivation Self‐improvement may also be achieved through efforts at the improvement of the social relations affected by one’s moral failure Thus, our model proposes that the feeling of shame is associated with social‐improvement motivation through the motivation for self‐improvement (see Figure 1) Although it is rarely acknowledged in psychology, the feeling of shame has small to moderate correlations with motivation to improve the individual’s social relations (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Schmader & Lickel, 2006) For example, Tangney et al (1996) found that felt shame was correlated with wanting to make amends Miller and Tangney (1994) found that felt shame was characterized by apologizing and trying to make things better Roseman et al (1994) found that felt shame was characterized by wanting to make up for what was done and to apologize for it In three studies, de Hooge et al (2008) had participants imagine, recall, or experience failure The feeling of shame led individuals to act more pro‐socially toward those who knew of their failure Perhaps because few psychologists expect shame to be related to social‐improvement motivation, these are some of the only studies to examine how shame encourages actual pro‐social behavior Nevertheless, there is clear and consistent evidence that feeling shame is linked to the motivation to improve the social relations affected by one’s moral failure Feeling of Inferiority In English, the word “ashamed” can be used to express a general feeling of inferiority (e.g., Leach & Spears, 2008; Eur J Soc Psychol 41, 468– 478 (2011) Rethinking shame Smith et al., 2002) Thus, when lay people state that they feel “ashamed”, they may mean that they feel inferior because they appraise a failure as indicating a global, and thus unalterable, self‐defect When a general feeling of inferiority is not explicitly assessed, the expression of “shame” may be confounded with the debilitating feeling of inferiority (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) For this reason alone, most measures of “shame” are ambiguous in meaning Somewhat less ambiguous are those measures that purposefully assess the shame concept as mainly a feeling of inferiority At least since Lewis (1971), psychologists have tended to conceptualize a general feeling of inferiority as central to the shame concept For example, seven of the 16 items in the TOSCA scale of chronic proneness to shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) refer to general feelings of inferiority (e.g., “I feel… like a rat, … stupid, … inadequate”) This fits with Lewis’s (1971, p.84) argument that “Shame of failure is for an involuntary event It results from incapacity.” Like the appraisal of a global self‐defect to which it is tied, a general feeling of inferiority views the self as unalterably defective Partly because Lewis (1971) viewed a general feeling of inferiority as central to shame, it made sense for her to expect shame to promote self‐defensive responses to failure, such as avoidance, hiding, and covering up However, it is the feeling of inferiority embedded in the shame concept that provides a clearer psychological basis for self‐defensive responses to failure (for discussions, see Ferguson, 2005; Leach & Spears, 2008) As one believes that there is little that one can to alter the defective self, the feeling of inferiority drives the motivation to escape the painfully inadequate self and the failure that indicates one’s inadequacy A wide range of research in psychology shows the feeling of inferiority to be a moderate to strong predictor of maladaptive responses to failure (for reviews, see Ferguson, 2005; Leach & Spears, 2008) For example, Smith et al (2002, Study 4) asked participants to recall a time when they felt bad about doing something wrong or being inferior Feeling angry and vengeful at the time was more highly correlated to feeling inferior (r = 34) than was feeling ashamed (r = 23) In a study of chronic individual differences, O’Connor et al (1999) showed that the feeling of inferiority was more strongly associated with maladaptive responses than “shame.” They found chronic “self‐hate” to be more strongly correlated to hostility, low self‐esteem, and psychopathology than the chronic proneness to shame measured by the TOSCA Given the debilitating degree of self‐reproach in the feeling of inferiority, it is also possible that this feeling immobilizes people (Lewis, 1971) For this reason, Leach and Spears (2008) describe the pain of inferiority as a state of extreme passivity that promotes externalized hostility only when easy opportunities arise Thus, our model proposes that the feeling of inferiority has only a tenuous link to self‐defensive motivation (see Figure 1a) 473 (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008) and in the eyes of others (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995; de Waal, 1996) Thus, if a moral failure threatens to damage one’s social image, it also threatens to damage one’s “social bond” (Scheff, 2000) to others (Ahmed et al., 2001; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; de Waal, 1996) This is exemplified by the fact that a moral failure can lead groups to exact social punishment by marginalizing, ostracizing, or excluding the offender (Braithewaite, 1989; de Waal, 1996) Thus, our model proposes that those concerned with their social image can appraise others as likely to condemn them for their moral failure (see Figure 1a) This form of social marginalization should be most linked to a painful feeling of rejection against which people should want to defend themselves Appraisal of Other‐condemnation For some time in sociology, damage to social image has been central to the shame concept (e.g., Cooley, 1902; for reviews, see Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff, 2000) Despite the fact that Lewis (1971) is widely referenced as arguing that shame is intensely self‐focused, she also argued that “The ‘other’ is a prominent and powerful force in the experience of shame” (p.41) Thus, she conceptualized shame as, at least partly, based on concern for social image: “the self is thus divided in shame; it is experiencing condemnation from the other or from the field, and it is simultaneously acutely aware of itself” (p.39, italics added) Lewis’s (1971) emphasis of this appraisal of other‐condemnation likely followed from the fact that her research on “shame” was of “neurotic” clients who came to view their therapists as the “laughing; ridiculing, powerful, active” other A number of recent psychological approaches to the shame concept include the appraisal of other‐condemnation in combination with the typical emphasis of global self‐defect (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2002) For example, Iyer et al (2007) told US and British participants that Iraqis believed their national character to be corrupt and arrogant This manipulation increased the feeling of shame and a measure akin to the appraisal of other‐condemnation However, the manipulation aims to damage both self‐image and social image, making it impossible to gauge the role of each in the feeling of shame Such oscillation between conceptualizing shame as based on concern for self‐image or social image is consistent with Lewis’s (1971) insistence that the shame concept include a variety of appraisals and feelings However, folding the appraisal of other‐condemnation into “shame” obscures the role of social‐image concerns in the experience of moral failure As a remedy, our model isolates the appraisal of other‐condemnation and ties it to the feeling of rejection in an appraisal–feeling combination that shows a distinct concern for damage to one’s image in the eyes of others (see Figure 1) Feeling of Rejection CONCERN FOR SOCIAL IMAGE Having others view one as honest, trustworthy, and fair is important for a moral social image in one’s own eyes Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd Lewis (1971) argued that “for shame to occur there must be an emotional relationship between the person and the ‘other’ such that the person cares what the other thinks or feels about the self In this affective tie the self does not feel autonomous Eur J Soc Psychol 41, 468– 478 (2011) 474 Nicolay Gausel and Colin W Leach or independent, but dependent and vulnerable to rejection” (p.42) Consistent with this, Scheff and Retzinger (1991) conceptualize shame as involving feelings of rejection and rebuff about the threat of social isolation engendered by a moral or other failure Even the TOSCA measure of shame proneness includes “feel alone and apart from…” as an item, although it does not include a feeling of rejection in its conceptualization of shame Although the feeling of rejection has rarely been explicitly included in psychological approaches to the shame concept, psychologists have long viewed the feeling of rejection as central to the experience of condemnation or other social devaluation (for a review, see Baumeister & Leary, 1995) And, a great deal of research shows that individuals experience social devaluation as an intensely unpleasant emotional experience (for reviews, see Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009) In fact, MacDonald and Leary (2005) reviewed a great deal of evidence that shows the emotional experience of social devaluation to involve the same physiological systems as physical pain Consistent with this, a great deal of research shows that the feeling of rejection is extremely debilitating (for reviews, see Baumeister & Leary, 1995; MacDonald & Leary, 2005) For instance, in a meta‐analysis, Gerber and Wheeler (2009) showed experimental manipulations of social exclusion to have moderate to large effects on self‐esteem, mood, positive affect, and a sense of control Although people can describe this feeling as “shame” (MacDonald & Leary, 2005), it is more accurate to call it a feeling of rejection or isolation The label is important because the appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection combination is a more precise description of the social psychological basis for self‐defensive motivation Self‐defensive Motivation As reviewed above, the feeling of shame has a small empirical link to self‐defensive motivation However, the more debilitating feeling of rejection, often embedded in the shame concept, has a more considerable link to self‐defensive motivation (for a review, see MacDonald & Leary, 2005) This suggests that felt shame only appears to be linked with self‐defensive motivation because it is conceptualized and measured in a way that emphasizes felt rejection Thus, our model identifies the other‐condemnation → rejection combination of appraisal and feeling as a more precise explanation of self‐defensive motivation than the more general concept of shame that prevails at present (see Figure 1) Physical or psychological withdrawal and avoidance can militate against the appraisal of other‐condemnation and feeling of rejection by reducing one’s exposure to those expected to condemn one (Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) Thus, one can prevent further damage to one’s image in the eyes of others by removing oneself from the scene of failure (Ferguson, 2005; Thomas, 1997) Given that the damage to social image is believed done, there is little else that one can but defend one’s social image against further damage Wikan (2008) offers what we view as an example of the link between appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection and self‐defensive motivation She describes Rahmi Sahindal’s Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd motivation for murdering his daughter Fadime for bringing “shame” on the family by publicizing her relationship with a non‐Kurdish Swede and the family’s resultant ostracism and threats of violence Although Sahindal described his feeling as shame, he believed that his social image was so damaged in the eyes of his extended family, community, city, and the whole of Sweden that “he no longer could bear to get on the bus between his job and his home; he wanted to move to a new place He couldn’t bear going to work” (p.117) This sounds like a feeling of rejection tied to an appraisal of widespread moral condemnation A damaged social image can also promote self‐defense through the externalization of the painful feeling of rejection (Lewis, 1971; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991) Thus, the appraised other‐condemnation → felt rejection combination should also be tied to hostile anger and aggression toward those who can be blamed for the damage to one’s image in the eyes of others (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, 2011a) In their meta‐analysis, Gerber and Wheeler (2009) found the feeling of rejection to be linked to anti‐social responses MacDonald and Leary (2005) argue that feelings about devaluation lead to aggression when other forms of self‐defense, such as escape, are not easy This seemed to be the case in Rahmi Sahindal’s horrific murder of his daughter Fadime Social Defense of Social Image A moral failure puts our social relations at risk because it puts our social image in those relations at risk (Goffman, 1959; Keltner & Harker, 1998; Scheff, 2000) This risk is real The damaged social image that can follow from a moral failure can lead communities to exact material punishment including starvation, physical isolation, and violence (see de Waal, 1996) As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, communities can also exact social punishment for moral failure, including social marginalization, ostracism, and exclusion (Braithwaite, 1989; de Waal, 1996; Goffmann, 1959) Fear of this sort of social punishment is the basis for the feeling of rejection specified in our model As a poor social image poses a serious risk to our social relations, we have good reason to worry about the material and social consequences of moral failure Because the risk is so great, individuals should be motivated to defend their social image against such potential damage where possible Indeed, those who have experienced or witnessed the feeling of rejection tied to the appraisal of other‐condemnation should wish to avoid this painful feeling by engaging in social defense of their image in the eyes of others In instances when a moral failure does not yet appear to have damaged one’s image in the eyes of others, concern about social image should implicate the self less This should make emotion and emotion‐based motivation less likely (Lazarus, 1991) Instead, individuals should be most focused on defending their social image from the potential damage that their moral failure may to their social relations This is most easily done by improving one’s social relations—an alternative pathway incorporated into our model at the top of Figure Thus, a moral failure may directly motivate efforts at social defense of one’s social image when one views the potential damage to social image as preventable Eur J Soc Psychol 41, 468– 478 (2011) Rethinking shame 475 Figure Expanded conceptual model of the experience of moral failure Note: Top half of figure shows concern for social image; shaded, bottom half of figure shows concern for self‐image The core model is shown in dark gray By expressing a desire to improve one’s relationship with those affected by one’s moral failure or with the relevant community, one may pre‐emptively defend one’s social image from the condemnation that could otherwise follow from a moral failure Public statements of responsibility or regret can lead others to view one as having re‐established one’s moral standing in the group (Braithwaite, 1989) Expressions of humility may similarly work as an appeasement strategy that reduces the need for punishment or condemnation (de Waal, 1996; Keltner & Harker, 1998) This socio‐functional view of the social defense of social image has been examined in ethological approaches to social groups It also fits with a socio‐functional view of emotion As the feeling of rejection is highly aversive, people should be motivated to defend their social image in ways that prevent the appraisal of other‐condemnation and feeling of rejection A number of sociological approaches to the shame concept also emphasize that the possibility of other‐condemnation can motivate individuals to defend their social image before serious damage is done (e.g., Braithwaite, 1989; for a review, see Scheff, 2000) For example, Goffman’s (1959) notion of face‐work suggests that people engage in social defense of their image in the eyes of others Goffman presumes little involvement of the self and thus gives no pride of place to emotion as a basis of motivation THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS Why some people respond self‐defensively to moral failure while others respond by wanting to improve themselves and their social relations? The prevailing view in psychology is Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd that shame promotes self‐defensive motivation, whereas guilt or remorse promotes more positive motivation Across sub‐ disciplines of psychology, shame is thought to be based on an appraisal of global self‐defect and is thus driven by concern for an irreparably damaged self image As a result, shame is thought to motivate people to defend themselves from further damage to their devastated self image through avoidance or withdrawal Although this view is popular, it suffers from several important problems Notably, “shame” is only modestly related to self‐defensive motivation And, in direct contrast to the prevailing view, shame is at least as strongly linked to motivation for self‐improvement and social improvement Thus, we thought it necessary to rethink shame We first differentiated the subjective feeling of shame from the ambiguous concept referred to as “shame” by researchers and by their research participants In our view, the feeling of shame is a dysphoric experience of contrite self‐criticism about a failure in a domain important to the self‐concept This feeling of shame is only one of the numerous appraisals and feelings embedded in the prevailing concept of shame Thus, rather than continuing to conceptualize shame as an ambiguous admixture, we dissected the concept into two distinct appraisals and three feelings Our model proposes how these elements combine to form distinct experiences of moral failure Each experience is suggestive of a distinct motivational pathway As such, we offer social psychological explanations as to why people respond to moral failure with self‐defensive or self‐improvement motivation Rather than invoking the ambiguous experience of “shame”, our model proposes that people travel down one or the other path because of a specific pattern of how they appraise and feel about their moral failure Eur J Soc Psychol 41, 468– 478 (2011) 476 Nicolay Gausel and Colin W Leach We were able to distinguish the different pathways in our model partly because of what each pathway suggests about a person’s overriding concern in their moral failure Those most concerned with their self image are thought most likely to appraise their moral failure as indicating a defect of the self Unlike the prevailing view in psychology, we thought it important to distinguish the appraisal of global self‐defect, presumed central to the shame concept, from the appraisal of a specific self‐defect that seems more appropriate to moral failure This more circumscribed appraisal of self‐defect also seems more likely in non‐clinical populations (Ferguson, 2005) We reviewed theory and research that suggests that shame is actually tied to an appraisal that one’s self image suffers a specific self‐defect in need of repair As self‐ improvement is the most clear and direct way to repair a damaged self‐image, we reasoned that shame about a specific self‐defect should best predict self‐improvement motivation and thus social‐improvement motivation However, improvement is a more difficult aim for those who appraise a moral failure as damaging their global self‐image As a feeling of ontological inadequacy implies that one’s entire self‐image is irreparably damaged by a moral failure, it should encourage a feeling of inferiority Although people may describe this experience as a feeling of shame, a feeling of inferiority is a more accurate conceptualization and description Inferiority is a highly unpleasant and intense feeling of self‐criticism that people wish to be rid of Thus, as shown in the research we reviewed above, there is some reason to expect felt inferiority to predict self‐defensive responses to moral failure Indeed, escape and avoidance is a reasonable response to an unalterable self‐defect What else can one but run away? However, given the debilitating degree of self‐reproach involved in the feeling if inferiority, it is even more likely that individuals become passive observers of their fate, unable to flee or much else besides reproach themselves (Leach & Spears, 2008) Rather than attributing the defense of self‐image to shame, we propose that this motivation is closely linked to a feeling of rejection Building on theory and research on the shame concept and on social exclusion, our model views the feeling of rejection as tied to the appraisal that a moral failure suggests that others will condemn one Thus, this appraisal–feeling combination indicates a damaged social image and thus social bonds at serious risk Given this appraisal and feeling, a self‐ defensive response to moral failure makes most sense If the damage to social image is already done, there is little that one can to improve it Instead, individuals focus on trying to defend their social image against further damage by escaping condemnation By identifying the subjective appraisal of other‐condemnation and feeling of rejection as distinct from shame, our model explains the social psychological basis for self‐defensive motivation more precisely than the ambiguous shame concept Guilt? Because shame is typically thought to promote self‐defensive motivation, other self‐critical feelings have been tied to self‐ improvement and social‐improvement Guilt is chief among these emotions In fact, a great deal of theory and research in psychology views guilt as the pro‐social antithesis of an anti‐social Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd shame concept (for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002) Given this, some may wonder whether our conceptualization of shame comes too close to the prevailing view of guilt We do, in fact, view shame and guilt as closely related feelings that have a great deal in common (see Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, 2011b; Leach et al., 2006) However, research has established a number of small differences between the feelings (for a review, see Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) Most important for the present purposes is that guilt focuses more narrowly than shame on the appraisal of agency (i.e., causality, responsibility) for moral failure (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 1994; Roseman et al., 1994) Thus, as Lewis (1971) argued, the concern in guilt is the moral failure rather than the self‐image of the failed Given this focus on the agency for moral failure, guilt is a likely motivator of efforts at social improvement that ameliorate the effects of the moral failure (e.g., Leach et al., 2006; for a discussion, see Leach et al., 2002) This pathway is shown at the bottom of the expanded model shown in Figure As shame shows a greater concern for self‐image than guilt, shame should be a greater motivation for the improvement of self‐image As one’s identity is not implicated in the same way in guilt as in shame (Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson et al., 2007), guilt may be more easily dealt with by improving the social consequences of the moral failure for which one appraises oneself as an agent In the experience of shame, the agency for moral failure is appraised as having the more profound implication of highlighting a specific defect in the self Thus, as shown in Figure 2, we view the appraisal of agency as modestly associated with the appraisal of self‐defect thought to be central to shame An example may prove helpful Because of a consistent failure to recycle, one may appraise oneself as contributing to global warming and thus as the agent who caused this moral failure However, this appraisal does not imply that one views oneself as suffering a defect in one’s self‐concept What of the Non‐moral? There are few failures more important to self‐image or social image than moral failures Nevertheless, non‐moral failures can be important Indeed, much past work has examined “shame” about failures of competence, such as performing poorly at work or school As in moral failure, we believe that examinations of failures of competence need to distinguish the feeling of shame from the feeling of inferiority and appraisal of global self‐defect that are often embedded in the shame concept We expect that examinations of competence failure will show that what has been previously described as “shame” is actually an appraised (global) self‐defect → felt inferiority combination Failures of competence may also encourage concern for social image, where such failure is important to one’s view of oneself in a group or community Thus, self‐ defensiveness may also flow from the appraised other‐ condemnation → felt rejection combination when social‐image concern drives the experience of failures of competence The concept of shame is also used quite often to refer to peoples’ experience of negative events that are not clearly about morality or competence and not clearly an example of failure For example, shame is often used to describe the experience of stigmas, such as physical deformity, severe disability, extremely low status, and rape or other serious Eur J Soc Psychol 41, 468– 478 (2011) Rethinking shame victimization We believe that dividing the broad concept of shame into specific appraisals and feelings should aid any examination of the emotional experience that people refer to as “shame.” Although a survivor of sexual assault may tell a therapist that she feels “ashamed,” our model requires an analysis of this utterance to go beyond the survivor’s or the therapist’s common‐sense understanding of “shame.” Our model may be used to examine whether the survivor says that she is ashamed because she feels that her family or community will condemn her Unlike other approaches, our model can differentiate this concern for serious damage to her social image from the concern for damage to her self‐image Referring to both of these experiences of sexual assault as “shame” does little to clarify the survivors’ actual experience Describing the former experience as felt rejection and the latter as felt inferiority goes much further in representing the meaning the event has for the survivor As such, these more precise characterizations may better guide how therapists or loved ones may best engage the experience and how it may be more carefully and accurately researched Methods and Models Distinguishing the appraisals and feelings that are commonly embedded within the shame concept enables methodological approaches that are more flexible and more precise than the unitary scales that prevail at present Rather than combining appraisal, feeling, and motivation into a single scale of “shame,” we advise the measurement of each individual element (see Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) This allows the direct assessment of the inter‐relations between measures of appraisal, feeling, and motivation Structural Equation Modeling is one excellent way to simultaneously estimate patterns of covariation to examine the latent structure of peoples’ experience of moral failure (for a general discussion, see Leach, 2010) Our studies of moral failure have provided consistent evidence that our differentiated model of appraisals, feelings, and motivations is a more appropriate measurement of the experience of moral failure than a single, omnibus concept of shame (Gausel, Leach, & Vignoles, 2011a,b; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2011) Examining the experience of moral failure with distinct appraisals and feelings also allows researchers to validate the subjective meaning of the feelings that participants express by tying each feeling to an appraisal that helps define it (for general discussions, see Lazarus, 1991; Leach, 2010) Thus, participants’ expression of felt shame has a specific meaning when it is especially linked to the appraisal of a specific self‐ defect If, for some reason, an expressed feeling of shame is closely linked to an appraisal of global self‐defect, this particular meaning of “shame” would be evidenced in the empirical model In this way, we could know that this particular expression of shame is equivalent to our conceptualization of the feeling of inferiority despite its expression as “shame.” Thus, our model enables research to distinguish between participants’ semantic expression of feelings and the more consistent and considered conceptualization of emotion required of those who generate theory and conduct research As such, our model helps to specify what exactly participants and researchers mean when they refer to the shame concept Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 477 It may also be important to note that our conceptual model need not be thought of as a simple, unidirectional, causal model Although appraisal often does lead to feeling and motivation, this is not the only causal direction possible Based on Lazarus (1991), we prefer to view our conceptual model as a network of inter‐related elements (for a discussion, see Leach, 2010) Each element implies its concomitant elements as well as the motivation that best suits each combination Thus, the self‐defensive motivation of avoidance is implied by a feeling of rejection about an appraisal of other‐ condemnation This motivation is socially and psychologically consistent with self‐defensive motivation Self ⇔ Social Our separation of concern for self‐image and social image is not meant to imply that the two concerns are mutually opposed Rather, we wish to suggest that one or the other concern is prepotent in each feeling in our model In the feeling of rejection, for instance, concern for social image is prepotent; concern for self‐image is secondary However, one feels rejection because it is important to one’s self‐concept to be accepted and valued by others This is why the appraisal that others condemn one harms the self and thus feels bad (for a general discussion, see Lazarus, 1991) Concern for social image that does not involve the self‐concept is not emotional in our model It is experienced as a more purely social concern for the defense of one’s social image in an effort to avoid the potential social costs of moral failure (see Figure 2) Although concern for self‐image is at the heart of felt shame, it is clear that self‐image is grounded in social relations regulated by moral standards More obviously, the moral failure that precipitates felt shame is typically social in nature Moral failures often involve other people who one has wronged in some way Thus, the concern for self‐image that is illustrated in moral shame is inherently social This is part of the reason that shame motivates not just improvement of the self but also improvement of the social relation If self‐image is inherently social, then the improvement of self‐image is also an improvement of social relations Because self‐image is inherently social, it is also possible that concern for self‐image can dovetail with concern for social image in felt shame Indeed, individuals are likely to be aware that improving their self‐image and their social relations is also likely to improve their social image It has long been recognized that others can interpret one’s expression of shame as a signal that one wishes to improve one’s social image and one’s social relations (see Braithwaite, 1989; 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