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Making room for the ‘non-‐creative’? A cultural psychological perspective Vlad Petre Glaveanu Aalborg University This chapter asks the question ‘what is non-‐creative?’ and tries to answer it from the perspective of cultural psychology It is argued that, while current scientific and lay understandings tend to make creativity the exception within daily life, cultural psychologists are inclined to think differently Theorised as acting in the world by either widening or reducing three main types of difference – between self and other, between sign and object, and between past, present, and future – creativity emerges as a quality intrinsic to human action On the contrary, the ‘non-‐creative’ is associated, within this view, with an active denial of difference, something specific, among others, to the logic of totalitarianism, formalism, and assessment It is argued, in the end, that ‘making room’ for the ‘non-‐creative’ in our theories is a necessity since this category not only helps us preserve the meaning of creativity but demonstrates why creativity is, in fact, fundamental for our dignity and humanity The term creativity undeniably became very popular in recent decades in both scientific and lay discourses Often paired up with innovation, these are some of the most common words one finds in educational and governmental policies, not to mention the sector of art and technology It is so frequently used in fact that unthinking repetition risks making the word ultimately useless (Williams, 1961) Indeed, the presumed importance of creativity for individuals, communities, and society as a whole is widely recognised and this importance resides in the fact that creativity is assumed to generate value, including economic value (see for instance research on ‘creative industries’; Caves, 2000) In this context, in both science and everyday life, creativity moves from being an attribute to becoming an ideal, something that needs to be not only studied but promoted Among the few topics in science to be invested with ‘moral’ value, creativity is all about generating novelty that makes a positive change in the world (for exceptions see Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman & Runco, 2010) But in order to promote creativity we must first be able to identify it and this, in turn, requires us to define it There are plenty of definitions of this phenomenon in the psychology of creativity, usually focused on the creative product Stein (1953, p 311) proposed that “creative work is a novel work that is accepted as tenable or useful or satisfying by a group in some point in time” The ‘double’ criterion of novelty and utility helps differentiate creativity from those habitual acts that may be valuable but are not novel, as well as the vast number of products that are simply bizarre or have no obvious social value (e.g children’s expressions, dreams, etc.) Moreover, there is a clear assumption that creative outcomes describe a continuum There are creations that may be important for the person, for instance they help the individual reach a solution others already know And there are creative acts that leave their mark on the knowledge of large groups; for example, celebrated inventions or artworks The above ‘ends’ of the creativity continuum were referred to by Boden (1994) as the P-‐creative (creative for the person) and the H-‐creative (creative on a historical scale) respectively In fact, these contrasting examples are so extreme that one might wonder if we are still referring to the same phenomenon There is a long history in psychology, and not only, of focusing on the highly creative at the expense of the mundane and associating ‘pure’ creative expression with the figure of the genius or the eminent individual (Glaveanu, 2010) And it is this kind of essentialist and exclusivist view of what creativity is that explains, at least in part, our societal fascination with it While most would agree that everyone has at least the potential for creativity, what we expect of the people actually called creative is to make visible and long-‐lasting contributions This pervasive association between creativity and genius or creativity and radical change has also deep consequences for how we identify it Unsurprisingly, the most common assumption in both science and applied fields is that we don’t have enough creativity, that we live in cultures of conformity (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995) that crush creative initiatives and lead us towards living unauthentic, boring, passive lives Often schools are accused of being the instrument of such conformist cultures, of discouraging creativity at an age when it should be flourishing (see Fasko, 2001) If creative expression is all about risk-‐taking, challenging norms, and going against the habitual, then certainly not many people can be said to act creatively Of course, such reasoning is flawed To begin with, it promotes a view of creativity as something that only a few are capable of and, in an effort to promote it, in fact makes it more and more out of reach Second, at a practical level, one should imagine how a school would be like, for instance, if populated only by highly creative students and teachers according to the understanding referred to above Third, and most importantly for the present chapter, this view portrays creativity as the exception in human life and the ‘non-‐creative’ as the default mode of our existence It is precisely this last point that I want to challenge here with the means of cultural psychology The argument I will make is that things are exactly the other way around: creativity is intrinsic to our human existence while the ‘non-‐creative’ is rare, an almost hypothetical construct In the end, however, I will argue (creatively?) that we need to make an effort to ‘save’ the category of the ‘non-‐creative’, to make room for it within cultural psychological theory because this is the only way to properly understand the true importance of creativity for individuals, society and culture Identifying the ‘non-‐creative’ It might seem at first that detecting the ‘non-‐creative’ is more than straightforward As argued above, the comparison term for creativity is often high performance and revolutionary achievement so, through this prism, the ‘non-‐creative’ seems to engulf all of everyday life Think for instance about what you did yesterday Most probably you spent a considerable amount of time doing ‘normal’, typical activities like walking, cooking, cleaning, greeting other people, etc These types of mundane activities don’t usually end up being novel, original, and useful (or they might be useful but certainly not very original) Going back to the school example, where is the creativity in teaching the same content in the same way year after year and expecting pupils to memorise and present it back to the teacher? Teaching based on problem solving can be a solution but, even in this case, the ‘products’ of learning are not original enough: pupils get to know what everybody else does or should know Of course, such assumptions are being contested today and the present chapter will contribute to this critique It is not surprising to find that most people would agree with the fact that they might show some spontaneity in their everyday activity (an expression of ‘little-‐c’ creativity; Craft, 2001), but are reluctant to consider themselves ‘creative’ in a more substantial sense (Big-‐C creativity) (see Karwowski, 2009) This, of course, does not mean they see themselves as lacking all creative potential, but it does indicate that we often draw a (too) sharp line between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ creativity And this despite current scholarship arguing that, in fact, the processes specific for creative thought are not dependent on level of achievement (Weisberg, 1993) Both geniuses and ‘average’ individuals, when creative, associate or combine ideas, but ‘non-‐creative’ thought relies more on stereotypical associations and algorithms for solving problems It might be highly effective in dealing with existing obstacles but produces nothing new What makes it easy to spot the ‘non-‐creative’ is the clarity, but also rarity, with which the highly creative presents itself Some of the first studies of creativity in psychology considered the life and work of recognised creators in the arts and sciences, either by analysing their outcomes or conducting psycho-‐biographies This is certainly not a thing of the past and, in recent decades, some of the best known books in the field focused on ‘exemplary creators’ in an effort to uncover their characteristics (see for example Gardner, 1993; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996) There are several direct benefits associated with exploring in detail the activity of recognised creators To begin with, it helps us solve the criterion problem as nobody would doubt these individual are or were in fact creative Second, this study of high-‐level creativity can perhaps tell us something central about the phenomenon, it might reveal the ‘core’ of what it means to create Even if these core elements might not be available to everyone (in the end, we do have only one Freud or Einstein), at least we will be able to understand better what creativity is all about And if we study the personality or cognition of these creators perhaps we can build general profiles for different domains that could ultimately be used as diagnostic tools Of course, many of these aims remain desirable end-‐points and need more research to materialise But, on the other hand, they also serve to show us clearly what socially recognised creativity is and place it in sharp contrast to the ‘non-‐creative’ How is the ‘non-‐creative’ identified though in the case of lower-‐level creative achievement? Today, the notion of creativity has been ‘democratised’ (Bilton, 2007) but how exactly is this more ‘mundane’ creativity detected? Let’s take the case of creativity tests, most of which are considered to evaluate creative potential rather than actual achievement One very well-‐known set of measures are the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT; see Torrance, 1966), widely applied in schools but also work contexts around the globe Based on a definition of creativity as divergent thinking, they invite respondents to generate as many creative ideas as they can in response to verbal or non-‐ verbal stimuli The results are scored typically for fluency (number of ideas), flexibility (number of different categories of ideas), originality (rarity of ideas), and elaboration (how developed the ideas are) Let us focus on the criterion of originality, central for current definitions of creativity What is an original / creative idea? One that was not formulated by many others when answering the test Conversely, a ‘non-‐creative’ idea is a common one and examples of such widespread ideas are listed in the TTCT manual Being ‘non-‐creative’ is thus described by being similar or identical to others, their thinking and action In general, creativity researchers would agree that people are not (or are less) creative when they reproduce what others are doing, even when they reproduce what they themselves did in the past But such an assumption is deeply problematic as human life, at both the level of the individual and society, is marked by regularity and often drives people towards ‘sameness’ Once more, the ‘non-‐creative’ appears as the rule rather than the exception of our existence Revising the ‘non-‐creative’: The contribution of cultural psychology As described before, my aim here is to reverse this relationship between the creative and the ‘non-‐ creative’ and ‘democratise’ creativity even further through a thorough ‘socialisation’ of the concept (see also Vygotsky, 1991) In order to reveal the intrinsic creativity of our action and experience in and of the world we need however new theoretical lenses, different from the usual cognitive and psychometric ones that define much of today’s psychology of creativity Cultural psychology is a discipline that is primarily concerned with emergence and developmental phenomena (Valsiner, 2007) Although not many cultural psychologists discuss creativity per se (mostly due to its individualistic overtones ), they are concerned with knowledge construction and meaning-‐making, improvisation and action, imagination and everyday life From this perspective, creativity is not a mental, individual process but a quality of human action that captures its flexibility, intersubjective nature, and value for both self and others This is also the pragmatist position (see Joas, 1996) that considers how acting is always situated and, as such, responsive to constant changes in the environment As the most basic level we can understand creativity as our capacity to live, adapt, and grow within a world that is constantly in motion, marked by the passing of irreversible time Acting in and on this world and creating meaning about it necessarily has to take into account sociality (self – other relations), materiality (sign – object relations) and temporality (the relation between past, present, and future) (see also Glaveanu, 2014) These are all captured by a basic cultural psychological framework presented in Figure 1: Figure 1 Creatogenetic differences, a cultural psychological model (from Glaveanu & Gillespie, 2014) The model above highlights three important ‘differences’ in the genesis of creativity (for details see Glaveanu & Gillespie, 2014) In essence, what this perspective argues is that without these differences there would be no (possibility for) creative expression, although they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for creative acts to occur Creativity becomes impossible in a world where the self is not differentiated from others, where signs and objects have a one-‐to-‐one relationship, and there are no temporal changes One might object that, in such a world, it would be impossible for psychological life to develop more broadly, and this cannot be contested However, there is something particularly important about creativity in relation to these three types of ‘difference’ Werner and Kaplan (1963) proposed a similar model to theorise symbol formation and, indeed, there is a close connection, from a cultural psychological perspective, between the symbolic function and creativity The capacity to acquire, generate and use / transform symbols is at the core of creative expression as it involves the action of the self, always in relation with others, within the context of the material world and its inherent temporal flow Following Winnicott (1971), we can see how the emergence of the first symbols used by the child, opening up what he called the third or potential space of existence, represents the first manifestation of both creativity and culture After the quadratic universe of self, other, object, sign comes into existence it continues to ‘expand’ in order for the person to both accumulate from and add to the cultural life of his/her community What exactly is the movement specific for creativity within the socio-‐material-‐temporal world? Most would believe, based on existing conceptions and definitions, that to demonstrate this quality one should try to increase the ‘distance’ between self and other (by generating perspectives that are not easy to reconcile), sign and object (by violating conventions about their relationship), and between past, present, and future (by breaking with what already exists and being oriented towards the ‘not-‐yet there’) This is, for instance, one of the essential features of artistic expression Successful artists often defy the expectations of their audience, re-‐create meaning about the objects they work on, and, when part of the avant-‐garde, challenge the ‘past’ and its institutionalised forms Conversely, it might be assumed that the contrary move of bridging the ‘gaps’ inscribed within the three axes of Figure 1 will result in non or less creative action For instance, the attempt to make the views of self and other more uniform, to stabilise the meaning of objects, to generate a solid continuity between present and past Where is the creativity in this case? Specific for a cultural psychology approach is the fact that it recognises the creative value of actions that, otherwise, seem uncreative Let’s take the very mundane example of writing a report for work, describing in detail what has been discussed during a certain meeting Surely there are few less exciting tasks than this one and many would quickly catalogue such an activity as mindless, routine, fundamentally ‘non-‐creative’ And yet, let us consider it from the socio-‐material-‐temporal perspective developed here What is essential in this activity is the person’s effort to ‘transcribe’, in the most accurate manner, what had happened during the meeting As such, the person needs, based on notes and memory, to produce a report that will be scrutinised by others in light of their own notes, memories, and interests Negotiating differences in perspective and coming to an agreement often takes place in a more or less explicit manner Second, the person in question needs to find the best semiotic means to describe the world From the choice of words to organising the narrative thread, these are potentially challenging tasks, especially for a novice In essence, the signs and symbols used will strive to capture reality but there can never be a perfect alignment between world and its re-‐presentation Finally, as time passes, self, others and objects change, the entire context of writing the report changes and its author will have to take this into account (e.g., it would be useless to finish this task if, meanwhile, the company goes bankrupt!) What this example wanted to argue is the fact that creativity is intrinsic to cases in which nothing ‘new’ is seemingly generated: the effort to reproduce what exists is never a duplicate but a re-‐creation (Ingold & Hallam, 2007) Is there room for the ‘non-‐creative’ in cultural psychology? One immediate question for cultural psychologists who use a framework similar to the one discussed in the previous section is: what exactly is the ‘non-‐creative’? Is every form of human expression creative and, if so, doesn’t this make the concept useless? In other words, what are the ‘limits’ of creativity? (for similar concerns see Negus & Pickering, 2004) In answering this important question we need to make a distinction, similar to the one made in the psychology of creativity between potential and manifestation Saying that creativity is an ever-‐present potential in the case of human action doesn’t mean that each and every act will make use of this potential or, at least, make full use of it Going back also to the idea of a ‘creativity continuum’ we can see how, in some instances, our actions considerably diverge from what seemed to be their ‘normal’ path and transform both person and environment But, as argued above, even those actions that follow a well-‐rehearsed script cannot be denied any creativity It is, in these latter cases, the creativity required to adapt to ever-‐changing contexts marked by the passing of time What is essential for the cultural psychology approach though is the fact that, instead of operating with an easy distinction between Big-‐C and little-‐c, between the ‘high’ and the ‘lower’ level, it recognises the emergence of any creative act within the framework of self – other, sign – object, past – present – past depicted in Figure 1 In this sense, both visibly creative acts and more habitual forms of creative expression (see Glaveanu, 2012) emerge out of a common ground of social, symbolic and material relations, all organised within irreversible time (Valsiner, 2007) And yet if, as previously argued, both actions aimed at expanding and reducing the differences inscribed into the three ‘axes’ should be considered creative, what exactly is the ‘non-‐creative’? A short answer is that, within the logic of the model presented here, the ‘non-‐creative’ emerges from an act of denying the difference instead of acting on it This negation of difference does not translate into identification as the opposite of creativity since, indeed, every creative act relies as much on identity, repetition and stability as it does on differentiation, change and transformation We can think here about the role played by what seem to be very ‘stable’ features of reality in the creative process, for example language, habits and traditions However, the acts of identification that give substance to the self and allow us to think using stable concepts recognise, assume and manage difference (think about identity formation as a simultaneously personal and social process) Equally, the mere existence and recognition of difference simply constitutes the premise for creativity but not its realisation (something that raises the important pragmatic question of which differences actually end up making a difference in creative work and how) It is precisely when the positions of self and other, sign and object, past and future are made to ‘collapse’ that we are effectively denying the possibility of creative action But, is such a denial ever possible? Let’s take the example of self – other differences of position and perspective This fundamental distinction between the ‘me’ and the ‘not-‐me’ is achieved early on in development through what Piaget referred to as decentration (Piaget, 1954) Following the Piagetian logic, such developmental achievements can never be reversed, at least not under normal circumstances However, people find other ways of denying this differentiation and, in essence, imposing their view of reality on others (sometimes they are too centered on their own perspective to notice that such difference even exists!) In this sense, the ‘non-‐creative’ materialises in those relations of power that effectively ‘cancel’ the other and his/her alternative position or perspective Interestingly, there has been research conducted regarding the relationship between creativity and the ‘totalitarian mindset’ In the words of Montuori (2005, p 20), “this mindset manifests in a specific way of thinking and discourse, focusing on the elimination of ambiguity, complexity, and difference” and is, therefore, the antithesis of pluralism and creativity When placing totalitarianism within inter-‐ personal relations we can notice how, at times, we are unable to entertain even the possibility of difference in relation to a certain course of action Such reactions define the ‘non-‐creative’ With reference to the sign – object relation, the ‘non-‐creative’ is distinguished by applying fixed meanings that lead to automatic action The creativity of semiosis resides in the fact that our contact with the material and social world is multiply and flexibly mediated by signs and symbols An object might be called differently in different circumstances (think for instance about literal and metaphorical uses of the word ‘rose’) just as the same sign can be applied to a multitude of objects (and, indeed, any category of objects is defined itself by variability) What is the ‘non-‐creative’? In line with Ricoeur’s (1973) thinking, we can conceive a fully formal language, in which there is only one symbol representing one object, as an ultimate example This aspect of formalism stands in contrast to the dynamic nature and productivity of ‘natural’ language, in Ricoeur’s terms The latter is described by its finitude but, simultaneously, it is open to an infinity of potential (creative) uses Finally, temporal differences can also be ‘collapsed’ or, rather, unified into one single point (which is not the same as the ‘eternal’ present) Human creativity relies on our capacity to ‘travel’, back and forth, between past (even a historical past we did not witness) and future (again, also a distant future long after we are gone) These imaginative loops (Zittoun & Cerchia, 2013; Zittoun & de Saint Laurent, 2014) open new perspectives for action and make it, at once, present in its unfolding, continuous with the past, and oriented towards the future Our capacity to experience and semiotically construct multiple dimensions in parallel to the constant flow of irreversible time makes human beings capable of escaping the ‘here and now’ of existence The ‘non-‐creative’, in this case, is represented precisely by being incapable of escaping a here and now that becomes ubiquitous It means to deny development, more specifically, to close developmental paths How does this happen? We can think for example about psychological assessment and the common practice of attributing scores to abilities like intelligence and creativity itself These forms of evaluation are a-‐temporal since, once formulated, they ‘reflect’ the person at time X but not necessarily at time X+1 Moreover, the results of assessment can be used to categorise the person, to place him or her within a certain educational or professional path and, concurrently, irrevocably close potential futures Concluding remarks on why we need to theorise the ‘non-‐creative’ My aim in this chapter was to address the question ‘what can be considered non-‐creative?’ I have shown that while, from both a scientific / psychological and lay perspective, the answer is that many things and people can be described as either less or non-‐creative, a cultural psychological approach reverses this claim If our existence as human beings in a social, material, and temporal world is described by plurality of perspectives, flexible semiotic processes, and recursive experience of time, then creativity becomes the norm and the ‘non-‐creative’ the exception Any one of our acts has at least the potential to be creative by integrating various perspective, re-‐signifying reality and being oriented towards an essentially open future But if this is the case, are we to do away with the category of the ‘non-‐creative’ altogether? Does it become useless because, if so, the risk is that its ‘pair’, the notion of creativity, might be equally futile as a scientific and lay notion Not only I have tried above to identify cases in which we can legitimately talk about ‘non-‐ creative’ action (or, better said, tendencies, in action and attitude, towards the ‘non-‐creative’), in ways that ‘make room’ for it, but my overarching aim was to show that creating a space for the ‘non-‐ creative’ in the cultural psychology of creativity is a theoretical and practical necessity Saving the ‘non-‐creative’ from its dissolution doesn’t merely preserve the notion of creativity but, as conceptualised here, demonstrates its crucial role for the life of individuals and society as a whole If totalitarianism, formalism and assessment are, based on their relation to difference, instances of the ‘non-‐creative’ (among others), then creativity has value not only because it generates novel and useful outcomes but because it preserves our dignity as human beings and contributes to healthy psychological living (see also Winnicott, 1971) To exist in a world that is plural, dynamic and open-‐ended is both a prerequisite for and a consequence of us acting creatively in relation to our own self, to others, signs, objects, to our past, present, and future Bilton, C (2007) Management and creativity: From creative industries to creative management Malden, MA: Blackwell Boden, M (1994) What is creativity? 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Rethinking creativity: Perspectives from cultural psychology London: Routledge 12 ... show that creating ? ?a space ? ?for ? ?the ? ?non- ‐ creative? ?? in ? ?the ? ?cultural psychology of creativity is ? ?a theoretical and practical necessity Saving ? ?the ? ?non- ? ?creative? ?? from... ? ?for instance they help ? ?the individual reach ? ?a solution others already know And there are creative acts that leave their mark on ? ?the knowledge of large groups; ? ?for. .. of creativity What is an original / ? ?creative idea? One that was not formulated by many others when answering ? ?the test Conversely, ? ?a ? ?non- ? ?creative? ?? idea is ? ?a common
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