©n April 5, 2010, at approximately 3:02 PM, 29 miners died and two miners were injured
as a result of a massive explosion at the
Upper Big Branch South Mine
omen tar Soa mm
Jason M Atkins Edward D Jones Howard D, Payne ChristopherL Bell,Sr, — RichardK.Lane DU Gregory S Brock 'William R Lynch Snead
Kenneth A.Chapman —_ J0Marcum Gary W Quarles Jr
CƠ 1a Ronald L Maynor 8n Charles T Davis Nicolas D McCroskey oe oe
Cory T Davis a nay Benny R Willingham
` An eta Da Ricky L Workman
William 1 Griffith co
Trang 4
Overview « ÌMSHAS investigation shows that the explosion at UBB was started by a T0 0101 67) 0¡ 0000| Di nh "The ignition was not prevented “`
Inadequate rock dust in tailgate of LW
Methane ignition transitioned into a massive coal dust explosion Today, MSHA will present its findings to date:
~_ Desoriplion of the aocident
~_ The condiions and praetices in the mine preceding the accdent Beth
Trang 5General Information
Mine opened September 1, 1994
Eagle coal seam eee tier — Average coal thickness 64 inches eee a
Four producing seclions
~_ 3 continuous miner (CM) sections en) „`
NĨ —_ 234 underground, 2 surlace Soar
Trang 6Active Workings
a
Trang 7Description of the Accident
Trang 8Description of the Accident (Personnel in Affected Area )
PRU neem Tg
Pee maintenanee shift (4/5/2010) was reported as uneventful
Day shift production crews entered mine ~_ Hoadgate 22 (HG 22), 6:00 AM, Elis poral
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— Tailgate (TG 22), 6:40 AM, UBB portal Various Support Personnel
~_ Pumping crew, 6:38 AM, Elis portal
Hổ GỐI
Trang 9Description of the Accident
UBB Longwall Day Shift Summary
30 minute call outs to top Massey managers
= First Call Out 7:30 AM
—_LW ran until 11:00 AM, Ð passes ~_LW was down, 11:00 AM 1o 2:15 PM
+ Mechanical probleme with the shearer
»_ AL least one member of upper management at UBB was at LW, =- Last call out at approximately 2:30 PM
Trang 10Description of the Accident
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~_ Shearer shut off by TG side remole control at approximately 3:00 PM —_Water supply manually shut-off at headgate
~_ Shearer high-voltage power manually disconnected
Trang 11
Se
Trang 12Description of the Accident
AL approximately 3:02 PM
~_ Electrioal power at the Elis Poytal went off ý” `”
~_Dust and debris blown out of the portals Mine fans at the UBB portal stalled ~_©O monltoring system started alarming
=_ Several miners near the portals evacuated the mine
= Surface personnel began notifying underground (UG) personnel to
Trang 13Description of the Accident
= | Tim Blake (1 of 2 survivors of the TG 22 crew) recounted that ~_Felt the wind piek up
—_Immediately blinded by dust Se
~_Immediately donned his self-contained, sofrrescuer (SCSR) Blake sat for a couple of minutes in the dark and dust When wind and the dust decreased
— He placed SCSRs on crew members = Removed some of crew from mantrip Approximately 45 minutes later
Trang 14Description of the Accident
Approximately 20 to 30 minutes after the explosion, several
managers started into the mine from both the Elis and UBB portals
= Mr, Blake walked out about 20 XCs when his cap lamp was spotted by the incoming managers
= Patrick Hilbert stayed with Mr Blake and the other managers
proceeded further into the mine on foot
Trang 15Notification of Accident
DO
donah Bowles, Safety Director, Marfork Mine Galled MSHAS hotline at 3:30 PM
Reported an air reversal on beltline at the Ellis Portal
Concentrations of 50 to 100 PPM of carbon monoxide (00) Reporled mine was being evacualed
No one trapped or injured
w Hotline operator finished the call with Bowles and called Distriot 4 at 3:42 PM
« Immediately, MSHA contacted the mine operator ~_Delermined that a serious event had occurred = Issued a 103(j) control order
Trang 16Rescue and Recovery Operations
UBB managers transported TG 22 crew out of mine — Chris Blanchard and Jason Whitehead traveled further into the mine on foot ees Mine Rescue Teams (MRTs) explored LW face and found HG 22 mantrip DU h7 Ti T2 7 Se eae ection ey A aa Gas monitoring, boreholes drilled into mine, nitrogen injection and seismic monitoring
MRTs made several attempts to find 4 miseing miners = The final missing miner was found at 11:20 PM on Friday, April 9
Trang 18Investigation of the Accident
Accident Investigation began April 12, 2010 ~_UGinvestigation delayed until June 26, 2010
Trang 19MSHA Personnel Involved 105 MSHA Investigation Personnel have been utilized during the on- site investigation
~_Type and Number of Teams Utilized s_ Mâno Dust uvey Tearns = 10 teams par đay an 2.)
ni Ventlaton Team - 39 øarns ower 10 days ni Flames and Ferees Team ~ 1 team
`”
/"—” `
An additional 45 Technical Support Personnel have been utilized to
perform testing and other technical activities
Trang 20Other Parties Involved
State of West Virginia
C00 70 | United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) Pree Rae uc)
Trang 21Evidence Collected to Date
ø More than 84,000 pages of documents
»_ 954 separate maps have been logged into evidence
Trang 22if F ` H |
TT and 3
Practices at UBB:Prior
Trang 23Geology
CC
~_Upto 1,200 feet dep —_Extensive overmining —_History of floor heaving —_ Long hietory of inundations
w Explosion in gob of LW 2 West panel in 1997 —_Attributed to root fall
w UBBinundations in 2003 and 2004 —_Foor craoks, regional fauting No —_Massey Was aware of inundations
Trang 27Ventilation
ø Ì Push-pull system: 2 blowing fans, 1 exhaust fan »_ Bandytown fan ventilated area oí explosion
= Vent plan required 15,000 cfm in the last open XC (LOC) for CM Pectin
See MMU LAR UL Ae Ee
Trang 28LW Ventilating Quantities
Prior to 12/19/09 the LW was ventilated with ~60,000 cfm
Failure of ground control in the LW HG necessitated a change to relocate the HG 22 [1101/1002 —_ LW vemtlalng quanHly lnxeaed tơ ~140,000 cím
ee eens
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quantity decreased 0,000 cfm in three days In mid-February and beginning of March 2010, several unexplained fluctuations in LW Ere NCsonicl Seay
Trang 29LW Ventilating Quantities
w On 3/9/10 unapproved changes were cited in the LW tailgate
~_ Prior to the order the LW quantity was ~ 80,000 cỉm
~_ After correotion of cited condition, the LW quantity was ~ 77,000 cím = The operator decided to install equipment regulating doors on the
LW intake around March 17, 2010
—_ The operator has stated this was done to ensure adequate air for HG 22
—_ The LW intake quantity was reduced ~20,000 cim to 60,000 cím by CĨ
Trang 30Ventilation
'Weekly Examinations and Air Measurements
~ _Measurements for numerous ạr splits not reoorded ~ Measurements for air splits reoorded intermittently
See Um a eam Eee ae sie)
Trang 31Ventilation Chronic ventilation problems at UBB ` = Indicated by testimony of those who provided information to the DO
=-_ Many equipment doors used in lieu of overcasts ~_ Dĩd not reliably separale air courses
= Ofen it opon
Trang 33Dust Suppression
Water supply used for dust suppression was inadequate for LW ~_Improperly-Titered river water
= Taigate drum
— 7 missing spray nozzles Sree ey
~_Minimum water prossure could not be maintained'
Trang 37Shearer Drum
(All Sprays Installed)
Trang 38Examinations
MSHA's findings are based on examination of record books and
testimony about examinations at UBB hM
—_ HaZards recorded in production and maintenance reports, not listed in required examination books
» CM section should have been evacuated and power disoonnected - (1.6% methane) ~ they just waited 25 minutes for it to clear ee ae an ed
Pipe Oe ae Teele
~_ Examiners assigned by the mine operator did not \urn on gas detectors =_ Required air readings not reoorded
= Corrective actions not recorded
Trang 39Two Sets of Records
Onshift Report Production Report
Trang 40Two Sets of Records
Onshift Report Maintenance Report
Trang 41Two Sets of Records
Onshift Report Production Report
‘Low Air in LOB Doors outby going to HG22 Tail open 7:00-8:10 Adverse Root condition their coal streak four 75° up
Trang 42Examinations
MSHA's findings are based on examination of record books and
testimony about examinations at UBB hM
—_ HaZards recorded in production and maintenance reports, not listed in required examination books
» CM section should have been evacuated and power disoonnected - (1.6% methane) ~ they just waited 25 minutes for it to clear ee ae an ed
Pipe Oe ae Teele
~_ Examiners assigned by the mine operator did not \urn on gas detectors =_ Required air readings not reoorded
= Corrective actions not recorded
Trang 43UBB Midnight Shift Summary
for April 5, 2010
= | Preshifts for OM sections on morning of 4/5/2010 reported few
hazards
= Preshift/ onshifts for belts on morning of 4/5/2010 ~_Reporled 6 of 10 bells needed rock dusling
Trang 44UBB Day Shift Summary for April 5, 2010 LW Preshift Report for the oncoming evening shift called out at 2:40 PM — No methane TT — _Nohazards HG 22 preshift Tố TG 22 preshift — Nohazards reported
Trang 46Examination and Maintenance
of the Longwall Bleeders
» Ì The company designee to make methane checks and examine LW' bleeders
~_Woekly examination
~_Yeshlft @xam pumping crew
Trang 47Examinations
EU eee Ronee icon mts management
~_UBB managers wero aware that chronic hazardous conditions were not recorded as corrected ~_ Testimony indicates UBB management ee examiners to not
record hazards in books
= Many hazards Were not teoorded ==
Trang 48Rock Dust
"% cay
—_ 17 rocK đuei violatione within one year prior to explosion WM `
=_ Interviews indicate rockdust problems
= Generally, only the track and belts were rock dusted — Some areas were only rock dusted as developed "
ha
—_ Railtmounted pod duster, 1.6 ton capaeitý j”".- 71
—_ Unit was more than 25 years old, probleme with air compressor ~_ Sngle crew dusted on midnight shift =_ Bogulaly taken of ok đugÌng to do other work
Trang 49Page of Rock Dust
Œew's Notebook
— Me BIDE No Help tis pote
Trang 50Rock Dust on LW Tailgate
ø Ì LW tailgate had a low roof
~_ Extensive floor heaving
Sec net Ran]
= Each LW pass generates float coal dust even with effective water CN
=-_No eidenee of rock dust applied to TG after development
—_No reoords were found during the investigation
Trang 53
Results of Post-Explosion Rock Dust Analysis
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Trang 55Training Deficiencies at UBB
ø ÌInadequate training or no training of miners 263 employee and contractor files were reviewed 205 training defioiencies were found
104 miners did not receive or did not complete required
“experienced miner” training before commencing work at UBB
42 miners did not receive training before they were assigned to 0U 0i
Trang 56Illegal Advance Notice
Security guards radioed the mine office when mine inspectors Ere)
Dispatchers relayed the information underground and tracked the movements of mine inspectors
Production sections involved in the explosion had at least one-hour advance nolioe of inspections
~_ Time to correct non-compliant conditions and/or shut-down production ~_ Air flows increased at area to be inspected
Mine inspectors rarely arrived on sections unannounced Advance notice severely limited the effectiveness of MSHA inspection efforts at UBB
Trang 57Intimidation of Miners
« | UBB upper management throatened to fire first line management for not eta otic tote Safety hazards such as insufficient air wore not acceptable excuses for not el A section foreman was fited for delaying production for about an hour to fi 7¬
Dean Jones (victim) was told “ithe can't go up there to run coal, just bring your ri = Testimony indicated many miners were intimidated
‘Strongly discouraged from slowing or stopping production for safety reasons Examiners were pressured not to list hazards in the books
Trang 58Engineering and Mine Planning
Engineering at the mine performed on an ad hoc basis D7)
THal and eror method nh TC Sarled at Logan's Fork mine
»_ Eoessve hao at UEB ø speed up devdoprten! lo the LWY = Pillars in HG & TG of LW too small oa)
Sno
~_ D-4 required a supplernental taigale development
7
= After 2 months of LW mining, subsidence cracks developed up to the overiying Logans Fork Mine —_Waler inundatlon Novertber 16, 2009 flooded bleeders
Trang 60Potential Ignition Sources
lãi 17.1 10.001 7) CỔ
~ Wom bits
—_Nonfunelional and missing water sprays =_ Other, less likely, sourees:
— Rock fall — Pan line
= Nearly all recovered electrical components have been tested and checked for possible ignition sources and none were identified
Trang 61Most Likely Cause of Explosion
U00 0 và ác Tec
~_Floor craoks with methane liberations identified at Shields 180 and 171
=_ A limited amount oí methane in explosive range occurred at eg
Ignited at shearer due to cutting through sandstone The crew left the shearer location
Trang 62Explosion Flame Map
~ Extent of Flame
Trang 63Detection of Methane
The methane monitors on the tai! of the LW and on the shearor did not do-
Cĩ
Information collected from the handheld gas detector located at shield 83 dĩd not reeord elevated methane levels prior to the explosion
Information collected from handheld gas detectors carried by UBB
employees who traveled to within two XĨ of the LW faoe on the TG side approximately 2 hours after the explosion recorded a methane level of only 08%
On 4/5 rescue team members advanced to shield 120 on the LW faoe Did not report any sound emanating from the LW face or TG entry which would have indicated a large volume of gas release