Inching toward a unified metatheory for psychology

Inching Toward a Unified Metatheory for Psychology Michael F. Mascolo Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science ISSN 1932-4502 Integr psych behav DOI 10.1007/s12124-020-09543-2 23 Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be self-archived in electronic repositories If you wish to selfarchive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com” 23 Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-020-09543-2 BRIEF COMMUNICATION Inching Toward a Unified Metatheory for Psychology Michael F Mascolo # Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020 Abstract Zagaria et al (2020) have aptly suggested that as a discipline, psychology is a giant with feet of clay Drawing on the content of introductory textbooks, the authors show that there is little coherence and consensus about the meaning of key psychological terms – including such terms as psychology, mind, behavior Drawing on evidence marking psychology is a “soft” science, the authors suggest that psychology can profit by adopting the “hard” foundation of evolutionary psychology as its metatheory While Zagaria et al.’s characterization of psychology’s fractious foundation has deep merit, their desire to erect a psychological metatheory on evolutionary psychology is unlikely to solve the problem they so aptly identify At the least, I suggest a unified metatheory must: (a) establish a shared psychological lexicon; (b) elaborate a methodology that coordinates first-, second- and third-person modes of inquiry, and (c) develop a process model that describes psychological functioning at the biological, psychological and socio-cultural levels of analysis To illustrate, I describe how contemporary relational and systems frameworks provide a framework that can move us in these directions Keywords Metatheory Evolutionary psychology Intersubjectivity Mind Psychology Unification Zagaria et al (2020) have written an important and penetrating critique of the discipline of psychology and its capacity to function as a science They have argued, successfully in my view, that there is a profound lack of consensus among psychological scientists about central and foundational concepts in the field This includes concepts that are generally thought to provide the intellectual grounding of the field, including psychology, mind, behavior, as well as concepts that are taken to refer to particular classes of psychological processes – cognition, consciousness, thinking, feeling, emotion, deciding, and so forth They have suggested that the conceptual foundations on which theory * Michael F Mascolo mascolom@merrimack.edu Department of Psychology, Merrimack College, North Andover, MA 01970, USA Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav and research in psychology are erected stand, in their words, on amorphous feet made of clay They argue that there is a need to develop a coherent psychological metatheory – a set of foundational concepts that can move psychology from its current preparadigmatic state to an increasingly unified system of scientific concepts and presuppositions Having its origins in the “hard” rather than “soft” presuppositions of the biological sciences, the authors nominate evolutionary psychology as a possible metatheoretical framework for psychological science Zagaria et al (2020) have appropriately diagnosed psychology’s struggle to construct a shared conceptual foundation I am less confident about their proposed cure – the idea of evolutionary psychology as psychological metatheory In what follows, to explain why, I first reflect upon the problem of conceptual clarification in psychology I argue that conceptual confusion has its origins not in the so-called “softness” of psychology, but instead in our collective failure in developing a psychological science framed in its own terms To make progress toward a unified framework, there is a need to understand psychological concepts at the psychological level itself, while simultaneously seeking to understand how psychological processes are both biologicallyembodied and culturally-embedded This cannot be done by emulating the methods of the “hard” sciences To understand their subject matter, natural scientists not need to consider how the objects of their inquiry (atoms, projectiles or organ systems) experience their worlds; psychological scientists, however, cannot otherwise In this way, the processes by which humans gain psychological knowledge are fundamentally different from those that they use to understand particles, objects and bodies (Valsiner and Brinkmann 2016) From this perspective, conceptual clarity in psychology cannot be achieved from within the objective versus subjective polarity that typically structures discourse in psychological science It can be achieved, however, through the intersubjective analysis of experience as it arises in relations between people in joint action (Mascolo 2016, 2017) In what follows, I first engage in a brief examination of Zagaria et al.’s (2020) call for a unified psychology In response to their call, I suggest that, at minimum, any unified metatheory must: (a) establish a shared psychological lexicon; (b) elaborate a methodology that embraces the full range of possible forms of inquiry; and (c) develop a process model that describes psychological functioning at the biological, psychological and socio-cultural levels of analysis I then describe how contemporary relational and systems frameworks can move us in the direction of a unified psychological metatheory Systems frameworks seek to understand how psychological structures emerge within multi-nested organism-environment systems Person-environment systems are mutually constituted at the biological, psychological and socio-cultural levels of functioning Although psychological processes are emergent biological systems, they must be understood at their own level of functioning To so, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of psychological concepts through a refinement of the relational processes by which we gain psychological knowledge in the first place – namely intersubjective engagement between people (Mascolo and Kallio 2020) Drawing on methodologies that integrate first, second and third person forms of inquiry, I propose a relational process model of psychological functioning that identifies how psychological structures self-organize within the context of the multi-layered person-environment system Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav Can Evolutionary Psychology Function as a Psychological Meta-Theory? Zagaria et al (2020) put forth a series of arguments to support their suggestion that evolutionary psychology can function as a meta-theory for psychology First, drawing on an interesting body of bibliographic data, they have produced evidence suggesting that natural and social sciences can be differentiated along a hard-soft dimension Relative to softer sciences, hard sciences are organized around more unified body of core knowledge; their progress is informed by novel findings produced by shared methods and organized by more-or-less consensual ways of understanding the significance of research findings To the extent that evolutionary psychology it is founded upon the “harder” science of biology, evolutionary psychology is able to build upon a more unified body of core concepts and methods While Zagaria et al (2020) acknowledge the limitations of evolutionary psychology, they write: …evolutionary psychology’s global theoretical consistency (which cannot determine its scientific success alone anyway) cannot be ignored…It is linked directly to biology, through which it can be connected to the other “hard” sciences It is compatible with –and somewhat built on –neuro-cognitivism, and finally it is consistent with other psychological sub-disciplines (e.g developmental, social, personality and psychopathology) and with other disciplines and sciences, like anthropology Further, they suggest that evolutionary psychology provides a framework for understanding perennial psychological issues, such as the nature-nurture problem, the role of culture in human development, and the tendency for psychologists of different theoretical orientations to organize their theories by referring to innate processes that are products of evolution They also suggest that while many have critiqued the presuppositions of evolutionary psychology, existing critiques tend to focus on narrow sense evolutionary psychology rather than broad sense evolutionary psychology, which exhibits both intellectual flexibility and pluralism Zagaria et al (2020) contention that “evolutionary psychology may represent a compelling metatheory” (p 13) rests on several core principles: What is fiercely debated concerns specific theories and methodologies: almost no-one would deny that we are animals biologically designed to survive and reproduce Most of the critics of evolutionary psychology recognize that its core principle is credible… However, “the contested nature of evolutionary psychology lies not in our status as evolved beings, but in the extent to which evolutionary ideas add value to studies of human behavior, and the rigor with which these ideas are tested” (Barrett et al 2014, p 1) Can evolutionary psychology provide psychology with a compelling metatheory? Psychology must have its basis in strong biological and evolutionary theory However, this is not the same as saying that evolutionary psychology can provide a metatheory for psychology There are several reasons why this is the case First, it is true that most scholars would embrace the idea that humans are biological organisms whose survival Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav is dependent upon the processes of natural selection and reproduction.1 However, while this statement may have psychological ramifications, it has no psychological content To build upon this statement, there is a still a need to develop and invoke psychological concepts – principles that explain how adaptive activity is mediated by processes that extend beyond the biological This same point applies to the statement that the value of an evolutionary approach lies in “the extent to which evolutionary ideas add value to studies of human behavior” (p 13) An evolutionary framework cannot provide a metatheory simply by adding value; a psychological metatheory must provide a framework for understanding what it means to speak of psychological as opposed to, say, biological or cultural processes A psychological metatheory must provide a framework – however abstract – for understanding processes at the psychological level of analysis The second reason proceeds from the first Zagaria et al (2020) began their paper with the observation that there exists little consensus about the core meaning of psychological terms It is not clear how adopting evolutionary psychology as a metatheory would solve this problem To function as a metatheory, evolutionary psychology (or any other model) must either be able to provide a psychological lexicon, or otherwise function to clarify the meanings of psychological terms In the absence of such a lexicon, it follows that any evolutionary psychology would be dependent upon a preexisting psychological science.2 To the extent that evolutionary psychology relies upon psychological science for its psychological content, it cannot function as a metatheory for that science A third objection concerns the status of evolutionary psychology itself To their credit, Zagaria et al (2020) acknowledge a long list of critiques of evolutionary psychology, including: its testability, some of its fundamental cognitive assumptions like the massive modularity, the alleged inconsistency of the notion of EEA (environment of evolutionary adaptation), its potential methodological flaws (disjunction and grain problems), its alleged determinism, reductionism and the underestimation of the environmental influences, as well as the so-called “natural teleology” and the “spandrel” problem… All theoretical systems, scientific or otherwise, are organized by pre-theoretical and pre-empirical assumptions, beliefs and values Evolutionary psychology is no different As described by Zagaria et al (2020), even in the context of theoretical pluralism, evolutionary psychology contains a meta-theoretical bias toward thinking of humans as beings (a) who have an innate psychological core; (b) whose actions can be understood Zagaria e t al (2020) acknowledge that while their articulations sometimes invoke teleological language, that they mean this language to be taken metaphorically In this regard, the statement “almost no-one would deny that we are animals biologically designed to survive and reproduce” contains teleological language that many would find objectionable It might be easier to agree with the reframing of the statement provided here This is implicit, of course, in the use of the phrase evolutionary psychology That the adjective evolutionary modifies the noun psychology suggests a view that focuses on evolutionary aspects of psychological processes, or evolutionary perspectives on psychological processes In the former, the focus on evolution is but a part of the larger focus on psychology; in the latter, an evolutionary perspective must be able to give coherence to the entire field of psychology – which includes clarification of core principles Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav as traits that have been selected by evolution; (c) as individuals whose actions function in the service of genetic imperatives; and related ideas Whether these points are refutable is not at issue here; instead, the issue is the extent to which a model based on contestable presuppositions can function as a broad metatheory While evolutionary psychology can be offered as but one perspective within a plurality of competing views, in the absence of consensus about its paradigmatic assumptions, evolutionary psychology cannot function as a core psychological metatheory Steps Toward a Unified Psychological Metatheory Creating a unified metatheory for psychology is a daunting task The field of psychology comprises a suite of diverse paradigms and perspectives that carve the psychological world in different ways These frameworks contradict each other in many ways As a result, a unified theory must be synthetic rather than eclectic (Bidell 2020) Any hope of creating a unified framework would require transformation of existing theoretical frameworks en route to integrating them to form a metatheory that has broad application Such a task would therefore require a willingness on the part of scholars to rethink core assumptions and values and find ways to reconcile competing frameworks I suggest that at minimum, a unified metatheory for psychology would have to address three basic issues, including developing (a) a sharable psychological lexicon; (b) an integrative methodology and (c) a process model that describes how psychological functioning operates both within and between multiply-nested (biological, psychological and socio-cultural) levels of organismic functioning The Intersubjective Corroboration of Psychological Concepts Zagaria et al (2020) have shown that there is little consensus and clarity in the field about foundational psychological concepts In introductory textbooks, psychology is typically defined in terms variations on the theme of “the science of mind and behavior”.3 This definition, however, is the result of a marriage of convenience Textbook authors are charged with the task of coordinating theoretical diversity The reference to behavior in the definition allows inclusion of perspectives that emphasize the capacity to make "objective" observations of that which is publically observable References to mind or mental operations allow inclusion of the view that reference to “observable” behavior is insufficient; that psychology deals with experience and other “non-observable” processes that “lie behind” behavior The use of the conjunction “and” in the definition (i.e., mind and behavior) juxtaposes these concepts without speculating on the nature of their relation To say that psychology is a “science” allows readers to gloss over the noncommittal “and” and proceed with confidence that whatever “mind” is, it must be accessible through the scientific observation One might ask whether introductory texts – which are created in a desire to cover vast areas within the field – are the best place to seek comprehensive definitions of psychology How can one create a shared definition amidst the variety of different content areas? Psychological textbooks are intended merely to survey the field – not to characterize it as a whole Such a critique, however, would concede the point that Zagaria et al (2020) make The mere fact that authors of introductory textbooks must struggle to find a coherent unifying theme illustrates the problem at hand Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav In this way, common definitions of psychology are founded upon a dualism: while “behavior” is something accessible, “mental processes” are subjective and mysterious – measurable through their capacity to be tethered to operational definitions.4 The focus on that which is observable is what was meant to mark psychology as a science However, psychological processes are not observable in the same sense that physical and biological systems are Humans not gain knowledge of psychological experience by making inferences about what lies behind inscrutable patterns of “overt behavior” Instead, the very possibility of constructing psychological knowledge presupposes that humans have some capacity to engage the experiences of others In this way, psychological knowledge has its origins in intersubjective processes that occur between and among people (Mascolo 2016, 2017) Intersubjectivity is the process of coordinating, sharing and mutually incorporating experience between people (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2008; Matusov 1996) Infants come into the world with a primordial capacity for intersubjectivity (Meltzoff 2013, Trevarthen and Aitken 2001) Infants not engage their caregivers as if they were objects or inscrutable strangers Soon after birth, infants treat their caregivers as interactive agents (Bardi 2017; Reddy 2015) They adjust their emotional expressions to the ongoing and anticipated actions of their caregivers (Fogel, 1993) It is upon basic modes of intersubjective engagement that higher levels of socio-psychological understandings are acquired (Rochat and Passos-Ferreira 2009; Zahavi 2006) Thus, psychological knowledge develops neither through “objective observation” nor from “subjective introspection” It develops as cultural agents use everyday psychological language – whose shared meanings already exist in the culture – to refer to experiences that arise between infant and caregiver in the process of intersubjective engagement (Bretherton and Beeghly 1982; Mascolo 2017; Verhagan 2008) From this perspective, psychological concepts not gain their meaning through their correspondence to object-like processes that exist in an unmediated world (or in the heads of either self or others) Psychological terms are words; they allow us parse our joint experience in shared ways – that is, to make intersubjective experience intelligible to both self and other If this is so, then conceptual clarification in psychology cannot occur simply by making more precise recordings of observable behavior Instead, to must occur through a process of intersubjective corroboration – a process of coordinating and corroborating between people the ways in which we use language represent, describe and express experience (Mascolo and Kallio 2020) Any description of a person’s psychological processes always occurs against the backdrop of an already existing psychological lexicon Any characterization of a psychological state, either in the self or the other, is mediated by intersubjectively shared and contested systems of meanings (Husserl 1970; Matsuev 2003) The first step in conceptual clarification would involve reflecting on the (often tacit) ways in which we typically use a given psychological term, comparing this meaning to other possible ways of using the term, and then explicitly settling upon the way we will define a given term in any particular theoretical and empirical work Second, we can then reflect upon how our use of psychological concepts structure our empirical studies, as well as the extent to which the results of our studies corroborate (or fail to corroborate) their meanings Third, we can compare how the results of our studies comport with results of Indeed, many formal definitions of psychological processes are themselves couched in operational terms Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav other studies structured by similar concepts In this way, psychological meanings become clarified not merely by making more careful descriptions of what we see, but by assessing, coordinating and corroborating the shared ways in which we use particular psychological (Mascolo and Kallio 2020) Toward an Integrative Psychological Methodology A methodology is a conceptual framework that governs our approach to studying a given area of the world Methodology is not the same a method; a methodology is a set of principles that guide the process of inquiry (Valsiner 2020) It identifies what counts as an appropriate research question; what counts as evidence; what methods can be used to test theoretical claims; and what qualifies as appropriate interpretations Psychological science has long struggled with issues of methodology Since its severing from philosophy, psychology has sought to define itself as an empirical science In so doing, it has largely accepted “objectivist” principles of scientific inquiry that have their origins in the natural sciences The goal has been to describe the observable world from a theoretically-neutral third-person point of view This goal has created a suite of internal contradictions in psychological methodology Psychological events not exist as “observable entities” in the same way that molecules, cells and bodies If we did not already have the capacity to experience anger for ourselves – if we were not already able understand the shared meaning of words like “anger”, “desire” or “goal” – we would never be able to recognize or identify these experiences in either ourselves or in others In this way, the capacity for shared understanding – intersubjectivity – precedes both our “first-person” reflections personal experience as well the “third person” identification of psychological states in others What we sometimes call “subjectivity” and “objectivity” are both made possible by the more primary process of intersubjectivity What are the implications of this idea for psychological methodology? Does the primacy of intersubjectivity mean that third-person (i.e., “objective”) and first-person (i.e., “subjective”) methods have no place in psychological inquiry? On the contrary: from an intersubjective point of view, there is an important place for first- and thirdperson methods However, within this view, the terms “subjective” and “objective” begin to lose their conventional meanings Objective observations cease to be neutral descriptions of the way the world really is; instead, they become accountings that are available to all of us, rather than just to me or to you Subjective reports cease to be descriptions of private states to which only I can have access; instead, they become socially mediated reflections on personal experiences – expressions that are made possible through our capacity use words to represent and communicate shared and contested meanings (e.g., the word “anger”) An integrative psychological methodology would be one that acknowledges rather than marginalizes the fundamentally intersubjective (i.e., “shared” or “second-person”) origins of psychological knowledge It would be one that embraces the utility of first- and third-person forms of inquiry – but while acknowledging the need to be reflexive about how such forms of inquiry are structured by meanings that have their origins in past and present forms of intersubjective engagement between persons Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav A Relational Conception of Psychological Functioning Having articulated tools for identifying and studying key psychological processes, a unified metatheory should be able to specify a general process model of psychological functioning Such a model should provide a framework that is broadly applicable to the study of any psychological issue or problem In what follows, in broad strokes, I outline what might be called a relational systems model of psychological development that provides an example of how this might be done This model seeks to build upon what is shared among systems-related approaches to psychology, including epigenetic (Gottlieb and Lickliter 2007), dynamic systems theory (Granic 2008; Thelen and Smith 2006; Van Geert 2020), dynamic skill theory (Fischer et al 1993; Mascolo and Fischer 2015), relational-developmental theory (Lerner and Lerner 2019; Overton 2014), enactivism (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2008), and a suite of related approaches (Henriques 2011; Mascolo and Bidell 2020; Uher 2016; Valsiner 1998) With a relational systems model, psychological functioning operates as a selforganizing person-environment system Any psychological outcome is an emergent product of coactions that occur both within and between levels of a multiplynested person-environment system (Gottlieb 1991) As shown in Fig 1, it is helpful to think of person-environment interactions as organized within multinested biogenetic, psychological, social-relational and cultural-linguistic systems At the bio-genetic level of functioning, organisms operate as living systems that regulate internal processes to adapt to environmental circumstances Psychological processes are forms of biological processes As emergent products of complexly structured biological systems, they show emergent properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of their base elements (Mascolo and Kallio 2019; Stephan 2004) As an emergent form of biological activity, a psychological process is any adaptive process that is mediated by meaning or experience (Mascolo et al 2014) From this view, it follows that although all psychological processes are biological processes, not all biological processes are psychological processes (Mascolo and Kallio, 2019) The analysis of psychological processes requires its own vocabulary – including such terms as consciousness, attention, emotion, meaning, experience, and so forth All psychological processes operate within broader systems of social relations The social-relational level of functioning consists of interactions that occur between at least two people In face-to-face social interaction, social partners continuously adjust their actions, thoughts and feelings to the ongoing and anticipated actions of their social Fig Multi-Nested Epigenetic Systems Note Adapted from Gottlieb, 1991; Gottlieb and Lickliter, 2007 Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav partners It follows that in joint action, social partners co-regulate each other’s actions (Fogel 1993) Because each partner adjusts to the other, neither partner can be said to be in full control over his or her actions In joint action, control over action, thought and feelings is distributed between people (Kostrubiec et al 2018) As a result, novel forms of acting, thinking and experience emerge in in ways that would be impossible if either individual were acting in isolation (Fischer et al 1993) Social interaction, however, itself occurs within broader cultural-linguistic frames – systems of shared and contested symbolic meaning, values and practices distributed throughout a community (Mascolo 2004; Valsiner 2012) Language and other semiotic systems play a central role in the historical formation of the cultural meanings and practices that frame everyday interaction Language functions as an intersubjective vehicle for representing shared and contested meanings Human language is not a mere matter of communication; language and other cultural tools function as mediational means (Wertsch 1998) As individuals develop, they use language to represent and regulate their own thinking, feeling and acting It is through their immersion and appropriation of culture that persons create themselves and become more fully human If people enter the world as biological beings, they need culture to move toward completion Figure outlines a process model of psychological functioning from a relationalsystems framework (Mascolo and Fischer 2015) In Fig 2, the person-environment system is composed of five interlocking components: (a) individual action, (b) the objects of action, real or imagined, (c) other persons, (d) cultural tools that mediate intersubjective social exchanges, and (e) the broader system of shared, symbolicallyrepresented meanings, values, belief and practices of the culture As discussed above, any psychological act is an emergent product of the relational interplay among the various aspects of the person-environment system For example, consider the simple act of “having coffee with a friend” This socio-cultural activity is composed, in part, of the act of drinking a cup of coffee The (a) act of drinking is performed on (b) an object, namely, the coffee The act of drinking is (d) mediated (Wertsch 2007) through the use of a cultural tool – a coffee cup At this point, we can see that control over the person’s action is distributed between the person, the coffee and the cup (Granott 2020; Kostrubiec et al 2018) The person must adjust the movements of the hand to the contours of the cup; she must adjust her Fig The Coactive Person-Environment System Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav drinking to the amount of coffee contained in the cup, its temperature, and so forth In this way, the coffee and the cup are part of the process of the person’s action Further, the act of drinking itself functions as part of a larger cultural activity – having coffee with a friend In so doing, the person and (c) her friend position themselves (Harré 2015) within a broader system of (e) cultural meanings, story-lines, values and practices – what one does and how one acts at a coffee shop Each person continuously adjusts their actions to the ongoing actions of the other They take turns drinking and talking, adjusting their acts in ways that fit into their (d) intersubjective shared set of expectations for conducting the ongoing activity – namely, “having a cup of coffee” This simple example illustrates the ways in which psychological activity – meaningmediated action – self-organizes between people within particular socio-cultural contexts (Steenbeek and van Geert 2020) Structures of individual action not only have their origins between people in the dynamic person-environment system, they also arise from the mutual regulation of processes that operate within individuals (see Mascolo and Fischer 2015; Mascolo and Kallio 2019 ) The co-regulation of psychological system as they operate within individual persons is shown at Point (a) As shown at Point (a), the process of individual action beings at the level of affective activity that is initiated outside of conscious awareness (Grandjean and Scherer 2008) In any given context, (1) nonconscious processes assess shifting relations between ongoing circumstances and a person’s motives, desires and concerns (e.g., the hot coffee is about to spill) (see Mascolo in press) Shifts in the fate of a person’s motives and concerns generate (2) affect (e.g., fear) (Roseman 1984; Tong et al 2013) Affective (and other attentional modulation) processes thereupon (3) select (Lewis 1996; Mascolo in press) unconsciously detected motive-relevant circumstances (i.e., the impending spill) and organizes them into (4) conscious awareness In so doing, representations of the organism’s most adaptively pressing concerns are represented in consciousness for further adaptive action (Freeman 2000) Consciousness mediates adaptive action by (5) continuously activating the construction (6) novel strategies (e.g., adjusting the angle of the coffee cup) to resolve the adaptive challenge This process describes the basic architecture of individual action However, perhaps the most important element of psychological functioning occurs with the construction of (7) reflexive self-awareness (Mascolo & Fischer 1998; Zahavi 2006) Self-awareness occurs when consciousness loops back upon itself to takes itself as its own object The development of self-awareness is mediated through the use of symbolic vehicles (e.g., language) Using language and other semiotic tools, the individuals gain the capacity to construct valued representations of self – emotionally-invested conceptions of “who I am”, “who I want to be”, and “who I should become” in relation to others (Harré 2015; Young and Thompson 2017) Discursively produced representations of identity come to function as higher-order goals (Carver & Scheier 2020) – socio-moral guides (Tangney 2002) that drive social action and come to define us as persons We create ourselves through our relations with others (Fogel 1993) – through our capacity to represent ourselves using intersubjectively shared meanings constructed in our discursive exchanges with others (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2008; Rochat and Passos-Ferreira 2009; Tomasello 2016) Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav Relational Personhood The relational approach provides but one example of many comprehensive approaches that have been proposed It seeks to develop a series of qualities that a genuinely unified theory should have First, it provides an integrative and holistic model of psychological functioning It brings the various facets of psychological functioning together in a singular model In so doing, it provides a framework for understanding the ways in which psychological functioning is both embodied by biological systems and embedded in socio-cultural processes It seeks to identify psychological structures as the product of relational forms of activity – processes that occur between self and other; biology and culture; parts and wholes Further, it seeks identify a psychological level of functioning in ways that neither reduce it downward to its biological substrata nor upward to the cultural processes in which it is embedded In this regard, it provides a framework for understanding how “higher” and “lower” level systems mutually constitute each other over time, even as higher level processes (e.g., consciousness, meaning) emerge dynamically from the complex coordination of lower-order base elements (e.g., biological systems, neural networks, etc.) In its attempt to identify an irreducibly psychological level of analysis, a unified metatheory would seek to re-unite scientific psychology with its philosophical roots To the extent that psychological categories have their origins in human experience, they cannot be defined simply by referring to independently observable entities in the world Instead, there is a need to acknowledge the intersubjective origins of psychological knowledge, and to seek to establish greater intersubjectivity about the ways in which we use psychological concepts Such a unified theory would have to pay deep attention to the ways in which the thinking of scientists and laypersons alike is both expressed by and organized by language and by shared beliefs and assumptions that are ofen difficult to identify To the extent that our observations and interpretations of the world are mediated personal and socially-constructed systems of meaning, a unified metatheory would have to be perpetually reflexive – always alert to the ways in which implicit beliefs and assumptions shape psychological analysis As this is accomplished, it is possible to propose and refine process models of psychological functioning, such as that described in Fig Such a model would allow us to understand psychological functioning as a dynamic system of situated processes that operate over time, rather than as a set of discrete and abstract variables that are divorced from context and concrete experience Based on a degree of consensus about core theoretical terms and processes, a unified model must be able to claim broad applicability to address any type of psychological issue A unified model would seek to establish a “methodology without the method” (Valsiner 2020) That is, it would be able to draw upon the full range methods of inquiry to seek evidence that support or invalidate theoretical assertions in any given area It would thus be able to move seamlessly between first-, second- and third-person methods without conflict or contradiction In the present formulation, to the extent that all methods of inquiry ultimately have their origins in the human process of intersubjective engagement, no contradictions among diverse methods should arise A unified model of psychology should be one that is simultaneously holistic and analytic Even as it breaks down human action into its component processes, it should be one in which we can ultimately recognize ourselves and our relationships with each other Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav References Bardi, L (2017) Biological motion perception In B Hopkins, E Geangu, & S Linkenauger (Eds.), The Cambridge encyclopedia of child development (2nd ed., pp 271–276) New York: Cambridge University Press Barrett, L., Pollet, T V., & Stulp, G (2014) From computers to cultivation: Reconceptualizing evolutionary psychology Frontiers in Psychology, Bidell, T (2020) Philosophical background to integrative theories of human development In M F Mascolo & T Bidell (Eds.), Handbook of integrative psychological development (pp 2–37) New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Bretherton, I., & Beeghly, M (1982) Talking about internal states: The acquisition of an explicit theory of mind Developmental Psychology, 18(6), 906–921 De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E (2008) Making sense in participation: An enactive approach to social cognition In F Morganti, A Carassa, G Riva, F Morganti, A Carassa, & G Riva (Eds.), Enacting intersubjectivity: A cognitive and social perspective on the study of interactions (pp 33–47) Amsterdam: IOS Press Fischer, K W., Rotenberg, E J., Bullock, D H., & Raya, P (1993) The dynamics of competence: How context contributes directly to skill In R H Wozniak & K W Fischer (Eds.), Development in context: Acting and thinking in specific environments (pp 93–117) Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc Fogel, A (1993) Developing through relationships Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press Freeman, W J (2000) Emotion is essential to all intentional behaviors In M D Lewis & I Granic (Eds.), Emotion, development, and self-organization: Dynamic systems approaches to emotional development (pp 209–235) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Grandjean, D., & Scherer, K R (2008) Unpacking the cognitive architecture of emotion processes Emotion, 8(3), 341–351 Granic, I (2008) A dynamic systems approach to understanding family and peer relationships: Implications for effective interventions with aggressive youth In A Fogel, B J King, & S G Shanker (Eds.), Human development in the twenty-first century: Visionary ideas from systems scientists (pp 216–224) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Granott, N (2020) The puzzle of microdevelopment: Variability, fractals and why developmental change is so different and still the same In M F Mascolo & T Bidell (Eds.), Handbook of integrative psychological development (pp 278–306) New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Gottlieb, G (1991) Experiential canalization of behavioral development: Results Developmental Psychology, 27(1), 35–39 Gottlieb, G., & Lickliter, R (2007) Probabilistic epigenesis Developmental Science, 10(1), 1–11 Harré, R (2015) Positioning theory In J Martin, J Sugarman, & K L Slaney (Eds.), The Wiley handbook of theoretical and philosophical psychology: Methods, approaches, and new directions for social sciences (pp 263–276) Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell Henriques, G (2011) A new unified theory of psychology New York: Springer Science + Business Media Husserl, E (1970) The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: An introduction to phenomenological philosophy (D Carr, trans Evanston: Northwestern University Press Kostrubiec, V., Huys, R., & Zanone, P.-G (2018) Joint dyadic action: Error correction by two persons works better than by one alone Human Movement Science, 61, 1–18 Lerner, R M., & Lerner, J V (2019) The development of a person: A relational–developmental systems perspective In D P McAdams, R L Shiner, & J L Tackett (Eds.), Handbook of personality development (pp 59–75) New York: The Guilford Press Lewis, M D (1996) Self-organising cognitive appraisals Cognition and Emotion, 10(1), 1–25 Mascolo, M F (2004) The coactive construction of selves in cultures In M F Mascolo & J Li (Eds.), Culture and self: Beyond dichotomization (pp 79–90) New directions in child and adolescent development series W Damon (series editor)) San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Mascolo, M F (2016) Beyond subjectivity and objectivity: The intersubjective foundations of psychological science Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 50, 185–195 Mascolo, M F (2017) How objectivity undermines the study of personhood: Toward an intersubjective epistemology for psychological science New Ideas in Psychology, 33, 41–48 Mascolo, M F (in press) A Relational Conception of Emotional Development Emotion Review Mascolo, M F., & Fischer, K W (2015) Dynamic development of thinking, feeling and acting In W Overton & P Molennar (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology and developmental science (vol 1: theory and method) (pp 113–161) New York: Wiley Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav Mascolo, M F., & Kallio, E (2019) Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency Philosophical Psychology, 32, 437–462 Mascolo, M F., & Kallio, E (2020) The phenomenology of between: An intersubjective psychological epistemology Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 33, 1–28 Mascolo, M F., Basseches, M., & El-Hashem, A (2014) Toward an integrated constructionist psychology: The coactive construction of meaning In J Raskin, S Bridges, & J Kahn (Eds.), Studies in meaning (pp 246–299) New York: Pace University Press Mascolo, M F., & Bidell, T (Eds.) (2020) Handbook of Integrative Development Science Routledge/Taylor & Francis Matusov, E (1996) Intersubjectivity without agreement Mind, Culture & Activity, 3, 25–45 Meltzoff, A N (2013) Origins of social cognition: Bidirectional self-other mapping and the ‘like-me’ hypothesis In M R Banaji, S A Gelman, M R Banaji, & S A Gelman (Eds.), Navigating the social world: What infants, children, and other species can teach us (pp 139–144) New York: Oxford University Press Overton, W F (2014) The process-relational paradigm and relational-developmental-systems metamodel as context Research in Human Development, 11(4), 323–331 Reddy, V (2015) Joining intentions in infancy Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22, 24–44 Rochat, P., & Passos-Ferreira, C (2009) From imitation to reciprocation and mutual recognition In J A Pineda (Ed.), Mirror neuron systems: The role of mirroring processes in social cognition (pp 191–212) Totowa: Humana Press Roseman, I J (1984) Cognitive determinants of emotion: A structural theory Review of Personality & Social Psychology, 5, 11–36 Steenbeek, H., & van Geert, P (2020) Education and development as complex dynamic agent systems: How theory informs methodology In M F Mascolo & T Bidell (Eds.) Handbook of integrative psychological development (pp 161–189) New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Stephan, A (2004) Phenomenal emergence Networks, 3–4, 91–102 Tangney, J P (2002) Self-conscious emotions: The self as a moral guide In A Tesser, D A Stapel, & J V Wood (Eds.), Self and motivation: Emerging psychological perspectives (pp 97–117) Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Thelen, E., & Smith, L B (2006) Dynamic systems theories In R M Lerner & W Damon (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Theoretical models of human development (Vol 1, 6th ed., pp 258–312) Hoboken: Wiley Tomasello, M (2016) A natural history of human morality Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Tong, E M W., Tan, D H., & Tan, Y L (2013) Can implicit appraisal concepts produce emotion-specific effects? A focus on unfairness and anger Consciousness and Cognition: An International Journal, 22(2), 449–460 Trevarthen, C., & Aitken, K J (2001) Infant intersubjectivity: Research, theory, and clinical applications Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42(1), 3–48 Uher, J (2016) Exploring the workings of the psyche: Metatheoretical and methodological foundations In J Valsiner, G Marsico, N Chaudhary, T Sato, & V Dazzani (Eds.), Psychology as the science of human being: The Yokohama Manifesto (pp 299–324) Cham: Springer International Publishing Valsiner, J (1998) The guided mind: A sociogenetic approach to personality Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Valsiner, J (Ed.) (2012) The Oxford handbook of culture and psychology New York: Oxford University Press Valsiner, J (2020) Methodology without the method Rebuilding psychology into a developmental science In M F Mascolo & T Bidell (Eds.), Handbook of integrative psychological development (pp 138–160) New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Valsiner, J., & Brinkmann, S (2016) Beyond the “variables”: Developing metalanguage for psychology In S H Klempe & R Smith (Eds.), Centrality of history for theory construction in psychology (Vol 14, pp 75–90) New York: Springer International Publishing van Geert, P L C (2020) Dynamic systems, process and development Human Development, 63(3–4), 153– 179 Verhagan, A (2008) Intersubjectivity and the architecture of the language system In J Zlatev, T P Racine, C Sinha, E Itkonen, J Zlatev, T P Racine, & E Itkonen (Eds.), The shared mind: Perspectives on intersubjectivity (pp 307–331) Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company Wertsch, J V (1998) Mind as action New York: Oxford University Pres Wertsch, J V (2007) Mediation In H Daniels, M Cole, & J V Wertsch (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Vygotsky (pp 178–192) New York: Cambridge University Pres Author's personal copy Integr Psych Behav Young, R L., & Thompson, C Y (2017) Morality as a discursive accomplishment among animal rescue workers Deviant Behavior, 38(8), 879–894 Zagaria, A., Ando’, A., & Zennaro, A (2020) Psychology: A giant with feet of clay Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science Zahavi, D (2006) Subjectivity and selfhood Cambridge: MIT Press Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations Michael F Mascolo is Professor of Psychology at Merrimack College ... evolutionary psychology cannot function as a core psychological metatheory Steps Toward a Unified Psychological Metatheory Creating a unified metatheory for psychology is a daunting task The field... engage in a brief examination of Zagaria et al.’s (2020) call for a unified psychology In response to their call, I suggest that, at minimum, any unified metatheory must: (a) establish a shared... COMMUNICATION Inching Toward a Unified Metatheory for Psychology Michael F Mascolo # Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020 Abstract Zagaria et al (2020) have aptly