the gambia and the world a history of the foreign policy ppt

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HAMBURG AFRICAN STUDIES kéo

ETUDES AFRICAINES HAMBOURGEOISES Xi

9

Omar A Touray

The Gambia and the World

A History of the Foreign Policy of Africa's j

Smallest State, 1965 - 1995

Institut fiir Afrika-Kunde

Institute of African Affairs on

Institut d’Etudes Africaines

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9

Omar A Touray

The Gambia and the World

A History of the Foreign Policy of Africa’s

Smallest State, 1965 - 1995

>

Institut fiir Afrika-Kunde

Institute of African Affairs Institut d'Etudes Africaines

M004 702S-5BF~XGUI

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A History of the Foreign Policy of Africa’s Smallest State,

1965 - 1995 /

Omar A Touray -

Hamburg : Institut fúr Afrika-Kunde , 2000

(Hamburg African Studies ; 9)

ISBN 3-928049-66-6 ; ISSN 0947-4900

Alie Rechte vorbehalten

Institut fur Afrika-Kunde

im Verbund der Stiftung Deutsches Ubersee-Institut Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20354 Hamburg

@

VERBUND STIFTUNG DEUTSCHES UBERSEE-INSTITUT Das Institut fur Afrika-Kunde bildet zusammen mit dem Institut fur Allgemeine Uberseeforschung, dem Institut fur Asienkunde, dem Institut fur Iberoamerika- Kunde und dem Deutschen Orient-Institut den Verbund der Stiftung Deutsches Ubersee-Institut in Hamburg

Aufgabe des Instituts for Afrka-Kunde ist die gegenwartsbezogene Beobachtung und wissenschafiche Untersuchung der _politischen, witschaftichen und gesellschaflichen Entwicklungen in Afrika,

Das Institut fur Afrika-Kunde ist dabei bemdht, in seinen Publikationen verschiedene Meinungen zu Wort kommen zu lassen, die jedoch grundsatzlich die Auffassung des jeweiligen Autors und nicht des Insttuts fur Afrika-Kunde darstellen,

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List of Maps and Figures Vị

ist of Abbreviations VII

Preface

182 rt]! IS OQ

‘The Rationale and Objectives of the Study 1

oO |

Foreign Policy Orientation of Micro-States 3 Micro-States and Multilateral Diplomacy 5

Miero-States and Bilateral Relations 7

Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Micro-States — 7 ‘The Foreign Policy of The Gambia: The Argument, 3

‘Approach and Structure 10

(Solin at

U THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT 13

‘The Country and its People 14

Colonial Rule Ss

Movement towards Independence 16

Post Independence Politics 1

The Economy 19

‘Currency Regime and Economic Performance 21

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Relations with Senegal 31 ‘Membership of International Organisations B

'anclusion 2

\V ENERGY CRISES, INFLATION AND THE

GAMBIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1975-1980 “

The Gambia, Britain, and the European Community 59

Ẩanadian Assistance 64

Diplomatic Expansion in the Arab World 66

Relations with Asian Countries 69,

The Gambia and the Super Powers 72

The Gambia and the United Nations Group eae 1 15

V FOOD SELF SUFFICIENCY, DROUGHT

CONTROL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION:

THE GAMBIA AND Wi FRICA, 1975-1985, 1

“The Organisation of the Gambia River Siates, OMVG: 80 The Gambia and the Permanent Inter-State Committee

for Drought Control in the Sahel (CIL 90

The Gambia and the Economie Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) 95

Conclusion 8

VI — FROM DETENTE TO CONFEDERATION AND

SENEGAL AETER IS 9%

Prelude to the Confeder 975:

‘The Crises of the Early 1980s 105

‘The Birth of the Senegambian Confederation 107

Conclusion 8

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ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1980-1995 119 ‘The Internal Slump and The Gambia's Extemal Relations,

1980-1985 "9

‘The Gambia and the Westem Donors, 1981-1985 122 ‘The Gambia and the Middle East, 1981-1985 126

‘The Gambia and Asia, 1981-1985 29

‘The Debt Crises and Feonomic Reform — IãI

Economic Recovery and Foreign Policy fFom Mid-980s— 133 3 Ỹ i 5 te a 3 7 Ee cai The Round-Table Economic Diplomacy of the Early 1990s 141 Conclusion 12

‘The Gambia, Decolonisation and Recognition 147 ‘The Gambia, ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War $6 ‘The Gambia and Human Rights in Africa 161 cesta

IX CONCLUSE-OA tg

‘The Triumph of The Gambia’s Foreign Policy 166,

Foreign Policy Limitations 13

References and Selected Biblio, 179

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4d Tả TA: MAPS

The Gambia and the Trans-Gambian Route

The Gambia River Basin States andl the Shared Waters

RE

The Structure of The Gambia’s Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy (as at December 1995)

Sources of Development Finance, 1974-1980 Origin and Type (in million GMD)

Sources of Development Finance, 1981-1990 Origin and Type (in million GMD)

Sources of Development Finance, 1981-1990: Trend in Constant Dollar Terms

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ACP ADB AFPRC ANC BADEA BCEOM CFA CCCE GILIS DRK ECOWAS ECOMOG ECU EDE EEC EMCBP ERP ESAF EU FAO FFHC FEYP PLS FNLA GAMWORKS GATT GDP GPMB GPP GPTC GSRULP GCC Ico IDA IMF Kw Loc MOIA-G MPLA NASA NCC

African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States African Development Bank

Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council African National Congress

Banque Arabe du Développement en Afrique

Bureau Central des études et équipment d’outre-mér Communauté Finaneiére Africaine

Caisse Central de Coopération Economique

Comite Intre-état de la Lutte Contre la Sécherésse dans le Sahel

Democratic Republic of Korea

Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS (Cease fire) Monitoring Group European Curreney Unit

European Development Fund European Economic Community

Economic Management Capacity Building Project Economie Recovery Programme

Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility European Union

Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Freedom From Hunger Campaign

First Five Year (Development) Plan Front Line States

Frente Nagional de la Libertagio de Angola

Gambian Agency for the Management of Public Works General Agreement on Tariffand Trade

Gross Domestic Product,

Gambia Produce Marketing Board Gambia People’s Party

Gambia Public Transport Corporation

Gambia Supreme Revolutionary Underground Labour Party Gulf Co-operation Council

Islamic Conference Organisation Intemational Development Associati International Monetary Fund Kreditanstalt fir Wiederaufbau Least Developed Country

Movement for Justice in Africa (Gambia) Movimento Popular de la Libertagao d' Angola National Aeronautic and Space Administration National Consultative Councit

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ĐAU, OCAM: ODA OECD OIC OMVG OMV ‘OPEC PDOIS PANA PE PLO PPP PRC PSD PS SADR SAL SAL SAP SDR STABEX SWAPO UDI UN UNDP UNCTAD UNGA UNITA up USAID WHO wro ZANU-PF ZPE

Organisation of African Unity

Organisation Commune A fiicaine et Malagache Official Development Assistance

Organisation for Economie Cooperation and Development Opportunity Industrialisation Centre

Organisation de la Mise en Valeur de la Fleuve Gambienne Organisation de la Mise en Vateur de la Fleuve Senegalaise Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism

Pan-African News Agency Patriotic Front (Liberia)

Palestine Liberation Organisation People Progressive Party

People’s Republic of China

Programme for Sustainable Development Parti Socialist (Senegalais)

Saharaoui Arab Democratic Republic Struetural Adjustment Facility

uctural Adjustment Lending Structural Adjustment Programme Special Drawing Right

port Stablisation Fund

South West African People’s Organisation Unilateral Declaration of Independence United Nations Organisation

United Nations Development Programme

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations General Assembly

Uniao Nasional para Independéneia Total de Angola United Party

United States Agency for International Development World Health Organisation

World Trade Organisation

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The full history of The Gambia’s foreign policy has yet to be written This is because the independence of the country is fairly recent and the records relating to the post-independence period have not yet been opened to the public However, there is sufficient information to allow for some preliminary assessment of the subject The purpose of the present enterprise is, therefore, to provide the general public with one such assessment

It should be underscored at the outset that the approach adopted here is only one of the various approaches to the study of foreign policy, and that there is indeed more to The Gambia’s foreign policy and relations than we could possibly cover in a single volume The sheer size of the ground prompts us to organise the study around patterns that seek to capture the essence of the country’s policy rather than to chronicle individual diplomatic events It is hoped that asa preliminary examination of The Gambia’s diplomacy the study will provoke greater debate about the subject among students, practitioners and the general public

In the preparation of this study I have owed a debt of gratitude to a countless ‘number of people and institutions First and foremost, I would like to express my profound gratitude to Antony G Hopkins, Smut Professor of Commonwealth History at Pembroke College, Cambridge, who, for many years, supervised my rescarch at the University of Geneva’s Graduate Institute of International Studies, Professor Hopkins’ commitment, illuminating guidance, constructive criticism and constant accessibility helped me considerably to crystallise my ideas and thoughts I am indebted to Professor Ammold Hughes Centre of West Aftican Studies, University of Birmingham, in two respects: first, for allowing me to draw liberally on his works on Gambian politics and Senegambia, and secondly for reading through the original manuscript and offering invaluable criticism and Buidance I would also express my appreciation to my publishers, the Institute of African Affairs in Hamburg, for accepting to publish this work without any financial cost to me, Ata time when few speciatised works of this nature are Published without the author paying considerable financial subvention to the publisher, the move by the Institute is indeed commendable

Special thanks go to the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, for the fellowship during 1991-1994; and to the Swiss Agency for International Development Co-operation (DDA) for the generous research grant that enabled ‘me to undertake the first fieldwork for the present study in 1993 For their kind assistance and co-operation, I would like to record my gratitude to the staff of the following institutions: Department of State for Foreign Affairs (Banjul) the Public Records Office (Banjul), Information and Broadcasting Services (Banjul) the National Library (Banjul), Bureau des archives nationales (Dakar), Ministére

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INTRODUCTION

Rationale and Objectives of the Study

When Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah enjoined Afticans to ‘seek first the political kingdom and every thing else shall be added onto i’, he was echoing a sentiment about independence that had been widely upheld in most colonial territories It had engendered the strong currents of nationalism that dislodged colonial rule from Asia, and added momentum to African nationalism, which was to prove instrumental in the de-colonisation of most of Africa But while it confers rights, independence imposes obligations too And few optimists ignored the magnitude Of the challenges that fulfilling those obligations could present For African states, in general, the frail state structures and the weakness of the economies they inherited made the challenges all the more formidable For The Gambia in particular, those challenges were magnified by both the country’s level of

development and minute size With a total land area of 11,360 km? and a

population of 330,000 in 1965, The Gambia was undoubtedly mainland Africa's smallest state Added to the minute size was the paltry per capita income that stood at £ 30 in 1965 The poor endowments, together with a total dependence on mono-culture agriculture, cast grave doubts about the country’s viability 4s án independent state Indeed dim views of small states have a remote origin, Middle-sized countries such as Belgium and Portugal were once considered to be too small to be economically viable.' Guiseppe Mazzini, one of the fathers of a unified Italy, also thought that a dozen states were quite enough for Europe He dismissed the nationalism of the Scots, Welsh and trish on the grounds that their economies Were too small to go it alone.’ The rash of teritorial acquisitions and national ‘mergers that marked most of the 19th century particularly reinforced that view Following the establishment of the League of Nations, five of the European micro-stales applied for membership Luxembourg alone was admitted, in December 1920 The application of Liechtenstein was rejected on the grounds that "by reason of her limited area, smali population and her geographical position, she has chosen 10 depute to others some of the attributes of sovereignty." Monaco withdrew its application; San Marino did not pursue its

application any further; and no action was taken regarding Iceland.’ Therefore,

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the general misperception about small states

Thus in the wake of The Gambia’s admission to the United Nations in 1965, Secretary General U Thant recommended that criteria for admission of the new ‘members should be re-examined and that some form of association status should be considered In response to that call the Public Administration Division of the UN produced in 1968 a detailed report on the issues facing smatl countries.° and the Admission Committee was resuscitated However on account of the Cold War environment atthe time, not a single state was debarred from membership of the United Nations on the grounds of size although a few countries were debarred on political grounds” The result was that by 1997, 39 oŸ the 185 member-states of the organisation had less than 1.5 milion inhabitants.” Yet the size of micro-states continues to prompt questions on their survival, In the ease of The Gambia the question that invariably arises is: how has the country survived amidst the overwhelming odds of small size and under-development?

The Gambia’s viability may be attributable to various factors but the most important of these is the country’s foreign policy, Relations with the outside world enabled the country not only (o survive economically, but also to safeguard her independence and territorial integrity But even though studies on Gambian history and politics have come a long way." foreign policy remains a marginal area of scholarly enguiry Apart from the special and contentious relations with Senegal no other aspects of The Gambia's diplomacy have received sufficient scholarly attention.” Iwo articles have attempted a cursory examination of the

* See United Nations Public Administration Division Comparative Analisis af the Disinctive Public Adminisarion Problems of Small Sites and Terruories (Nevw York: United Nation 1968) Harden (ed Sin! is Dangerous p.19; Se, also Edward Dommen and Philippe Hein States,

Mierostates un Islands (London: Croom Helm, 1985), chapter | The states are Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados Belize, Botswana, + sunei Cape Verde The Comoros Cyprus, Djthouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, The ‘Gambia, Guinea Bisean, Grenada Guyana Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, ‘Mauritius, Monaco, Oman, Qatar, San Marino, Sao Tome Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St Kitts

Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent, Suriname, Swaziland Samoa, Vanuatu,

* Major studies of Gambian history and politics include JM Gray A History of The Gambia (Cambridge: CUP, 1940) Amold Hughes From Green Uprising to National Reconsilition: The People’s Progressive Party on The Gambia, 1959-1973" Canatim Journal of African Satie, 9 0905)

* Works on The Gambia's relations with Senegal include Ronald J Harrison, "Senegal and Gambia: Some Problems of Associaton", in Etudes de gvographic wropicale offert i Pier ‘Gourou Paris: Mouton 1972), pp 327-39; Huber Deschamps "Les Frontiers Revue Francais e'éaudes politique Africans, 80 (1972), pp HST; Amold Hughes, * Senegambia de a séné ambi

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detailed assessment of the period before 1975." The limited accessibility of

these studies has reduced their utility for the general appreciation of The Gambia's foreign policy Thus, the objective of the present enterprise is to offer the first full-length study of The Gambias foreign policy during the first thirty years of independence on the basis of extensive primary sources and of a broad range of secondary sources that have been available only as scattered articles, news items and government statements It is hoped that the exercise will provoke greater debate about the country’s foreign policy not only among academics, but also among the policy makers and within the general public

‘The Theoretical Context

Before we go any further, we deem it necessary to place the study in an appropriate theoretical context Indeed, the sizeable literature on micro-states suggests that the proliferation of these states generated as much interest in the academic community as it preoccupied policy makers While it is beyond the scope of the present study to provide an exhaustive synthesis of the literature, it would be appropriate to place signposts to the general areas of enquiry Works that emerged in the immediate post-independence period revolve around four main themes: viability and vulnerability of small states," membership of

international organisations:'’ social and demographic problems associated with

Paritioned Africans: Ettnic Relations Across Africa's Imermatonal Boundaries 1884-1984 (London: C Hurst, 1985), pp 75:85: Peter Robson, "The Problem of Senegambia” Joumal of Modern African Studies, 3 (1965), pp 393-407: "Senegamia: Maintaining Sovereign in aa Association af West African States, Parhiamentaricn: Journal of the Parliaments of the Commomeatth, 67 (1986), pp 14-16: 1C Senghor, “Politics and Functional Intemational Integration: Gambia In Senegambian integration, 1958-1974" (Ph.D Thesis, Yele Sưategv to University 1979}, Kalida Bayo, °Mass Orientation and Region Integration: Environmental Variations in Gambian Orientations towards Senegambia' (Ph.D thesis, Northwestem University 1977}, aniles by Ebrima Sall and Halifa Salish, Amold Hughes, and Ousseynow Faye in

Societ-espace-temps, 1994) sof Gambia’ Independence”, Presence Africaine, 98 (1975)

Apicana Marburgensi, 8 (1973), 3-33

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dominate the most recent works too '°

‘As far as foreign policy is concerned four main considerations run through the literature: (i) the foreign policy orientation of micro-states: (ii) their participation Dilemma (Geneva: Dotation Camegie Powt la Pais Internationale, 1967), pp 22 26 35-48; Rapoport, Muteba and Thera Small Stes amd Terrnories: Rapaport "Participation of Min States informational Affairs", Proceedings ofthe American Society of Duernational Law (1968), pp153-165; William M Harris, "Micro-Sttes in the United Nations: A Broader Purpose”, Colnnbia Journal of Tramsnational Lae, 9 (1970), 9p 23:33: David A Hay The New Nations in the United Nations 1960-1967 (New York: Columbia University Press 1970): Stephen M Sshwebel."MiniSates and a More Effective United Nations", imerican Journal of International Lane 67 (1973) pp 108-116 On the question of appointnent and voting authority see also Catherine Sent Manno "Selective Weighted Voting in the United Nations: General Assembly Rationale and Methods" Fteraational Organisation Sec, among olhers, Benedict "Sociological Aspect of Smallness": and TE Smith 20 (1960) pp 37-62

Demographic Aspect of Smallness" both in Benedit (ed Proflems of Smaller Territories, ‘Chapters and $ respectively Vital The hnequtity of Sates, pp 59-86, aul 143-158: Rapoport Mutebs, and Thera, Small

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foreign policy decision-making process These areas are examined briefly in the following pages

Foreign Policy Orientation of Micro-States

By focusing their attention on the problem of small siz, students of micro-states, argue that the small size of micro-states is a major determinant of their extemal relations Accordingly, small size usually implies limited natural resources, since natural resources tend to be randomly distributed over the surface of the globe."” In tum, where @ country has few natural resources its economic base will be fragile For miero-states, the absence of economies of scale acts as a deterrent to the establishment of a diversified pattern of industries and further exacerbates their economic vulnerability."® Accordingly, these economic disabilities make ‘micro-states highly responsive to events that occur in the external environment However, as the limitations in the socio-economic structure of these states are likely to be reflected in the resources available to their governments, it would seem that the capacity of these governments to respond positively to extemal ‘occurrences would be severely restricted Thus, disabilities inherent in small size have been regarded as giving rise 1 a number of important foreign policy consequences It has been held, for example, that small states will demonstrate

low level of participation in international affairs and that they would not advocate revolutionary changes in the international system, or as some have pul it, their foreign policies will demonstrate a status quo orientation.”” Furthermore, since these states have limited military or economic power, they are likely to rely on diplomatic means in order to convey to other countries the nature of their national interests in the different areas of international relations that are vital not just to their security but also to their very survival Because of their limited military capabilities, small states are likely to avoid the use of force as a technique of

state-eraft and to rely, alternatively, on international legal norms.”? They are also

likely to use diplomacy to persuade wealthy and powerful nations to enter into relationships with them that can work to their material advantage without necessarily entailing unacceptable constraints on their sovereignty and independence.” It has also been argued that the foreign policies of small states will be narrowly limited both in geographic and functional scope.”* They are also expected to avoid indulging in behaviour that will tend to alienate more powerful

states.” Furthermore, it has been contended that micro-states’ participation in

international affairs will be based predominantly on economic issues, and that

" Reid, The Impact of Very Small Size, pp

"Commonwealth Seeretarit, Falnerahilty,p 17; Reid, The Impact of Very Small ize, p 13, "" MA Bast, "Size and Foreign Poliey Behaviour, A Test of Two Models’, World Potties, 25 (1973), pp 556-576 © Reid, The Impact of Very Smal Sie, p 4

Commonwealth Secretariat, Fulnerabiliy, p68 > bid "thú

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contiguous arena."

Micro-States and Multilateral Diplomacy

In promoting their political survival as well as their economic welfare, miero- states will tend to engage in activities atthe broad, international system level The awareness that their viability is conditional will encourage such states to engage in a pattern of foreign policy interaction which emphasises a diversified pattem ‘of dependence on the system as a whole instead of dependence on one or few states In their search for economic assistance miero-states tend to look to the multilateral agencies asa counterweight to dependence on bilateral arrangements.” Thus the emphasis that the foreign policies of micro-states pla on the contiguous region can be attributed to the need to respond to phenomena which are closer to home and which could have impact on their domestic alas.” While it is recognised that all states join international organisations for the advantages they expect to derive from them, it would appear that miero-states have more material advantages to gain - particularly in comparison with their capacity t contribute - in services technology and economic aid As a consequence they are prone to join ay many international organisatio

possible that deal with matters affecting their national interest and do not impinge too severely upon their sovercignty.”” Furthermore representation in such Intemational bodies constitutes an efficient and less expensive method of maintaining extensive relations with the outside world than do direct and traditional bilateral diplomacy." Membership of the United Nations is also important for these states because it purportedly provides deterrence against the possibility of obliteration by a predatory larger state and also because the UN is a forum where a state can alert and sensitise the entire international community to the existence of specific security threats.” Ibid pp 2728 > Ibid "ibid p 28-30

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Micro-States and Bilateral Retations

‘Although membership of multilateral groups is important in their search for ‘greater security, a number of independent micro-states have been found to rely heavily on bilateral arrangements However, given the size of the international ‘community, micro-states often select countries on which to focus Since most of them went through European colonial control they often begin by establishing diplomatic representation in the capitals of the former colonial powers and major ‘world powers, then to immediate and regional neighbours, and countries in which key intemational organisations have their headquarters and important trade and security partners.” Bilateral relations with former colonial powers are particularly important for micro-states as they are dependent on these Western

powers not only for economic aid but also for their security.”' Bilateral relations

with the rest of the world are often conducted in international fora Representation at the international bodies has the added advantage of facilitating this Membership of the United Nations is particularly helpful in this respect because it is the only organisation where virtually every nation is represented ‘And the annual General Assembly sessions afford micro-states an opportunity to

eract with several other states Overtures made at that time can then be

followed up through contacts at various national United Nations missions.”?

Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Micro-States

As fur as decision-making is concerned, it has been argued that foreign policy’ in tmicro-states is predominantly individual and personalised rather than a group process." Unlike the situation that prevails in larger political systems, the chief decision-maker in a micro-state is involved not merely in giving a final and

Formal assent to proposals submitted to him: he also participates actively’ in the process of lower-level discussion, He may be directly involved in the implementation of the decisions as well." Singham argues that the political processes of very small communities are characterised by a highly personalised

form of government and an authoritarian form of decision making,”

norms They maintained only a 40 per cent overall participation ratio, and individually they are members of an average of less than seven of the organisations Thus despite their relative ‘enthusiasm to join the United Nations, Mierotates become more selective about membership in its specialised agencies, Plschke, Micro-states in World Afar, pp 99-102

> plischke, Micro Sates in World Affairs, pp 46-47

2 For more on this see Harden, Snails Dangerous, pp 3899 `*Cammoaneath Seenearia, Vulnerubiin, p.68 ibid

iid p18 °° A.W Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in the Colonial Potty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), cited in Reid, The Impact of Very Small Size, p 323, see also David Murray "Public Adminstration in the Mieto-states ofthe Pacitie” in Dommen and Hein (eds) Sars Micro-sates and Islan, particulary p 198; and Al-Ebraheem, Kua! and the Gulf pp 49-50

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miero-stales can be seen in many ways Firstly, while the cut-off point remains debatable, population is generally considered to be the most appropriate criteria for the definition of the term *micro-state’ Secondly, the literature shows, in particular that the small size of micro-states offen has security implications and therefore influences theit foreign policy This influence can be seen in their attempts to avoid ambitious extemal behaviour so as to preclude the possibility of their actions being considered aggressive and to rely on diplomatic, rather than rmilitary, means for security

The titerature has however, been marred by several weaknesses Firstly there seems to be a deliberate attempt to draw an artificial distinction between the foreign policies of micro-states and the policies of the rest of the developing countries The analysts seem to have mistaken disabilities arising from economi problems for those arising from small size A closer examination will show that apart from the security implications of smallness most of the observations made in the literature about the foreign policies of micro-states cannot be accounted for by smaliness but by economic disability: they therefore apply to any other array ‘of developing states Furthermore it must be noted that natural resources tend to be randomly distributed on the surface of the globe: therefore no correlation exists between small size and the lack of resources How would we then explain their existence in large quantities in small Gulf states like Kunwait, and the paucity ‘or the toal lack of them in many other vast territories?

It also seems obvious that a limited involvement in international affairs and the tendency to conduct bilateral relations through intemational organisations might be accounted for by economic considerations and again this is not specific to miero-states A country’s involvement or non-invatvement in international affairs «does not reflect its size, but its economic capability and its role perception

Similarly the views on the foreign poliey decision making in micro states can hardly stand empirical tests A micro-state may have an authoritarian foreign policy decision making structure, but again it would be found that this feature is not @ product of its small size Most studies of decision making show that authoritarian foreign policy decision making is a pattern more likely to be found in developing states, where the supporting bureaueratic structures tend to be weak." In these states political mobilisation is based on charismatic tradition that reduces the role of political parties, legislature, and public opinion in foreign policy formulation; and decision-makers place little emphasis on accountability 10 the public for foreign policy choice.” Moreover the economic constraints of these states restrict their information and communication networks so that they

John J Siremlau, "The Foreign Policies of Developing Countries inthe 1980s", in idem (ed) ‘ho Farcigs Policy Priors of Third World States (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1982), pp | see also Stephan Wright, “The Foreign Policy of Africa’, in Ray Macridis (ed, Foreign Policy 1 World Polis, 8" ed (Prentice Hall Intemational), 9p 336-338,

"id

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policy decision-making process.”

‘The conclusion we can draw from the above analysis is that there is neither a distinet theory nor a distinet approach to the study of the foreign policies of micro-states Size would obviously have security implications that foreign policy decision-makers will have to take into account; but there is hardly any other factor that would make them any different from the rest of the developing ‘countries If the general tendency in the literature is to consider the foreign policies of micro-states as predominantly concerned with economic development,

‘the question then arises as to why that is specific to micro-states.”

‘The Foreign Policy of The Gambi:

The Argument

The difficulty in defending the positions taken on micro-states has prompted us to premise our examination of The Gambia's foreign policy on the recognition of the country’s small size and level of development This recognition constitutes the

basis of our argument which is pitched at two levels: empirical and theoretical Empirically, we will show that throughout the period under consideration, The Gambia’s foreign policy had three primary objectives: to strengthen security, ‘promote economic development, and boost national prestige

The country’s small size and inability to assume her own defence compelled her to rely entirely on her foreign relations for the promotion of her security objectives, which had three dimensions: security of the borders, security of the regime, and the security of national independence and identity Although there

have been few cases in the post-war world where a micro-state has been forcefully annexed by a larger state, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a sương indication of the precarious security of micro-states This vulnerability feeds the anxiety that micro-states exhibit over the security of their borders, despite the various international inhibitions against invasion, In the case of The Gambia, this concem accounted for the decision to enter into various arrangements with Senegal The security preoccupation partly explains The Gambia’s bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, too, and her unreserved support for the Cairo Resolution on the inviolability of African borders adopted by the O.A.U Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1964 During the period under study, forcign policy was used as an instrument of security for the regime It was intended to provide a safety net against all possible

foreign-backed and unconstitutional forms of change within the country"” The

™ Christopher Hill, "Theories of Foreign Policy Making in the Developing Countries”, ia ‘Christopher Clapham and W Wallace (eds), Foreign Policy Making in Developing States, p 3 ˆA comparison of two different counties like Egypt and Kuwait will show that the Foreign

policy ofthe later has no fewer economic metives than that ofthe former

© This problem is associated paricularly with small developing sates See Graham Nerton, ‘Defending The Easter Caribbean", The World Today, 6 (1984) pp 256-257; and Joaathan Alford, "Security Dilemmas of Small Sates, The World Today, 89 (1984), p 364

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Jawara’s advocacy for democracy and greater respect for human rights had a motive behind them too Besides the rights that democracy and human rights enshrine they were also upheld by the Gambian Government as a means to ‘sin intermational (particularly Western) suppor

Preservation of the political independence and national identity of the country constituted the third aspect of the security objective The Gambia sought to protect her identity and independence so that no foreign policy move would compromise or impinge on them The country’s relations with Senegal best exemplify this aspiration Gambian leaders realised for example, that a full jmplementation of the 1981 Senegambian Confederation agreements would not only have adverse economic consequences for the small state: it would also interfere with national independence and would bring about a de facto obliteration of the Gambian personality Consequently they dragged their feet andl precipitated the collapse of the confederation in 1989

It will be shown also that, because of her low level of development ‘The Gambia relied heavily on foreign relations for her economic development The economic consideration accounted not only for the close ties The Gambia maintained with the donor countries but also for her policy in West Africa However this objective was pursued as long as it did not compromise national and regime security The Gambian Government broke off diplomatic relat with Gaddafi’s Libya in 1980 when the Government was convinced that d

the economic assistance Libya was giving, relations with Tripoli represented a threat to the regime's security ‘Although security and economic considerations were important they alone did not account for The Gambia's diplomaey It will be shown that prestige as well as the desire to project national independence and sovereignty were considerations that affected policy in the micro-state too This concern could be gleaned trom the country's largely sentimental involvement in international potitics from its relatively etive participation in regional and sub-regional polities and from its espousing humanitarian causes such as democracy and respect for human rights at both national and international levels

Our contention implies, on a more theoretical level, that in fact all states purstie the same general foreign policy objectives They differ only in the detaél ingredients of their objectives and the manner in which they pursue their goals Pundits would recognise that these claims are not new in the theoretical literature However, they will note, to0, that the claims are not only attributable to larger states; in most instances they have been argued rather than demonstrated

Approach and Structure

The study is a straightforward case-study, structured around the argument we have formulated above Each chapter is organised around a thematic issue within a specified time frame, and looks at the domestic conditions and relates them to

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which the country’s foreign policy was formulated, Chapter 3 looks at the question of viability which constituted the driving force behind the country’s foreign policy during the first ten years of independence Chapter 4 examines ‘The Gambia's diplomatic response to the adverse effects that energy crises, inflation and drought had on the national economy in the 1970s Chapter 5 extends the examination of the country’s diplomatic response 10 drought, by looking specifically at the country’s perception of and role in regional bodies such as Organisation of The Gambia River States (OMVG), ECOWAS, and the Comité Permanent Inter-Etat de la Lutte contre Ia Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), Chapter 6 looks at the confidence building drives that characterised ‘The Gambia's relations with Senegal during 1975-1980, and the union of the 1980s Chapter 7 examines the effects of the domestic stump and the crippling debt burden on the country’s foreign relations during 1980-1995 Chapter 8 looks at some of the international political issues that the country’s policy makers had to wrestle with during the period under consideration Chapter 9 concludes the study by looking at the strength and the limitations of The Gambia’s foreign policy

Sources

The primary sources on which the present study is largely based were collected during research work undertaken in The Gambia and Senegal in 1993 These include documents of the Ministry of External Affairs in Banjul: diplomatic correspondence, bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, speeches of the Gambian President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, minutes of the Ministry of Extemal Affairs, memoranda, administrative correspondence between the Ministry of External Affairs and other Government ministries, press releases; treaty files of the Ministry of Justice: budget speeches of the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs: minutes of debates in the House of representatives; foreign trade statistics; annual reports of the Central Bank of The Gambia; several documents from The Gambia Information Services Bureau Documents inspected at the National Archives in Dakar included statements by the Senegalese President and other Government ministers on matters relating to The Gambia; documents of the defunct Senegalo-Gambian Permanent Secretariat as well as of the Secretariat of the Senegambian Confederation These were supplemented subsequently by information gathered progressively during 1994-

1997 in various places, including The Gambia, Geneva, and Brussels

‘The papers and journals that have been extensively relied upon include The Gambia News Bulietin (Iater The Gambia Weekly and now Gambia Daily), The Gambia Outlook, The Gambia Onward, and The Senegambian Sun, The Nation, the Daily Observer, the Point, Le Soleil, !'Harmatan, and Wal Fajir: the weekly West Africa; and the periodicals, Africa Comemporary Record, Africa Research Bulletin, and Africa Confidential,

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sources These were mainiy in the form of surveys, interviews and informal discussion with several Gambian and Senegalese officials Since my interest in this area began in the 1980s, my own record and memory of the events, particularly the most recent ones also served as a valuable source, In addition to the above sources the footnotes and the extensive bibliography also show the secondary’ material that has been extensively used throughout the study Those works have helped place our work in perspective and relate our positions to the existing ones

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THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT

The pre-eminent role the Realists and their followers ascribe to the international system in international relations suggests thatthe foreign policy behaviour of states is the product of the international environment in which they live and operate Thus 4 state's action is analysed from the perspective of that environment Accordingly forces external rather than internal to the state are regarded as the major determinants of foreign policy; and for developing states, foreign policy is viewed as a function of the East-West conflict.’ The criticism that these assertions provoked are both deep in intensity and wide in scope, Not only is the international system the creation of national governments it has also been conferred with as much power as

national governments have been willing to relinquish.’ And while the growth of

international organisations and transnational transactions that characterise this system needs to be recognised, it has not rendered state boundaries obsolete.’ East and Gregg for example, find that the foreign policy acts of 82 nations are systematically rather than randomly associated with their domestic eonditions.* And in examining the security policies of Germany, Japan, and Italy, Jensen also finds that the intemal environment is a more important factor than the extemal environment in the formulation of national security policy.’ These findings suggest that the benign force the Realists ascribe to the intemational system is almost entirely symbolic, It follows therefore that any attempts to understand the foreign policy of a state must begin with the appreciation of its national attributes from Which its politcal concems stem, and which account forthe difference between its policy and that of any other state.” This consideration provides the rationale of the present chapter

" For more on the realist schoo! of thought, see K Walts Theory of nernational Politics (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley 1979), H Morgenthau, Potties Among Nations, $*ed (New York: Alfed A Knopf, 1978); James t Dougherty and Robert L Plalzgraft, Contending Theortes of bucrnationad Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 2% ed, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1981) For the realist views on the foreign poliy of developing sats, Collaborators, The Foreign Policy of Arab States (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc 1984), Chapter see Bahgat Korany, Ali E Hilla Dessouki and

* Peer Calvet, The Foreign Policy of New States (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Book, Lid 1986), pp 23-24 Wid, p 23, LÊ Eaw and Grega, "Factors Influencing Co-operation and Conflict in the international System” 265 * {Jeasen, "Postwar Democratic Politis: Natonalintmational Linkages in the Defense Policy of the Defeated States’, in James Rosenau ed.) Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press 1969), pp, 304- 333 See also Roy C Mactidis (ed), Foreign Policy: in World Politics, 8% ed (Prentice-Hall Intematonal 1992), pp 1-6: and Stephan Wright, “The Changing Contexts of African Foreign Palisis,” im idem (ed), African Foreign Policies (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1999), pp 2-16

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The Land

By area, The Gambia is the smallest country in mainland Aftiea It comprises an area of 11.360sq.km and is surrounded by Senegal except at the Atlantic coastline The country’s boundary with Senegal is about 600 kilometres long and largely permeable There is no natural division between the two countries and no physical landmark to distinguish the two counties from each other For the most part, the boundaries pass through bushes and villages straddle the frontier The country is bisected by the River Gambia and varies in width (north-south) from 48 kilometres a the Atlantic coast to 24 kilometres in the eastem portion,’

Physically The Gambia is a flat fand with a maximum elevation of 35 meters above sea level and ean be divided into three distinet zones The first region is the tmangrove belt which borders the river trom its mouth on the Atlantic Ocean to more than 240 kilometres inland, The second region consists of the "Banto Faro" which lies behind the mangrove belt and on slightly higher ground It becomes swampy during the eainy season Inthe up river regions the Banto Faro is flooded with fresh ‘water and is suitable for rice cultivation Behind these swamps stretches the third geographic region, the sandstone plateau in which most of the country’s crops = primarily groundnuts millet and sorghum - are grown." ‘As a Sahelian country The Gambia’s climate is characterised by a long dry season, lasting fom November to May and a short rainy season which lasts from June to October.” Average rainfall ranges from 800 mm in the east t0 1700 mim atthe western end of the country The short rainy season and limited irrigation fac restrict agricultural activities to erops with short eycles such as groundnut, millet sorghum and rice The combination of fresh water from heavy rains and tidal aetion provides a system of natural irrigation in the mangroves and riverside swamps and facilitates rice cultivation The salt water Would kill the weeds in the dry season and in the later part of the rainy season, fesh water is pushed in by each tide to irrigate rice which has been transplanted However years of drought have caused the salt penetration to spread further up river

Society and Religion

Despite its small size, the population of The Gambia is characterised by great ethnic diversity No ethnic group commands an absolute majority In the most recent census the figure for the total population of the country stood around 1.025 Million.” The

ˆ The county’s shape as given sew maay vivid comments such as "a mouse in a Senegalese tap and “a long swoercknuckle finger probing deep into the heart of Senegal.” In 1981 President Senghor of Senegal sid The Gambia was "pointed like a revolver inthe yy stomach of Senegal {Quotations rom David P, Gamble Bibliography of The Gambia pi

See J Duley Stamp, djaca A Sindy i Tropical Development (New York: John Wiley and So Ine 1966), “L Bery, Technical Notes (Pais: UNESCO Pr

Deserifcaion ions 'Expétence 1995 census 1975), pp 9-11; and also CHLSS, Le Sabel en fate Comre la "in The Sahel: Ecological Approaches to Lan Use, MAP in: Programme Allemand CILSS, 1989) p16

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‘cent, the Wolof 12 per cent, and the Jota 7 per cent The remaining percentage was ‘constituted by the Sarahuli, the Serer, the Aku (Creole), Manjago, and the Bambara

‘The constitution of The Gambia does not specify a state religion, but more than 85 pet cent of Gambians are Sunni Muslims by faith, Though Islam was introduced as carly as the twelfth century, it was not until the Soninke-Marabout Wars of the mid- 1850s that most of the population was converted to Islam Christians are estimated to constitute less than 10 percent of the population, concentrated in the capital, with the Aku constituting the bulk of the Christian population [tis estimated that about 1 per cent of the population follow traditional African religion

History and Pol

Colonial Rute

Until 1889 British activities in the territory centred on a fortress on James Island, the settlement on Bathurst which henceforth became a crown colony, the river, and the island of Georgetown The rest of the territory remained kingdoms and chieftains most of which entered into treaties with France However, in the 1880s, the British sought to extend their control to the hinterlands, and under the 1889 agreement with the French, Britain acquired the territories on both banks of the river Thus the absurd boundary was agreed on, taking no account either of natural features or of boundaries of traditional states It cut through the old kingdoms of Wuli, Kantora and Fuladu, etc

Following the acquisition of the new territories, a protectorate system was set up; treaties were signed with chiefS along the river, and Travelling Commissioners were appointed to travel through their tervitories and to explain to the people the new

system of government that had been imposed.! However, the extet of British

rule was met with sirong resistance, particularly from such religious leaders as Foday Sillah of Gunjur and Foday Kaba in the lower river areas." It was not untit 1901, the year in which Foday Kaba was killed, that opposition to British rule was

brought to an end," and the effective colonial rule began,

In 1902, the protectorate form of administration was extended to the colony proper (comprising Bathurst and the Kombo St Mary) The legislative power, for the colony and the protectorate alike, was exercised by the Govemnor in the Legislative Council, a body consisting usually of three officials and three nominated non-officials Administration in the protectorate was largely conducted by local authorities under the supervision of Travelling Commissioners Traditional local

"As no reliable maps ofthe country were available, many villages claimed by the French were found to be almost within a stone throw of the River, while thse sid to be English were situated 12 t0 1S miles inland, Colonial Annual Report (1903) cited by D Gamble Bibliography of The Gambia,

Introduction p xiv

"For a detiled study of the resistance of Foday Silah and Fodey Kaba see S.C Ukpabi, "The Gambia Expedition of 1901", Bullevin "1M Gray, A History of The Gambia (Cambridge, CUP, 1940) 472 de L FAN 33 2), Ser B (19711, pp 285-298

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and custom." However their activities remained under the supervision of colonial authorities, ‘Aller the Second World War, an elected member, to represent Bathurst and Kombo St, Mary, was added to the Legislative Council, which now consisted of the governor three ex-oflicio members several nominated members, who might be either official or non official, and one elected member." In 1951 the representative clement on the council was inereased to include eight unofficial members Two of these were elected to represent Bathurst and one to represent Kombo St Mary: four unofficial members were appointed to the four divisions of the protectorate and one ‘was appointed to represent commercial interests All the elected members became members of the Executive Council, and two became ministers without portfolio in the government." In 1954 a decisive step was taken to enlarge the Legislative Council and to give that body and the Executive a non-official majority."” In 1962,

The Gambia became one of the self-governing territories in West AMtrica."*

Movement owards Independence

The movement towards independence was initially dominated by a group of highly

educated men in Bathurst and the neighbouring Kombo They inchuded the Reverend John Colley Faye, leader ofthe frst Gambian political party the Democratic Party

LM Garba Jahumpa."” a teacher and leader of the Moslem Congress Panty; a well

known Bathurst Lawyer Pierre S Nie,” leader of the United Party (UP): and his brother E.D Nie, also a lawyer However, the enfranchisement 1960 passed the leadership of the movement into the hands of the educated élite of the protectorate in

from the Protectorate.”" There, the dominant figure was Dawda (then David) fawara,

‘who became leader of the Protectorate People's Party.””

Foreign Office, Historical Section, Partition of Africa: British Possessions (1) (London: HLM

Stationary Ofte, 1920) pp 1-14 °"T1 might be said thatthe constitutional changes that took place in other parts of British West Africa inthe 1920s an the 19s were Ite fo come in The Gaba However ths doesnot mean that there sere o Toa! demands fr reform as argued tO Auk, "The Police of Decoloiston in British West Aca’ in JA Ajayi and M Crowder (eds) Hixon’ of West Afico (Londo Longman 197%), p 623-663 The Gambian section of National Congres of Bish West Aca had mm inmeasive yitation for reform inthe early 1920s though these eff filed to bing about mỹ oncrete changes For more on thi ee AyodeleLangles, Pa km cond Natoma on West “Vrica,190-1943 (Oxf: The Claredon Press 1973) pp 134133 '°J.LPrice, Political institutions of West Africa, 2” ed (Hutchinson of London 1975), pp 90-92

For mor on this se, W.E Ward, Government in West Arca Sed (London: George Alen and Unwin LTD, 981, pi; Price, Pola! Instons, 92

"Gailey, Hitrica Dictionary

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sought to integrate the several ethnic groups as well as the colony and the protectorate in the subsequent years As part of this policy, it changed its name to People's Progressive Party (PPP) The PPP won the crucial elections of 1962, which ushered in self-government with Jawara as Prime Minister It devolved on him to negotiate the final stages of decolonisation with Britain At the Independence Conference in London in July 1964 it was agreed that The Gambia, while continuing to co-operate with Senegal, would become an independent country within the ‘Commonwealth on 18 February 1965."

Post Independence Politics

For most of the immediate post-independence period United Party constituted the main parliamentary opposition to the PPP Government.” New forms of opposition ‘emerged in the mid 1970s, and were represented by Sheriff Dibba, a former Vice- President of the country; and Cheyassine Secka, a Lawyer In 1975 Dibba launched his National Convention Party (NCP) In the same year, Secka founded the National Liberation Party The NLP failed to make any impact on voters in the 1977 elections The NCP fared better, replacing the United Party as the major opposition party, but making only a limited inroad into the PPP's large majority

Charges of corruption and incompetence, levelled at the PPP, fuelled a third opposition in the late 1970s the Gambian Socialist Revolutionary Party, and the Movement for Justice in Africa - The Gambia (MOJA-G) appeared in 1980 These groups rejected parliamentary opposition as futile and advocated other polit measures Both the GSRP and the MOIA-G were proscribed in 1980 following the assassination of Commander Mahoney of the Paramiliary Field Force MOJA leaders were arrested and charged with seditious activities.” Hopes that violent opposition had been displaced were cruelly shattered in less than a year On 30 July 1981, a group of leflist civilians teamed up with defectors from the Field Force to atiempt the overthrow of the state The rebellion was crushed with the aid of 3000 Senegalese troops brought in under the provision of

(London, 1964), pp 186-190; West Africa, 17 October 1954, p 1057; also Michael Crowder, Gambian Political Scene", West Africa, 2 November 1957, p 1035; 18 October 1958, p 987, The Protectorate Peoples Pat, later Progressive People’s Paty, was created in December 1989, It ‘was not the extension ofthe franchise to the Protectorate that led directly tothe formation ofthe PPP 38 Olajide Aluko contends in Aluko, “The Politis of Decolonisation in British West Africa”, p 652 For a detailed study of the evolution of the People’s Progressive Party, see Arnold Hughes "From Green Uprising to Nationat Reconciliation: The People’s Progressive Party in The Gambia, 1959 1973", Canadian Journal of African Stadies, 9 (1975), p 61-74; Idem, "From Colonialism te Confederation: The Gambian Experience of fndependence, 1965-1982", in Robin Cohen (ed), rican Islands ‘See Sessional Papers No.12 of 1964 (Bathurst Government Printer, 1964) and Enclaves (London: Sage Publications, 1983), in particular, pp 61-66,

ˆ Thị seeion draws liberally on studies by Arnold Hughes, particularly his

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accused of complicity and Dibba the party leader, was imprisoned

Although the eight-day insurrection briefly marred The Gambia's overseas prestige the country soon returned to normality Among the measures taken to reassert democratic practive in The Gambia perhaps the most prominent was the holding of the country’s first presidential elections on the occasion of the general elections of 4-5 May 1982 Although the NCP vote held up relatively well it lost ‘nvo of its Hive seats in the House of Representatives (including that previously held bby Dibba) to the PPP The government vote too, fell because a large number of former PPP supporters voted for independent candidates The final distribution of « Was manifested by his overwhelming victory over Dibba in the presidential el was: PPP 27, NCP 3 Indepenslents 5 Sir Dawda's personal popularity

Which he wan by 137.020 votes to 52.136

In the run-up to the general and presidential elections held in March 1987, the NCP together with two new opposition parties formed in 1986, sought to capitals ‘on revelations of corruption in official circles and on the financial hardship resulting

from the government's economic recovery programme Freed from the constraim Which the state of emergency and the detention of its leaders had posed at the time of the previous elections the NCP mounted a vigorous campaign aimed at defeating the PPP An additional nation-wide challenge to Jawara’s party came trom the Gambian People’s Party (GPP) a centrist group which was broadly similar, in its ideology and policies both to the PPP and NCP The GPP formed in February 1986 and led by Assan Musa Camara (also a former Vice-President of The Gambia) was expected 10 do Well in the efections mainly because the party was reported to ‘command a strong following among Fula and Sarahuli communities in the McCarthy Island and Upper River Divisions However its prospects were subsequently ympered by a controversy surrounding its attempt to raise funds from abroad and by the arrest in London, on fraud eharges of its deputy leader, Lamin Saho, A more locatised challenge to the PPP came from the People’s Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS) a socialist group which was formed in Serekunda in July 1986, Both Sheriff Dibba and Assan Musa Camara competed with Jawara in the 1987 presidential elections.”

As expected, the PPP was confirmed in power winning 31 of the 36 directly elected seats in the house of representatives; however its share of the poll fell again, by around 5 per cent to approximately 58 per cent Sir Dawda Jawara, too was r elected president with a reduced share of the vote (59 per cent, compared with over

72 per cent in 1982) With Dibba’s vote remaining almost unchanged from the 1982 election, it was apparent that Camara had attracted votes from Jawara The two ‘opposition leaders also failed to retain their seats in the House of Represent

Although the GPP obtained 12 per cent of the vote cast in the legislative electio lost the three seats that it had held in the previous assembly; while the NCI

On this point, see "The Gambia: Attempted Coup, Proposed Merger with Senogal” Keesinex Contemporary Archives, (Now 6, W981), pp 3165-66; and Hughes, "Why the Gambian Coup Failed", Vest rica 26 October 1981; Hem, From Colo pp 69-70,

pica Comenporary Records ()986-1987), pp B24-B2S

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won only five seats The PDOIS secured only 1 per cent of the votes and failed to win a seat Despite the proliferation of parties the position of the PPP in The Gambia remained strong in the face of fragile challenge posed by the divided ‘opposition This was confirmed in the last parliamentary and presidential elections which were held before Jawara’s administration was unseated in a military coup in July 1994

The Economy

‘The Gambia ranked among the forty-nine least developed countries (LDCs).* The economy's dependence on a single eash crop (groundnuts) made it vulnerable to the risks of bad weather, pests and price fluctuations Groundnuts and groundnuts products (oil and cake) accounted for 90 per cent of the domestic exports and 25-40 per cent of the Gross Domestic Products (GDP).”” Annual purchase of groundnuts for exports followed a rising trend from the early 1960s This result was attributed to

the influx of seasonal immigrants , known as "strange farmers" from Senegal,

Guinea and Mali, to the government extension work, and to the increasing use of fertilisers In the four seasons, 1973/74 to 1976/77, purchases averaged 132.000 ‘metric tonnes per year In the following four seasons, 1977/78 to 1980/81, unfavourable weather and pest infestation reduced the annual average to 71,000 tonnes, This contraction, which was also experienced in other crops produced severe economic strains In 1982, production of groundnuts was estimated at about 151,000 tonnes; it declined by nearly one-third, to 106.000 tonnes, in 1983 According to FAO estimates, annual output had recovered slightly by 1988, to 110,000 tonnes The Gambie’s inability to influence market conditions meant that export camings were particularly precarious, even with the expansion of the

groundnuts crop !

Other major erops were millet, sorghum, rice and maize These crops, too, saw a similar setback as a result of drought, with the output of millet and sorghum estimated to have fallen from 49,000 tonnes in 1982 to 29,000 tonnes in 1983 In 1988, however, the millet and sorghum crops rose to an unofficial total of 79,000 tonnes Production of paddy rice fell from 37,000 tonnes in 1982 to 19,000 tonnes in 1983 Production in 1987 was unofficially estimated at 30,000 tonnes Maize output «dwindled from 17,000 tonnes in 1982 to only 6,000 tonnes in 1983 It rose to 16,000

IMP World Survey, February 1982, p SI: The Gambia Macro-Bconomic Framework for Development Co-operation: Strategic Review of Emerging Prontes, Document ofthe Fifh Round “Table Conference (Geneva 1998), ©The United Nations Conference on the Lest Developed Countries,

Presentation”, LDCICP/22, The United Nations, 1981, p 3

"Fora detailed study ofthese people, see Kenneth Swindell, The Sramge Farmers of The Gambia: A Stayin the Redistribution of african Population Monograph Series No XV (Swansea: Cente for Development Studies 1981); and also Douglas Rimmer, The Economies of West Arica H Intemational Economies Series (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), pp, 12-14

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citrus fruits avocados and sesame seed was encouraged by the government, and proved to be commercially useful, Cotton was introduced in the Nineteenth Century, bur the area under cotton cultivation remained small."

In the 1980s, livestock rearing and fisheries, two other important activities, accounted for 8 per cent and 1 per cent of the GDP respectively However, livestock too was severely depleted by periodic drought The FAO estimated that there were 290,000 cattle in 1985 (down from 300,000 in 1983), 85,000 sheep, 94,000 goats and 12.000 pigs.” The Livestock Marketing Board had a contract with the Nigerian government for the supply of the Ndaama cattle for breeding: a similar agreement was reached with Gabon in 1985 Finance was being channelled into livestock rearing particularly of the trypano-tolerant Ndaama breed with a view to promoting further export, The total ishing eatch declined trom 18,092 tonnes in 1977 0 9.212 tonnes in 1982 before recovering to 14.376 tonnes in 1987."" Exports of fish and fish produets were valued at D 4.1 million in 1982, D 3.4 mitlion in

1983, D 3.35 million in 1984, but only D 2.5 million in 1985/86

The contribution of industry to GDP at constant 1977/78 prices was D 36 million or 10.4 per cent in 1981/82 D 34.3 million or 8.8 per cent in 1983/84 It rose to 35.6 million or 9.4 per cent of GDP in 1985/86 and to 10.6 per cent of GDP in 1990, ‘The sector was based on less than 60 establishments which centred on fight industries mainly brewing solt drinks bottling fish freezing, soap manufacture, brick making and other processing

Trade and transportation also constituted important economic activities because of the relatively low rate of import duties in The Gambia and the country's prominent role as an entepot for imports into Senegal, Guinea, and Mali, The count geographic location had contributed to the growth of this trade particularly when ‘The Gambia's economic policies gave it a competitive edge relative to neighbouring countries The river served as a major artery of trade and transport, and the length of all-weather roads had increased since 1960, The port of Banjul was modernised and reed Facilities at the Yundum international airport were upgraded in 1989 by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to enable the airport to serve as an emergency landing site for space shuttle vehicles Additional improvement work was carried out and a new terminal constructed under the Transitional Programme of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council,

The Gambia's mild climate, tong stretches of sandy beaches and relative proximity to Europe made the country an attractive destination for European tourists More than 112,000 tourists visited The Gambia in 1988/89: the sector contributed between 8 and 10 per cent to the Gross National Product in the mid-1980s, and provided

Tb ‘ountry Survey: The Gambia", in Africa Today (London: Aftiea Books Ltd), pp 947-965, Ibid

Ibid, see also UNDP, The Gambia: Development Co-operation Report, 1991 July 1992; West Africa, supplessent, 12-18 February 1990, p 270; World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies (Washington D.C: The World Bank 1989), p 166; Budger Speech by the Honowuble Sathou Sulayman Sabally, Minster of Finance and Trade, une 1990,

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generated by tourism) However, the sector suffered a 60 per cent decline in

1994/1995, following the military take-over in July 1994 and the subsequent putlout of several European, mainly British , tour operators from The Gambia.”

Currency Regime and Economic Performance The West African Curreney Board was replaced by the Gambian Currency Board in 1965, without any change to the one-to-one parity of the Gambian Pound with

Sterling.* In November 1967, the Gambian Pound was devalued along with

Sterling In March 1971, the Central Bank of The Gambia was inaugurated, and in July a new decimalised curreney unit, the Dalasi, was adopted, replacing the old unit at the rate of five Dalasis to a Pound Sterling Following the floating of the pound in 1972, the parity with Sterling was maintained until 1973, when the Dalasi was revalued to four Dalasis to a Pound Sterling in order to arest the inereases in the

price of imports from non Sterling sources.” The worsening economic situation led

to the devaluation of the Dalasi to the earlier rate of five Dalasis to a Pound Sterling in March 1984 In January 1986, the fixed rate was abandoned, and the "floating’ rate was adopted as part of the IMF-supported Economic Recovery Programme CERP) By July 1995, the exchange rate was approximately 15 Dalasis to the Pound Sterling

During the 1960s, The Gambia experienced an annual economic growth of 4.5 per cent as against a population increase of 2.6 per cent."” Per capita income peaked at USS 260 in 1967/68 (constant prices) because of the good performance in the agricultural sector” Between 1969 and 1977, however, severe droughts affected agricultural production so that the average annual growth rate dropped to 1.5 per ‘cent while the population growth remained high The GDP increased from D 208 million ($ 100 million) in 1975 to D776 million in 1983/84 but fell sharply to 5183 million in 1984/85, as a result of poor agricultural production and of the increased cost of imported food and fuel According to World Bank estimates per ‘capita income fell to US$ 200 by 1975 It rose to US$ 360 in 1982, before falling

again to $ 230 in 1985 (constant prices) It rose again to USS 360 in 1994,"

% See the comprehensive study on this topic by Barbara Dianne Steffen, “Tourism and cultural ‘Change in West Atrican Bakau OW Town: A Case Sti)” (PhD Dissertation, George Washington University 1986)

Budget Speech bythe Honourable Bala Garba Launpe, Suly 1995 Daalas Rimmer, The Economies of West Afco, p 128, and 278 note 18 Phd 9.137,

* For more on this, see Tian Salah, “zones and Poliies n The Gambia", The Journal of Madern african Stuties.28 (19), pp, 621-648 * Wid, 635, Salah has also anibuted the rise ia per capita income tothe performance ofthe import

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programmes ~ in 1963/64, 1967/68, 1970/71 each lasting for four years - were implemented.”’ The programmes concentrated on improving the basic infrastructure of The Gambia, and three-quarters of the expenditure were directed to non- immediate revenue eaming projects The three programmes did not represent any detailed or comprehensive economic plans, They sought to programme readily identifiable public sector projects in a way that reflected broad development opportunities Thus, neither private investment nor macro-economic targets were included."

Real economic planning began with the First Five-Year Plan for Economie and Social Development (FFYP) which lasted between 1975/76 and 1980/81, The plan ‘was intended to complete projects carried forward from the third capital expenditure programme and to provide a link between previous development policies (which hhad emphasised growth and short-term diversification of production), and the long term goal of greater human and natural resources development.* The plan was also intended to reduce The Gambia's heavy dependence on groundnuts through the diversification of agricultural production to facilitate greater self-suliciency in cereals and to reduce the inereasing disparity between the rural and urban incomes bby concentrating development resources in the rural areas."© More generally the plan was designed to achieve accelerated economic development by projecting an average growth rate of 4.5 per eent per annum of the GDP and to bring about the changes required for self-sustained growth.” The last Development Plan (1981/82-1985-86) was launched in 1982 The total expenditure envisaged under the plan was D475 million Like the First Plan, the Second Plan aimed at a GDP growth rate of 5.1 per cent per annum, and at improving the balance of payments and the governments financial position as well as at the achievement of price stability and the maintenance of a liberal trade

Agriculture, manufacturing and tourism were accorded top priority However severe drought public sector deficits and a rising external debt burden hindered the realisation of the Plan's target and led to the introduction of austerity measures ‘hich were followed by an Economie Recovery Programme in August 1985,

The Eeonomic Recovery Programme envisaged a reduction in public expenditure in conjunction with the diversification of the agricultural sector and the stimulation of the private sector (in part by the transfer to private ownership of several parastatal organisations) Under the programme, a flexible exchange rate system was ntroduced, pricing policies were liberalised, and steps were taken to increase public

° The Gambia, Thind Development Programme 197 1971).p.8

United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Counties, Country Review Mectings: The Gambia (United Nations, 1981) p 5

© The First Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1978/1976- 1979/1980 (Banjul ‘Government Printer, 1975), Ibid p.3 and p 30

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adopted Unlike the previous plans, The ERP achieved considerable success Real GDP rose by Š per cent for each year since 1986/87 As a result of the increased ‘commercial activity, inflation (measured by the consumer price index) declined from 70 per cent in 1985/86 to 20 per cent in 1986/87, and to 7.7 per cent in 1988/89 Extemal reserves, which stood at USS 1.73 million in 1985 rose to USS 13.56 million in 1986 and to USS 15.5 million in 1987 ** The reform policies were supported by the international community, particularly the International Monetary

Fund, with a three year arrangement under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) that expired in November 1991, and by the World Bank through structural and sectoral lending, including the second structural adjustment loan (SAL 11) which was completed in June 1992 From mid-1993, however, the Gambian economy suffered from a series of adverse shocks, expansionary physical policy, increasing structural weaknesses, and diminished private sector confidence The result was that Real GDP grew by only | per cent and per capita income declined by 6 per cent during 1993-1996.” However, the improvement in groundnut production and the tourism seetor in 1997

brought about a real GDP growth of 5.5 per cent in that year And the tight monetary

policy maintained inflation below 5 per cent,

‘We maintain at the outset ofthis chapter thatthe foreign policy of @ country can only be understood by looking at the domestic conditions fom which its concerns stem These conditions invariably include the domestic resources, level of development, size and political tradition However, these variables do not in themselves make policy; they only condition policy-makers to take a certain course of action, Thus no examination of internal sources of foreign policy ean be complete without an assessment of the bureaucracy which is responsible for making and

executing foreign policy decisions

‘The Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy

In The Gambia, as in most countries, the foreign policy bureaucratic structure included the Head of State, the Minister and the Ministry of External Affairs Other ministries were also part of this structure, but their influence remained secondary Up to 1994, the dominant figure in the foreign policy bureaucratic structure was Sir Dawda Jawara

“ World Bank, World Tables (1989.90), p 255; See also Club du Sahel, Retrospective View of he Sahelian Economy, (Monica: Institute GAMMA, 1985), p35 © The Gambia Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility: Policy Framework Paper 1998-2000,

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Athaji Sir Dawda Jawara, was bom in 1924 in Barajali, a village about 150 miles from Banjul He was one of the six boys of Almami Jawara, a prosperous Mandinka trader, Jawara was brought up in Bathurst: and on leaving school in 1945, he joined The Gambia Medical Department as a trainee nurse He later went to Achimota College in Ghana with a scholarship to study nursing and later to Glasgow where he obtained an intermediate B.Sc alter six years of studies In 1953, he became Christian and took the name David He entered polities in 1959, and became ‘The Gambia's first Prime-Minister in 1965 a year in which he also returned to his native islam He was knighted in 1966, and became ‘The Gambia's first President in 1970." An English associate of Jawara described him as more scientific than political: “he wants to look at all the facts and then comes to his conclusion as if he were solving an equation." His rise to power in The Gambia was attributed Tess to his political style than to the hundreds of people he knew during his years as a Veterinary officer He was once quoted as saying "there is not a cow in the country that doesn't know me."*" Alan Rake, a renowned personality in African affai describes Jawara in the following terms:

He has followed the constitutional convention of multi-party system, abiding by the rule of law, although he had been astute enough as a politician to win successive democratic clei His rule has been peaceful and uneventful, with the exception of the sudden bloody ‘coup attempt which rocked his country in July 1981."

At the helm of power during 1962-1994, Jawara remained a constant factor behind The Gambias foreign policy Although he had never been the countey’s Foreign Minister, nor sought to combine the Presidency with the Foreign Ministry Portfolio, Jawara’s influence on The Gambia's foreign policy needs to be emphasised He nominated the Minister of External Affairs from his own party, and was empowered by the constitution to nominate The Gambia's principal representatives (ambassadors and high commissioners) to foreign countries Therefore, up to 1994, The Gambi’s foreign policy reflected Jawara’s personality, beliefS, and stand on both African and international issues The limited diplomatic posts abroad reflected, on the one hand, Jawara’s approach to public affairs, and, on the other hand his strong belief in the centralisation of all state activities in the hand of the executive The Presidential diplomacy, which won The Gambia as many fiends as criticism for Juwara, stemmed from this convietion, Jawara not only represented The Gambia at most international summits, he also paid official visits to as many countries as possible Besides Jawara, the Ministry of External Aflairs, which constituted the forcign

° See, HLA Gailey, Historical Dictionary of The Gambia Metuchen, NJ London: The Pres tn, 1987) pp 8488 ote i The New York Ties 18 February 1965

* The New York Ties, 18 February 1968 Alan Rake, 170 Wi in Aca: Leaders forthe 1990s (London: The Searecrow Pres Ins, 1993), pp.1IEH6

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‘making structure Its role however was to execute and to help presidential decisions, ‘on matters relating to foreign policy

The Ministry of External Affairs

Immediately after independence, the business of foreign affairs in The Gambia was conducted from the Prime Ministers Office, and was headed by a Minister of State,

A.B Njie, who was also the non-resident High Commissioner to Dakar."* In 1968, a

full Ministry of External Affairs was created, and A.B, Njie became the country's rst Minister of External Affairs Nje's tenure of the post was brief; he was replaced

by Assan Musa Camara,’” who held the post until 1974 Between 1972 and 1974,

Camara held the External Affairs portfolio together with the vice-presidency Njie took over the Extemal Affairs portfolio again between 1974 and 1977, After the 1977 elections, the External Aflairs portfolio was given to a new member of Cabinet, Lamin Kiti Jabang, hitherto Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of External Affairs Omar Sey succeeded Jabang in 1987 and maintained the post up to

the demise of Jawara’s government in July 1994

‘The Ministry of Extemal Affairs was (and remains) part of the Civil Service: its structure therefore resembled that of other government ministries During the research work for the present study in Banjul in the first half of 1993, some 152 civil servants were asked to list (in a hierarchical order) three government ministries which they considered to be the most important Less than 32 per cent of the people questioned included the Ministry of External Affairs in their list; about 6.5 per cent cited it as the most important government ministry, 11.2 per cent as the second most important, and 13.8 per cent as the third most important More than 65.7 per cent of the people questioned did not cite it at all However, all those questioned considered “The Gambias link with the external world “very important” as this "brings in money" This accounts for the fact that about 65 per cent of those questioned considered the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs the most important government ministry The Ministry of Finance and Economie Affairs featured in the list of about 94 per cent of the people questioned

Nile was bor in Banjul in 1904, He was educated at Methodist Mission schools in Bathurst and entered the Civil Service in 1925 He held several postions including the Registrar of the Supreme Court before retiring in 1958, Although « Muslim, Re opposed the concspt held by the Muslim Congress Party of using religion for political purposes, and helped instead form the Democratic Panty A.B Nje ied in 1982 Gailey, Mstorical Dictionary

© Camara was bom in 1923 in Mansajang village in a Muslim family He was converted to Christianity at the St Mary Catholic Mission school in Bathurst He was 1048.58, before entering politics In 1960, he tood and won a seat as an independent candidate, and a schoo! teacher between later joined the United Panty In 1962, he crossed the carpet to the PPP following his electoral victory ‘and the defeat of his party, the UP, He held several ministerial posts including the Viee-Presideney in 1972-1977 * Sey was born in Basse in 1941; he was educated t St George and St Augstin High schools and at ‘Yundum College He worked as a teacher (1963-64) before going to Temple University (1964-1969) He was a senior lecturer at Yundum College during 1970-1973, became director of youth sports and ‘ature in November 1973 He was the Chairman of African football referees before his nomination as Minister of External Affairs in 1987

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Ministry of External Aflairs directly influenced the country’s foreign relations more than any other minisuy did, It was the sole executing agent of The Gambia's political relations with foreign countries, and the country’s diplomats were often recruited from the rank of its staff Like most Government Ministries it was headed by a Permanent Secretary who Was the most senior official in the Civil Service structure He was answerable to the Minister of External Affairs, the Secretary General, and the President He was responsible for the daily running of the Ministry and was assisted by one or more deputies In July 1994, there were three divisions dealing with political affairs administration, and international economic and technical co- operation As Figure 2.1 shows, each of the divisions was headed by a Director or a Deputy Permanent Secretary At a lower level were Principal Assistant Secretaries, who were above Senior Assistant Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries The most junior professional position was that of the Cadet Administration Officer The country’s diplomatic missions also had a similar structure They were headed by an Ambassador (High Commissioner in Senegal and in Commonwealth countries) who was assisted by a counsellor or in few cases a Deputy Head of Mission, Other staif members included first secretary second secretary third secretary or attaché although non of the missions had all staff categories at any one time,

In July 1994, there were 49 offic sn Service™, Of this 30 were at the overseas missions Among the foreign missions, London was the largest, with 6 diplomatic staff, Rivadh/Jeddah had 5 Dakar Š, Brussels and

Freetown 3 each: Bissau, Lagos New York Paris and Washington had For the 1994/1995 Financial Year the approved recurrent budget of the Ministry stood at 1D 3.132.430 (about USS 0.36 million at current rate) representing about 3.7 per cent of the overall government recurrent budget of D 877 million (about USS 97.4

Million at current rate) The Ministry of education accounted for 12.8 per cent of the recurrent budget, health 7.2 per cent, agriculture 2.42 per cent and finance and ‘economic affairs 2.96 per cent.”"

In addition to the President and the Ministry of Extemal Affairs foreign policy decision making in The Gambia involved the heads of various government ministries and departments as well as representatives of foreign governments in Banjul." Through the inter-ministerial consultation arrangement, several ministries, ind departments were able to express their opinion on various foreign affairs questions The Ministry of External Affairs would consult other permanent secretaries if @ particular subject was relevant to their ministries Comments and opinions expressed by these ministries were used as a basis of the official poli When the opinion of the various ministries differ on a particular subject, their different opinions would be considered by the Cabinet before a final decision was

mentary Secretary, but exclude service staff finance attaches and focally-ecrited staff a the overseas missions

© Esuimates of Recurrent Revenue and Expenditure, 1995/1996 (Banjul) tid

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Ministry of External Affairs would also rely on intemational bodies such as the Commonwealth Secretariat in London for information and data on various

subjects." Bilateral consultations with the diplomatic representatives in Banjul had

also been a feature of the decision-making process Contact with the British High Commission in Banjul, for example, provided the Gambian Government with details of the implications of British membership of the EEC for former British colonies, and regular contacts with the EU delegation in Banjul also offered valuable information To a large extent therefore, the foreign poticy bureaucracy of The Gambia may lack the sophistication of the foreign policy machinery of a larger and developed country; itis not however of low political importance and intellectual

calibre as East contends to be the case of most developing countries.*

Conclusion

The conclusion we can draw from the above survey of The Gambia’s national features is that the country is a small state with limited resources Its economy is based on agriculture and remains vulnerable to the vagaries of bad weather, commodity price fluctuations and other external economic shocks The paramount importance of these attributes could hardly be lost on the bureaucracy that engineered The Gambia's foreign policy And the extent to which these characteristics moulded the country’s extemal relations will be revealed in the chapters that follow

It will be revealed, for example, that the poor economy and low level of development gave rise to dependence on the international community for economic assistance, and that the historical links with Europe and religious affinity with the Middle East bolstered the Government's efforts in mobilising assistance Irom these regions,

Furthermore, while there is hardly any correlation between size and wealth, there certainly is between size and military capability Therefore, even if The Gambia could financially afford an army, she did not have the human resources for a credible defence force ‘Thus the small size of the country constituted another major handicap and prompted the leaders to rely on diplomacy to promote both national and regime security objectives And on account of the country’s geographical location, efforts in the area of security centred on Senegal, the country that alone constitutes The Gambia’s immediate external environment Indeed, The Gambia's case is not the only instance where geographical location has assumed considerable significance The freedom of choice and type of external relations of countries Ii Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were limited because of their geographical

© ervew with Jabang iid ee also Gomez, “The External Relations.” 250

© Maurice East, "Foreign Policy Making in Smal Sates: Some Theoretical Observations Based on a Study ofthe Ugandan Ministy of Foreign Aflies, Polley Sciences, 4 (1974), particularly pp 491-194