upper big branch mine south mine id doc

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©n April 5, 2010, at approximately 3:02 PM, 29 miners died and two miners were injured

as a result of a massive explosion at the

Upper Big Branch South Mine

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Jason M Atkins Edward D Jones Howard D, Payne ChristopherL Bell,Sr, — RichardK.Lane DU Gregory S Brock 'William R Lynch Snead

Kenneth A.Chapman —_ J0Marcum Gary W Quarles Jr

CƠ 1a Ronald L Maynor 8n Charles T Davis Nicolas D McCroskey oe oe

Cory T Davis a nay Benny R Willingham

` An eta Da Ricky L Workman

William 1 Griffith co

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Overview « ÌMSHAS investigation shows that the explosion at UBB was started by a T0 0101 67) 0¡ 0000| Di nh "The ignition was not prevented “`

Inadequate rock dust in tailgate of LW

Methane ignition transitioned into a massive coal dust explosion Today, MSHA will present its findings to date:

~_ Desoriplion of the aocident

~_ The condiions and praetices in the mine preceding the accdent Beth

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General Information

Mine opened September 1, 1994

Eagle coal seam eee tier — Average coal thickness 64 inches eee a

Four producing seclions

~_ 3 continuous miner (CM) sections en) „`

NĨ —_ 234 underground, 2 surlace Soar

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Active Workings

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Description of the Accident

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Description of the Accident (Personnel in Affected Area )

PRU neem Tg

Pee maintenanee shift (4/5/2010) was reported as uneventful

Day shift production crews entered mine ~_ Hoadgate 22 (HG 22), 6:00 AM, Elis poral

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— Tailgate (TG 22), 6:40 AM, UBB portal Various Support Personnel

~_ Pumping crew, 6:38 AM, Elis portal

Hổ GỐI

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UBB Longwall Day Shift Summary

30 minute call outs to top Massey managers

= First Call Out 7:30 AM

—_LW ran until 11:00 AM, Ð passes ~_LW was down, 11:00 AM 1o 2:15 PM

+ Mechanical probleme with the shearer

»_ AL least one member of upper management at UBB was at LW, =- Last call out at approximately 2:30 PM

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~_ Shearer shut off by TG side remole control at approximately 3:00 PM —_Water supply manually shut-off at headgate

~_ Shearer high-voltage power manually disconnected

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Se

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AL approximately 3:02 PM

~_ Electrioal power at the Elis Poytal went off ý” `”

~_Dust and debris blown out of the portals Mine fans at the UBB portal stalled ~_©O monltoring system started alarming

=_ Several miners near the portals evacuated the mine

= Surface personnel began notifying underground (UG) personnel to

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= | Tim Blake (1 of 2 survivors of the TG 22 crew) recounted that ~_Felt the wind piek up

—_Immediately blinded by dust Se

~_Immediately donned his self-contained, sofrrescuer (SCSR) Blake sat for a couple of minutes in the dark and dust When wind and the dust decreased

— He placed SCSRs on crew members = Removed some of crew from mantrip Approximately 45 minutes later

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Approximately 20 to 30 minutes after the explosion, several

managers started into the mine from both the Elis and UBB portals

= Mr, Blake walked out about 20 XCs when his cap lamp was spotted by the incoming managers

= Patrick Hilbert stayed with Mr Blake and the other managers

proceeded further into the mine on foot

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Notification of Accident

DO

donah Bowles, Safety Director, Marfork Mine Galled MSHAS hotline at 3:30 PM

Reported an air reversal on beltline at the Ellis Portal

Concentrations of 50 to 100 PPM of carbon monoxide (00) Reporled mine was being evacualed

No one trapped or injured

w Hotline operator finished the call with Bowles and called Distriot 4 at 3:42 PM

« Immediately, MSHA contacted the mine operator ~_Delermined that a serious event had occurred = Issued a 103(j) control order

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Rescue and Recovery Operations

UBB managers transported TG 22 crew out of mine — Chris Blanchard and Jason Whitehead traveled further into the mine on foot ees Mine Rescue Teams (MRTs) explored LW face and found HG 22 mantrip DU h7 Ti T2 7 Se eae ection ey A aa Gas monitoring, boreholes drilled into mine, nitrogen injection and seismic monitoring

MRTs made several attempts to find 4 miseing miners = The final missing miner was found at 11:20 PM on Friday, April 9

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Investigation of the Accident

Accident Investigation began April 12, 2010 ~_UGinvestigation delayed until June 26, 2010

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MSHA Personnel Involved 105 MSHA Investigation Personnel have been utilized during the on- site investigation

~_Type and Number of Teams Utilized s_ Mâno Dust uvey Tearns = 10 teams par đay an 2.)

ni Ventlaton Team - 39 øarns ower 10 days ni Flames and Ferees Team ~ 1 team

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/"—” `

An additional 45 Technical Support Personnel have been utilized to

perform testing and other technical activities

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Other Parties Involved

State of West Virginia

C00 70 | United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) Pree Rae uc)

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Evidence Collected to Date

ø More than 84,000 pages of documents

»_ 954 separate maps have been logged into evidence

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TT and 3

Practices at UBB:Prior

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Geology

CC

~_Upto 1,200 feet dep —_Extensive overmining —_History of floor heaving —_ Long hietory of inundations

w Explosion in gob of LW 2 West panel in 1997 —_Attributed to root fall

w UBBinundations in 2003 and 2004 —_Foor craoks, regional fauting No —_Massey Was aware of inundations

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Ventilation

ø Ì Push-pull system: 2 blowing fans, 1 exhaust fan »_ Bandytown fan ventilated area oí explosion

= Vent plan required 15,000 cfm in the last open XC (LOC) for CM Pectin

See MMU LAR UL Ae Ee

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LW Ventilating Quantities

Prior to 12/19/09 the LW was ventilated with ~60,000 cfm

Failure of ground control in the LW HG necessitated a change to relocate the HG 22 [1101/1002 —_ LW vemtlalng quanHly lnxeaed tơ ~140,000 cím

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quantity decreased 0,000 cfm in three days In mid-February and beginning of March 2010, several unexplained fluctuations in LW Ere NCsonicl Seay

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LW Ventilating Quantities

w On 3/9/10 unapproved changes were cited in the LW tailgate

~_ Prior to the order the LW quantity was ~ 80,000 cỉm

~_ After correotion of cited condition, the LW quantity was ~ 77,000 cím = The operator decided to install equipment regulating doors on the

LW intake around March 17, 2010

—_ The operator has stated this was done to ensure adequate air for HG 22

—_ The LW intake quantity was reduced ~20,000 cim to 60,000 cím by CĨ

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Ventilation

'Weekly Examinations and Air Measurements

~ _Measurements for numerous ạr splits not reoorded ~ Measurements for air splits reoorded intermittently

See Um a eam Eee ae sie)

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Ventilation Chronic ventilation problems at UBB ` = Indicated by testimony of those who provided information to the DO

=-_ Many equipment doors used in lieu of overcasts ~_ Dĩd not reliably separale air courses

= Ofen it opon

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Dust Suppression

Water supply used for dust suppression was inadequate for LW ~_Improperly-Titered river water

= Taigate drum

— 7 missing spray nozzles Sree ey

~_Minimum water prossure could not be maintained'

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Shearer Drum

(All Sprays Installed)

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Examinations

MSHA's findings are based on examination of record books and

testimony about examinations at UBB hM

—_ HaZards recorded in production and maintenance reports, not listed in required examination books

» CM section should have been evacuated and power disoonnected - (1.6% methane) ~ they just waited 25 minutes for it to clear ee ae an ed

Pipe Oe ae Teele

~_ Examiners assigned by the mine operator did not \urn on gas detectors =_ Required air readings not reoorded

= Corrective actions not recorded

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Two Sets of Records

Onshift Report Production Report

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Two Sets of Records

Onshift Report Maintenance Report

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Two Sets of Records

Onshift Report Production Report

‘Low Air in LOB Doors outby going to HG22 Tail open 7:00-8:10 Adverse Root condition their coal streak four 75° up

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Examinations

MSHA's findings are based on examination of record books and

testimony about examinations at UBB hM

—_ HaZards recorded in production and maintenance reports, not listed in required examination books

» CM section should have been evacuated and power disoonnected - (1.6% methane) ~ they just waited 25 minutes for it to clear ee ae an ed

Pipe Oe ae Teele

~_ Examiners assigned by the mine operator did not \urn on gas detectors =_ Required air readings not reoorded

= Corrective actions not recorded

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UBB Midnight Shift Summary

for April 5, 2010

= | Preshifts for OM sections on morning of 4/5/2010 reported few

hazards

= Preshift/ onshifts for belts on morning of 4/5/2010 ~_Reporled 6 of 10 bells needed rock dusling

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UBB Day Shift Summary for April 5, 2010 LW Preshift Report for the oncoming evening shift called out at 2:40 PM — No methane TT — _Nohazards HG 22 preshift Tố TG 22 preshift — Nohazards reported

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Examination and Maintenance

of the Longwall Bleeders

» Ì The company designee to make methane checks and examine LW' bleeders

~_Woekly examination

~_Yeshlft @xam pumping crew

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Examinations

EU eee Ronee icon mts management

~_UBB managers wero aware that chronic hazardous conditions were not recorded as corrected ~_ Testimony indicates UBB management ee examiners to not

record hazards in books

= Many hazards Were not teoorded ==

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Rock Dust

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—_ 17 rocK đuei violatione within one year prior to explosion WM `

=_ Interviews indicate rockdust problems

= Generally, only the track and belts were rock dusted — Some areas were only rock dusted as developed "

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—_ Railtmounted pod duster, 1.6 ton capaeitý j”".- 71

—_ Unit was more than 25 years old, probleme with air compressor ~_ Sngle crew dusted on midnight shift =_ Bogulaly taken of ok đugÌng to do other work

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Page of Rock Dust

Œew's Notebook

— Me BIDE No Help tis pote

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Rock Dust on LW Tailgate

ø Ì LW tailgate had a low roof

~_ Extensive floor heaving

Sec net Ran]

= Each LW pass generates float coal dust even with effective water CN

=-_No eidenee of rock dust applied to TG after development

—_No reoords were found during the investigation

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Results of Post-Explosion Rock Dust Analysis

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Training Deficiencies at UBB

ø ÌInadequate training or no training of miners 263 employee and contractor files were reviewed 205 training defioiencies were found

104 miners did not receive or did not complete required

“experienced miner” training before commencing work at UBB

42 miners did not receive training before they were assigned to 0U 0i

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Illegal Advance Notice

Security guards radioed the mine office when mine inspectors Ere)

Dispatchers relayed the information underground and tracked the movements of mine inspectors

Production sections involved in the explosion had at least one-hour advance nolioe of inspections

~_ Time to correct non-compliant conditions and/or shut-down production ~_ Air flows increased at area to be inspected

Mine inspectors rarely arrived on sections unannounced Advance notice severely limited the effectiveness of MSHA inspection efforts at UBB

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Intimidation of Miners

« | UBB upper management throatened to fire first line management for not eta otic tote Safety hazards such as insufficient air wore not acceptable excuses for not el A section foreman was fited for delaying production for about an hour to fi 7¬

Dean Jones (victim) was told “ithe can't go up there to run coal, just bring your ri = Testimony indicated many miners were intimidated

‘Strongly discouraged from slowing or stopping production for safety reasons Examiners were pressured not to list hazards in the books

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Engineering and Mine Planning

Engineering at the mine performed on an ad hoc basis D7)

THal and eror method nh TC Sarled at Logan's Fork mine

»_ Eoessve hao at UEB ø speed up devdoprten! lo the LWY = Pillars in HG & TG of LW too small oa)

Sno

~_ D-4 required a supplernental taigale development

7

= After 2 months of LW mining, subsidence cracks developed up to the overiying Logans Fork Mine —_Waler inundatlon Novertber 16, 2009 flooded bleeders

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Potential Ignition Sources

lãi 17.1 10.001 7) CỔ

~ Wom bits

—_Nonfunelional and missing water sprays =_ Other, less likely, sourees:

— Rock fall — Pan line

= Nearly all recovered electrical components have been tested and checked for possible ignition sources and none were identified

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Most Likely Cause of Explosion

U00 0 và ác Tec

~_Floor craoks with methane liberations identified at Shields 180 and 171

=_ A limited amount oí methane in explosive range occurred at eg

Ignited at shearer due to cutting through sandstone The crew left the shearer location

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Explosion Flame Map

~ Extent of Flame

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Detection of Methane

The methane monitors on the tai! of the LW and on the shearor did not do-

Cĩ

Information collected from the handheld gas detector located at shield 83 dĩd not reeord elevated methane levels prior to the explosion

Information collected from handheld gas detectors carried by UBB

employees who traveled to within two XĨ of the LW faoe on the TG side approximately 2 hours after the explosion recorded a methane level of only 08%

On 4/5 rescue team members advanced to shield 120 on the LW faoe Did not report any sound emanating from the LW face or TG entry which would have indicated a large volume of gas release